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ABSTRACT
The coup attempt of 2016 constitutes a major incision in contemporary Turkish politics. Focusing on the symbolic aspects of the AKP’s authoritarian rule in the direct aftermath of the coup attempt, this article offers a new conceptual framework to analyze three symbolic and discursive strategies that the government employed with the aim to normalize its exceptional and transformative measures: legitimation, narrativization and ritualization. It argues that these strategies contribute to the deepening of the AKP’s authoritarian regime formation and contends that the government’s actions are a reflection of the power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen movement.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Dvora Yanow, Sevgi Adak, Kumru Toktamis and Paul Kubicek as well as the anonymous reviewers for their insightful, inspiring, and helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I also would like to thank the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP) for providing the funding for the research as well as Blanca Camps, Laura Feliu and Ferran Izquierdo for their unrelenting support of my research project ‘From Exceptionalism to Normalization: The Radical Transformation of the Republic of Turkey'.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Note on Contributor
Olivia Glombitza is an Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the Open University of Catalonia. She is also a fellow for the ‘Sectarianism, Proxies and De-Sectarianization’ project at Lancaster University and for the research project ‘Transnational Dynamics and Actors in the Middle East and North Africa: A Genealogy of Elites and Social Movements between the Local and the Global,’ based at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. In addition, she has led projects on the current ongoing transformation of the Republic of Turkey and the role of identity and ideology in peace-building in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, both supported by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP). . Her research interests include the politics and international relations of the Middle East, particularly Iranian and Turkish domestic and foreign policies; relations of power; symbolic politics; conceptualizations of ideology and identity; peace building and mediation; and media representation and discourse analysis.
Notes
1 “Turkey Rounds Up Plot Suspects After Thwarting Coup Against Erdogan.” Reuters, July 15, 2016.
2 Also known as cemaat [congregation] or hizmet [service].
3 See Gavriely-Nuri, The Normalization of War, 15.
4 Taş, “Turkey: From Tutelary.”
5 Öniş, “Monopolising the Centre,” and Akkoyunlu and Öktem, “Existential Insecurity.”
6 Initially, as Kubicek argues in his article “Faulty Assumptions,” many scholars and others had been optimistic about the AKP’s potential to pave the way for democracy in Turkey.
7 Taş, “Turkey: From Tutelary”; Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”; Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown”; and Akkoyunlu and Öktem, “Existential Insecurity.”
8 Akkoyunlu and Öktem, “Existential Insecurity,” 506.
9 A notable exception here is Hakkı Taş’s article “The 15 July.”
10 Aslan, “Symbolic Politics.”
11 Ibid., 17.
12 Aslan, “The Politics of Emotions.”
13 Aslan, “Symbolic Politics.”
14 Taş, “The 15 July.”
15 Gavriely-Nuri, The Normalization of War, 13.
16 Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture.
17 Gavriely-Nuri, The Normalization of War.
18 Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, 61.
19 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 170.
20 Ibid., 170.
21 Arendt, On Violence, 29, 34.
22 Zald, “Culture, Ideology,” 262.
23 Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant.
24 Entman, “Framing Bias.”
25 Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant.
26 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 41.
27 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 30.
28 De Fina, “Narrative Analysis,” 239.
29 Bottici, “Narrative,” 919.
30 Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, 62.
31 De Fina, “Narrative Analysis,” 244.
32 Ibid., 236.
33 Ibid., 237.
34 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 5.
35 Fairclough and Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, 4.
36 Bell, “The Ritual Body,” 302.
37 Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, 197, and 8.
38 Wodak et al., The Discursive Construction, 206.
39 Ibid., 206.
40 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 22.
41 Izquierdo Brichs and Lampridi-Kemou, “Sociology of Power,” and Izquierdo Brichs and Etherington, Poder Global.
42 Ibid.
43 Izquierdo Brichs and Etherington, Poder Global, 23.
44 Ibid., 130.
45 Perchoc, “Media Freedom.”
46 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown,” 14.
47 Ibid., 16.
48 Ibid., 18.
49 For more information on the GM, see Tee, The Gülen Movement and Hendrick, Gülen. For the subsequent alienation and conflict between the AKP and the GM, see Taş, “A History.”
50 Tee, The Gülen Movement.
51 Toktamis, “A Peace That Wasn’t.”
52 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (hereafter UN), “Report.”
53 Esen and Gumuscu, “Turkey: How the Coup Failed,” 60. In this context, however, it is necessary to note that while elections took place, one should not assume they were free and fair, as the opposition and other groups have faced increasing obstacles in expressing their views, particularly since 2017. See Freedom House “Turkey.”
54 See, for example, UN, “Report.”
55 See, for example, European Commission, “Turkey 2018 Report” and European Parliament, “2016/2993(RSP).”
56 Media Ownership Monitor, “Shutdown Media.”
57 UN, “Report.”
58 Erdoğan, “Turkey’s Regional and Global Vision.”
59 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey.”
