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ABSTRACT
This article aims to assess the relationship between populism and immigration in the European Union and their impact on EU–Turkey relations. Following a literature review on the current state of populist movements in the EU as well as on the findings of a comparative fieldwork conducted in Germany, France, Italy, Greece and the Netherlands, the article seeks to understand and explain how the debates on migration, refugees, mobility and Islam have an impact on the rise of extreme right-wing populism. Starting with the depiction of the main constituents of populist rhetoric in Europe vis-à-vis migrants and refugees, the article subsequently analyses social-economic, political and cultural drivers of populist extremism, and the resentment against diversity, multiculturalism, Islam, immigration and mobility among the supporters of populist parties in five selected European countries. In the last section of the article, the impact of right-wing populism and Islamophobia on the EU–Turkey relations will be analyzed.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributors
Ayhan Kaya is Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University. Some of his latest books are Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization (Palgrave, 2012) and Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey (Palgrave, 2013).
Notes
1 Tocci, “Turkey and the European Union.”
2 The fieldwork is composed of one hundred in-depth interviews conducted in five countries within the framework of a Horizon 2020 project entitled CoHERE: Critical Heritiages: performing and representing identities in Europe (https://research.ncl.ac.uk/cohere/). The semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the supporters of the populist parties in five countries between 15 March and 30 May 2017. Twenty interviews were conducted in each country and in each specific city selected in accordance with the popularity of such populist movements: Dresden, Germany; Toulon, France; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Rome, Italy; and Athens, Greece. Along with the findings of the literature review, the interviews were conducted with male and female interlocutors within the 20–60 age bracket, living in places where populist parties have been traditionally strong. The interviews were conducted in the native language of the interlocutors by local researchers who have access to the neighborhoods and networks. The interviewers took notes during the interviews rather than using tape-recorders and any other electronic instrument to record, and they transcribed the interviews to English before transmitting the interviews to the PI, Ayhan Kaya.
3 More information on the CoHERE (‘Critical Heritages’) project can be found at https://research.ncl.ac.uk/cohere/about/#CoHERE%20Objectives. The project, ‘The Future of EU – Turkey Relations (FEUTURE)’, reveals the narratives and drivers of the EU-Turkey relationship, the likely scenario(s) for the future, and the implications these may have on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighborhood and the global scene (http://www.feuture.eu).
4 Wodak, The Politics of Fear, and Wodak and van Dijk, Racism at the Top.
5 Ionescu and Gellner, Populism: Its Meanings; Ghergina, Mişcoiu and Soare, Contemporary Populism; and Moffit, The Global Rise of Communism.
6 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 546.
7 Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.
8 Rydgren, “Immigration Sceptics,” 740.
9 Vossen, “Classifying Wilders” and Ye’or, Eurabia.
10 Kaya, “Migration debates in Europe.”
11 Kaya, “Backlash of Multiculturalism.”
12 Quoted in Der Spiegel, 11 September 2011.
13 Pelinka, “Right-Wing Populism,” 8.
14 Sarrazin, Deutschland schafft sich ab.
15 See 11 August 2011 article in German newspaper, Morgen Post, at http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article105070241/Pro-Deutschland-ueberklebt-Sarrazin-Plakate.html accessed on 5 June 2017.
16 PEW, “Spring Global Attitudes Survey 2016.”
17 Kaya, “Islamophobism.”
18 Ingulfsen, “Why Aren’t European Feminists.”
19 Kaya and Kayaoğlu, “Individual Determinants.”
20 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages.
21 Farris, “Femonationalism.”
22 Mondon and Winter, “Articulations of Islamophobia.”
23 Lipset, Political Man.
24 Kaya, “Islamophobism.”
25 Kaya, “Islamophobism.”
26 Verwiebe et al., “Skilled German Migrants.”
27 The average population with a tertiary education rose from 19.5 percent in 2004 to 24.7 percent in 2013. Among the peripheral countries, Portugal has seen the largest increase in the number of graduates, rising 59 percent in the last decade, followed by Ireland and Italy at 44 percent and 43 percent, respectively.
28 The term ‘trope’ refers to the recurring ideas, phrases, images, fears, concerns and gestures encountered during the fieldwork interviews.
29 Hargreaves, Migration, Race and Ethnicity, 26–7.
30 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood.
31 Tocci, “Turkey and the European Union.”
32 See Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2016/06/24/erdogan-eus-reluctance-to-accept-turkey-has-islamophobic-motives, accessed on 11 December 2017.
33 Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy, and Moffit, The Global Rise of Communism.
34 Kaya and Kentel, Belgian-Turks.
35 Aksel, “Home States” and Adaman and Kaya, “Social Impact of Emigration.”
36 Adaman and Kaya, “Social Impact of Emigration” and Türkmen, “A Transformed Kemalist Islam,” 86.
37 Aydın-Düzgit, “Encounters with Europe.”
38 Pusch and Splitt, “Binding the Almancı” and Kaya and Tecmen, “The Role of Common Cultural Heritage.”
39 Pusch and Splitt, “Binding the Almancı,” 149.
40 See Aksel, “Home States and Homeland Politics.” For a current discussion on the lobbying activities of the Turkish government see http://www.dw.com/en/the-lobby-behind-turkeys-prime-minister/a-17652516 accessed on 21 June 2017.
41 For a detailed account of the UETD see http://www.uetd.org/cms/front_content.php, accessed on 15 November 2017.
42 Abadan-Unat et al., “Yurtdışında Yaşayan Seçmenlerin Siyasal Davranışları” and Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan, “The Implementation of Voting from Abroad.”
43 TCCB, “President Erdoğan.”
44 TCBB, “President Erdoğan.”
45 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. “Preserve Your Culture.”
46 Aksel, “Home States and Homeland Politics” and Kaya and Kentel, Belgian-Turks.
47 Paçacı-Elitok and Straubhaar, Turkey, Migration and the EU.
48 Hakura, “Partnership is No Privilege.”
49 Guattari, The Three Ecologies.
50 For a detailed account of the polemic between the Turkish President and the Dutch PM prior to the Dutch general elections (15 December 2017) and the Turkish constitutional referendum (16 April 2017), see The Guardian (11 March 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/erdogan-brands-dutch-nazi-remnants-for-barring-turkish-mp accessed on 21 December 2017.
51 For a detailed discussion on this issue see The Guardian (15 March 2017), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/15/recep-tayyip-erdogan-rails-against-dutch-in-televised-speech-netherlands-srebrenica accessed on 17 December 2017.
52 For further information on this see http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkey-threatens-to-send-europe-15000-refugees-a-month/ accessed on 5 December 2017.
53 For further information on Erdoğan’s Nazi analogy see http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-idUSKBN16D1FO accessed on 5 December 2017.
54 See Deutsche Welle, http://m.dw.com/en/turkey-asks-germany-for-extradition-of-top-coup-suspect/a-40115499 accessed on 18 December 2017.
55 For further information on Turkey’s list of German companies supporting terrorism see http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-claims-daimler-basf-and-other-german-companies-support-terror/a-39763199 accessed on 29 December 2017.
56 For more information on the German government’s proposal to the European Commission see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-eu-idUSKBN1AG1NM accessed on 30 December 2017.
57 For Erdoğan’s call on Turkish-origin German citizens to reject main parties (SPD, CDU and the Greens) in the General Elections of September 2017 see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-18/erdogan-calls-on-turks-in-germany-to-vote-against-turkey-s-foes accessed on 30 December 2017.
58 For further detail about the polemic between Erdoğan and Sigmar Gabriel see https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/erdogan-launches-war-of-words-815072 accessed on 30 December 2017.