https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6020-3326
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ABSTRACT
Numerous studies have analyzed Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. This article focuses on the Diyanet’s new role in the politics of the family and argues that this role constitutes the main channel for its institutional expansion. By discussing the female preachers employed to reach more women and the Family Guidance Bureaus established to strengthen the family through religious guidance, the article looks at the ways in which both have expanded Diyanet’s institutional capacity to reshape gender and family relations along state-sanctioned religious lines. It also suggests that desecularization may offer a conceptual framework with which the implications of Diyanet’s expansion through familialist policies can be analyzed.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Sevgi Adak is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations at the Aga Khan University in London. Her work focuses on gender studies, social history of modern Turkey, and Turkish politics. She received her PhD from Leiden University’s School of Middle Eastern Studies in 2015. Between 2009 and 2014, she was a research fellow at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam. Her book, Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: Gender, Power and Resistance under the Kemalist Regime, will be published by IB Tauris.
Notes
1 Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism.”
2 Kaya, “Islamisation of Turkey,” and Lord, Religious Politics.
3 Lüküslü, “Creating a Pious Generation,” and Kandiyoti and Emanet, “Education as Battleground.”
4 Lord, Religious Politics, 98.
5 Öktem, “Global Diyanet,” and Öztürk and Sözeri, “Diyanet as a Turkish.”
6 Öztürk, “Turkey’s Diyanet.”
7 Tütüncü, “The Women Preachers”; Sancar, “Diyanet’in ‘Kadınlaşması’”; Hassan, “Women Preaching”; and Maritato, “Performing Irşad,” and “Reassessing Women.”
8 Yılmaz, “Strengthening the Family.”
9 Mardin, “Religion and Secularism,” and Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism.”
10 Kandiyoti, “Travails of the Secular,” 515.
11 For a notable example, see Gözaydın, Diyanet.
12 Gözaydın and Öztürk, The Management of Religion, 10–11.
13 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity; Gözaydın, Diyanet; and Kara, Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi’nde.
14 Gözaydın, “A Religious Administration.”
15 Kuru, Secularism and State, 167.
16 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity, 70.
17 Sakallıoğlu, “Parameters and Strategies”; Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State?”; and Kandiyoti, “Travails of the Secular.”
18 Çınar and Gencel Sezgin, “Islamist Political Engagement.”
19 Lord, Religious Politics, 42.
20 For the new organizational law in 1965, see T.C. Resmî Gazete, 2 July 1965. https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/12038.pdf.
21 Lord, Religious Politics, 106–11, and Gözaydın and Öztürk, The Management of Religion, 15.
22 Öztürk, “Transformation of the Turkish.”
23 Kandiyoti, “Travails of the Secular,” 521.
24 Öztürk, “Turkey’s Diyanet.”
25 Lord, Religious Politics, 125.
26 In 2018, the approved budget of the Diyanet was 7 billion 774 million, which was increased to 8 billion 376 million at the end of the year. 2018 Yılı Kurumsal; 2019 Yılı Kurumsal.
27 See Diyanet’s official statistics, http://stratejigelistirme.diyanet.gov.tr/sayfa/57/istatistikler.
28 See Resmî Gazete, 13 July 2010. https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/07/20100713-2.htm.
29 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2015, 9–13; 2018 Yılı Faaliyet, 30.
30 Diyanet currently runs three radio stations: Diyanet Radio, Diyanet Quran Radio and Diyanet Prophethood Radio.
31 Another example is the mosque youth branches (cami gençlik kolları), which are already established in 1500 mosques. The Diyanet aims to have them in more than 20,000 mosques in 2021. “2021’e kadar 20 bin camide Gençlik Kolu,” Haber Türk, 22 October 2016.
32 The protocol the Diyanet signed with the Ministry of Youth and Sport, for example, allows its personnel give moral and religious education in facilities administered by the ministry, including sport facilities, dormitories, and summer camps. See, http://www.gsb.gov.tr/HaberDetaylari/1/33369/genclik-ve-spor-bakanligi-ile-diyanet-isleri-baskanligi-degerler-egitimi-isbirligi-protokolu-imzalandi.aspx.
33 The Ministry of Family and Social Policies was established in 2011 replacing the State Ministry of Women and Family Affairs. Thus the word 'women' was removed from the name of the ministry. The name of the ministry was changed once again in 2018 to Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services.
36 Casanova, Public Religions.
37 Davie, Religion in Modern Europe.
38 Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular.”
39 See Levey and Modood, Secularism, Religion.
40 Fox, Political Secularism.
41 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion; Haynes, Religious Transnational Actors; and Mavelli and Petitio, Towards a Postsecular.
42 James and Mandaville, Globalization and Culture.
43 Cesari, “Religion and Politics.”
44 Berger, “The Desecularization.”
45 Karpov, “Decesularization”
46 Lisovskaya and Karpov, “Orthodoxy, Islam.”
47 Karpov, “Decesularization,” 236.
48 Ibid., 250.
49 Karpov, “The Social Dynamics,” 256.
50 Lisovskaya and Karpov, “Orthodoxy, Islam,” 289–90.
51 See, for example, 2018 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, 13.
53 It is difficult to give the exact number of female preachers employed by the Diyanet as some were dismissed in recent years under emergency rule measures. However, the number was 726, for example, in 2014, compared to 57 in 2002 when the AKP came to power.
