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Abstract
Turkey is a negotiating candidate for the EU membership. Though the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU continue in the official sense, in reality, the relations are in a deadlock. It is often argued that Turkey–EU relations have entered a new era since January 2013, and new optimistic comments have emerged. This paper argues that there exists a pull–push balance in the accession process for the EU that normally attracts candidates and makes them more vulnerable to the EU conditions. The success of the political transformation of eastern European states relied to a large extent on the balanced pull–push accession processes. It is argued here that this balance for Turkey has been deteriorated and this fact has made the EU ineffective in transforming Turkish politics and polity. Therefore, this paper argues for the re-establishment of the balance to improve and normalize Turkey–EU relations.
Notes on Contributor
Ali Resul Usul is Director of the Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. He completed his undergraduate degree at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, holds an MA degree in Political Science from the Bilkent University, and PhD degrees from the University of Essex and the Bilkent University. His published works include Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Political Conditionality (London: Routledge, 2011), and various articles and book chapters on topics of European Union, democracy, democratization, international relations, international human rights, and Turkish foreign policy.
Notes
1. Müftüler-Baç and Güney, “The European Union,” 281–293.
3. See Wiener and Diez, European Integration Theory; Rosamond, Theories of European Integration.
4. About intergovernmentalism, Stanley Hoffman's study in 1964 is the main early contribution: Hoffman, “The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes.”
5. Moravcsik, The Choice of Europe.
6. Sweet and Sandholtz, “European Integration and Supranational Governance.”
7. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration.”
8. Bache and George, Politics in the European Union.
9. Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration.”
10. Rosamond, “New Theories of European Integration,” 121.
11. Schimmelfennig, “EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement.”
12. Schimmelfennig et al., International Socialization in Europe.
13. Pridham, “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia”; “Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality.”
14. Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 114.
15. While some states may be subject to conditionality in a stricter manner, others may encounter more lenient treatment on the part of the union. A number of researchers argue that “membership conditionality has not been applied consistently and other considerations will continue to play a role in enlargement decisions,” which would diminish the force of EU conditionality. See Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality,” 105. It is often argued that high politics or geopolitical considerations, along with individual member state pressures, are sometimes prioritized over a merit-based accession process. A much-quoted case in this regard was the decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit on the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania despite their failures, Romania in particular, to meet enough the political criteria to start negotiations particularly because their membership would be necessary to sustain stability in the Balkan region. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 453. The accession of Poland with German help and Latvian and Estonian accession in spite of the unfavorable conditions endured by the Russian minority are often indicated as some evidences in this regard; Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 114–117; Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 453.
16. Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 112.
17. Ibid.
18. Epstein and Sedelmeier, “Beyond Conditionality”; Roberst, The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe.
19. Gallagher, Romania and the European Union.
20. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality.”
21. Schimmelfennig, “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement,” 919.
22. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 465.
23. Ibid, 468.
24. Schimmelfennig, “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement,” 919.
25. European Commission, Negotiating Framework.
26. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 464.
27. Member of European Parliament's (MEPs) in the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on June 24, 2008, approved an enlargement report stressing that the EU's own capacity to absorb new states should be taken into account when considering membership applications in the future. The report, prepared by German center-right MEP Elmar Brok, was evaluated as a move “to make enlargement harder” and a new sign for “enlargement fatigue” (http://euobserver.com/15/26387).
28. Trauner, “From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality”; Anastasakis, “The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans.”
29. Trauner, “From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality,” 777.
30. Anastasakis, “The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans.”
31. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 460.
32. Jacoby, “The Reality Behind the Potemkin Harmonization.”
33. Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality,” 460.
34. Öniş, “An Awkward Partnership”; Kubicek, “Turkey's Place in the ‘New Europe.’”
35. Muftuler-Bac, “Turkey's Candidacy to the European Union.”
36. For the place of Europe in Turkish modernization, Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey.
37. Landau, Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey; Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization.
38. Kubicek, “Political Conditionality”; Usul, Democracy in Turkey.
39. Kubicek, The European Union and Democratization. For linkage and leverage functions, see Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage”; Lavenex and Schimmetfenning, “EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood.”
40. See Yeşilada, EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st Century; Aksu, Turkey-EU Relations.
41. Öniş, “Domestic Politics”; Canefe and Ugur, Turkey and European Integration.
42. Müftüler-Bac and Mclaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union,” 20.
43. Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference.”
44. Rumelili, “Negotiating Europe.”
45. Nas and Özer, Turkey and the European Union; for the discussion on the “harmonization” of Turkish foreign policy with the EU, see Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy.
46. From the reform perspective, Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey.”
47. Muftuler-Bac and Mclaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union,” 20.
48. Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey's Accession to the European Union.”
50. Financial Times, May 7, 2007.
51. Financial Times, April 27, 2008.
52. “Merkel: Turkey—a friend, but no place for that friend in EU,” Turkish Daily News, August 22, 2005.
53. Olli Rehn argues “We have to keep the Balkans and Turkey motivated throughout the long process, so our commitment must not waver … The EU's transformative power depends on our credibility in offering integration in return for major reforms. Our word must be our bond—pacta sunt servanda. It is very important that we continue opening chapters in the accession negotiations without delay, to demonstrate that the process is moving forward. We should never make it easy for the nationalists to claim that there is no point continuing to work on the EU agenda, because the EU will never let their country in. That argument would destroy the strategic bargain of accession in return for meeting the conditions that gives enlargement policy its substantial transformative power” (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/642&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
54. Schimmelfennig, “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement,” 931; See Mehmet Ugur's important contribution in this regard, Ugur, The European Union and Turkey.
55. Schimmelfennig,, “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement,” 927.
56. Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality,” 131.
57. These chapters are “Free Movement of Goods,” “Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services,” “Financial Services,” “Agriculture and Rural Development,” “Fisheries,” “Customs Union” and “External Relations.”
58. Abramowıtz and Barkey, “Cyprus Sabotage.”
59. Milliyet, January 8, 2011.
60. Thornhill, “The Danger in Dashing Turkey's European Dream.”
61. Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
62. Hurriyet Daily News, August 20, 2012.
63. Yeni Safak, April 4, 2008. For the EU policies of AK Party, see Duran, “Islamist Redefinitions of European and Islamic Identities in Europe”; and Usul, “The Justice and Development Party and the European Union.”
64. Milliyet, October 9, 2007.
65. Gardner, “Turks Delight in Showing Strength to the EU.”
66. Erdoğan, “The Robust Man of Europe.”