https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3669-6620
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ABSTRACT
Turkish foreign policy has taken a military turn in recent years. Turkey is now a major arms exporter, it hosts military bases in its neighborhood and beyond, and has engaged in conflicts in Syria and Libya. Scholars have highlighted identity and international system theories to explain the military assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. This study proposes a domestic economy explanation. It argues that national wealth, a take-off in defence industry, and an alliance of conservative bourgeoisie and political Islamists are the primary drivers of the military turn in foreign policy. Analysis of Turkish economic development and historical trajectories of economic and bureaucratic wings of the defence industry shows that complex business-politics interactions and commercial interests of defence companies propel military assertiveness. This domestic economy framework supplements insights from the identity and international system theories to significantly add to our understanding of the military turn in Turkish foreign policy.
Acknowledgements
The Author would like to thank Nilgün Önder and the panel participants at the 2022 International Studies Association annual meeting for their valuable comments; Fredrich Schuller for his research assistance; and the experts affiliated with the Presidency of Defense Industries for their insights.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The Economist. “The Technology of Seeing and Shooting Your Enemies,” January 29, 2022. Accessed March 23, 2022. https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2022/01/29/the-technology-of-seeing-and-shooting-your-enemies.
2 Maya Carlin, “How the Turkish-Made TB2 Drone Gave Ukraine the Edge Against Russia,” Business Insider, September 18, 2022. Accessed January 10, 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/how-turkish-baykar-tb2-drone-gave-ukraine-edge-against-russia-2022-9.
3 SIPRI “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.”
4 Hacaoglu, “Mapping the Turkish.”
5 Grigoriadis, “The European Union.”
6 The Blue Homeland Doctrine proposes that Turkey should aggressively protect its interests and use unilateral military force if necessary in extended maritime borders in the Mediterranean and beyond. See Gingeras, “Blue Homeland.”
7 In this study, I use military turn, rise of the military might, and military assertiveness interchangeably to describe the use of military capabilities in Turkish foreign policy.
8 For broad historical accounts of Turkish foreign policy, see Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy; Aydin, Turkish Foreign Policy; and Oran, Türk Dış Politikası.
9 Kirişci, “The Transformation”; Kutlay, “Economy”; Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The (Un)making.” Especially see Yalvaç, “Approaches,” for a novel approach combining historical materialism and critical realism in the study of foreign policy.
10 Altunışık, “Worldviews”; Kirişçi, “The Transformation”; Aydin, “Determinants”; Öniş, “Multiple Faces”; Öniş and Kutlay, “The Anatomy”; and Akkoyunlu, “The Five Phases.”
11 Ciftci, “Social Identity.”
12 Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy.
13 Yalvaç, “Approaches”; and Yavuz, Nostalgia.
14 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy; and Aydin, “Determinants.”
15 Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization”; and Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift.”
16 Yavuz, Nostalgia; and “The Motives Behind.”
17 This definition of periodization is similar to Yalvaç’s critique of realist accounts of Turkish foreign policy which he views as theoretically uninformed chronologies of events. See Yalvaç, “Approaches,” 120.
18 Aydın, “Determinants”; ”Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization”; Öniş and Yilmaz, “Between Europeanization”; and Akkoyunlu, “The Five Phases.”
19 Öniş and Yilmaz, “Between Europeanization.”
20 In a different study, Öniş remains sceptical of such paradigm or axis shift periods associated with ideology and identity. See Öniş, “Multiple Faces.”
21 Atmaca and Torun, “Geopolitical Visions.”
22 Aktürk, “The Fourth Style.”
23 Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation.”
24 Brown, The Middle East, 3–5. Hinnebusch argues that a liberation war at the time of the founding made Turkey a somewhat autonomous and not quite a revisionist state in this framework. See Hinnebusch, “The Middle East.”
25 Coş and Bilgin, “Stalin’s Demands.”
26 Aydın, “Determinants.”
27 The recent purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system triggered a backlash from the US and the resulting US sanctions show the difficulties of maintaining a multi-balancing act.
28 Jung, “Turkey and the Arab,” 1–17.
29 Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal,” and Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail.”
30 Kutlay and Öniş, “Turkish Foreign Policy.”
31 Balcı, “Why is ‘Precious Loneliness’.”
32 Mehmetcik and Çelik, “The Militarization.”
33 Öniş and Kutlay, “The Anatomy”; Kutlay and Öniş, “Understanding Oscillations”; and Kutlay and Öniş, “Turkish Foreign Policy.”
34 Kutlay and Öniş, “Understanding Oscillations.”
35 Kutlay and Öniş, “Turkish Foreign Policy.”
36 Jordaan, “The Concept.”
37 Coş and Bilgin, “Stalin’s Demands.”
38 Demir, “Transformation.”
39 Stergiou and Kollias, “The Political Economy,” 8.
40 Greece increased its military spending from $5.3 billion in 2020 to $8.08 billion in 2021. See SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Transfers.”
41 Waltz, “The Anarchic Structure,” 94; and Horowitz, The Diffusion.
42 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, 60–61.
43 Powell, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy.”
44 Poast, “Beyond,” 226.
45 Ibid,
46 Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources.”
47 Kriner, Lechase, and Zielinski, “Self-Interest,” and Johnson, “The Cost.”
48 Historically, there have been other cases supporting this correlation in addition to the US. See Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict, and Fordham, “Power or Plenty?” and “Who Wants to Be.”
