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ABSTRACT
The upgrading of Başakşehir from a quarter to a district is related to the transformation of İstanbul Başakşehir Football Club from a football club into a politico-cultural project carried out capitalist cronies attached to the governing (Justice and Development Party). ‘Rent-seeking’ activities in cultural areas are usually neglected or, if anything, considered the indirect results of developments in the financial or economic field. Sports in general and football in particular are the best examples of this omission. This article is directed towards filling this gap by taking Başakşehirspor as a venue to explore how ‘rent-seeking relations’ expand and gain a foothold in culturally-oriented economic fields in order to bolster their already established control over networks of cronies in the political and economic system. In the literature, a common characteristic of crony capitalism, network formation, has not received sufficient attention. The available research, focusing on whether crony capitalism merely replaces corruption, clientelism, or both, overlooks certain kinds of methodological approaches that could be fruitful, such as network analysis. An analysis of how this network revolves around Başakşehir and of its transformation under AKP governance will provide a basis to show how Başakşehirspor replicates the same practices of network formation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Gürcan and Peker, Challenging Neoliberalism, 60.
2 Pérouse, “İstanbul Çeperlerinde,” 24–5.
3 In recent years, Başakşehir has become the place where AKP’s combined neoliberalism and Islamism in the same kettle in the form of lofty residences, luxurious fitness centers and spas that separate men and women, flamboyant ‘iftar banquets’ and baby showers in expensive hotels, and lifestyle magazines for rich conservative women. As distinct from the early Turkish Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party which defended state interventionism into the economic and social life, AKP has been a supporter of neoliberal policies.
4 ‘In the discourse of the AKP, “New Turkey” symbolizes a break from the Kemalist past and its Western cultural precepts, secular elitism and military tutelage.’ Lüküslü, “Creating a pious,” 639, endnote 2.
5 Laura Pitel. “Political football: ‘pro-government’ club shakes up Turkish league.” Financial Times, March 29, 2018.
6 Another example of AKP’s endeavors to design football as compatible with their neo-Ottomanist hegemony project through municipalities is Osmanlıspor. Despite the efforts of AKP’s Melih Gökçek, who served as the Mayor of Ankara for almost 25 years, Osmanlıspor became one of the most hated football clubs like Başakşehir; however, it reclaimed its former name ‘Ankaraspor’ upon AKP’s loss of the local elections in 2019. Serkan Alan. “Osmanlıspor’dan neden nefret ediliyor?” Gazeteduvar, June 6, 2019.
7 “We still have problems in social and cultural rule: President Erdoğan.” Hürriyet Daily News, May 28, 2017.
8 “Gezi’nin Şedit ve Vandal Gençleri.” SETA, June 1, 2017 https://www.setav.org/gezinin-sedit-ve-vandal-gencleri/
9 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Genç bir nüfusa sahibiz ama medeniyet tasavvurumuzu layıkıyla hayata geçiremiyoruz.” Anadolu Ajansı, October 19, 2020 https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-genc-bir-nufusa-sahibiz-ama-medeniyet-tasavvurumuzu-layikiyla-hayata-geciremiyoruz/2011237
10 “Sosyal ve kültürel iktidarımızı sıkıntılı.” Hürriyet, May 28, 2017. 7
11 “Erdogan concentre désormais aussi le football turc entre ses mains.” Express, May 5, 2018.
12 As a matter of fact, the anti-AKP climate of the stadiums has long existed before the Gezi Park protests. In 2011, when the incumbent Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and accompanying AKP ministers were harshly confronted by the audience at the entrance of Galatasaray’s stadium, TT Arena, they had to leave even before the game started. See “TT Arena'da büyük protesto!” Cumhuriyet, January 15, 2011.
13 Bilgin Gökberk. “Başakcity.” Cumhuriyet, May 5, 2017.
14 Galatasaray 35.3 percent, Fenerbahçe 29.1 percent, Beşiktaş 17.6 percent. See “Areda Survey Sosyometre.” Areda, August 2019.
15 Kang, Crony Capitalism, and White, “The Beginnings.”
16 Mazumdar, “Crony Capitalism and India.”
17 Åslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism.
18 Ivanković, “The Political Economy.”
19 Haber, ed., Crony Capitalism.
20 Marks, “Nationalist Policy-Making.”
21 Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism.”
22 Reinsberg, Kentikelenis, and Stubbs, “Creating Crony Capitalism,” 22.
23 Krueger, “Why Crony.”
24 Enderwick, “What’s Bad,” 118.
25 Aligica and Tarko, “Crony Capitalism,” 173.
26 Mohamed, “Crony Interlockers.”
27 Chivangue, “Crony Capitalism.”
28 Crony capitalism of AKP is also apparent in the TV series industry. State television channel TRT and private TV channel ATV, chaired by the brother of Erdoğan’s son-in-law, are used as a medium for the TV series shot by film companies founded mostly by former AKP MPs. For example, Kemal Tekden, the owner of Tekden Film, the producer of the TV series Diriliş Ertuğrul, is a former AKP MP and a politician/businessperson who received many contracts from Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Es Film, a producer of TV series, many of which were aired by TRT, including the neo-Ottomanist series Payitaht Abdülhamit, is owned by Yusuf Esenkal who was a close friend of Bilal Erdoğan from Kartal İmam Hatip High School. Similarly, actors like Engin Altan Düzyatan and Bülent İnal who portrayed Ottoman Emperors in the series of these production companies are rewarded by state banks who have picked them as their faces in recent advertising campaigns. Erk Acerer. “Abdülhamid ‘biterken’.” Birgün, March 08, 2021.
