Relations with Turkey and Their Impact on the European Union

Abstract

This article focuses specifically on the interplay between Greek–Turkish relations and how these play out in the European Union (EU). In particular, the author analyses the reasons behind Greece’s U‐turn of December 1999 when at the Helsinki EU summit it lifted its objections regarding Turkey’s EU future. He then explains the rationale behind Greek thinking as an attempt to secure its security needs by bringing Turkey into the EU fold. Finally, the article explores the prospects of further improvement in the relations between the two states as Turkey’s turn to begin accession negotiations nears.

Notes

[1] This article was completed before the European Council took its decision upon the start of accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 December 2004.

[2] Foreign Minister George Papandreou described gestures of good will to be: a development in the Cyprus Problem, the acceptance of Cyprus EU‐accession even before a solution of the political problem, a willingness to call upon the International Court of Justice in Den Haag to resolve conflict issues in the Aegean, the signing of a contract of friendship and the renunciation of war threats in the case that Greece should expand its national waters to 12 sea miles. See Athener Zeitung (29 October 1999, p. 4).

[3] Nowadays we know more about Greece’s statistics and convergence with the Maastricht criteria.

[4] However, Cyprus’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 made it clear that the EU—despite its support for the Annan Plan—did not perceive the island’s lasting division as an obstacle for membership. See Axt (2004).

[5] Reported in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (9 October 1999, p. 10).

[6] In June 1999 the Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Cagmakoglu stated that the island Agathonissi near Samos, which is inhabited by 150 Greeks, should be handed over to Turkey, as well as all other islands previously belonging to the Ottoman Empire and that in later agreements were not clearly designated as Greek.

[7] The role of the media cannot be underestimated in this context. See Meinardus (1995).

[8] The Law was revised in 1998. Since the beginning of the 1980s, there was a secret enactment where members of the minority should be treated according to the ‘19 to 1 key’. This meant that for every 19 permits issued to ‘real Greeks’, one should be issued to Muslims.

[9] In this case the criticism came from former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yiannis Kapsis, for the secret enactment was his creation.

[10] A special group was to work out the texts in November 2000.

[11] Up until now the extension of the 680‐km motorway stretching from the Turkish border to the Adriatic Greek port of Igoumenitsa is planned in the framework of the trans‐European networks.

[12] For a description of the NATO problems in the Aegean, see Axt and Kramer (1990: 27f).

[13] The cooperation between Greece and Iran might be the result of enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Israel. It was on 25 October 1999 that the Israeli Premier travelled to Turkey on a state visit.

[14] Quotation in the Athener Zeitung (8 October 1999, p. 5). (Emphasis in italics by the author.)

[15] For the record, that such a pact should come to exist between two NATO partners is quite absurd.

[16] The activities of the EU expert commission, which started in spring 1997, were abandoned by the Turkish side after the (for Turkey, negative) Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. See Agence Europe (31 December 1997, p. 3; 13 February 1998, p. 3).

[17] See Agence Europe (10 July 1997, p. 2) and The Washington Post (5 August 1997, p. A15).

[18] Solana had detailed talks with the corresponding NATO Ambassadors and Ministers of both countries. For the agreed‐upon confidence measures, see the Solana statement in Agence Europe (10 June 1998, p. 3).

[19] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (21 July 2003, p. 6), translation by the author.