Beyond mutually hurting stalemate: why did the peace process in Turkey (2009–2015) fail?

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the peace process between the Turkish government and the PKK, invoking the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) formulations of Ripeness Theory. It questions why the negotiations failed although Turkey’s conditions had become ripe for resolution. This research shows that even though the ripe moment occurred before the process steered the parties toward the negotiation table, their perspectives regarding the table ultimately changed due to both domestic and international developments. Hence, the MHS seized at the beginning of the process did not turn into the MEO that would lead to resolution.

KEYWORDS:

• Peace process
• Kurdish question
• PKK
• conflict resolution
• Ripeness Theory

Introduction

When Ripeness Theory emerged, it primarily explained how peace negotiations started but did not present a straightforward answer regarding how to move to the reconciliation phase. Over time, this gave rise to the formulation of two preconditions to get a positive result out of negotiations: ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS) and ‘mutually enticing opportunity’ (MEO).¹ The dynamics paving the way for reconciliation are explained by two factors: MHS as the push factor that urges parties to enter negotiations and MEO as the pull factor that leads to a successful negotiation.² This study, employing MHS and MEO formulations, will investigate the factors that urged the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), parties to enter negotiations and yet hindered the reconciliation during the peace process between 2009 and 2015.

The peace process in Turkey was started in 2009 for resolving the Kurdish question.³ During the first stage of the peace process, the focus was on the democratic demands long voiced by the Kurdish population. These demands mainly included strengthening local authorities and recognition of Kurdish identity and cultural rights. Though the initial process ended in 2011, it gained momentum once again in 2012, and it was relatively more transparent and public than in its initial phase.⁴

The second stage of the peace process began when a group of Kurdish politicians visited Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, in January 2013. In this period, there was regular shuttle diplomacy between these politicians and Öcalan and the PKK. Additionally, the government developed a series of mechanisms to institutionalize and legalize this process. For example, Wise People’s Committee (Akil İnsanlar Heyeti) was formed in 2013 to understand societal expectations for the peace process, and Resolution Process Committee (Çözüm Süreci Komisyonu) was also formed in the National Assembly.⁵ Furthermore, a Law on Eliminating Terrorism and Strengthening Social Integration (Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun) was introduced in 2014.⁶ However, as is well-known, it is never easy to move from conflict to peace. Although this process was seen as ‘a historic moment’ or ‘a year of opportunity’ when it first began, it ended in the summer of 2015, and armed conflict started again.⁷

In this study, Zartman’s Ripeness Theory is used to look at the process’s failure through its push and pull model. The study’s empirical goal is to reveal the factors that moved the parties toward the negotiation table and the reasons for the failure of the process. In this way, we may have a more refined understanding of the obstacles placed in front of negotiations and the process’s overall fragility. This study begins by contending that peace talks began at a ripe moment. However, it argues that even though the talks began at a precipitous moment, this ripeness could not be maintained throughout the negotiation process. In other words, the MHS did not turn into MEO, and so the process failed.

Methodologically, this study leans on a qualitative case study. Data was collected through field research conducted between March 2018 and December 2019. Secondary data sources such as public statements of high-level actors were also analyzed. To collect primary sources, twenty in-depth elite interviews were conducted with the actors involved in the negotiation process directly or indirectly, including political elites, bureaucrats, civil society members, journalists, and intellectuals/academics. We should note that there were two constraints on reaching the relevant actors in the field deriving from the political tensions in Turkey: election processes and the ‘sensitivity’ of the topic. While this research was being conducted, trustees were appointed to replace ousted mayors in several municipalities in the Southeast. Therefore, some deputies representing the Kurdish side spent most of their shifts in the region and cancelled their scheduled appointments. Second, it was also observed that interviewees abstained from speaking about ‘sensitive’ issues when the occasion arose. Indeed, both the urban warfare fought in Turkey following the failure of the peace process and the Turkish army’s cross-border military operations against the PYD (Partîya Yekîtî ya Democrat / Democratic Union Party) in Syria caused the interviewees to be more sensitive and hold back while speaking. Thus, except for names available in sources open to public, the interviewees’ names are not mentioned in this study to ensure their safety and protect their sensibility.

The study comprises four main parts. First, the literature review on the failure of the peace process in Turkey is presented and evaluated. Second, the push and pull model developed by Zartman within Ripeness Theory is explained. Third, the parties’ motives for sitting at the negotiation table and the ripeness of the process in each phase are revealed. Finally, the reasons for not maintaining this ripeness are discussed.

Literature review

Many studies have been carried out about Turkey’s peace process and its failure. One example of scholars who study the Kurdish Opening is Pusane, who attributes its failure to the divided nature of the actors on both sides of the conflict. She asserts the process failed because of domestic factors such as the nationalist reactions against the process and its mishandling.⁸ Çiçek, on the other hand, argues that the failure of the peace process was due to the Turkish nationalist ideological-political character of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), its adoption of the neoliberal Islamist politics and the lack of deep democratic values, and its inability to handle the Kurdish issue administratively. Hence, he underlines that the AKP government cannot deal with the issue through political or legal means and cannot go beyond the traditional national security policy.⁹ In another study, Aydınlı and Özcan claim that the conflict resolution and counter-terrorism approach should have been employed concurrently for the initiative to be successful.¹⁰ Lastly, Kardaş and Balcı present the inter-societal security trilemma among nationalist Kurds (the PKK and various political parties and non-governmental organizations), Islamists (the AKP government), and the state (bureaucracy and opposition parties) as the main reason for the Kurdish Opening’s failure.¹¹

In relation to the Resolution Process, Özpek analyzes the role of the political elites, such as Erdoğan and Öcalan. He offers Erdoğan’s individual political calculations and his difference of opinion with the Kurdish-oriented People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) and the PKK on the presidential system as the main explanation for the failure of the process.¹² Political leaders play a vital role in resolving conflicts, so their personalities, identities, biases, perceptions and interests should be taken into account when making an analysis about a negotiation process. Yet, they have to calculate national and international factors/contexts as well when they make a decision, even if for personal political ambitions. In short, we think that the prolonged Turkey-PKK conflict and attending peace efforts cannot be reduced to the elite-level due to complex, multi-dimensional, domestic and regional factors regarding the Kurdish question, even though it is not possible to exactly measure which one affected the peace process more.

It is also stated that the AKP went through existential crises during the process, such as the 2013 Gezi Park Protests, the 17–25 December Operations, and the Kobane protests, furthering the concerns about remaining in power and hampering efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue.¹³ On the other hand, it is argued that the lack of unity and coordination within the Kurdish side posed an obstacle to build a vigorous and developed pattern of communication between the two sides. For example, the spectacular success of the HDP in the 7 June 2015 elections was regarded as a threat by the PKK, which had been holding the leadership status among Kurds for three decades, because the HDP could have taken the place of the PKK.¹⁴ This sense of threat motivated the PKK to carry out its armed attacks again.¹⁵ Yet, domestic dynamics alone cannot provide a thorough insight as to why the Resolution Process failed. This could only show one side of the coin.

