Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Persisting Structural Constraints to Democratic Consolidation

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Notes

[1] Macedonia’s economic position relative to the Yugoslav average has declined steadily since 1975.

[2] See ‘Spannungen vor Stichwahlen in Mazedonien. Demokratietest noch nicht bestanden,’ Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 24 March 2005, p. 5; ‘Betrügereien in Mazedoniens Lokalwahlen. Zweite Runde erneut mit massiven Unregelmäßigkeiten,’ NZZ, 29 March 2005, p. 4.

[3] For the constitutional problems originating from Crvenkovskis strong position, see the 2004 report of the International Crisis Group.

[4] There was a strong process of centralization when Macedonia gained independence in 1991–1992. Of formerly 6,003 administrative officials responsible to local governments in 1990, only 270 remained in 1992 (see Labović 1999: 75, Table 1).

[5] Džaferi and Thači, the leading persons of DPA, have more than once expressed the opinion in the last few years that multi‐ethnic states are failing constructions and cannot work, that Ohrid is ‘dead’, that only mono‐ethnic states have a future in the Balkans, and that they will boycott the sessions of parliament. ‘The vehemence of the rhetoric and its direct challenge to an internationally brokered peace agreement are almost unprecedented in the region’ (International Crisis Group 2003: 29).

[6] The voter turnout in parliamentarian elections was 84.5 per cent (1990), 77.8 per cent (first round 1994), 72.9 per cent (1998) and 73.4 per cent (2002). This is high compared to most other Eastern European Countries. Even the presidential elections in 2004 are not as low as the results seem to show (55.0 per cent in the first round and 53.6 per cent in the second). Many journalists argued that Macedonia was in danger of being affected by the ‘Serbian virus’—that is, voter turnout too low to reach the necessary quorum of 50 per cent. There was lower voter turnout in previous elections as a kind of protest in the first round of the elections, although voter turnout was higher among ethnic Macedonians as among Albanians. Yet, in the second round, the ethnic gap was the main reason for the lower voter turnout. A lot of Albanians stayed home and the voter turnout was drastically reduced in overwhelming Albanian election districts like Gostivar (from 51.0 to 36.4 per cent) in Debar (from 39.5 to 26.9 per cent), in Tetovo (from 48 to 27 per cent). However, in mainly Macedonian districts it increased: in Berovo, from 66.75 to 74.57 per cent; in Valandovo, from 57.3 to 70.9 per cent; in Gevgelija, from 69.7 to 79.7 per cent; in Veles, from 57 to 60 per cent; in Strumica, from 61.6 to 71.3 per cent; in Štip, from 58.7 to 65.2 per cent; and in Radoviš, from 55.8 to 69.3 per cent (see the homepage of the Macedonian states election commission: www.dik.mk).

[7] See also UNDP, Early Warning Report 7 (November 2004). Available online at: http://www.undp.org.mk/publication/EWNov2004Eng.pdf.

[8] For the nearly total lack of dissidents in socialist times, see ‘Ima li disidenti vo Makedonija,’ Makedonija vo svetot 2/3 (2000): 12; Jovanovski and Penev.

[9] For the problem of unemployment in Macedonia, see Vaknin 2001.

[10] ‘The reason for the high deficit is, according to experts, the constant lack of competition of domestic products’ (Neneska‐Fidanoska 2004).

[11] ‘Mazedoniens Ministerpräsident tritt zurück. Mangelnder Rückhalt in der Regierungskoalition,’ NZZ, 17 November 2004; ‘Riskantes Referendum in Mazedonien,’ NZZ, 6–7 November 2004.

[12] In the 2002 elections, voter turnout in District 6 was 68.1 per cent. District 6 is predominantly Albanian, and the Albanian parties obtained 70 per cent of the vote there. In Districts 3 and 4, which have an overwhelming Macedonian majority of more than 90 per cent, the voter turnout was 78.9 and 77.3 per cent, respectively.