Nation-Building, Party-Strength, and Regime Consolidation: Kemalism in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Despite its waning influence, Kemalism remains a compelling topic within scholarship on Turkey. In recent years, for instance, a growing literature has critically examined the policies, arrangements, and institutions that underpinned the Kemalist single-party rule (1923–46). Although they have expanded our stock of knowledge on this period and pushed scholarly exchanges beyond polemical debates, most of these studies neglect to account systematically for the origins of the regime and assess it in light of other similar cases from the global south. To address such questions, this paper classifies Kemalism within a category of national-developmentalist regimes. The Turkish case differed from these cases, however, with its low level of institutionalization, particularly its ruling party's limited organizational and mobilizational capacity. While scholars tend to focus on the coercive aspects of Kemalist rule, in reality the regime was built upon a weak party apparatus, a factor that precluded the consolidation of the regime. This paper attributes such an outcome to two factors that gave Mustafa Kemal few incentives to build strong state and party institutions at the onset of his rule, namely (1) a low level of intra-elite conflict and (2) limited popular mobilization. Due to their limited base of support, the Kemalist leadership remained vulnerable to the defection of elites, who could mobilize the popular classes against the ruling party. This paper situates Kemalism as part of a broader category of reformist regimes in the developing world. In so doing, the paper carves out an analytical space wherein scholars can analyze Kemalism in comparative light and highlight the ways with which the Turkish experience differed from other similar cases in the global south.

Acknowledgements

I thank Lesley Turnbull for her comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Sinan Ciddi and Paul T. Levin for organizing the workshop, as well as all of the presenters and participants for their helpful comments, particularly Asli Iğsız, whose stimulating questions improved this paper. I am also grateful to Ahmet Kuyaş, whose academic guidance during my fieldwork greatly improved the quality of the research that went into this paper. While conducting research for this article, I have benefited from an affiliation with Sabanci University. Finally, I thank the three anonymous reviewers for their feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on Contributor

Berk Esen is currently a PhD candidate in the department of Government at Cornell University and a visiting scholar at Columbia University. His main research interests are political economy of development, authoritarian regimes, democratization, political parties, Turkish politics, and Latin American politics. He will graduate in January 2015. His dissertation, titled Political Mobilization and Institutional Origins of National-Developmentalist States, examines the political trajectory and economic policies of nationalist regimes in Turkey, Egypt, Mexico, and Argentina during the middle half of the twentieth century. He has spent 18 months conducting field research in Buenos Aires and Istanbul and was a visiting fellow at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires and Sabanci University, Istanbul. In February 2015, he will join Sabanci University as a faculty fellow.

Notes

1. Koçak, Belgelerle Iktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi; Brockett, Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution; Yildiz, Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyebilene; Akin, “Reconsidering State, Party, and Society in Early Republican Turkey”; Atabaki and Brockett, Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labor; Metinsoy, “Fragile Hegemony, Flexible authoritarianism, and Governing from Below.”

2. My use of the term “global south” is similar to the “semi-periphery” as used by the dependency scholars during the 1970s. In other words, I categorize series of countries that otherwise differed in their national cultures, historical legacies, religions, and geographical locations based on the similar position they occupied in the international division of labor. These cases were not fully institutionalized but nor were they consigned to the low-wage scale world economy, instead occupying a middle stratum. As such, indigenous leaders could hope to muster local resources in such a way as to initiate an import-substitution developmental model that would advance their respective countries relative to the industrialized world. Compared to more “peripheral” cases, these countries also had a higher degree of political centralization and more advanced state structures, which made this political project more feasible. While these cases frequently grouped together under the rubric of “emerging market” or “developing countries,” this paper suggests that such structural similarities existed since at least the early twentieth century. I thank Asli Iğsız for pushing me to make this point explicit and help establish the connection between the two historical periods.

3. For some exceptions, see Özbudun, “Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution,” 380–405; Waterbury, Exposed to İnnumerable Delusions; Atabaki and Zurcher, Men of Order; Angrist, Party Building.

4. Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics, ch. 1.

5. For the most comprehensive anthology of Kemalism, see the volume edited by Insel Kemalizm.

6. Parla and Davison, Corporatism in Kemalist Turkey, 9

7. Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti; Nisanyan, Yanlis Cumhuriyet.

8. Kansu, 1908 Devrimi; Atabaki and Zurcher, Men of Order.

9. Parla, Türkiye'de siyasal kültürün resmıˆ kaynakları; Parla and Davison, Corporatism in Kemalist Turkey.

10. Kahraman, Bülent. İçselleştirilmiş, Açık ve Gizli.

11. Ecevit, Atatürk ve devrimcilik.

12. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey; Kili, Ataturk Devrimi: bir Cagdaslasma modeli; Timur, Turk Devrimi ve Sonrasi.

13. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey; Rustow, Ataturk as Founder of a State; Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey.

14. Ecevit, Atatürk ve devrimcilik; Ecevit, Bu düzen değişmelidir; Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin düzeni: dün, bugün, yarın.

15. Kili, 1960–1975 doneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde gelismeler; Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics, ch. 3.

16. Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti; Başkaya, Batılılaşma, çağdaşlaşma, kalkınma paradigmanın iflası; Beşikçi, Cumhuriyet halk fırkasının programı.

17. Parla, Türkiye'de siyasal kültürün resmıˆ kaynakları; Kansu, “Türkiye'de Korporatist Düşünce”; Parla and Davison, Corporatism in Kemalist Turkey.

18. Aktar, Varlık vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” politikaları; Yildiz, Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyebilene.

19. Koçak, Belgelerle Iktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi; Nisanyan, Yanlis Cumhuriyet. For a stimulating critique of this literature, see Alaranta, Contemporary Kemalism.

20. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism.

21. Kışlalı, Atatürk'e saldırmanın dayanılmaz hafifliği; Kışlalı, Kemalizm, laiklik ve demokrasi; Savaş¸, İrtica ve bölücülüğe karşı militan demokrasi; Manisalı, İslamcı siyaset ve cumhuriyet.

22. Akçali and Perincek, “Kemalist Eurasianism,” 550–569.

23. For earlier attempts at classification, see Matossian, “Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization”; Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations.

24. For these types, see Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy; Berman, Sheri, Social Democratic Moment; Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets.

25. Chibber, Locked In Place, 16.

26. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, Waldner, State Building and Late Development; Chibber, Locked In Place; Kohli, State-Directed Development.

27. Kurtz, Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective, 1–17.

28. Waterbury, Exposed to İnnumerable Delusions, ch. 2.

29. It should be mentioned that the dependency and world-systems theorists have also addressed some of these questions, especially explaining how the relative positioning of countries in the capitalist system affect their long-term patterns of growth. Indeed, this article has taken some inspiration from this approach and, in particular, shares its systemic focus on the middle-income countries as part of a larger global economy. Yet it also differs from this literature in several important ways. First, unlike these studies, this article suggests that political leaders in the middle-income countries enjoyed autonomy from market forces, both in the domestic and international arenas. It was precisely this autonomy that enabled them to address their countries’ structural problems by way of promoting industrialization, social progress, and economic growth. Similarly, this article also does not dismiss the possibility that the state can become an engine of economic growth. Finally, deviating from their uniform analysis of the state in the South, this article accounts for the specific state and party structures that were established in Kemalist Turkey, with a different capacity to mobilize domestic actors than other similar cases. For more on the dependency and world-systems theories, see Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America; Evans, Dependent Development; Wallerstein, Centrist Liberalism Triumphant.

30. Waldner, State Building and Late Development, 24.

31. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, Angrist, Party Building; Slater, Ordering Power. For an excellent discussion of the different regime types, see Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.

32. For Mexico, see Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; Middlebrook, Paradox of Revolution. The most comprehensive study to date on the CHP is Ciddi's Kemalism in Turkish Politics, which traces the development of the party, focusing particularly on the interplay between secularism, nationalism, and populism as part of its Kemalist agenda. Bila's CHP 1919–2009 offers a less theoretical but still useful chronological account of the party during its first nine decades.

33. On the better performance of institutionalized party regimes, see Smith, “Life of the Party,” 421–451; Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization; Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule.

34. Mann, The Sources of Social Power; Wallerstein, Centrist Liberalism Triumphant.

35. For these revolutions, see Knight, Mexican Revolution. Kansu, Revolution of 1908 in Turkey; Sohrabi, “Constitutional Revolutions.”

36. For WWI's impact on the Ottoman Empire, see Yalman, Turkey in the World War; Reynolds, Shattering Empires.

37. For the regional congresses held in Anatolia at the time, see Tekeli and Ilkin, Ege'deki Sivil Direnişten Kurtuluş Savaşı’na Geçerken; Tanör, Türkiye'de kongre iktidarları.

38. Zurcher, Unionist Factor.

39. For the role strong legislatures play in incorporating the opposition forces and potential challengers into the regime, see Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” 1279–1301; Wright and Escriba-Folch, “Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival,” 283–309.