While internal factors made the process more fragile, external factors had a destructive impact on it. Changing regional dynamics, particularly the Syrian civil war, complicated the Kurdish issue and brought about spoiling risks for the peace process beyond Turkey’s control.¹⁶ The powerful ethnic and cultural connections between the Kurdish population in Turkey and Syria, and ideological and organic ties between the PKK and the PYD complicated the issue further.¹⁷ The Turkish government amended its stance towards the Kurdish issue because of increasing security concerns in the region and decreased its tolerance towards PYD/PKK activities. Full disarmament of the PKK, one of the first conditions of the Turkish government for proceeding with the peace process, became unrealistic given the instability in Syria. Some researchers comment on the process’ failure based on the regional/external factors, namely the political and territorial gains of PYD and the fear of separatist movements among the Kurdish population in Turkey inspired by these gains.¹⁸ These studies can provide insight regarding how regional factors affected the resolution process practically, but mostly the content is descriptive, and a comprehensive account of conflict resolution theory is lacking.

To sum up, each one of these studies pays attention to a specific feature or a specific actor of the process rather than treat it as a whole and offer a holistic approach. Mostly, the 2009–2011 Kurdish/Democratic Opening Process and 2013–2015 Resolution Process have been thought of as separate processes, and related analyses have been made in this direction. However, we treat these processes as a whole and see them as two different stages, two different trivets of the same process because the process that started in 2009 (and even earlier with secret talks) somehow went on until 2015 albeit with ups and downs. Moreover, it is not possible to put attempts towards resolving such a complex, transnational, and regional/international issue as the Kurdish Question and the failure of these attempts down to a certain actor or domestic factors. Therefore, we intend to exhibit a multi-dimensional, inclusive and holistic approach to analyze the emergence of the peace process in Turkey and its failure. We try to reveal that both domestic and international factors pushed the conflicting parties towards the negotiation table, while these factors also destabilized the peace process, albeit at different levels, depending on the changing circumstances and the perceptions of political actors.

In this study, Zartman’s Ripeness Theory is utilized to look at the process’ failure through its push and pull model. The peace process has been studied by some researchers within Ripeness Theory. For instance, Tezcür analyzed whether the resolution process that started in 2013 between the Turkish state and the PKK had reached the ripe moment or not. Due to the limited number of civilian and security force casualties and geographically contained and seasonably constrained character of the conflict, he suggests that the conflict hurts neither side too badly. Thus, the military situation before the process was not necessarily a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, but it was a ‘mutually bearable stalemate’. It was not ‘ripe for the peace’ because both sides were capable and willing to clash against each other. Consequently, we need to look at alternative factors outside of the combat zone, such as electoral calculations and geopolitical concerns of the AKP to understand the timing of the 2013 resolution process.¹⁹

As is understood, Tezcür had strong skepticism regarding aspirations for peace. His skepticism has indeed a logical basis, especially if we think about the result of the process. However, the crucial point in Ripeness Theory is that a ripe moment is mainly a ‘perceptual’ moment. It is mostly about perception, will, and expectations of the actors apart from the number of casualties and costs. This means that it is not just an objective moment, but is based on the subjective perceptions of conflicting parties. Hence, they can feel MHS although they hold their power. To illustrate, the 1990 peace negotiations in South Africa did not start due to increasing casualties, but started thanks to the perceived MHS by the conflicting parties.²⁰ Also, in Turkey, at the beginning of each process, there was an expectation, hope and perception among the people and the leaders supporting the negotiations even though they knew that attaining peace would be exceedingly difficult after almost thirty-year-old bloody conflict. On the other hand, 2015–2016 turned out to be one of the bloodiest and deadliest periods in the history of the Turkey-PKK conflict, but we have seen no known peace attempt since 2015.

Focusing on similar objective indicators, Ünal puts forward that the conflict was ripe for resolution, and Ripeness Theory is beneficial to explain why the peace process in Turkey begun. He even emphasizes in line with Zartman that reaching a MHS is the prerequisite for the emergence of a negotiation process. Meanwhile, he acknowledges that, although ripeness explains the inauguration of negotiations properly, it does not explain whether they will be successfully finalized.²¹ Considering Ünal’s arguments, we attempt to apply a different framework to contribute to Ripeness Theory. In this regard, extending the ripeness perspective by using the MHS concept in the broadest sense would provide a better device. Unlike Ünal, we try to go beyond MHS and employ the concept of MEO to clarify the emergence and failure of the peace process. Lastly, our research is methodologically different from his research because we analyze public statements of political leaders and benefit from elite interviews conducted with the actors who are involved in the peace process directly or indirectly. We think that their perceptions about the peace process have importance as they affected the negotiation table.

Zartman’s Ripeness Theory: push and pull model

Ripeness Theory explains why and when conflicting parties sit at the negotiation table for conflict resolution. According to Zartman, the parties can end the conflict only when they are ready. In other words, they start negotiations when unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked, and the parties feel they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.²² Two perceptual elements are needed for negotiations to start: a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a way out (WO).

Zartman argues that ‘plateaus’ and ‘precipice’ can lead to the emergence of a MHS perception as they put pressure on the parties to resolve the conflict. While the former can be seen as a ‘deadlock’, the latter can be seen as a ‘deadline’ of an upcoming catastrophe.²³ In the condition of plateau, the conflicting parties reach a stalemate and suffer from this intolerable situation because they cannot gain a victory or create unilateral solutions. As the conceptual opposite of the plateau, a forthcoming ‘precipice’ may cause a potential enormous loss and/or considerable shift in the parties’ power positions.

On the other hand, WO, as the second essential element of ripeness, leans on the parties’ perception that it is possible to come to reconciliation through negotiations.²⁴ If the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (even if not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out.²⁵ In this situation, both parties share the condition of being ready to reconcile. As a result, MHS and WO perceptions, stemming from a recent or impending catastrophe, give the parties the feeling of potential for progress toward resolving the conflict, and then a ripe moment might occur.

There have been some criticisms of the early forms of Ripeness Theory. One of the most significant criticisms is that a conflict being costly or locked in a stalemate cannot be sufficient regarding ripeness. Urlacher asserts that a costly and persistent conflict can last for decades with no effort for a solution.²⁶ On the other hand, Pruitt and Kim disagree with the idea that there should be a mutual stalemate and point out the situations in which while there was a perception of stalemate by one of the parties, the negotiations started thanks to the optimism of the other party.²⁷

Another criticism is that Ripeness Theory overlooks the fact that the parties may decide to enter negotiations for reasons other than reaching a peace deal. Not every negotiation attempt is made with ‘good faith’. Accepting to begin negotiations could be a way for the conflict parties to buy time, gain legitimacy, or international recognition.²⁸ Additionally, beginning negotiations is not binding and does not necessarily guarantee the participation of an insurgent group or a government.²⁹

Moreover, Pruitt claims that the continuation of a negotiation depends on whether the forces that led motivation to end the conflict continue after the agreement and whether the optimism about the agreement’s usefulness is maintained.³⁰ Moreover, various groups on both sides of the conflict, not merely the leaders as suggested by Zartman, must be ready to begin negotiations and agree with the other party.³¹ Put differently, a coalition of subgroups, including moderates and hawks/radicals, should be involved in peace negotiations. When a broad central coalition happens, negotiation becomes likely; and if the coalition persists, a lasting agreement is likely to be reached.³² In this way, the conflict can become ripe enough to be resolved. Pruitt does not deny the significance of leadership because leadership is a crucial element in forming this broad central coalition. If a political leader supports negotiations, the central coalition will be broader, especially if the leader has high standing and is known as a patriot that can be trusted with the interests of the group.³³

Considering all these criticisms, Zartman revised Ripeness Theory with a new formulation called the ‘pull and push model’ to explain how the ripe moment initially seized can be maintained throughout the negotiations and a successful result can be obtained. In the formulation, while MHS is defined as a push element that pushes parties to begin negotiations, MEO is defined as a pull element that leads the negotiation to succeed. Perception of ripeness should be maintained throughout the negotiation to prevent the parties from abandoning the negotiation and attempting to find a unilateral solution. For this reason, MHS perception serves as a factor that compels the parties to begin negotiations. Yet, it should be maintained during the negotiations to come to a reconciliation. Additionally, WO should create the perception of MEO and should be turned into a formula for resolution.³⁴ Developing MEO during the negotiation phase is an essential condition to reconcile and resolve the conflict.

