https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0724-7394
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the ways in which various aspects of Turkish modernity, including gender reforms and nation-building, were reconstructed by the Berlin Circle, whose members were the ideologues of nationalist authoritarian modernization in Iran. To this end, I analyzed texts published between 1923 and 25 in Iranshahr and Nameye Farangestan, two important periodicals of the Berlin Circle. The results of this study show that while gender reforms were welcomed, longingly desired [hasrat], and upheld as a lesson [ibrat], Turkish nationalism was mostly perceived as a threat [tahdid]. This decentralized and horizontal view towards Turkish modernity suggests that its reconstructed image served to transfer and propagate different messages that implied the possibility of modernization reforms in an Islamic country like Iran and induced anxieties to push Iranian society to an imagined ideal future.
Acknowledgments
The Author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers of this journal, Prof. Alev Çınar, Assoc. Prof. İlker Aytürk, Assist. Prof. Berrak Burçak, Dr. Maryam Najafi, Ms. Robabeh Taghizadehzonuz, Ms. Eleanor Lovinfosse, Ms. Maryam Gholizadeh and Ms. Katherine Blythe for their valuable comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Cole, “Marking Boundaries,” 35.
2 Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iranianness,”163–5.
3 For a discussion about the different constituents of Iranian identity, see Akbarzadeh and Barry, “State Identity,” 615–6; Karimifard, “Constructivism, National Identity,” 240; Mohammad Nia, “Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy,” 173; Maloney, Iran’s Long Reach, 3–4; Milani, “The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency,” 96; Holliday, Defining Iran; Saleh, Ethnic Identity, 45; Mohammadpur, Karimi, and Mahmoodi, “Predicament of Identity in Iran,” 1973–1980; and Elling, Minorities in Iran.
4 Ansari, “Taqizadeh,” 49.
5 Abrahamian, “The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution,” 391–407.
6 Rabi and Ter-Oganov, “The Russian Military Mission,” 446–8.
7 Atabaki, “Recasting and Recording,” 223.
8 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism, 68.
9 While WWI ended in 1918, British forces and the Red Army only left the country in 1921.
10 Ansari, “Iranian Nationalism,”106; Litvak, “The Construction,” 8–14.
11 During the late Qajar era, different politicians took sanctuary in the Ottoman Empire and Europe. See Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz,” 154–69, and Bonakdarian, “Iranian Constitutional Exiles,” 175–91.
12 The capital city of the Azerbaijan province of Iran and the gateway for modern ideas during the Qajar era.
13 Katouzian divides his life into three periods: 1878–1911, 1911–34, and 1934–70. For more details, see Katouzian, “Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh,” 195–213, and Ansari, “Taqizadeh and European Civilization,” 47–58.
14 The Intelligence Bureau for the East.
15 Novzari and Naseri, “Dalayel ve Bastarhaye,” 187–202.
16 Sepehr, Iran dar Jange Bozorg, 431–22.
17 Katouzian, “Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh,” 195–201.
18 Milani, “Majalleye Kaveh,” 504.
19 Matin-Asgari, Both Eastern and Western, and Matin-Asgari, “The Berlin Circle,” 49–66.
20 Entekhabi, Nasyonalism va Tajaddod dar Iran.
21 For more detailed information about Iranian Journals in Germany, see Alsulami, “Iranian Journals in Berlin.”
22 Behnam, Berlaniha, 102.
23 Wodak and Kryzanowski, Qualitative Discourse Analysis, 6.
24 Fairclough and Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 258.
25 Atabaki, The State and the Subaltern.
26 Atabaki and Zürcher, Men of Order.
27 Başkan, From Religious Empires to Secular States.
28 Hazır, Religion-State Relations in Turkey and Iran.
29 Behnam, Berlaniha, and Matin-Asgari, Both Eastern and Western.
30 See Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz,” and Matin-Asgari, Both Eastern and Western.
31 See Paidar, Women and the Political Process; Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran; and Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches.
32 For a detailed discussion about the ideas of the late Qajar activists see Khastou, “Nasle Avval,” and Khastou, “Nasle Dovvom.”
33 Entekhabi, Nasyonalism va Tajaddod dar Iran, 168.
34 Taqizadeh. 1920. “Sermaqaleh,” Kaveh, Seri II, 1(1) 1–2; also see Shadi, The Philosophy of Religion, 26–8.
35 For a discussion about the intellectual evolution and historical contingencies that paved the way for the emergence of ideas of authoritarian modernity during the late Qajar period see Entekhabi, Nasyonalism va Tajaddod dar Iran, 168; Shakouri and Abbasi, “Sheklgiriye Andisheye,” 109–28; and Matin-Asgari, Both Eastern and Western.