40. Mango, Ataturk, 275–276; Gingeras, “Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens.”

41. Yama'uchi, “Reflections on the Social Movements,” 42. Perhaps the most famous of them were Circassian Ethem and his two brothers, Resit and Tevfik. Ranchers by professions, they were one of the major power-brokers within the Circassian community of Northwest Anatolia.

42. Mango, Ataturk, 300–301.

43. Hanioglu, Ataturk, ch. 5. For more on the intra-parliamentary opposition against Kemal, see Frey, Turkish Political Elite, 306–323; Güneş, Birinci Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin düşünsel yapısı; Demirel, Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet.

44. Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti, ch. 1.

45. Uyar, Tek Parti Donemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 71–74; Mango, Atatürk, 370–376.

46. For more on the 1923 election, see Güneş, “1923 Seçimlerinde Oylar Nasıl Kullanıldı”; Demirel, Tek partinin yükselişi, 151–162.

47. Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti, 70–91; Hanioglu, Atatürk, ch. 6.

48. Alpkaya, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kurulusu.

49. Mango, Atatürk, 393.

50. Keskin, Türkiye'de devletin toprak, 272–289.

51. For more on Inonu's life and career, see Heper, İsmet İnönü.

52. Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti, 104–133.

53. Hale, “The Turkish Republic and its Army”; Sarigil, “Turkish Military Principal or Agent?”

54. In fact, a substantial group within the ruling party seems to have preferred at this point a moderate course. To prevent more resignations, Kemal briefly replaced the Prime Minister Inonu with Fethi Bey but then quickly sided with the hardliners. Mango, Ataturk, 418–419; Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti, 105–107.

55. Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti, 94–99.

56. Mango, Atatürk, 410–414.

57. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey; Baskan, “What Made Ataturk's Reforms Possible?”

58. Olson, Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism; Özoğlu, From Caliphate to Secular State, 89–100. For the extent of collective action during this period, see Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution.”

59. Since Kurdish tribal and religious leaders like Sheikh Said collected the tithe tax, its abolition was a major blow to their power base. I thank Ahmet Kuyas for raising this point. For the complicated political landscape of the region, see Bruinessen Agha, Sheikh, and State, Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State; and Klein, Margins of Empire.

60. Özoğlu, From Caliphate to Secular State, 100–112.

61. For an extensive discussion of these trials, see Ibid., ch. 4

62. Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution.

63. Kili, 1960–1975 döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde gelişmeler, 58.

64. Uyar, Tek Parti Donemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 242.

65. Ibid., 243.

66. Akin, “Reconsidering State, Party, and Society in early Republican Turkey,” 440–441.

67. This local bourgeoisie had a history of collaboration with Ottoman state officials in areas of tax collection, local governance, and troop mobilization. For more on these families, see Meeker, A Nation of Empire.

68. Öz, Türkiye'de tek-parti yönetimi ve siyasi katılım, 182–183.

69. Silier, Türkiye'de tarımsal yapının gelişimi, 47–60; Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey,” 100–117; Emrence, “Turkey in Economic Crisis (1927–1930),” 67–80.

70. Most of it came from the ranks of the urban middle class, including merchants, professionals, and civil servants. On the Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi, see Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey; Emrence, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası; Koçak, Belgelerle Iktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi.

71. Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey Kemalism, ch. 1.

72. Tekeli and İlkin, 1929 dünya Buhranında; Uygulamaya geçerken Türkiyede devletçiliğin oluşumu; Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey.

73. A detailed look at the Kemalist economic policy is beyond the scope of the paper. For such a comprehensive economic analysis of this period, see Silier, Türkiye'de tarımsal yapının gelişimi; Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions; Keyder, Definition of a Peripheral Economy, Tezel, Cumhuriyet Donemi Iktisat Tarihi; Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal döneminde ekonomi.

74. Kuyas, Ideology of the Revolution; T ürkes, “Ideology of the Kadro [Cadre] Movement”; Aydin, “Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s.”

75. Behar, İktidar ve tarih; Copeaux, Türk tarih tezinden Türk-İslam sentezine.

76. See Üstel, İmparatorluktan ulus-devlete Türk milliyetçiliği. For more on People's Houses, see Karpat, “The People's Houses in Turkey”; Simsek, “People's Houses as a Nationwide Project for Ideological Mobilization.”

77. Karaömerli˙oğlu, “People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant.”

78. Öz, Türkiye'de tek-parti yönetimi ve siyasi Katılım, 170–171; Uyar, Tek Parti Donemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 263–265.

79. Alaranta, Contemporary Kemalism, 111–120; Peker, İnkıl âp dersleri.

80. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 73.

81. Uyar, Tek Parti Donemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 78.