MEO can be formed by the parties attending the negotiations or a third party. This should be an attractive formula for the conflicting parties and serve their needs and interests better than the status quo. When the proposed deal brings more immense benefits than continuing the conflict, MEO can emerge. For the negotiators and the third party, the difficulty lies in creating an attractive formula with details for reconciliation.³⁵ Therefore, formal and fundamental demands from the parties should be met with the formula, and the process should be fortified with external incentives and restrictions so that it runs its course.³⁶

As mentioned above, we aim to systematically apply Zartman’s Ripeness Theory to the peace process in Turkey. The concept of MHS, as the initial prerequisite for a negotiated settlement, is very useful for understanding the beginning of the negotiations in Turkey. However, we need to emphasize that ripeness of Turkey-PKK conflict is rooted in social, economic and political costs/risks along with the military stalemate, and national and regional dynamics paved the way for riper circumstances for resolution of the issue. Accordingly, we examine why the peace process in Turkey failed, although the ripeness of the process in each phases steered the conflicting parties toward the negotiation table. In other words, we elaborate on why the MHS did not turn into MEO in the case of Turkey’s peace process.

The democratic opening process: a ripe moment for resolution

The first hopes for Turkey’s peace process emerged with then-Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır speech in 2005. Before the speech, ‘Turkish intellectuals’ called for disarmament by the PKK in response to its increasing violence activities in 2004–2005 and called for an ‘initiative’ from the government.³⁷ In the speech, Erdoğan said that he would resolve the Kurdish question with more human rights and more democracy. For the first time in the conflict’s history, a prime minister explicitly recognized the ‘Kurdish question’ unlike how the issue had long been defined, i.e. ‘the PKK or terror problem’. Erdoğan’s meeting with the aforementioned intellectuals in 2005 was seen as the first step to resolving the Kurdish question by democratic means rather than military means.³⁸

A couple of opportunity perceptions that arose in that period (2005–2009) caused the parties to accept participating in the process. The first one is that both parties thought the conflict was unsustainable, and the costs and risks of pursuing a military struggle were not acceptable. Even though the state was contending against it, the PKK strengthened its organizational structure further and founded the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), a quasi-state structure, in 2007 to create a de facto autonomy. Also, the PKK carried out typical, urbanized terrorist attacks such as targeting civilians and kidnapping businesspeople, public officials, and teachers to undermine the government authority besides its attacks against military bases. Therefore, military means were not a solution on its own and were merely a vicious cycle of violence. This situation was acknowledged by the state since quite a few failed attempts rendered the issue in an ‘unmanageable status’. Thus, the AKP opted for a new means of handling the question because ‘the “Kurdish Question” would not be resolved by the policies of the past’.³⁹

The PKK also understood that it could not overcome Turkish security forces. Even if it made some limited gains, the PKK was not able to realize its target of replacing the state authority in the Kurdish-populated southeastern region.⁴⁰ In an interview, Karayılan, one of the leaders of the PKK, mentions a case of common incapability to win by saying that the PKK ‘would not possibly surrender or be rectified using violence. However, there is also the fact that we cannot defeat the state either’. Öcalan’s brother Osman Öcalan stressed the PKK could not achieve its goals by utilizing violence anymore. He also pointed out that the PKK was ready to negotiate and resolve the conflict through peaceful means by saying, ‘Neither side can win this war, it is impossible … Even if the PKK members receive a blow, there can be found more people behind who want to take their place. The PKK can always renew itself’.⁴¹ For this reason, the Turkish armed forces and the PKK were locked in a mutual stalemate, which became the motivation for a negotiated settlement.⁴²

In addition to the costly military deadlock, the parties’ quest for legitimacy to hold their power positions vis-a-vis existential threats was the second reason for resolution. In this way, they saw the negotiation table as an opportunity. The PKK thought that if the government addressed the PKK and began negotiations, it would ensure its legitimacy. It was listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union (EU). In this context, it hoped to remove the ‘terrorist’ label by entering into a negotiation process with the Turkish state.⁴³ As one interviewee mentioned, ‘for Öcalan, even the fact that negotiations were beginning was an important baseline for legitimacy, and it was satisfactory enough that this was happening under the society’s very eyes’.⁴⁴

Similarly, the AKP perceived the process as an opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, it was victorious in every election. Yet, the AKP was perceived as a threat by the secular state establishment. Hence, the AKP openly admitted in the initial stages of its power a key to remaining in power was to avoid conflicting with the secular block that the army was leading.⁴⁵ Encouraged over time by the results of the elections, the AKP tried to limit the military’s impact on politics and keep its influence at the legitimate level. In this context, ‘the AKP realized in its struggle with the military that it would not be enough to solely contend with the actor itself; it also had to control the political sphere that was in the control of the army.’⁴⁶ The AKP attempted to do so by resolving the Kurdish question. In other words, to democratize Turkey and depoliticize the military, the Kurdish question must have been resolved.⁴⁷

Moreover, the AKP got above-average support from the Kurds in the Eastern Anatolia and the Southeastern Anatolia regions, where the majority had previously voted for Kurdish-oriented parties.⁴⁸ This also established a significant amount of Kurdish influence inside the party.⁴⁹ In turn, the AKP perceived itself as a party representing the Kurds as well. One of the interviewees explains this situation in the following way:

It is seen that the AKP was a party around 2009 that received almost 55–60 percent of votes across Turkey from people with a Kurdish identity. The AKP had at least as much claim as the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) had in the name of representing the Kurdish identity.⁵⁰

In this context, the Kurds became an essential and necessary ally for the AKP against the Kemalist tutelage. By putting forward that the same Kemalist mindset pressured both conservative-Islamist groups and the Kurds, the AKP established a bond between the Kurds and its party base.⁵¹ AKP leaders also believed in that the idea of pan-Islamism would simplify their job of resolving the Kurdish issue on political grounds.⁵² In short, for the inner circle of AKP, starting from an Islamist point and forming a mutual point of resistance against the pressure from the Kemalist regime with the idea of ummah was a viable strategy that would more easily resolve the Kurdish question by political means.⁵³