36 Afshar. 1924. “Maaref dar Iran,” Iranshahr, 2(3) 140.
37 Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, 53.
38 Tavanayi, “Gharb az Didegahe Kaveh,” 77–9. Rahbar, “Nokhbegan va Sheklgiriye Goftemane Tovse dar Iran.”
39 Atabaki and Zürcher, Men of Order, 7; Abadian, “Ruznameye Kaveh”; Entekhabi, Nasyonalizm va Tajaddod dar Iran, 166. Boroujerdi also investigates the same line of thought among poets, novelists, and politicians in the first two decades of the 20th century: Boroujerdi, “The West,” 396–7.
40 Atabaki, “From Multilingual Empire,” 49.
41 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism, 65.
42 Ibid., 65.
43 Ansari, “Iranian Nationalism,” 101.
44 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism, 36.
45 Katouzian, “Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh.”
46 Arani later stated that due to the desires of his age as a youth, lack of knowledge, and improper environment, he cooperated with Iranshahr and Farangestan. See: Arani. 1935. “Taghyire Zabane Farsi,” Donya, 1(10-11-12) 373. Arani was arrested in 1938 during the Reza Shah reign, and died or was killed in jail in 1940. For more details see Zakavat, “Nesbate Andishe va Amalkarde Taqi Arani,” 59–70.
47 Matin-Asgari, “The Berlin Circle: Iranian Nationalism,” 53–4.
48 Ahıska, “Occidentalism,” 353.
49 Yanık, “The Metamorphosis,” 531–3.
50 Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation,” 661–71.
51 Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, 249.
52 The Berliners repeatedly refer to the Republic of Turkey as ‘Young Turkey.’ For instance, see Kazemzadeh. 1924. “Jomhuriyyat va Enghelabe Ejtemai,” Iranshahr, 2(5&6) 266–9.
53 According to Kazemzadeh, the essential determinants of backwardness are education, ethics, and race. He also asserts that ‘becoming nation’ functions as the sole strong motivator for modifying an unpleasant present situation, adding that ‘becoming nation repairs destructions, settles turmoil, and is a rope for our salvation.’ See Kazemzadeh. 1923. “Maaref va Maaref-Parvaran,” Iranshahr, 2(2) 74.
54 Ibid.
55 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism, 30.
56 Kazemzadeh. 1924. “Ruhe Irani Hamishe Zende Ast,” Iranshahr, 2(9) 499-501.
57 Kazemzadeh. 1923. “Maaref va Maarefparvaran,” Iranshahr, 2(2) 77.
58 Iranshahr, 1(12), (1923) 316.
59 For a discussion about the roots of Aryanism and race-based discourses in modern Iran and the West, see Zia-Ebrahimi, “Self-orientalization”; Ansari, “Iranian Nationalism,” 87–103; and Motadel, “Iran and the Aryan myth.”
60 Göle explains the implications of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ in the Turkish context, arguing that because contemporanization is about the future rather than the present time, ‘becoming’ modern is more illustrative than ‘being’ modern. See Göle, “Global Expectations,” 48.
61 See Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism, 45. Contrary to the Berliners who used to identify Iranian Turks as racially Aryans who speak an alien language, Browne uses racist rhetoric to describe the Turkish people of Azerbaijan province as ‘sullen, moody, dull, witted, fanatical and violent’ subjects of the Qajar state, incomparable to the ‘bright, versatile, clever, skeptical and rather timid townsfolk of Kirman.’ See Ibid., 22–3.
62 Ibid., 46–9; Also see Ahıska, “Occidentalism,” 354–55.
63 Çınar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 23.
64 Moshfegh. 1924. “Lakkeye Nang,” Farangestan, 5, 206.
65 Iranshahr, 1(1) (1924) 2.
66 Spohn, “Political Sociology,” 49–54.
67 Eisenstadt, Patterns of Modernity.
68 Wittrock, “Modernity?” 31–6.
69 Kamali, Multiple Modernities.
70 Göle, “Global Expectations,” 40.
71 Kazemzadeh. 1923. “Maaref va Maaref-parvaran,” Iranshahr, 2(2) 74–6.
72 Nalçaoğlu, quoted in Ahıska, “Occidentalism,” 354.
73 Kazemzadeh. 1924. “Jomhuriyat va Enghelabe Ejtemai,” Iranshahr, 2(5&6) 266–7.
74 Ibid., 268–9.
75 Iranshahr. 1924. “Khafe Kardane Ehsasate Javane Iran,” 2(5&6) 305.
76 Iranshahr. 1924. “Ellate Tarjihe Dokhtarane Ferangi,” 2(11&12) 714.
77 Esfahani, “Be Monasebate Rafe Hejab va Azadiye Zanane Osmani,” Iranshahr, 2(11&12) (1924) 750–1.
78 Iranshahr. 1924. “Khafe Kardane Ehsasate Javane Iran,” 2(5/6) 304.
79 Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 132–55.