29 According to Khatri et al., “to classify cronyism as instrumental vs relational, the extent of focus on task vs relationship, utility vs affection, and self-interest vs loyalty must be assessed.” Khatri, Tsang, and Begley, “Cronyism: a cross-cultural analysis,” 70.
30 Khatri, “Definitions of Cronyism.”
31 Sayarı, “Interdisciplinary Approaches.”
32 Berenschot, “The Political Economy,” 1566–7.
33 Zywicki, “Rent-Seeking,” 83.
34 Akçay, “Neoliberal Populism,” 5.
35 “Controversial tender system allows Turkish companies to dominate World Bank public investment list.” December 30, 2018, https://www.paraanaliz.com/intelligence/controversial-tender-system-allows-turkish-companies-dominate-world-bank-public-investment-list/
36 Turkish Commerce Registry Gazette (Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi, TTSG). 10.06.2014, no. 8587, 465.
37 İstanbul Ticaret Odası Resmi Web Sitesi. Istanbul Ticaret Odası Bilgi Bankası, 2020, https://bilgibankasi.ito.org.tr/tr/bilgi-bankasi/firma-bilgileri
38 Burak Arıkan, Zeyno Üstün and Ahmet Kızılay. Graph Commons. New York, 2020. https://graphcommons.com/about. Data entry and graph visualization is carried out by KirpiVeri (established by Sinan Çetin and Bayram Şen)
39 Including Başakşehirspor itself.
40 “Uçurum İlköğretim Okulu,” Habertürk, March 1, 2004; İstanbul Haber Servisi; “Küçükçekmece’de Altyapı Sorunu,” Cumhuriyet, January 19, 2001.
41 Ark, “Transformation Urbaine.”
42 Çavdar, The Loss of Modesty, 54–5.
43 Pérouse, “İstanbul Çeperlerinde,” 24.
44 See Map I. Bahçeşehir, which is now part of today’s Başakşehir Municipality, was part of Büyükçekmece and was not involved in the heated debate at that time. The debate about including Bahçeşehir into the district of Başakşehir revolved around gerrymandering because Bahçeşehir, as a highly developed urban area, was considered as a constituency where the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) traditionally gains the majority of voters.
45 Karaman, “Urban Neoliberalism,” 3419.
46 Çavdar, The Loss of Modesty, 11–12.
47 Power et al., “Football and Politics,” 1.
48 Lüküslü and Dinçşahin, “Shaping Bodies,” 202.
49 Ibid., 198.
50 Irak, “Supportérisme et engagement,” 78–9.
51 Koç, Özen-Aytemur, and Erdemir, “Powerful Actor,” 1904.
52 Amani, “Football in Turkey.”
53 Erdoğan tried also to establish loyalty of Club boards through tax amnesties and real estate allocations.
54 Apart from the neoliberalization of football in Turkey, there is a global trend especially after the Bosman ruling in 1995 through which the restriction for football players in the EU to move to another team after the end of their contract without payment of the transfer fee was removed. Thus, the neoliberal wave shaking the world affected football as well by commodifying the sport.
55 Zeynep Özar. “Hayat Fena Hâlde Futbola Benzer.” Socrates Dergi, February 3, 2016, https://www.socratesdergi.com/hayat-fena-halde-futbola-benzer/.
56 Rico Rizzitelli. “Le football turc en coupe réglée.” Libération, February 13, 2017, and Erturan-Ogut, “Neoliberalizing Football,” 6.
57 Erhart, “United in Protest,” 1727.
58 “Taraftarsız Stadyum Açılışı.” Evrensel, April 10, 2016.
59 Hasan Al. “Başakşehir, Damat Gümüşdağ’a, Yok Pahasına Satılmış.” January 16, 2018. http://www.patronlardunyasi.com/haber/Basaksehir-damat-Gumusdag-a-yok-pahasina-satilmis/200596. At the opening of Başakşehir Stadium, Erdoğan, who was the prime minister at the time and running in the elections for the Turkish presidency, was given a shirt with the number 12, representing his likely success in the twelfth presidential elections a couple of months later. Following the ceremony, the club manager declared that jersey number 12 would be out of circulation permanently while the club fans repeatedly opened a banner saying: “Our shirt number 12 is reserved for our President forever.”
60 “AKP'li belediye meclis üyesinin babasına 2 milyonluk ihale.” Evrensel, April 3, 2017.