One should also remember that n its first years in power, the AKP used a discourse in favor of democracy, human rights, cultural rights and pluralism as part of the EU harmonization process. It required support from the West in case of any military threat to remain in power.⁵⁴ Accordingly, the AKP accelerated EU reforms, and focused on the social, economic, and political dimensions of the Kurdish question. The goal of the AKP was to be recognized as a statutory political party by the secular groups in Turkey and the West. According to one of the interviewees, ‘ … virtually the only element that demonstrated the democratic identity of the AKP to the international circles, even after the Gezi Protests, was the Kurdish initiative that was still progressing, albeit in a sloppy manner.’⁵⁵ Consequently, the AKP’s attempt was towards earning international and domestic legitimacy against the military by maintaining the EU reforms.⁵⁶

Various regional dynamics pushed the government to produce a solution as well. First, the AKP realized that the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq would be permanent and wanted to develop a new policy toward the region. Also, any conflict, especially in the southeast of Turkey, was barring Turkey’s goals of being ‘an energy hub and a junction point for pipelines.’⁵⁷ In this context, the Turkish government strengthened its financial and security relations with the KRG step by step. Normalization of relations with Iraqi Kurds was compatible with Turkey’s new regional policy, called ‘zero problems with neighbors’. To accomplish all these goals, the idea of finding a solution to the Kurdish question became urgent. In other words, ‘speaking to the Kurds in Turkey was necessary to speak to the Kurds in Iraq.’⁵⁸

In the light of these developments and priorities, the parties agreed to sit at the negotiation table. Negotiations provided both parties with the opportunity to gain legitimacy and protect their political power. Thus, it was apparent that the circumstances were ripe for the 2009 democratic opening process to begin. Then, in August 2009, the Kurdish Initiative’s official announcement was followed by a series of statements coming from the government actors. The beginning of the process was called ‘a historic opportunity’ by then-President Abdullah Gül. In his speech, Gül remarked,

I have been within the state system for ten years; all fractions, be them civilian or military, are acting with a sense of common understanding, collaboration, and coalition more than ever before. The energy is being spent on a mutual basis; when one side does something, the other side does not try to bar it anymore.⁵⁹

These statements by Gül can be seen as another crucial indicator of the ripeness of the Kurdish question’s political resolution.

The failure of the democratic opening process: why did the MHS fail to turn into MEO?

A real peace process cannot merely be defined as ceasing armed conflicts and refraining from direct violence. The social, political, economic, psychological and security aspects of a conflict should be addressed with a comprehensive approach. The goal of a reconciliation process should be further beyond merely ending the violence.⁶⁰ Although the Democratic Opening process in Turkey started under the ripe circumstances seized, these ripe circumstances did not turn into MEO, and so did not lead to a reconciliation for distinct reasons.

Firstly, there was not even a consensus regarding what kind of peace the parties wanted.⁶¹ There was a ‘paradigmatic difference’ between the AKP and the PKK regarding the issue. While the AKP was aiming to make the PKK lay down arms and ensure broader democratic and cultural rights to individuals, the PKK pursued the process to form a self-administration, set up its own institutions, enable its militants to enter politics, and have Öcalan released.⁶²

On 15/22 August 2009, a ‘road map’ was proposed by Öcalan in which three steps were put forward for the Opening Process: (1) a declaration of a permanent ceasefire by the PKK; (2) the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the initiative of government to eliminate legal obstacles and the PKK to withdraw its armed forces; and (3) establishment of a democratic constitution. The PKK was to lay down arms and turn into a legal force if these conditions had been met. However, the government demanded first that the PKK lay down its arms for the Kurdish question to be resolved. So, the state did not respond to the road map.⁶³ The disagreement over the issues of withdrawal and disarmament became a fatal factor leading to the failure of both processes.⁶⁴

Without a clear plan and a mutual road map, it was not possible to tell whether any progress was being made towards a resolution.⁶⁵ As a result of the lack of clear terms, there was less pressure on the actors to be loyal to their commitments. For this reason, the Opening Process was described as botched by many from the beginning.⁶⁶ In other words, ‘even though it was one of the greatest steps the AKP took during its history, its requirements were not met.’⁶⁷

Two other shortcomings were the lack of transparency in the process and the exclusion of crucial actors from the process.⁶⁸ Oppositional parties and groups in the National Assembly, particularly the nationalist ones, did not fully trust the process. While the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partist, CHP) ‘criticized the Kurdish opening as an irresponsible initiative of the government […] and expressed its concern that this policy carried the risk of giving way to the ethnic disintegration of the Turkish society,’ the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) claimed it would ‘endanger Turkey’s identity as a unitary nation-state.’⁶⁹ To overcome aforementioned suspicion, the government published a brochure about the initiative at the beginning of the process. It emphasized that the language of education was Turkish and that it would remain that way, and that the government would not address criminal organizations and never sit at the negotiation table with them.⁷⁰ Mottos like ‘mothers shall not cry’ and ‘historic brotherhood’ were frequently used by the government to explain the process.⁷¹ However, these did not eliminate the doubts of opposition parties because only some government officials and the PKK leaders knew how the process was proceeding and where it would end up. As a result, the government was frequently accused of separatism by the opposition parties during the process. These concerns should have been eliminated by putting into effect much more transparent policies so that the public would also show support for the process.⁷²

Lastly, both parties’ failure to ensure a central coalition within themselves posed an obstacle to the ripe moment turning into MEO. Although Erdoğan said that he was ready to lose all kinds of titles and seats just to solve the Kurdish question, the reactions coming from even its own Sunni-Turkish base made it difficult for the AKP to face controversial and delicate issues. A similar problem of consensus happened in the PKK side as well. Despite the key position of Öcalan, the Kurdish movement produced a series of different power centers over the years, which occasionally made it difficult for the movement to act as a unified actor. From the moment the Kurdish Opening was initiated, this problem was observed on different occasions. One example would be the ‘Habur Incident’ that happened at the beginning of the process. On 19 October 2009, 34 PKK members came to Turkey from Iraq through the Habur border crossing and surrendered to the Turkish government. The welcome given to these PKK militants was pictured by radical Kurdish actors as ‘the failure of the state’ and turned into PKK propaganda. This scandal was met with disapproval even by some circles within the AKP, although then-Interior Minister Beşir Atalay saw it as a ‘road accident’. The Habur Incident caused the support level for the Kurdish Opening to go down by almost 20 percent, from 45.6 percent of the initial support to 27.1 percent.⁷³ Additionally, optimistic statements on the possibility of finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question at the beginning of the process came up against acts of terror by more radical groups shortly after like the Reşadiye attack in 2009 and the Silvan attack in 2011. This situation created the security dilemma between the parties and prevented the formation of an MEO perception.

The Kurdish resolution process: another ripe moment for resolution

The Silvan Attack caused Turkey to face another vicious cycle of violence. 2012 was the bloodiest year since 1999 in clashes between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK. Between 1984 and 2013, more than 22,000 acts of violence occurred, and the death toll reached 39,476, out of which 5478 were civilians, and 6764 were security personnel, including temporary village guards. However, neither the PKK nor the Turkish armed forces accomplished their goals through violence. Although the PKK continued recruiting new militants, it failed to mobilize Kurdish masses to fight against the Turkish army.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the Turkish state could not overcome the PKK. Moreover, the financial cost of the conflict for Turkey is estimated to be 300–450 billion USD. For this reason, the Turkish state and the PKK were locked in another mutual hurting stalemate, which became one motivation for the resolution process. This stalemate and the resulting fatalities pushed both the Turkish government and the PKK to look for an alternative, which is how the meetings between the two parties started again.⁷⁵ Also, as a forthcoming precipice (catastrophe), the government did not want to go back to the violent atmosphere of the 1990s in which many repressive and unlawful practices were implemented.⁷⁶ These meetings are likely to have yielded productive results as then-Prime Minister Erdoğan announced on 28 December 2012 that there were ongoing talks between the Turkish state and Öcalan.⁷⁷ This was a sign that a new process was to begin soon.

