Srebrenica—The War Crimes Legacy: International Arguments, Intervention and Memory

Abstract

The Srebrenica massacre has been seen as the turning point in American policy over Bosnia. However, the response to a major war crime was not the single most important element. The Clinton Administration was set on restoring the American leadership image through a pro‐active leadership policy. The Administration extricated itself from policy deadlock by taking risks and sharing responsibilities with its allies in Bosnia, which made effective leadership possible, accommodating the allies’ expectations. American policy was about this important business of image and power, not the fate of Srebrenica and Bosnia and the need to address the war crimes there. The real legacy of the war crimes at Srebrenica was that the response to it restored international leadership from Washington.

Notes

[1] BBC News Online, 20 September 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3124642.stm).

[2] The EU has given s2.5 billion since 1991, with a fifth of that sum being given since 2000 (see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/bosnia_and_herzegovina/eu_bosnia_and_herzegovina_relations_en.htm). The USAID Budget statement acknowledged the EU’s commitment, although it noted that the United States was the largest bilateral governmental donor—an assertion that possibly would be challenged if the combined commitment of some EU Member States with their common commitments via the EU were taken together (see http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/ba.html). Another $1 million, approximately, was ordered to be paid by the Bosnian Serb authorities. On this and reference for the original proposal, see Zupan (2004).

[3] CNN Online, 2 August 2001 (http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/11/bosnia.srebrenica/).

[4] BBC News Online, 11 August 2005 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3123485.stm).

[5] BBC News Online, 29 November 2001 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/1683 808.stm).

[6] BBC News Online, 27 January 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2698403.stm).

[7] See Bardgett (2005). I am grateful to James Gow for drawing the separate proposed memorial room to my attention (http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=2061).

[8] These included the preservation of Bosnia as a single state, a division of territory between the Muslim‐Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity based on the 51–49 Contact Group formula, constitutional structures, free and fair elections, and respect for human rights (see State Department 1995).

[9] For an insightful day‐to‐day account of the proximity talks, see Holbrooke (1998: 231–232); Bildt (1998: 120–168).

[10] Interviews, No. 5, Washington, DC, 14 March 1997 and No. 6, Washington, DC, 24 March 1997.

[11] Interview, No. 3, Washington, DC, 5 March 1997.

[12] Confidential Author Interview, Washington, DC, 24 March 1997.

[13] Not surprisingly, in the London conference on 21 July 1995 it was emphasised that ‘threats to the safety of UN personnel in Bosnia engaged the national interest of the troop contributing countries’ (Transcript of Press Conference Given by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Malkolm Rifkind, London, 21 July 1995).

[14] According to Secretary of Defense, William Perry, the deployment of RRF ‘would support [the US] objective of keeping US ground forces out [of Bosnia]’ (Perry 1995: 18).

[15] According to some accounts, the President did not have full advice that the operational and strategic reality of his December 1994 pledge to contribute American troops to an UNPROFOR withdrawal had created a situation that would have put the final nail in the Alliance’s coffin if not honoured (Woodward 1997: 256–257; Holbrooke 1998: 65–68).

[16] President Clinton’s Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 31 May 1995, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 31, no. 22, 5 June 1995, p. 925.

[17] In addition, it was voiced that the United States would provide lift and surveillance assistance to the RRF, yet the administration also changed its stance on these a few days later (see Schmitt 1995; Darnton 1995; Facts on File 55, no. 2845, 8 June 1995, p. 406).

[18] The RRF was incorporated in the UNPROFOR mission after an expedient effort by Paris in the UN (S/RES/998 (1995), 16 June 1995).

[19] American financial assistance to the RRF was allocated largely by the President away from congressional procedures (see ‘Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations for Purposes of Supporting the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act’, Presidential Determination No. 95–34, White House Release, 8/4 (240), 3 August 1995).

[20] Confidential Author Interview, Washington, DC, 18 April 1997.

[21] See ‘The President’s New Conference with European Union Leaders’, Washington, DC, 14 June 1995, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 31, no. 24, 19 June 1995, pp. 1054–1106; Sciolino (1996).

[22] Editorial, ‘Les Etats‐Unis et la Bosnie’, Le Monde, 17 June 1995; Zecchini (1995).

[23] President Chirac’s position is cited in Frachon & Lemaître (1995).

[24] Confidential Author Interview, Washington, DC, 19 February 1995; see also Lippman & Devroy (1995).

[25] Confidential Author Interview, Washington, DC, 26 March 1995. This point was also reiterated by a senior Washington Post analyst (Interview, No.7, Washington, DC, 24 March 1995).

[26] One difference was, though, that France had already demonstrated its preparedness to risk through the presence of thousands of troops on the ground.

[27] Whitney (1995). In reality, the UNPROFOR mission was expiring by late August. Before any new authorisation by the UN, a decision by Britain and France to remain was pending. However, both countries had stressed publicly that unless the UNPROFOR mission was neither humiliated nor threatened, a decision for a withdrawal would be inevitable (Drozdiak 1995a).

[28] The deaths of Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel and S. Nelson Drew on 19 August in a road accident in Sarajevo had injected a strong determination to Holbrooke to prove that his uncompromising style of diplomacy could indeed bear fruits (Holbrooke 1998: 93).

[29] This concerned the provision regarding the acceptance of Republica Srpska as the second entity in Bosnia and swaps of territory (Owen 1996: 330).

[30] Interview, No 20, London, 26 July 1999.