60 Reporters Without Borders, “Turkey.”
61 “Turkish Media Group Bought by Pro-Government Conglomerate.” The New York Times, March 21, 2018.
62 Ibid.
63 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Court Orders Newspaper Takeover.”
64 Perchoc, “Media Freedom.”
65 Kareem Shaheen, “Erdoğan v the Gülenists: From Political Allies to Turkey’s Bitter Rivals.” The Guardian, July 19, 2016.
66 Agamben, State of Exception, 2.
67 There are conflicting perspectives regarding the ideological alignment between the AKP and the GM. See, for example, Lord, Religious Politics, who argues for such an alignment, whereas Dogan, “Political Islamists” contends the opposite.
68 Kareem Shaheen, “Erdoğan v the Gülenists: From Political Allies to Turkey’s Bitter Rivals.” The Guardian, July 19, 2016.
69 Esen and Gumuscu, “Turkey: How the Coup Failed,” 61.
70 Taş, “A History.”
71 Erdoğan, “9.ASKON.”
72 “President Erdoğan Vows to Finish Off ‘Parallel Structure’.” Hürriyet Daily News, December 14, 2014.
73 Erdoğan, “Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nı.”
74 Erdoğan, “9.ASKON.”
75 Erdoğan, “Gazi Mustafa.”
76 Erdoğan, “Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nı.”
77 Ibid.
78 Erdoğan, “Turkish Grand National Assembly.”
79 Erdoğan, “Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nı,” “Turkish Grand National Assembly,” and “TESK 19.”
80 Fethullahist Terror Organization (Fethullaçi Terör Örgütü).
81 Çavuşoğlu, “Fighting the Enemies.”
82 Ibid.
83 Republic of Turkey, “Terrorism.”
84 Çavuşoğlu, “Fighting the Enemies.”
85 Erdoğan, “Turkey, A Year After.”
86 Çavuşoğlu, “The United States.”
87 Çavuşoğlu, “Fighting the Enemies.”
88 Erdoğan, “Turkey’s Regional and Global Vision.”
89 Erdoğan, “Address.”
90 Rabinowitz, “2011 Recognition.”
91 Çavuşoğlu, “Turkey: The Night.”
92 Ibid.
93 Erdoğan, “Address.”
94 Çavuşoğlu, “Fighting the Enemies.”
95 Erdoğan, “Turkey, A Year After.”
96 Erdoğan, “August 30 Victory Day.”
97 See for example “Turkey Demands Extradition of Gulen Followers in Germany.” Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2016.
98 Erdoğan, “Turkey, A Year After.”
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Çavuşoğlu, “The United States.”
102 Erdoğan, “Turkey, A Year After.”
103 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown,” 17.
104 The Guardian, “Erdoğan Addresses Turkey.”
105 Çavuşoğlu, “Turkey: The Night.”
106 See for example the website “July 15th 2016” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and “July 15 Coup Attempt” by the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey.
107 “Streets, Squares Around Turkey Mark July 15 Martyrs with New Names.” Daily Sabah, August 3, 2016, and “Istanbul Municipality Votes to Rid Street Names of Gülen Links.” Hürriyet Daily News, December 14, 2017.
108 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, “President Erdoğan Inaugurates.”
109 “Turkish Authorities Hold Anti-Coup Rally in Istanbul,” The Guardian, August 7, 2017.
110 “Turkey Marks 3rd Anniversary of July 15 Coup Attempt,” Daily Sabah, July 15, 2019.
111 Aslan, “The Politics of Emotions,” 399.
112 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 21.
113 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, “July 15.”
114 Erdoğan, “Turkey, A Year After.”
115 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 41.
116 Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”
117 Taş, “The 15 July,” 5.
118 Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, 42.
119 Ibid., 19.
120 See Aslan, “Symbolic Politics,” 11.
121 The AKP’s framing of political actors depends on their perception of them. This perceived status may change over time, as happened with the GM. Furthermore, unwanted political actors are not only framed negatively, but also drawn into each other’s realm and discursively connected to each other. To give but one example, shortly before the 2019 local elections, the CHP and the İYİ Party were associated with the GM and the PKK. In doing so, the former have been connected to the latter’s discursively established negative attributes and characteristics and therefore they are assigned the same negative frames and labels. For illustration, see “Erdoğan: CHP, İYİ Party have been ‘handed over to FETÖ, PKK’.” Hürriyet Daily News, February 17, 2019.
122 KONDA, “The July 15th.”
123 Aslan, “Symbolic Politics,” 10.
124 Ozduzen, “From Streets.”
125 David and Toktamis, “Everywhere Taksim.”
126 Aslan, “The Politics of Emotions,” 399.
127 Aslan, “Symbolic Politics,” 16.