In addition to this costly stalemate, the halting of clashes was important for the AKP because of its own political agenda. The AKP had started to lose votes in regions heavily populated by Kurds as a result of its nationalist discourse starting from the 2009 local elections. Further, the foundation of Hüda-Par in 2012, a Kurdish Islamic party using Islamist rhetoric just like the AKP, created concerns for the party leadership in terms of election estimations.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Erdoğan was aspiring to turn Turkey into a presidential system. For this, he needed to win 400 seats in the National Assembly in the coming election. In this context, Erdoğan established a direct relationship between the Kurdish question and the presidential system and stated: ‘If you want the “peace process” to continue, ensure that there are 400 lawmakers so that a strong party can come to power to realize it.’⁷⁹ With Kurdish support, Erdoğan would have overcome domestic opposition against the system he hoped to implement.⁸⁰ The presidential system could have been a significant opportunity for the PKK as well to make constitutional changes.⁸¹ Like Erdoğan, Öcalan was personally influential in starting the resolution process and tried to make way for negotiations. In his books, he points at himself as the only leader who understands the essence of the issue and can resolve it.⁸² According to an interviewee,

Within limited intelligence and communication channels, Öcalan makes his own interpretation of the Turkish and Middle East politics. When he thinks that the space for bargaining with the government is opened, he takes an initiative himself and tries to interfere.⁸³

Hunger strikes created an opportunity for Öcalan to prove this claim and paved the way for bargaining with the government to restart the negotiations. That Öcalan could end the hunger strikes before any fatalities occurred gave the government the impression that he was still the leader of the Kurdish movement.⁸⁴ Also, Öcalan was an actor who had been in prison for a long time, and he was seeking legitimacy to be released. Thus, he was a ‘weak’ actor for the government to carry out the negotiations with.⁸⁵ As a result, the government chose Öcalan as the addressee for the new process.

According to a rumor in the political backstage, in a letter claimed to be written by Öcalan addressing Erdoğan, he stated that the next target in the process that started with the MIT crisis (National Intelligence Organization/Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı) of 7 February in 2012 would be Erdoğan himself.⁸⁶ Öcalan wanted to tell Erdoğan in this letter:

International powers want to defeat you, but I am not in favor of allowing this because if there is one person to solve this problem, it is you. You contended against pro-tutelage powers, pro-military seculars who do not wish for the Kurdish question to be resolved.⁸⁷

It is asserted that this was a move expected by the government at the same period. This bilateral approach can be seen as an attempt to respond to a precipice that may shift their power positions, and so as an indication of a ripe moment for resolution.

Regional dynamics played a significant role in the re-establishment of the negotiation table. Developments in the Middle East, such as the Arab Uprisings, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, and the PYD’s founding of an autonomous region in Syria further complicated the conflict and carried the issue beyond Turkey’s control. Thus, they forewarned Turkey about the upcoming precipice. The Turkish government was trying to evade the turmoil in the Middle East with minimum damage. Also, the AKP wanted to take part in the redesigning of the Middle East. From the government’s perspective, the Kurdish question was clearly one of the most critical issues that needed to be handled effectively.⁸⁸ If this protracted conflict could be resolved peacefully on democratic grounds, Turkey would be able to present a democratic proposal to the people of the region and have the privilege of guiding the democratic forces.⁸⁹ On the other hand, continuation of the clash with the PKK would jeopardize the AKP’s policy toward the region. Therefore, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the Turkish government had a relatively moderate stance toward the PYD because it knew ‘you cannot have peace with the Kurds in Turkey by fighting the Syrian Kurds.’⁹⁰

On the other side, entering into the resolution process and maintaining the ceasefire was a viable option for the PKK due to the regional developments because fighting against Turkish armed forces would mean fighting two separate fronts.⁹¹ Before the process, the PKK wanted to try its canton structure of ‘Rojava’ in Turkey between 2011 and 2012 but it could not succeed in this goal. Then, it decided not to risk its gains in northern Syria by bringing up the Kurdish question in Turkey again. One interviewee explains why it opted for the resolution process as follows,

When we look at the 2011–2012 period, it is clearly seen that PKK preferred an attempt like the developments in Syria. The fact that the Turkish state had a stronger territorial control compared to the states in the Middle East made the PKK realize that a method based on violence was not viable and it would fail in such an attempt, which steered them toward the resolution process.⁹²

In brief, both parties strategically agreed to sit at the negotiation table thanks to individual, domestic and regional factors. The inefficiency of violent instruments to reach their goals created a perception of MHS in the Turkish government and the PKK again. Within the scope of domestic and regional developments, the leaders’ agenda regarding the Kurdish question paved the way for the resolution process as well. Then, the Kurdish resolution process started with Öcalan’s letter, which was read on the 2013 Newroz holiday and in which he clearly stated that the conflict was in a stalemate and the time had ripened for resolution. In his letter, Öcalan announced the end of the conflict between the Turkish state and Kurds and underlined that it was now time for a ‘cessation of hostilities’ and a shift towards political struggle instead.⁹³

Why did the Kurdish resolution process fail?

The ripe moment re-captured at the beginning of the resolution process could not be transferred to the negotiation table due to various reasons, and a perception of MEO that would lead the parties to resolution did not occur again. Some problems existed in the Democratic Opening process had been continuing. The resolution process faced additional problems rooted in the process’s handling itself and the domestic and regional political developments between 2013 and 2015.

When the resolution process started, it was observed that the parties still could not come to an agreement regarding their expectations from the ‘resolution’. Just as in the Democratic Opening process, for the government, peace meant the PKK’s disarmament and the Kurdish question’s resolution in an atmosphere of general democratization.⁹⁴ On the other hand, the Kurdish side’s expectations from the process varied from democratic autonomy and strong local administration to decentralization. For instance, it was highlighted that Turkey should withdraw reservations to the European Charter of Local Self Government and put forward the strengthening of local administrations as part of the process.⁹⁵ Gültan Kışanak, who was elected the mayor of Diyarbakır in the 2014 local elections, highlighted the demand for self-government following the elections by saying, ‘We want a share of the oil drilled in Diyarbakır’. The co-chair of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş said, ‘We will not only build fairs or culture centers. What is essential to build is democratic autonomy, this people has now come to the phase of governing itself.’⁹⁶ However, the government perceived the demand for self-government as fragmentation of the country and ‘state within the state’ and firmly rejected it.⁹⁷

Moreover, the parties could not agree on a clear road map for negotiations and the framework of reforms along the process. For example, following a meeting at Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe palace, it was understood that there was still no consensus between the government representatives and the Kurds’ İmralı Committee, except of a vague democratization perspective. Because of this ambiguity, the actors felt little popular pressure to fulfill their commitments throughout the whole process.⁹⁸