54 The latest step in this regard was the appointment of Huriye Martı as the first female vice president of the Diyanet on 18 November 2017.
55 Maritato, “Performing Irşad,” and “Reassessing Women.”
56 Maritato, “Addressing the Blurred.”
57 Hassan, “Women Preaching,” 462–63.
58 Hassan, “Women Preaching,” and Maritato, “Performing Irşad.”
59 Tütüncü, “The Women Preachers,” 602.
60 Maritato, “Reassessing Women,” 270.
61 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2016, 31.
62 Eslen-Ziya and Korkut, “Hutbelerde Toplumsal.”
63 Faaliyet Raporu 2016. It should be mentioned that the idea that men and women are different in essence (fıtrat gereği) but equal in value as believers is the predominant view of the Diyanet. This complementarity argument also dominates the content of the Friday sermons. Eslen-Ziya and Korkut, “Hutbelerde Toplumsal.”
64 Görev ve Çalışma Yönergesi, 8.
65 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2013.
66 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2015.
67 See, Aydın Bıçak, Diyanet İşleri.
68 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2014, 95.
69 See the information on Diyanet’s official website, https://dinhizmetleri.diyanet.gov.tr/Detay/200/aile-ve-din%C3%AE-rehberlik-b%C3%BCro-veya-merkezleri-%C3%A7al%C4%B1%C5%9Fma-y%C3%B6nergesi-yay%C4%B1nland%C4%B1. See also the official statistics, http://dinhizmetleri.diyanet.gov.tr/Detay/99/aile-ve-dini-rehberlik-b%C3%BCrolar%C4%B1.
70 For the 2015 regulations, see https://hukukmusavirligi.diyanet.gov.tr/detay/140/aile-ve-dini-rehberlik-b%C3%BCrolar%C4%B1-y%C3%B6nergesi.
71 See, Aile ve Dini Rehberlik.
72 Din Hizmetleri Raporu 2015.
73 See the main aims of the bureaus outlined at the Diyanet website. http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Gorevler.aspx.
74 This idea of creating a 'community of female believers' is mentioned by female preachers as one of the aims of their activities. Maritato, “Reassessing Women,” and Sancar, “Diyanet’in ‘Kadınlaşması’.”
75 According to the regulations, the personnel of the Family Bureaus are responsible for forwarding non-religious questions to other relevant public offices. However, available research suggests that the Family Bureaus usually provide guidance on non-religious issues as well. Sancar, “Diyanet’in ‘Kadınlaşması’”.
76 Aile ve Dini Rehberlik, 3.
77 See the website of the Sakarya mufti office, https://sakarya.diyanet.gov.tr/Sayfalar/contentdetail.aspx?MenuCategory=Kurumsal&contentid=566.
78 See the project page on the website of Diyanet’s Kütahya office, http://kutahya.diyanet.gov.tr/Sayfalar/contentdetail.aspx?MenuCategory=Haberler&contentid=214.
79 In one such collaboration, for example, in Şahinbey, in the province of Gaziantep, over 20,000 people have been trained in marriage school as of 2017. “Evlilik Okuluna Katılan 90 Çift Daha Sertifikalarını Aldı,” Haber Türk, 30 July 2017.
80 The Diyanet had indeed been pushing, through its personnel’s union, for an extension of its authority to include conducting civil marriages since 2007. Lord, Religious Politics, 117.
81 See, for example, the protocol signed between the Konya municipality and the Konya Mufti Office in March 2019, https://www.haberler.com/buyuksehir-ile-muftuluk-arasinda-kadin-ve-aile-10704011-haberi/.
82 For example, see the 12-week long marriage school organized by KAGEM, where the opening speech was given by the Diyanet’s Head of the Department of Family and Religious Guidance, Sedide Akbulut. “KAGEM’de İki İnsan Bir Hayat Evlilik Okulu Başladı,” Diyanet Haber, 2 November 2018.
83 Kocamaner underlines these links as indications of convergence between the family policies of the AKP and Islamic television programming. Kocamaner, “Strengthening the Family.”
84 Diyanet suggested to the commission that theology graduates should be eligible to become family consultants and that the mission of Diyanet’s family bureaus should be expanded by creating a new post, 'spiritual support experts,' in arbitration processes. “Aile Danışmanlığı için Manevi Uzman Önerisi,” Haber Türk, 4 April 2016.
85 Güneş-Ataya and Doğangün, “Gender Politics.” See also, Kandiyoti, “Locating the politics of gender”; Adak, “Gender Politics.”
86 Maritato, “Reassessing Women,” 13.
87 See Azak, “Secularism and Atheism,” and Hurtas, “Turks losing trust.” For the results of the Lifestyles Survey of the research company Konda showing decreasing levels of religiosity, see Hayat Tarzları Araştırması 2008–2018. https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/tr/HayatTarzlari2018/.