![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Why do so many regimes remain competitive authoritarian? This article argues that institutional path dependence explains the persistence of competitive authoritarian regimes in which electoral competition exists, but is unfair. The weakness of institutions regulating free and fair interparty competition, like multi-candidate elections, a constitution and statutes safeguarding fundamental rights, and intraparty competition, like intraparty democracy, is path-dependent and self-reinforcing. In settings where competition is partly free and fair, ruling elites have an incentive to combine democratic and undemocratic laws and policies to defeat counterelites and neutralize intraparty competitors. The likely long-term outcome is a vicious cycle of limited democratization, competitive authoritarian regime formation, and competitive authoritarian regime consolidation. I assess the argument by tracing the historical trajectory of reforms on constitutionalism, civil liberties, and multi-candidate competition in post-1950 Turkey, where the limits on interparty and intraparty competition have been reproduced in remarkable historical continuity.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Excerpt from Tanpınar, The Time Regulation Institute. 18.
2 Throughout the article “democratic competition” and “free and fair competition” are used interchangeably. Democratic competition resembles liberal democracy closely, and while a host of other procedures and rights are relevant for the functioning of a liberal democracy, this article focuses on three features of a political regime that are directly relevant for political competition: the constitutional separation of powers, the protection of civil and political rights, and genuine multi-candidate elections.
3 A competitive authoritarian regime refers to a political system in which elements of democratic contestation, such as elections, legislatures, parties and constitutional rule, exist, but political competition is less than free and fair. The incumbent’s packing of state institutions, disproportionate access to media, distribution of patronage, and repression of critics undermine opposition efforts to organize and compete. See Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism,” 1582. In other words, the presence of unfree and unfair elections, combined with severe restrictions on civil liberties, distinguishes these regimes from electoral democracy and full authoritarianism. See Levitsky and Way, “The Rise.” For definitional debates on hybrid, competitive authoritarian regimes, see Carothers, “The End”; Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives”; Zakaria, “The Rise”; and Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism.
4 Linz and Stepan, Problems.
5 The analysis presented here ends in 2015 to document the erosion of democratic competition in the secondary literature. More recent events, especially the aftermath of the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 and the country’s shift to a presidential regime, reinforce the conclusions of this article, but are excluded due to the limitations of secondary literature on current affairs.
6 De Mesquita et al., “Thinking Inside the Box.”
7 Shadmehr, “Mobilization.”
8 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution.
9 Przeworski, “Institutions Matter?”
10 Robinson and Acemoglu, Why Nations Fail.
11 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations.”
12 Capoccia and Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn.”
13 Møller, “When One.”
14 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn”; Capoccia and Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn”; Legler and Tieku, “What Difference”; Mainwaring and Zoco, “Political Sequences”; and Corrales, “Autocratic Legalism.”
15 For alternative conceptualizations of path dependence centered on normative commitments or habit, see Sarigil, “Showing the Path.”
16 Carothers, “The End.”.
17 Donno, “Elections and Democratization.”
18 Levitsky and Way, “The Rise.”
19 Ottaway, Democracy Challenged.
20 Geddes, “What Causes Democratization.”
21 Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism.”
22 Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn.”
23 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
24 For recent scholarship on the importance of intraparty dynamics, see Cross and Katz, The Challenges; Lehrer, “Intra-Party Democracy”; and Loxbo, “The Fate.”
25 Cooper, “Dominant Party.”
26 Brownlee, Authoritarianism, 41.
27 Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro, and Hirano, “Why Primaries”
28 Booysen, “The African National Congress.”
29 Lizzeri and Persico, “Why Did”
30 For the role of individual leaders, see Turan, “Leadership Change.”
31 For an appraisal of the role of parties in Turkish politics, see Wuthrich, National Elections.
32 Ayan Musil, Authoritarian Party Structures.
33 Sayari notes that intra-elite cleavages should be seen an important causal factor in the 1960s to explain the emergence of a comparative party system. Reflecting this analysis, the paper argues that the cleavages do exist, and are at times responsible for changes to the system, but the institutional setup does not allow for those cleavages to be expressed openly and democratically in most political parties. Sayari, “The Turkish Party System.”