Certain problems that existed in the previous process were still lingering, like the lack of transparency and sufficient public support. Thus, the process was not socialized. In this sense, civil society organizations could have contributed invaluably to peace-building efforts by filling the void between conflicting groups and societies. However, they could not play an effective role in shaping and promoting the peace process in Turkey.⁹⁹

As the government did not open more space for civil society organizations and other regional groups, the leadership of the PKK became more legitimate in the eyes of the Kurds through negotiations.¹⁰⁰ Even Yasin Aktay, who was the vice chairperson of the AKP, criticized this attitude and claimed, ‘The Kurdish Opening … resulted in the popular feeling that the state authority surrendered the region to the PKK’. Similarly, the nationalist suspicions towards the process continued. For instance, the MHP argued ‘terror achieved its goals that could not be achieved by weapon via the process … The PKK terror organization established territorial dominance and was effective on the state institutions … Therefore, the process strengthened the terror organization and its representatives.’¹⁰¹

Not only was the process marked by obscurity and insufficient support from the public, it was also yet to be institutionalized and its rules were yet to be established. For peace building, institutions are of high significance because destabilizing effects of political and economic liberalization could be reduced to minimum via functional institutions.¹⁰² However, the government was too slow in forming the legal grounds of the process; it was at the very last moment that it took action.¹⁰³ The lack of institutions and rules made it very difficult for the process to proceed stably and caused the actors to act inconsistently and irresponsibly. The lack of democratic control over the process decreased ‘audience costs’ considerably.

The AKP acted inconsistently during the process based on its electoral needs and tried to appeal to both Turkish nationalists and the Kurdish people. When Erdoğan realized that the support of Kurdish people for the presidential system was fading, his rhetoric leaned more on the nationalist discourse.¹⁰⁴ In this way, he searched for an alternative ally to establish the presidential system without any power-sharing mechanism. Then, when the end of the process neared, in a parliamentary group meeting held on 18 March 2015, Demirtaş made his famous speech:

Dear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as long as the HDP exists, as long as those who support the HDP breathe on this land, you will not be able to become the president. Dear Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, we will not let you become the president.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, the PKK did not mind going back to violence whenever it deemed necessary¹⁰⁶ because insurgent organizations need radicalization rather than moderation to survive. At the end of June 2013, the government made public that 85 percent of the PKK’s members were still inside Turkey’s borders, and they were still committing acts of waylaying people and extorting ‘tax’ payments.¹⁰⁷ As a response to this, the PKK claimed that the government did not remain committed to its promises and stopped the withdrawal as of October 2013. Then, the government stated that it would not move to the next phase unless a full disarmament of the PKK occurred.¹⁰⁸ However, when the PKK set up trenches, built barricades and kept its arsenals in city centers, it looked as though that it never thought of laying down arms, and its purpose was merely to take advantage of the resolution process, save time, and get ready for a virulent war against the Turkish security forces.

The parties of the process were still unable to have a central and powerful coalition to build peace. On the Turkish side, the government could not get rid of the accusations of treason and separatism coming from the opponents of the process. In the same way, the Kurdish side could not incorporate its hawks into the process. While the withdrawal of militants was being discussed, the PKK changed its top leaders and strengthened the armed wing in the ninth general assembly of Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People’s Congress). The concept of war was prevailing in the assembly despite the peace process. It was decided ‘to increase armed forces even more and provide them with the technical equipment and training enough to respond to any kind of attack’. Karayılan was replaced with Cemil Bayık and Bese Hozat. This replacement was putting into power those who were ‘in favor of armed struggle.’¹⁰⁹ The discrepancy between the Kurdish side’s moderates and radicals came to light even further after the 7 June 2015 elections. Demirtaş asked the PKK to lay down arms, after Öcalan’s call following the elections. Yet, the KCK objected to this call by saying, ‘we should make it clear that the issue of the PKK laying down arms in the struggle against Turkey and the will to do so completely belong to us.’¹¹⁰

In brief, neither side formed a major pro-peace coalition within their groups. While the nationalist Turkish flank was concerned with secret topics being discussed such as ‘amnesty to Öcalan, state or presidential system’, Kurdish actors worried ‘Is the state fooling us?’. Further, according to some pundits, the exclusion of fighters from Qandil from the process caused thoughts of ‘Is the leadership selling us off?’.¹¹¹ This discrepancy brought about a lack of trust, which caused the failure to achieve consistency in negotiations.

Lastly, the parties failed to agree on which actors would participate in the process. The government refused the participation of any third parties in any capacity. This attitude of the government is derived from the failure of back channel talks in Oslo. When the Oslo process failed, the distrust of the government toward foreign actors regarding the Kurdish question became known, and the government tried to leave out international actors as much as possible and manage the process with the domestic actors completely.¹¹² Indeed, then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu maintained in a speech that the ‘main lesson’ to be learned from Oslo was the necessity of excluding the third parties from the process and taking it forward as a ‘domestic and national’ process. He said: ‘I would like to draw attention to three characteristics of the resolution process. The resolution process is national, domestic, original … The process has to be protected against external factors.’¹¹³

In response to this, the Kurdish side wanted the US to take part in the negotiations by making various statements showing that a third party is needed as a principle. The head of the KCK Executive Council, Cemil Bayık, said in an interview,

We did what no one, no movement in the world, did so that Turkey would resolve the issue. Since 1993, we have declared unilateral ceasefire nine times … No power in the world takes these steps unilaterally. It definitely discusses under a third power’s watch, signs and then actualizes … Without a third party, no issue can be resolved in the world, and none has been resolved so far. Turkey trusts the US the most.¹¹⁴

An interviewee from Wise People’s Committee explains this attitude of the PKK over the idea that it would establish a ground for its international legitimacy.¹¹⁵

The absence of a third party in the negotiations hampered the resolution of disputes and the development of policies that will steer the parties toward the negotiation table when they turn toward alternatives outside the negotiation table. Though some perceived the Wise People’s Committee as a third eye, the committee’s goal was only to socialize the process and explain it to society.¹¹⁶ One of the Wise People defines the duty of the committee this way:

Wise People served two purposes in the field. They played a role toward collecting the demands of a certain part of the society like Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia, and reducing the reactions of other regions by pulling the negative energy of the society onto themselves like a lightning rod.¹¹⁷

In addition to the problems caused by the structure of the process and the strategic goals of the parties, certain other factors rooted in domestic politics also barred the formation of a MEO perception between the parties. The domestic political crises changed the yields and purpose of the negotiation table in the parties’ eyes. It can be said that the Gezi Park Protests and the 17–25 December Operations caused the AKP to be perceived as a weak actor by the PKK. As one of the interviewee states,

Both Gezi Park Protests and 17–25 December Operations put the AKP to a stress test. The PKK is speaking with an actor to make existential decisions for itself, like laying down arms. But has this government that it is speaking with seen its day? Is it still as powerful as before? Therefore, the PKK postpones deciding until the AKP passes this stress test and stops the process.¹¹⁸

On the other hand, the AKP saw that it could not get enough political support from the Kurdish voters through the process. The HDP passed the electoral threshold by taking 13 percent of total votes in the 7 June elections and entered parliament with 80 deputies. The AKP, which wished to push forward a presidential system, remained at 41 percent and could not get the majority to form a government for the first time in 13 years. One of the interviewees comments on this situation as follows:

