https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2560-2708
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ABSTRACT
This article presents the results of a simulation on the short-, medium- and long-term aggregated economic contribution of Syrian refugees on the Turkish economy. The simulation is focused on two sources of impact: refugees’ access to the Turkish labor market and the investment flow generated by Syrians inside the country. An input–output approach is used to compute economic effects considering the intersectoral linkages of the Turkish economy, thereby expanding the focus of a classic impact study. Our results show a positive economic impact of Syrian refugees of around 2 percent of GDP in the short term and 4 percent in the long term. Syrian immigration in Turkey is becoming a factor of economic dynamism that not only benefits the Syrian community itself but also the Turkish host communities. The direct and indirect contribution in terms of production and demand is very relevant and, properly channeled and promoted, can become a relative advantage for the country and not a burden of care.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Note on contributors
Ramón Mahía (PhD in Business Administration) is a professor in the Department of Applied Economics at the Autonomous University of Madrid (Spain). His field of academic specialization is the Economy of International Migrations. He has been the Spanish correspondent for the OECD Expert Group on Migration (SOPEMI) for several years and has participated in a number of international projects in this field. He currently coordinates two studies on the Economic Impact of Immigration in Spain and the challenges of European Migration Policy. He has published several articles and book chapters and currently works as co-editor of the CIDOB Spanish Immigration Yearbook.
Rafael de Arce is Professor of Econometrics at Universidad Autonoma de Madrid (UAM) and Université Paris Dauphine. He has coordinated different research projects funded by the European Commission, the United Nations, Euromediterranean Fourum of Economic Institutes, and Euromesco. He is author of more than 80 articles, book chapters and reports in the fields of international migration and energy economics. In the private sphere, he has collaborated with different companies as consultant. Recently, he has become cofounder of Smarquest SL, spin-off of UAM devoted to data collection and analysis.
Ahmet Ali Koç is Professor at the CERM Economic Research Centre on Mediterranean Countries at Akdeniz University in Turkey. His primary research focuses are agricultural economics and rural development, applied microeconomic analysis of policies and regulations in food, energy and social area. He acted as project partner and project leader in various projects funded by international institutions including EU framework programs and horizon projects. He published articles in international scholarly journals and written chapters in several international reports.
Gülden Bölük is an Associate Professor in Department of Economics at Akdeniz University in Antalya, Turkey. Her primary research interests are Industrial Organization, energy and environment economics, agricultural policy analysis and economics of Migration. She participated to various projects funded by international institutions including EU framework programs. She published articles in international scholarly journals and written chapters in several international reports.
Notes
1 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016.
2 DGMM Database.
3 OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2017.
4 Using the term employed by Seccombe in ‘Immigrant workers.’
5 Aydemir and Kirdar, “Quasi-Experimental Impact Estimates,” 282.
6 Assessing the economic contribution of labour migration in developing countries as countries of destination, cofinanced by the European Commission and launched by the OECD Development Centre and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2004 (http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/eclm.htm).
7 Böhme and Kups, “The Economic Effects.”
8 Biavaschi, “South-South Migration”; Őzden and Wagner, “Immigrant versus Natives,” and Narayanan and Lai, “The Causes and Consequences.”
9 Mayda et al., “The Labor Market Impact of Refugees”; Petrucci, “An Economic Take”; IMF “The Refugee Surge in Europe”; Capps and Newland, “The Integration Outcomes”; and Peri and Yasenov, “The Labor Market Effects.”
10 Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, “The Economics of Forced Migration.”
11 Mayda et al., “The Labor Market Impact of Refugees.”
12 In the Syrian–Turkish case, fewer than than 10 percent of refugees live in camps, according to the 2016 Government Annual Migration Report.
13 UNHCR, “2017 Progress Report.”
14 For instance, Syrian refugees were not allowed to work in Turkey until January 2016. In the UK, asylum seekers are not allowed to work unless they have been waiting for a response to their asylum claim for 12 months. Even then they are allowed to work only in occupations featured on the government's ‘shortage occupations’ list.
15 UNHCR, “Global Trends.”
16 Such as those of Tumen, “The Economic Impact,” or Ceritoglu et al., “The Impact of Syrian Refugees.”
17 To stem the flow of migrants crossing into Europe, the EU signed a deal with Turkey (the EU–Turkey Statement of March 18, 2016) that aims to return to Turkey migrants who do not have an asylum claim.
18 Kuschminder and Koser, “Understanding Irregular Migrants.”
19 INGEV and IPSOS, “Syrian Refugee Livelihood Monitor.”
20 Including 10 cities hosting 79 percent of refugees – Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, Mardin, Bursa and İzmir – and a total of 1,282 face-to-face interviews.
21 As pointed out by Akgündüz et al., “The Impact of Refugee Crises.”
22 Tumen, “The Economic Impact.”
23 Described to the author as the ‘rapid and massive movement toward the nearest neighbor during 2012 and 2013.’
24 See, for example, Zachariadis, “Immigration and International Prices.”
25 Initially, we would expect a positive effect on prices as immigration increases overall demand, but Zachariadis reported that the composition of demand (because of immigrant consumption) can change in a manner that negates any positive price effects. See Zachariadis, “Immigration and International Prices.” Additionally, we may find a second supply-side negative price effect because of lower prices or services produced by immigrants caused by a downward pressure on production costs for items more intensive in immigrant labor.
26 Ceritoglu, et al., “The Impact of Syrian Refugees.”
27 Akgündüz et al., “The Impact of Refugee Crises.”
28 Borjas, “Native Internal Migration.”
29 Del Carpio and Wagner, “The Impact of Syrians Refugees.”
30 Though only for men who had not completed high school education.
31 Kuyumcu and Kösematoğlu, “The Impacts of the Syrian.”
32 Nowrasteh, “Economics of the Syrian Refugee.”
33 Ozpinar, Basihos, and Kulaksiz. “Trade Relations with Syria.”
34 TOBB, Statistics.
35 See Tumen, “The Economic Impact”; Akgündüz et al., “The Impact of Refugee Crises,” and Del Carpio and Wagner, “The Impact of Syrians Refugees.”
36 DGMM Database.
37 INGEV & IPSOS, “Syrian Refugee Livelihood Monitor.”
38 Ibid.
39 DGMM Database.
40 CSGB. Labor Statistics, and TBMM 2018 datasets.
41 INGEV & IPSOS, “Syrian Refugee Livelihood Monitor.”
42 Gerşil and Temel, “Working Conditions and Informal.”
43 De Arce and Mahía, “An Estimation of the Economic Impact,” and de Arce and Mahía, “A Dynamic Input–Output Scheme.”
44 Ghosh, “Input–Output Approach.”
45 OECD, Online Tax Database.
46 TOBB, Statistics.
47 We assume an annual GDP growth of 4.5 percent for the first five years (2018–2022) and of 4 percent for the next five (2023–2028).
48 Results in billions of TL, expressed as 2012 equivalent prices.
49 18 years and older.