Shot in the foot: unintended political consequences of electoral engineering in the Turkish parliamentary elections in 2018

ABSTRACT

The ruling party in Turkey, the AKP, made an ex post mistake by changing the electoral law before the parliamentary elections in 2018. The new apparentement provision allowed parties to make electoral alliances and the alliances’ total votes could then be used to meet the threshold. Surprisingly, the MHP met the threshold in the election, while one opposition party, the İP, failed to do so. AKP lost the parliamentary majority as a result. We estimate election results using four alternative scenarios, identify all parties that made ex post mistakes in supporting electoral reform, and evaluate the reform’s political consequences.

KEYWORDS:

• Proportional representation
• electoral engineering
• Turkey
• parliamentary elections
• electoral manipulation

Acknowledgement

We acknowledge the support by the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine, in the form of an internal summer fellowship.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Grofman and Brunell, “The Art of the Dummymander.”

2 Nagel, “What Political Scientists Can Learn.”

3 Przeworski, Błędy: Informacja.

4 Kaminski, “Do Parties Benefit?”

5 Kaminski, “How Communism.”

6 Benoit and Schiemann “Institutional Choice”; Grofman et al., “Electoral Systems Change”; Stein, “Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict”; and Moser, “Unexpected Outcomes.”

7 Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds”, 168.

8 See Appendix 1 online for more information about Turkish parties.

9 Özbudun, “Democratization in the Middle East”; and Sayarı, “Politics and Economic Policy-Making.”

10 Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds”; and Szymański and Wódka, “Manipulation of Vote Choice.”

11 Taş, “A History”; and Göl, “The Paradoxes of ‘New’ Turkey.”

12 See various statements by MHP’s leader Devlet Bahçeli on the BBC website on January 16, 2016 and on April 17, 2017, and in Evrensel, May 10, 2016.

13 Yılmaz, The Presidential System in Turkey.

14 Kaya and Whiting, “The HDP, the AKP.”

15 Esen and Gümüşçü, “The Perils of ‘Turkish Presidentialism.’”

16 “Bahçeli’den Ittifak,” Retrieved June 9, 2020, from: http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/2481293-bahceliden-ittifak-modeli-onerisi

17 “Law Amending some Provisions”.

18 As noted in a Habertürk article “Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan ‘ittifak” on March 13, 2018; “Gece Yarısı ‘apar topar’” on March 13, 2018, http://www.diken.com.tr/gece-yarisi-apar-topar-26-maddelik-ittifak-yasasi-mecliste-kabul-edildi/; “CHP’li Torun’dan” on March 16, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/chpli-torundan-secim-kanunu-uyarisi/1091061.

19 All official election data in our paper are from the website of Supreme Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu), the highest election authority in Turkey (Supreme Election Council).

20 Kaminski, “Do Parties Benefit”; and Benoit and Schiemann, “Institutional Choice.”

21 Flis et al., “Pot and Ladle: Mathematical Underpinnings”; Flis et al., “Pot and Ladle: Seat Allocation”; and Evci, “Regional Correction,” See also Appendix 2 for details.

22 Supreme Election Council.

23 As reported in Sözcü’s article “Erdoğan: HDP’yi baraj” (retrieved on June 17, 2020).

24 Yılmaz and Bashirov, “The AKP after 15 Years.”

25 Balinski and Young, “Stability, Coalitions and Schisms.”

26 As reported on the BBC website in the article “Bahçeli: Türkiye İttifakı’ndan Bahsetmek Kafamızdaki Soru İşaretlerini Çoğaltmıştır” on April 21, 2019.

27 Przeworski, “Błędy: Informacja”; Kaminski, “How Communism”; Shvetsova, “Endogenous Selection”; Moraski and Loewenberg, “The Effect of Legal Thresholds”; Grofman et al., “Electoral Systems Change”; and Kaminski, “Coalitional Stability.”

28 As reported in “Gezici Araştırma” on January 20, 2018. http://www.diken.com.tr/gezici-arastirma-iyi-partinin-oyu-chpden-hdpnin-oyu-da-mhpden-fazla/; and in Haber on January 10, 2018.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Uğurcan Evci

Uğurcan Evci is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science program at University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on electoral engineering, electoral reform, and Turkish elections. He is currently working on an analysis of Turkish electoral design between 1980 and 2018.

Marek M. Kaminski

Marek M. Kaminski is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. His research interests are in game theory, voting theory, political consequences of electoral laws, the transition to democracy, and the subculture of prisons. His focus is on paradoxes, manipulation, and the limits of the rationality of social choices.