80 Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran, 54.
81 Farhadi, “Zanane Turk,” Farangestan, 1(1), (1924)12.
82 For the cognitive functions of metaphors see Evans and Green, Cognitive Linguistics, 311–5.
83 Farhadi. 1924. “Zanane Tork,” Farangestan, 1(1) 12.
84 The first editorial of Farangestan underlines that ‘we all have one dream and we all move to achieve it: domination of young thought over the old thought.’ See Farangestan. 1924. “Ma Che Mikhahim?” 1(1) 2.
85 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By.
86 Keles, “Modernization,” 6.
87 Farhadi. 1924. “Zanane Tork,” Farangestan, 1(1)13–14.
88 Ibid., 15.
89 Najmabadi argues that contact with Europe and the battle over Westernization paved the way for heteronormalization and the eradication of homosexuality as a historical reality among Iranian men. She believes that these efforts caused another contradicting gender-based binarization among two segregated genders. See Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 11–63.
90 Kandiyoti, “Reviewed Work,” 226–7.
91 The writer believes that this religious zeal could not be replaced by scientific logic in a country that lacks a state-wide public education system. See Farhadi. 1924. “Zanane Tork,” Farangestan, 1(1) 16.
92 Ibid., 16–7.
93 Farangestan. 1924. “Anche Mikhastem Beguyem,” 1(7&8) 370.
94 Farangestan. 1924. “Qahve Khaneye Qanbar,” 1(4) 196.
95 Farangestan. 1924. “Jange ba Tabiat,” 1(1) 24.
96 Farangestan. 1924. “Danestaniha” 1(1), 45–6.
97 Najmabadi argues that nationalist-modernist Iranians emphasized women’s education because they believed that education makes women good wives for their husbands and good mothers for their children, who will later contribute to the formation of the nationalist modernists’ ideal country. Consequently, education of women as future mothers who can give birth to a generation worthy of modernity was centralized within their agenda. See Najmabadi, “Crafting an Educated Housewife,” 91–125.
98 Parts of this booklet were published in: Iranshahr, “Maaref dar Osmani,” 3(1&2), (1924) 56.
99 Iranshahr, 3(3), (1924) 173.
100 For more detailed connotations of the word ibrat in different Farsi dictionaries see https://www.vajehyab.com/?q=%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AA&t=like&s=7
101 For more detailed connotations of the word hasrat in different Farsi dictionaries, see: https://www.vajehyab.com/?q=%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AA&t=like&s=7
102 Kazemzadeh. 1924. “Jomhuriyat va Enghelabe Ejtemai,” 1(5&6) 260.
103 Farangestan, 1(2), (1924) 62.
104 Ibid.
105 Iranshahr, “Maghame Zan dar Jameye Iran,” 3(6), (1925) 376.
106 Zarinebaf and Vejdani argue that a similar rivalry and cooperation between the late Qajar and Ottoman period modernists took place during 1906–09. See Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz,” and Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives,” 319–40.
107 Iranshahr, “Maaref dar Osmani,” 3(3), (1924)140–1.
108 For example, see this article by an unknown writer about the establishment of the laic system in Republic of Turkey: Farangestan, “Lozum Jodaiye Omur Mazhabi az Masaele Dini,” 1(11&12), (1925) 509–10.
109 Atabaki, “From Multilingual Empire,” 50.
110 Ibid.
111 Uzer, An Intellectual History. A 1927 report by the Turkish Intelligence Bureau of the Army about Azerbaijan of Iran shows that the new Turkish Republic was sensitive about the Turkish ethnic minority in Iran but preferred to adopt a more pragmatic approach toward this minority. See: Müezzinoğlu and Karamelikli, 1927 İran Azerbaycanı, 51–80.
112 For more detailed connotations of the word tahdid in different Farsi dictionaries see: https://www.vajehyab.com/?q=%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF&d=en
113 Farangestan, 1(11&12), (1925) 580–81. Translations from Turkish magazines and articles show that they used to keep track of the events like the decline in (pan)Islamism and (pan)Ottomanism and the rise in secular Turkish nationalism. Both Iranshahr and Farangestan published translations of the speeches and articles of Rovşeni Bey and Süleyman Nazif, two Turkish journalists and politicians. For a translation of Rovşeni Bey’s speech in Türk Ocakları see Iranshahr, “Aghideye Osmaniha darbareye Iran,” 2(2), (1924) 87–94; For Farangestan’s reaction to the Süleyman Nazif’s states see Shafaq, “Nameye Sargoshade be Soleyman Nazif,” 1(3), (1924) 117–24.