49 Fordham, “Who Wants to Be.”
50 Hobson, Imperialism.
51 Fallows, “The Military-Industrial Complex.” For an application to Turkish case, see Mehmetcik and Çelik, “The Militarization.”
52 Poast, “Beyond.”
53 Kutlay, “Economy”; Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The (Un)making”; and Yalvaç, “Approaches.”
54 Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The (Un)making.”
55 Ibid., 1297.
56 Kutlay, “Economy,” 76–81.
57 Kutlay and Öniş, “Understanding Oscillations.”
58 Scholars employ different measurement strategies to calculate military expenditures, using various combinations of military personnel expenditures, civilian security expenses, national defence budgets, and arms spending. See Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
59 Except for 2009, economic growth has always been positive with an average of 5.2 percent between 2002 and 2020, reaching impressive levels of 9.8 percent in 2004, and 11.2 percent in 2011 (World Bank, “GDP Growth”). The share of exports of goods and services as a share of GDP gradually increased from 25 percent in 2002 to 32.6 percent in 2019 (World Bank, “Exports”). In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows increased from $1 billion in 2002 to $22 billion in 2007 (World Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment”).
60 In this letter, then-US president Lyndon B. Johnson issued a stark warning to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü about Turkey’s possible engagement in Cyprus. Johnson warned that Turkish forces are not allowed to use the American weapons and that the US would not protect Turkey against a possible Soviet attack if Turkey were to launch a military operation to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus.
61 Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
62 NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–2020),” PR (CP) 2021(030), 16 March 2021. Available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/210316-pr-2020-30-en.pdf.
63 Ibid.
64 Yildirim and Sezgin, “Defence.”
65 TUIK, “Percentage.”
66 Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Spring.”
67 World Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment.”
68 Stergiou and Kollias, “The Political Economy.”
69 Johnson, MITI.
70 Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk, “Sources”; and Bugra, State and Business.
71 Demir, “Transformation”; and Mehmetcik and Çelik, “The Militarization.”
72 Kurç, “Between Defence Autarky.”
73 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy; and Aydin, Turkish Foreign Policy.
74 Demir, “Transformation”; and Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
75 These companies are consistently ranked among the top contenders according to SIPRI and Turkish ISO-500 industrial index. See Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
76 The history of defence history presented here is based on the information provided on the website of Presidency of Defence Industries at https://www.ssb.gov.tr/Website/contentList.aspx?PageID=39&LangID=2.
77 Johnson, MITI.
78 SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Transfers.”
79 Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
80 Demir, “Transformation,” 37.
81 See SASAD’s report, “2021 Performans Raporu,” for more details. Available at https://www.sasad.org.tr/uploaded/Sasad-Performans-Raporu-2021.pdf, accessed 25 October 2022.
82 For TİM reports see https://tim.org.tr/tr/default.
83 Daily Sabah, “Baykar Becomes Top Exporter in Turkey’s Defense, Aerospace Sector,” June 15, 2022. Accessed March 13, 2023. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/baykar-becomes-top-exporter-in-turkeys-defense-aerospace-sector.
84 Bugra, State and Business.
85 Buğra, “Politics”; and Buğra and Savaşkan, New Capitalism; Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The Unmaking”; and Yalvaç, “Approaches.”
86 Buğra and Savaşkan, New Capitalism, and Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity.
87 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity.
88 Buğra, “Politics.”
89 Ibid.; and Yavuz. Islamic Political Identity.
90 Buğra and Savaşkan, New Capitalism.
91 Demir, “Transformation.”
92 Sancak sold 49.9 percent of the BMC to the Qatar Army with a huge profit margin and another 25 percent to a relative of Erdoğan. Getting most of its revenue from the public funds, BMC was also awarded the Altay Tank Project, the first phase of which was previously given to Otokar, a Koç subsidiary. Although Otokar completed the first phase, its offer was declined by the SSB and the whole project was given to BMC which is yet to deliver the product. See Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map,” 66; and Özgür, “Koç’tan Sancak’a.”
93 Topal, “Türk Savunma Sanayiinin”; and Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map,” 75–77.
94 Of 3,189 ASELSAN suppliers, 2716 were local SMEs. See Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map,” 66; and Özgür, “Koç’tan Sancak’a.”
95 Akça and Özden, “A Political-Economic Map.”
96 Özgür, “Koç’tan Sancak’a.”
97 Bekdil, “Turkish Defense Exports.”
98 Bekdil, “Turkey’s Defense Industry.”
99 Zaks, “Relationships.”
100 Kutlay and Öniş, “Understanding Oscillations.”
101 Yavuz, “The Motives.”
102 Yalvaç, “Approaches.”
103 Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The Unmaking.”
104 Mehmetcik and Çelik, “The Militarization.”
105 Horowitz, The Diffusion. It should also be stated that unstable relations with Israel was a turning point for the decision to focus on drone production. Since Turkey heavily relied on Israeli drones (Herons) in its fight against the PKK, the worsening of relations provided an impetus to reduce dependency in this area. See “Turkey’s Giant Leap: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Israel Defense, August 16, 2020. Accessed March 13, 2023, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/44696.
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Sabri Ciftci
Sabri Ciftci is a Professor of Political Science and the Michael W. Suleiman Chair at Kansas State University. He is the author of Islam, Justice, and Democracy (Temple University Press) and co-author of Beyond Piety and Politics (Indiana University Press). He has widely published about religion and politics, Islam and democracy, and Middle Eastern and Turkish politics in Comparative Political Studies, Political Research Quarterly, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Democratization.