34 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy,” 250–52. Of the 1,037 individuals who became members of parliament between 1923 and 1946, only five were independent candidates not supported by the CHP. See Demirel, Tek Partinin İktidarı, 18.
35 For an account of state-society relations during the one-party era, see: Metinsoy, “Fragile Hegemony.”
36 Kadioğlu, “The Paradox.”
37 İnan, “Demokrat Parti,” 123.
38 Bingöl and Akgün, “Demokratlıktan Muhafazakâr Demokratlığa,” 6.
39 Albayrak, “Türkiye’de Demokrasiye.”
40 Yaşar, “Demokrat Parti’de,” 511.
41 İnan, “Demokrat Parti,” 124.
42 Uzman, “İktidardan Muhalefete.”
43 Albayrak, “Türkiye’de Demokrasiy,” 304.
44 Özçelik, “Demokrat Parti’nin,” 175; Emre-Kaya, “Demokrat Parti,” 97; and Keloğlu-İşler, “Demokrat Parti’nin Halkla,” 114.
45 Albayrak, “Türkiye’de Demokrasiye,” 303, and Bulut, “Üçüncü Dönem,” 128.
46 Özçelik, “Demokrat Parti’nin,” 179.
47 On September 6–7 1955, mobs attacked non-Muslim businesses in downtown Istanbul, killing many and looting property.
48 Demir, “Adnan Menderes.”
49 Albayrak, “Türkiye’de Demokrasiye,” 305.
50 Bulut, “Üçüncü Dönem,” 128–129.
51 İnan, “Demokrat Parti,” 134.
52 Özçelik, “Demokrat Parti’nin.”
53 İnan, “Demokrat Parti.”
54 While fears of a coup may be justified, it would be wrong to conclude that the DP was surrounded by the hostile old guard. The media, universities and public intellectuals were initially supportive of the Democrats. See Özçelik, “Demokrat Parti’nin.”
55 Ahmad, Turkey, 110; Bulut, “Üçüncü Dönem,” 141-144.
56 Aksin, Turkey: From Empire, 268.
57 Kalaycıoğlu, “The Motherland Party,” 45.
58 Ibid, 49–50.
59 Ibid, 51-52.
60 Aksin, Turkey: From Empire, 287.
61 For details, see Asrak Hasdemir, “1980 Sonrası.”
62 Öniş, “Turgut Özal,” 114.
63 Başlevent, “Socio-Demographic Determinants.”
64 Somer, “Does It Take Democrats,” 514, and Turam, “Are Rights,” 109.
65 Aydınlı, “Civil-Military Relations.”
66 For laudatory pieces on the AKP’s liberal-democratic achievements and capacity to integrate Muslim democracy to Turkey’s democratic mainstream, see Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, “The Era,” and Nasr, “The Rise.”
67 Lancaster, “The Iron Law,” 1678–1679.
68 Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Yavuzyilmaz, “Party (de)Institutionalization.”
69 Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman, “EU-Turkey Relations,” 18.
70 Tepe, “Turkey’s AKP,” and Taşkın, “Hegemonizing,” 292.
71 For a comparison of the achievements and failures under the AKP governments, see: Öniş, “Sharing Power.”
72 Turam, “Are Rights,” and Somer, “Moderation.”
73 Öniş, “Sharing Power,” 107.
74 Esen and Gumuscu, “Building,” 3, and Yeşil, “Authoritarian Turn.”
75 Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism,” 1587.
76 “MHP darbe istiyor”, BirGün, August 3, 2004. Accessed at: https://www.birgun.net/amp/haber/mhp-darbe-istiyor-21336
77 Yildirim and Lynch, “Contemporary Turkish Politics.”
78 Ayan, “Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey,” and Authoritarian Party Structures.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Onur Bakiner
Onur Bakiner is Associate Professor of Political Science at Seattle University. His research interests include transitional justice, human rights, judicial politics, and technology and society, particularly in Latin America and the Middle East. He is the author of Truth Commissions: Memory, Power, and Legitimacy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). His articles have been published in Journal of Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Law & Social Science, AI & Ethics, Negotiation Journal, Civil Wars, Journal of Law and Courts, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Memory Studies, and Turkish Studies.