114 Farangestan, “Mohafezekarane Efrati,” 1(3), (1924) 103.
115 Ansari, “Iranian Nationalism,” 110.
116 Afshar. 1925. “Gozashte-Emruz-Ayandeh,” Ayandeh, 1(1) 6–7.
117 Cole also states that in 1900, perhaps twenty-five percent of Qajar subjects were ‘pastoral nomads with no strong sense of territorial patriotism.’ See Cole, “Marking Boundaries,” 37.
118 Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iranianness,” 166.
119 Ansari, “Iranian Nationalism,” 110.
120 Ibid. For more detailed information about the ethnic structure of Iran, see Asgharzadeh, “Iran and Challenge of Diversity,” 14–24.
121 Farangestan, “Mohafezekarane Efrati,” 1(3), (1924) 103.
122 Kashani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iranianness,” 167.
123 Afshar, “Gozashte-Emruz-Ayandeh,” Ayandeh, 1(1), (1925) 4–9.
124 Iranshahr, “Maaref dar Osmani,” 3(3), (1924) 141.
125 Qazvini, “Tarze Negareshe Farsi,” 1(9–10), 422–4.
126 It is worth noting that even Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1939), the eminent Azerbaijani-Turkish nationalist, was under the influence of the race-based ideas of scholars and orientalists like Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882). See Shissler, Between Two Empires.
127 Arani, “Azerbaijan ya Yek Masaleye Hayati ve Mamati,” 1(5), (1924) 247–52.
128 Amin, The Making, 25.
129 Oskar Mann. 1916. “Kaveh va Derafshe Kavyan,” Kaveh, 1(1) 4.
130 Browne, A Year among the Persians, 109.
131 Cole, “Marking Boundaries,” 37.
132 For instance, Amir Kabir (1807–1852) and Hossein Sepahsalar (1828–1881), two reformist Chief Ministers of Naser al-Din Shah (1831-1896), attempted to implement reforms they witnessed during the Tanzimât period (began in 1839) and the First Constitutional Revolution Era (1876–1978) in the Ottoman State. See Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va Iran, 181–4; Shahbazi, “Kudeta-ye 1299,” 14.
133 Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, some of the deputies in the Fifth National Parliament asked to change from the monarchy to a republic but the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey, which came just before the vote, lent an upper hand to the opponents of the republic like Modarres. Subsequently, Ayatollah Hariri, Na’ini and Isfahani, in a visit with Reza Khan, asked him to renounce the idea of founding a republic in Iran because they were worried that the republic would set the basis for “the similar changes [that] took place in Ataturk’s Turkey.” In a joint statement, they asserted that ‘Islam prohibited a republic.’ See Zirinsky, “Imperial Power and Dictatorship,” 645.
134 For example, during the Qajar-Pahlavi interregnum and WWI, various periodicals were published by Iranians within Iran and abroad. For instance, Ebrahim Pourdavoud, an active member of the Berliners, published Rastkhiz during 1915–1916 in Baghdad and later in Kermanshah. See Ettehadiye, “Rastkhiz,” 65–88. In 1914, Seyyed Mohammad Tovfiq, who used to cooperate with the Berliners, published the periodical Khavar in Istanbul. In the 1920s, Tovfiq published Majalle-ye Khavar that was used to support Reza Khan and wrote pieces about the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and secular reforms in Turkey. See Shakour, “Ashnayi ba Jarayede Farsi dar Istanbul,” 72–3.
135 For instance, Young Turks was a source of inspiration for a group of pro-constitutionalist modernist Afghans who called themselves the Young Afghans during WWI. Prince Amanullah Khan, who later became the king of Afghanistan (1926–1929), was greatly influenced by the Young Afghans. See Arjomand, “Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan,” 945, and Saikal, “Kemalism: Its Influences on Iran and Afghanistan,” 26–31. Furthermore, reforms in the late Ottoman era and the Republic of Turkey piqued the interest of Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent. For instance, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh College, asked the Indian Muslim community to take the reforms of the Ottoman State as an example. Affinity with the Turks transformed into a strong movement all over the Subcontinent during the first two decades of the twentieth century.
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Naseraddin Alizadeh
Naseraddin Alizadeh received his BA in Physics from Tabriz University, MA in Economics from Tehran Allameh Tabatabai University. After defending his PhD dissertation at Ankara University, he worked as a counsellor for the Association for Asylum-Seekers and Migrants from 2017 to 19. Since January 2019 he has been teaching in Department of International Relations at Karabük University. He is the editor and contributor to Student Movement in Azerbaijan (2005) and The Challenge of Identity in Azerbaijan (2006), and he has also co-authored Social Cleavages in Iran (2010). His research interests include political economy, rent-seeking studies, nationalism, historiography, and ethnic studies in Iran and Turkey.