While the maximum percentage of votes received by the Kurdish parties was 7 percent before the process, it reached 13 percent by the end of it. Despite all these good things done during the AKP period and the improvements toward Kurds carried out by the AKP, the process served not the AKP but the HDP and developed the nationalist mindset among Kurds.¹¹⁹

Ultimately, the regional developments restrained the negotiation process from turning into MEO. Since the PKK saw the process as part of its regional strategy, it focused on the developments in northern Syria and did not want to continue its conflict with Turkey at the beginning of the process. According to one of the interviewees, ‘the fact that the state did not contend with terrorism during the resolution process made it easier for the PKK to steer its human resources and power toward Syria.’¹²⁰ Yet, the PKK changed its policy later based on the developments in Syria and sacrificed the resolution process in Turkey.¹²¹ A quasi-state structure in ‘Rojava’ in northern Syria provided the PKK with new source of inspiration. The PKK tried to commence the Kurdish Spring by changing its traditional ‘hit and run’ military tactic and adopting what is called ‘hit and stay’ and/or ‘take control of the area.’¹²² Thus, the PKK’s new strategy was first to capture a region and then to form a liberated area. Even though Öcalan argued that the PKK did not have separatist goals, the quasi-state activities of the PYD revived the so-called ‘Kurdistan’ dream once more among many nationalist Kurds. As a result, it can be said that Çandar’s claim that ‘the developments in the Middle East will certainly change the maps in a geography that involves Turkey as well’ was shared by the PKK.¹²³

As understood from all these disputes, there was a serious gap between the parties in terms of the content and the purpose of the peace process. As one of the interviewees points out, it was thought that this gap would close as the process progressed; but the gap never closed.¹²⁴ Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the ripe moment seized between the parties never turned into MEO. It could not create the perception that a genuine reconciliation and its implementation would be more beneficial for the parties than the conflict.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates how significant the pull and push model in Zartman’s Ripeness Theory is for conflict resolution literature considering the peace process in Turkey. The case study presents an example of a conflict that became ripe and ready for resolution since both parties had the perception that they would not win the war and reach their goals by violence. Additionally, it presents an example of a negotiation that did not result in success though it became ripe. This study questions why MEO did not form between the parties though the circumstances became ripe, and why the negotiations failed.

According to empirical data obtained from the research, the conflict was ripe for resolution in the beginning of the peace process because the conflicting parties saw the negotiation process’ commencement as a better alternative compared to the continuation of the conflict and accepted to sit at the negotiation table. The AKP and the PKK saw the negotiations as a way to protect their political power and believed that coming to a resolution and its implementation would genuinely yield mutual interests. On the one hand, the government thought that the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question would enhance economic prosperity and improve democracy in Turkey, in line with its international policy. Moreover, the AKP, as an Islamist movement, would gain legitimacy in the face of secular state elites thanks to the process; at the same time, it would strengthen its hand abroad, especially in its policies toward the West. On the other hand, the PKK thought it would regain its popularity with the process that was lost following the capture of Öcalan. As a violent non-state actor, the PKK also aimed to gain domestic and international legitimacy and recognition through negotiations, which was impossible to accomplish on the battlefield. All these factors and expectations paved the way for the perception of MHS between the parties and pushed them toward the negotiation table.

The MHS perception that pushed the parties toward the negotiation table could not spread over the process and could not create the MEO between the parties for several reasons. Firstly, the parties perceived the causes of the conflict differently. The government perceived the issue as a democratization problem and interpreted the negotiation process over democratization and disarmament. On the contrary, the Kurdish side perceived the issue within the framework of collective political rights and so highlighted strengthening the local administrations and power-sharing through autonomy throughout the process. As is seen, they drifted apart seriously regarding what would be negotiated. When the delicate topics came to table, the gap between the parties widened and distrust deepened. So, the different perceptions of the process and uncompromisable expectations from the negotiations posed a crucial obstacle for MEO formation.

Another factor that barred the formation of MEO is the absence of a third party during the process. Not allowing for a third party in the negotiations hindered the resolution of the disputes and the development of policies that would steer the parties toward the negotiation table again when they headed for options outside the table.

The parties failed to incorporate other actors and form a pro-peace coalition at the negotiation table. Neither the government nor the Kurdish side eliminated factionalism on their side. While they were trying to persuade the other party, they had to deal with the opposition coming from within as well. So, the parties’ failure to form a central coalition within themselves also posed an obstacle for MEO formation.

Finally, the parties’ utterly distinct perceptions about ‘the best alternatives to a negotiated deal’ can be seen as the biggest obstacle to creating MEO. During the process, the changing circumstances in both domestic and regional contexts rendered the negotiation table no longer the best alternative against the conflict for the parties. The political tensions such as the 17–25 December Operations, Gezi Park Protests, and Kobane Protests wore out the AKP as the initiator and implementer of the process. Meanwhile, they brought the PKK into doubt regarding the power of the government it was negotiating with. In the regional context, the PKK saw returning to the conflict as a better alternative to the negotiation table considering its gains in northern Syria. In the end, the AKP government realized that the process was progressing in favor of the PKK and to its detriment. Hence, the ripe moment that led to the commencement of the process did not fully spread over it. MEO did not occur between the parties, and the process failed.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Musa Akgül

Musa Akgül is a PhD Candidate in the Department of International Relations at Lancaster University. He earned his Master’s degree from the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in 2018. His primary research interests include conflict and resolution studies, international security and terrorism, Turkish politics, Turkish foreign policy, and the Kurdish question.

Çiğdem Görgün Akgül

Çiğdem Görgün Akgül is a research assistant in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Ordu University. She received her PhD from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at İstanbul University in 2020. Her primary research interests include conflict and resolution studies, deliberative democracy, and Turkish politics.

Notes

1 See, for example, Zartman, “Ripeness”; Zartman, “‘Ripeness’: Importance of Timing”; and Zartman, “Process Reasons for Failure.”

2 Zartman, “Process Reasons for Failure,” 304.

3 As is seen from the documents of ‘Oslo Talks’ leaked to the press in 2011, both parties of the conflict had already initiated a back-channel deliberation process in 2006. For more information, see Aliye Çetinkaya, “Asıl Amaçları Çözüm Sürecini Baltalamaktı.” Sabah, February 9, 2014.

4 Savran, “The Peace Process.”

5 “Çözüm süreci için komisyon tamam,” Milliyet, April 10, 2013.

6 “Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun,” Resmi Gazete, July 16, 2014.

7 During a trip to Iran in 2009, then-president Abdullah Gül said about the resolution of the Kurdish question that ‘very pleasant things will happen in the upcoming days’ and asserted that ‘a historic opportunity is seized’. See “Gül’den Kürt Açılımı Sinyali,” Milliyet, March 11, 2009.

8 Pusane, “Turkey’s Kurdish Ppening.”

9 Çiçek, “Elimination or Integration.”

10 Aydınlı and Özcan, “The Conflict Resolution.”

11 Kardaş and Balcı, “Inter-Societal Security Trilemma.”

12 Özpek, The Peace Process.

13 Çiçek, Süreç.

14 Çiçek, “Başarısız Çözüm Süreci,” 172.