61 Torunlar Holding, at the same time, has made significant amounts of donations to Ensar Foundation where Bilal Erdoğan is a board member. See “Organize işler.” Deutsche Welle, January 31, 2020.
62 Previously, he served as municipal councilor for AKP in Küçükçekmece and was the founding chairman of the party’s Youth Branches in the district.
63 Turkish Commerce Registry Gazette (Türkiye Ticaret Sicili Gazetesi, TTSG). 15.11.2006, no. 6683, p. 356.
64 Makro Construction and Ercan Uyan played a significant part in the transfer from Barcelona to Başakşehirspor of Turkish player Arda Turan, who in turn contributed to Erdoğan’s “Yes Campaign” for the Constitutional Referendum in 2017, while Erdoğan was the best man at Turan’s wedding. See Çiğdem Toker. “Başakşehir, konut sertifikası, futbol vesaire.” Cumhuriyet, January 16, 2018.
65 Volkan Ağır. “Başakşehir’i Siyasetten Bağımsız Düşünemeyiz.” Gazeteduvar, January 19, 2019.
66 Chloé Rebaudo. “Politique et Football. Ça ne tourne pas rond.” Le Taurillon, June 18, 2018.
67 “How to build a Turkish title contender from scratch.” Turkey from the Terraces, December 20, 2017 https://turkeyfromtheterraces.com/stories/2017/12/19/how-to-build-a-turkish-title-contender-from-scratch
68 Mithat Fabian Sözmen. “Başkanın Takımı Başakşehir ve Hedefleri.” Evrensel, April 18, 2018.
69 Another measure has been television censorship in the form of muting anti-government slogans on live broadcast. Kalaycı, “A Not-So -Friendly.”
70 Erturan-Ogut, “Neoliberalizing Football,” 2.
71 Ibid., 91.
72 Additionally, the sister of Ahmet Çalık, Şükran Akbulut, is married to Ali Akbulut who is the cousin of Ahmet Çalık. Ali Akbulut was previously the chairman of the executive board of Feza Gazetecilik, which was the media organ of Fethullah Gülen’s Cemaat, and he was also a shareholder of Bank Asya.
73 Patrick Keddie. “Dinamo Mesken: Turkish Football as a Political … Football.” Los Angeles Review of Books, March 28, 2015.
74 Andrew Wilks. “Turkish fans walking away from football over politics.” The National, June 18, 2021.
75 Sözmen, “Başkanın Takımı.”
76 In the football season 2019-2020, Başakşehirspor was the least successful team to draw spectators among 18 teams, with an average of 3037 spectators per game. “Süper Lig'de seyirci ortalamaları (2019-2020).” Goal, January 4, 2020 https://www.goal.com/tr/haber/super-lig-seyirci-ortalamalari-ortalamasi-sayilari-2019-2020/1mr83ui43ezlw14oqmcjb3urxf
77 McManus, “Been There,” 4.
78 Emre Sarigül. “Başakşehir’s Push to Upset Old Order in Turkey Gets Ultimate Examination.” The Guardian, May 17, 2019.
79 Adrien Mathieu. “Turquie - Ambitieux et proche du président Erdogan, l’Istanbul Basaksehir, le club en pleine ascension | Goal.com.” Goal, January 27, 2018 https://www.goal.com/fr/news/turquie-ambitieux-et-proche-du-president-erdogan-listanbul/e67yh493dg6×1nqk8psr9g3ho
80 Fiske, “The Cultural,” 35.
81 Crawford, Consuming Sport, ix.
82 Mustafa Pamukoğlu. “Başakşehir Futbol Kulübü Projesi Tutar Mı? 1.” Aydınlık Gazetesi, January 24, 2018.
83 By saying that he expects “Başakşehir to aim for the championship in the league of politics just as in the football league (…) For as long as we have not been present in these fields, our political power will also not increase,” Erdoğan admits both his desire for that team to be the champion and the weakness of religious conservatives in sports. “Erdoğan ‘AK Gençliği’ Başakşehir Tribününe Çağırdı: Şampiyonluğa Oynuyorsunuz.” Diken, April 14, 2018.
84 Gökberk, “Başakcity.”
85 “Nereden Geliyor Bu Değirmenin Suyu.” Odatv, December 29, 2018 https://odatv4.com/nereden-geliyor-bu-degirmenin-suyu-29121836.html.
86 “TFF Yönetim Kurulu’na AKP damgası!” Sözcü, June 2, 2019.
87 A detailed view can be explored using the Graph Commons web site: “Başakşehir Football Club,” https://graphcommons.com/graphs/a3c3fe4c-4185-489a-863c-039110dc370f?auto=true&layout=fa2
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Hüseyin Kalaycı
Hüseyin Kalaycı taught classes in departments of political science, international relations, and sociology at various private universities in Turkey before working as an associate professor in the Department of Foreign Languages at Yangtze Normal University. He has published books, book chapters, and articles on separatism, sub-national movements, and sports and politics.