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ABSTRACT
For decades, Turkish policymakers have perceived the possible emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region or an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq as an existential threat to Turkey. However, from 2008 onwards, under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkish foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was gradually desecuritized. In light of Turkey’s experience, this paper explores the role of context in desecuritizing foreign policy issues in general and Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG in particular. It argues that the changing civil–military relations in Turkey as well as the country’s broader political and economic conjuncture allowed for the desecuritization of Turkey-KRG relations from 2008 onwards. The context also determined what kind of a desecuritization Turkey experienced towards the KRG.
Acknowledgements
This research was in part supported by a TÜBİTAK career grant (grant number 114K354). I also would like to thank Selin Ulus and Burak Yılmazaslan for their research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Özlem Kayhan Pusane is an Associate Professor of international relations at Işık University, İstanbul, Turkey. Her research interests include security studies, foreign policy analysis, civil–military relations, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. She has written mainly on Turkey’s counterinsurgency policies, the Kurdish question, Turkish foreign policy, and civil–military relations in Turkey.
Notes
1 “K. Irak’a NATO.” Milliyet, July 26, 2006, 21.
2 “Erdoğan: PKK’ya Karşı Sabrın Sınırı Var.” Hürriyet, December 21, 2006.
3 Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
4 “Bush’a Kerkük Uyarısı.” Milliyet, October 12, 2006, 17.
5 It must be emphasized here that the concept of desecuritization does not necessarily refer to the complete disappearance of any security aspect from Turkey’s relationship with the KRG. It just means that the KRG was no longer identified as an existential threat to Turkey’s national security and that Turkish policymakers stopped considering extraordinary measures in their dealings with the KRG. In fact, the original conceptualization of desecuritization by Wæver (‘Securitization and Desecuritization’) was about détente politics, and in that case although there was a change in threat identification, the East-West relationship continued to have a security aspect.
6 Robins, “Turkey’s ‘Double Gravity’ Predicament,” 387.
7 For a few examples, see Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization”; Balzacq, Securitization Theory; and Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization.”
8 Although the concept of audience has also been subject of tremendous debate among securitization/desecuritization scholars, this paper specifically focuses on the interaction between the desecuritizing actor and the external context in the desecuritization of Turkey-KRG relations due to limitations of space.
9 Charountaki, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 192.
10 Without a doubt, the KRG’s efforts to restrict the actions of the PKK in northern Iraq during this period also facilitated this process.
11 Cited in Sarı Ertem, “Turkish-American Relations,” 61.
12 “Demokrasinin Çıtasını Düşürmeyiz.” Milliyet, October 15, 2008. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/demokrasinin-citasini-dusurmeyiz-1003392.
13 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey,” 91.
14 Nilgün T. Gümüş, “Critical September for Turkish Foreign Policy.” Hürriyet Daily News, September 2, 2017.
15 Cagaptay, Fidan, and Sacikara, “Turkey and the KRG.”
16 Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Kurdish Path,” 2.
17 “Erbil Visit Harbinger of Deeper Cooperation with Iraqi Kurds,” Kurdistan Regional Government’s old cabinet website, April 2011, http://previous.cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?a=39422&l=12&r=73&s=010000.
18 NTV, “Erdoğan ile Barzani İki Saat Görüştü.” NTV, April 19, 2012. http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-ile-barzani-iki-saat-gorustu,Pu6-VyUWI0-1gFjgxe4p9w.
19 Hürriyet Daily News, “Barzani Erdoğan Call on PKK to Let Go Arms,” April 21, 2012.
20 Hürriyet Daily News, “Iraqi Kurdish Leader Barzani Urges Support for Peace Process in Diyarbakır Rally with Turkish PM,” November 16, 2013.
21 Öktem, “The Nation-State’s Blurred Borders,” 6.
22 Daniel Dombey, “Turkey Ready to Accept Kurdish State in Historic Shift.” Financial Times, June 27, 2014.
23 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan A Haber’de Manşet Deviren Açıklamalar.” [President Erdoğan’s Headline Toppling Explanations at A Haber.] A Haber, May 21, 2015.
24 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 358.
25 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 491.
26 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 55.
27 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, 32.
28 In fact, any issue can be securitized or desecuritized according to this theory. But Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, argue that reference to certain objects facilitate securitization. Thus, it is not surprising that Turkish policy towards the KRG, which had to address the PKK presence there, was easily securitized. However, this paper shows that a number of social, political, and economic circumstances allowed this policy that had a serious security dimension to be desecuritized between 2008 and 2017. During this period, although the PKK presence in northern Iraq continued to be identified as a threat to Turkey’s national security, the KRG officials’ critical statements about the PKK activities within their borders were emphasized in the Turkish media. Thus, the KRG was identified as Turkey’s partner in the region which was also uneasy about the PKK’s presence on its territory. See ibid., 33.
29 Cited in Hansen, “Politics of Securitization,” 359.
30 Cited in Balzacq, Leonard, and Rurizca, “‘Securitization’ Revisited,” 503.
31 Ciutǎ, “Security and the Problem of Context,” and Wilkinson, “Limits of Spoken Words,” cited in Balzacq, Leonard, and Rurizca, “‘Securitization’ Revisited,” 503.
32 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic,” 68.
33 Cited in Hansen, “Politics of Securitization,” 359.
34 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 367.