15 Aktürk, “Why Did the PKK Declare,” 59.

16 Ünal, “Is it Ripe Yet?” 118–119; and Kadıoğlu, “Peace Process,” 9–10.

17 Parlar Dal, “Impact of the Transnationalization,” 1403.

18 Güneş and Lowe, “The Impact of Syrian War”; Resch, “Syria’s Impact”; and Savran, “The Peace Process.”

19 Tezcür, “Prospect for Resolution.”

20 Sisk, “Democratization in South Africa,” 56, 87.

21 Ünal, “Is it Ripe Yet?”

22 Zartman, “Timing of the Peace.”

23 Zartman, “Ripe for Resolution,” 267–68.

24 Zartman and De Soto, “Timing Mediation Initiatives,” 5.

25 Zartman, “Ripeness,” 228.

26 Urlacher, “Negotiating with Insurgents.”

27 Rubin et al., Societal Conflict, 173.

28 Urlacher, “Political Constraints and Civil War.”

29 Ghosn, “Getting to the Table.”

30 Pruitt, Whither Ripeness Theory, 13.

31 Pruitt, “Readiness Theory.”

32 Pruitt, Whither Ripeness Theory, 26

33 Pruitt, “Readiness Theory,” 1532.

34 Zartman, “Process Reasons for Failure,” 306.

35 Ibid., 310.

36 Zartman, “Ripeness.”

37 “Erdoğan Aydınları Memnun Etti,” BBC Turkish, August 10, 2005.

38 “Kürt sorunu benim sorunum,” Hürriyet, August 10, 2005.

39 Author interview, May 11, 2018, and Yeğen, “The Kurdish Peace Process,” 4.

40 Tezcür, “When Democratization Radicalizes,” 775.

41 For more information, see: Yetkin, “PKK’nın zor tercihi,” Radikal, October 28, 2010, and “Osman Öcalan: PKK silah bırakmaya hazır,” Milliyet, March 29, 2010.

42 Aktoprak, “The Kurdish Opening,” 657.

43 Başer and Özerdem, “Conflict Transformation,” 7.

44 Author interview, June 26, 2019.

45 Cizre, “The Emergence,” 1–2.

46 Author interview, April 16, 2018.

47 Author interview, October 31, 2019.

48 While the AKP received 53.2% of total votes in the Eastern Anatolia Region and the Southeastern Anatolia Region in the 2007 elections, the BDP received 23.8%. The result remained more or less the same in 2011 with the AKP receiving 50.6% of total votes and the BDP 31.6%. For more information, see: “1999’dan Bu Yana Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da Oylar Nasıl Dağıldı?” T24, April 10, 2014.

49 Karavelli, “Reconciling Statism.”

50 Author interview, October 31, 2019.

51 Cesur, “The Justice and Development Party’s”; and Saraçoğlu, “Türkiye Sağı.”

52 Author interview, October 31, 2019.

53 Aktoprak, “The Kurdish Opening,” 651–52.

54 Aydın and Emrence, Two Routes, 6.

55 Author interview, October 31, 2019.

56 Tezcür, “The Ebb and Flow.”

57 See Çandar, “The Kurdish Question,” 15; and Yeğen, “The Kurdish Peace Process,” 11.

58 Author interview, June 26, 2019.

59 “Gül, ‘Tarihi fırsatı’ Şam’da açıkladı,” T24, May 18, 2009.

60 Galtung, “Violence, Peace,” 167–91.

61 Author interview, April 17, 2018.

62 Bayramoğlu, “New Political Equilibrium,” 6.

63 “İşte Öcalan’ın yol haritası,” Hürriyet, March 3, 2011.

64 Çiçek, “Başarısız çözüm süreci,” 163.

65 Author interview, March 30, 2018.

66 Aydınlı and Özcan, “The Conflict Resolution.”

67 Author interview, April 3, 2018.

68 Author interview, March 30, 2018.

69 Pusane, “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening,” 88.

70 “AKP’den demokratik açılım kitabı,” NTV, December 23, 2009.

71 Author interview, July 25, 2019.

72 Keyman, “The AK Party,” 22–23.

73 Karaveli, “Reconciling Statism,” 19–20.

74 Tezcür, “Prospect for Resolution,” 29.

75 Ünal, “Is it Ripe Yet?” 104.

76 Author interview, March 29, 2018–May 11, 2018.

77 “İmralı ile görüşüyoruz,” Habertürk, December 12, 2012.

78 Tezcür, “Prospect for Resolution.”

79 Özpek, The Peace Process.

80 Author interview, June 26, 2019.

81 Özpek, The Peace Process.

82 Kapmaz, Öcalan’ın İmralı günleri, and Öcalan, “Demokratik Kurtuluş.”

83 Author interview, June 24, 2019.

84 Tezcür, “Prospect for Resolution.”

85 Author interview, October 31, 2019.

86 Author interview, April 10, 2018.

87 Author interview, June 24, 2019.

88 Author interview, April 17, 2018.

89 Author interview, May 11, 2018.

90 Author interview, April 3, 2018; May 11, 2018.

91 Author interview, April 16, 2018.

92 Author interview, June 27, 2019.

93 Çandar, “Bağımsız Kürdistan iptal oldu,” En son haber, March 21, 2013.

94 Yeğen, “The Kurdish Peace Process,” 12.

95 “Öcalan’dan kritik mesaj,” Ulusal Kanal, April 27, 2014.

96 “Demirtaş: Seçimden sonra özerklik ilan edeceğiz,” Hürriyet, February 12, 2014.

97 “Erdoğan: HDP eş başkanlarının sözleri anayasa suçu,” BBC News, January 2, 2016.

98 Author interview, April 17, 2018.

99 Author interview, April 10, 2018.

100 Author interview, April 10, 2018.

101 Author interview, May 3, 2018.

102 Paris, At War’s End.

103 Author interview, May 11, 2018

104 Author interview, March 20, 2018; April 5, 2018.

105 “Demirtaş: HDP var oldukça seni başkan yaptırmayacağız,” Hürriyet, March 18, 2015.

106 Author interview, April 10, 2018.

107 “PKK’nın sadece yüzde 15’i çıktı,” Milliyet, June 27, 2013

108 Köse, “Rise and Fall.”

109 “Karayılan-Bayık değişikliği ne anlama geliyor?” Haberler.com, July 11, 2013.

110 “KCK: Silah bırakma iradesi bize ait,” Radikal, June 12, 2015.

111 Author interview, July 25, 2019.

112 Author interview, April 17, 2018.

113 “Davutoğlu, Akil İnsanlar Heyetine Hitap Etti,” Akşam, October 19, 2014.

114 “Cemil Bayik: hiçkimse bizi dağlardan indiremez,” Milliyet, December 19, 2014.

115 Author interview, April 17, 2018.

116 Author interview, April 17, 2019.

117 Author interview, July 25, 2019.

118 Author interview, April 16, 2018.

119 Author interview, July 25, 2019.

120 Author interview, May 3, 2018.

121 Author interview, March 30, 2018.

122 SETA Yıllığı 2012, May 8, 2013, available at https://www.setav.org/seta-2012-yilligi/.

123 “Cengiz Çandar: Ortadoğu’da sınırlar değişecek, Türkiye’de buna dahil,” T24, November 26, 2012.

124 Author interview, April 17, 2018.