35 Stritzel, “Securitization, Power, Intertextuality,” 553, 556.
36 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 4.
37 Floyd, “Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation,” 330.
38 Hansen, “Reconstructing Desecuritization,” 529.
39 Here, it must be added that Turkish policymakers’ worsening relations with the Iraqi central government at the time, especially with Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, due to his sectarian policies and Turkey’s willingness to contain the Iranian influence in Iraq also contributed to the rapproachement with the KRG.
40 Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military,” 26.
41 Altunışık and Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 569.
42 Sarı Ertem, “Turkish-American Relations.”
43 “Irak Politikası Değişebilir.” [Iraq Policy Can Change.] Radikal, March 24, 2005.
44 Cited in Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
45 Cited in Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military,” 39.
46 See Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
47 “PKK Destekçisi Kürt Liderlerle Görüşmem.” [I Will Not Meet with Those Kurdish Leaders Who are Supporters of the PKK.] Hürriyet, February 17, 2007.
48 Milliyet, “Ben Bir Kabile Reisiyle Görüşmem.” [I Will Not Talk With a Tribal Leader], June 8, 2007.
49 Cited in Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
50 Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military,” 39.
51 Although the AKP has presented itself as a conservative democratic party since its establishment in 2001, many AKP deputies in the TBMM had served in the Islamist political parties in Turkey in the past, including the Felicity Party and the Welfare Party.
52 Quoted in Posch, “Crisis in Turkey,” 23.
53 Gürsoy, “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms,” 296.
54 Aknur, “Civil-military Relations,” 139.
55 Milliyet, “Ben Bir Kabile Reisiyle Görüşmem.” [I Will Not Talk With a Tribal Leader], June 8, 2007.
56 Cited in Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military,” 44.
57 Namık Durukan, “AKP, Barzani ile Temasta.” [AKP is in Contact with Barzani.] Milliyet, September 11, 2007. See also Özcan, “The Changing Role,” 40.
58 Sarı Ertem, “Turkish-American Relations,” 60.
59 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization,” 360.
60 Tol, “Untangling the Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership,” 3.
61 “Petrolü Irak’tan, Gazı Rusya’dan Alıyoruz.” [We Buy Oil from Iraq and Gas from Russia.] Hürriyet, July 28, 2014, and Mehmet Çetingüleç, “İran’a Ambargonun Kalkması Türkiye’ye Nasıl Yansıyacak?” Al Monitor, April 10, 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2015/04/turkey-iran-how-will-benefit-from-lifting.html.
62 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey,” 92.
63 Ibid., 93.
64 Mithat Yurdakul, “İran Petrolü Gitti Irak Petrolü Geldi.” Milliyet, January 29, 2014.
65 Hürriyet, “Petrolü Irak’tan, Gazı Rusya’dan Alıyoruz,” July 28, 2014.
66 Park, “Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations,” 12.
67 Aydın Selcen, “Erbil Başkonsolosluğu Nasıl Açıldı?” [How was the Arbil Consulate General Opened?] Gazete Duvar, March 26, 2017.
68 Kayhan Pusane, “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening,” 85.
69 Cited in The Economist, “Turkey and the Kurds: Peace be Unto You.” August 18, 2005. Accessed September 28, 2019. https://www.economist.com/europe/2005/08/18/peace-be-unto-you.
70 Tol, “Untangling the Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership,” 3.
71 Cevret Aşkın, “Barzani-Talabani’den PKK’ya Tam Saha Pres.” Radikal, November 27, 2011, and İlhan Dörtkardeş, “Barzani, PKK’ya ‘Silahları Bırak’ Dedi.” [Barzani Told the PKK to Give Up Arms.] Radikal, October 24, 2007.
72 Kayhan Pusane, “Turkey’s Changing Relations,” 23.
73 “Kürt Fobimiz Yok.” [We Do Not Have Kurdish Phobia.] Milliyet, July 27, 2013.
74 Constanze Letsch, “Turkish Soldiers Enter Syria to Rescue Soldiers Guarding Tomb.” The Guardian, February 22, 2015.
75 Kayhan Pusane, “Turkey’s Changing Relations,” 25.
76 Although the idea of improving Turkey’s relations with the KRG has found widespread acceptance among different groups in the public, nationalist circles have not been comfortable with the idea of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. For example, in a public opinion poll about Turkish foreign policy, carried out in January 2010, 69.1 percent of the participants opposed to the possible establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. See https://www.academia.edu/1435581/Kamuoyu_Ve_Türk_Dış_Politikası_Anketi_Ocak_2010.
77 “President Erdoğan Says PYD ‘No Different than PKK’ for Turkey.” Hürriyet Daily News, October 19, 2014.
78 Ahmet Topal, Ebru Şengül, and Hazal Ateş, “PYD DAEŞ’ten Çok Daha Tehlikeli.” Sabah, June 19, 2015.
79 Reuters, “Turkish PM Says Decision to Hold Iraqi Kurdish Independence ‘Irresponsible’.” Reuters, June 9, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-turkey-pm/turkish-pm-says-decision-to-hold-iraqi-kurdish-independent-irresponsible-idUSKBN1901K8.
80 “Iraqi Kurds’ Independence Move Irks Turkey, US.” Hürriyet Daily News, June 9, 2017.
81 “KRG Independence Referendum may be a ‘Casus Belli’ for Turkey: MHP Head.” Hürriyet Daily News, August 24, 2017.