Strategy and Genocide: Srebrenica as an Analytical Challenge

Abstract

Genocide is often seen as an extreme exhibition of senseless and purposeless violence and, as such, as particularly characteristic of modern war. The single most comprehensive examination of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, which was completed by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in 2002, is drawn to such an explanation. It judges the massacre to be an improvisation associated with the irrationality of war. By evaluating the evidence also used by the NIOD report, this article contends that, on the contrary, the genocide should be understood strategically. Force was used with specific intent and deliberation. The massacre of some 7,000 people was a means to achieve a political end.

Notes

[1] NIOD (2002). Henceforth, I will refer not only to page numbers in the Dutch edition, but also to the part, chapter and section, so that readers can check the non‐paginated online editions.

[2] The Court is due to wind up its proceedings by the end of 2010, so no new cases are likely. For a list of current and completed cases, see http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm.

[3] I wrote an extensive, highly critical, review of the NIOD report for a Dutch academic journal upon which this article builds extensively (Honig 2003).

[4] In English translation, the term ‘wetenschappelijk’ often causes difficulties and is frequently mistakenly translated as ‘scientific’. The report’s preferred translation of ‘analytical’ was well chosen, but did not convey adequately a further connotation in Dutch: ‘wetenschappelijk’ suggests an undertaking that follows the standards and methods of a distinct profession.

[5] The first analysis I wrote of the massacre in 1996 (Honig & Both 1997) was short on primary sources, more so than was the case for our analysis and explanation of the international community’s failings. Since then, the ICTY trials have produced so much new material that a reconsideration of the massacre has become worthwhile.

[6] I will concentrate my analysis here on these primary sources (and quote from the English translations which were made for the Krstić trial and that the NIOD report also used). These illustrate well the challenges and possibilities of strategic interpretation. For other, more general politico‐strategic considerations that also suggest that the Bosnian Serbs were after the whole enclave in 1995, see Honig & Both (1997: 141–173, esp. 144–145).

[7] For a survey of the military operations that the VRS actually undertook in 1995, see CIA (2002: Vol. 1, 281–396).

[8] Of note is that the much‐maligned idea that the mere presence of UN troops deterred the Serbs (’deterrence by presence’) did, to some degree, work (cf. the Dutch versions of the NIOD Press Release and the Summary for the Press).

[9] The apparent source for the NIOD interpretation that the objective was to reduce the enclave in size, confirms this. It seems to be based ultimately on conversations between Republika Srpska President Karadžić and VRS Commander Mladić with UNPROFOR commander General Rupert Smith at the beginning of March 1995 (NIOD 2002: III, 1, 17: 1832). It is rather unlikely that these men would have taken a UN general into their confidence.

[10] The order of 9 July, which directed the Drina Corps to take Srebrenica town and eliminate the enclave, also refers to ‘demilitarisation’ and the disarming of the ‘Muslim terrorist gangs’ (NIOD 2002: III, 6, 8: 2150). Demilitarisation is also a key theme in the conversations between General Mladić and Lieutenant‐Colonel Thom Karremans, the Dutch battalion commander, after the fall of the enclave (see the transcripts in ‘Enquête Srebrenica’ 2003: Appendix L, 341–350, esp. 343).

[11] An indication that General Mladić was on the look‐out for an incident is suggested by his already writing to UNPROFOR two days before the Višnjica attack complaining in the same terms about another smaller incident in the Ludmeri hills (NIOD 2002: III, 5, 8: 2036). In a ponderous discussion of the timing of the Srebrenica attack, the report offers this great detail: ‘[The journalist Zoran Jovanovic, at the time employed as information officer of the Drina Corps, confirmed that the murder of the five VRS woodcutters at Rupovo Bdro near Milici on 28 May and the raids on 26 June at Visnjica, followed by an attack on a VRS liaison patrol at Crna Rijeka, three kilometres from the Drina Corps headquarters … brought Mladic to the decision to finally disarm [!] the enclave’ (NIOD 2002: III, 5, 10: 2059; cf. also III, 5, 2: 2032). This nugget, from an authoritative source, indicates that a Bosnian Serb attack on 3 June, which resulted in the loss of Dutch Observation Post Echo can be seen as the start of an earlier attempt to take the enclave. If so, the operation was undoubtedly called off because of the mounting crisis around Sarajevo, which had led to NATO air attacks and the subsequent taking of UN hostages by the Serbs (see Honig & Both 1997: 153–156). Of further note is that the attempt to take advantage of this crisis by also attacking the Goražde enclave led to the worrying involvement of British troops in the fighting there in support of the Bosnian Muslims. The NIOD report fails to make these connections and inferences (NIOD 2002: III, 5, 2: 1989–2015).

[12] The reference to the Drina Corps plan confusingly includes the word ‘Map’, possibly suggesting that the document consists of, or contains a map. However, ‘Map’ should have read ‘5th Map’ or the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, one of the units earmarked for the attack. There is a later, unreferenced mention of ‘VRS maps for the operation’ (NIOD 2002: III, 5, 11: 2071).

[13] The ‘also’ from the original is not in the English translation.

[14] The English translation offers ‘some time after 11 July’, but the original ‘pas na’ is better translated with ‘only after’ (NIOD 2002: IV, 2, 20: 2573).

[15] My translation. The NIOD translation of ‘very likely’ is less definite than the original ‘hoogstwaarschijnlijk’ (NIOD 2002: IV, 2, 20: 3153).

[16] The Dutch original adds ‘uiteraard’ (’obviously’ or ‘naturally’) in front of ‘unintentional’. Four of the NIOD researchers (Titia Frankfort, Paul Koedijk, Ger Duijzings and Nevana Bajalica) later publicly distanced themselves from this statement. Two more were said to have had reservations (Blokker 2002).

[17] The Dutch original (‘Het is echter niet zo dat de VRS geen voorzorgsmaatregelen had getroffen’) is more definite than the English translation (‘The VRS had not omitted to take precautionary measures altogether’). It lacks the equivalent of ‘altogether’.

[18] E.g., the section on the massacre sites is little more than a straight summary of the verdict’s listing (NIOD 2002: IV, 2, 4–16: 2545–2560). The (brief) sections that follow (IV, 2, 17 and 18 on ‘Responsibility’ and ‘The Involvement of the General Staff’) offer some interesting information and discussion, but also contain much irrelevant or suspect detail, like a supposed intervention by former Yugoslav President Ćosić. Two of the four pages in the section on ‘Responsibility’ describe what is explicitly called the ‘minor role’ of Miroslav Deronjić, the local Bosnian Serb party boss and civil affairs commissioner for Srebrenica, which is furthermore based on Deronjić’s own recollections.

[19] NIOD (2002: III, 5, 9: 2052). In IV, 1, 3: 2480, however, where it is also claimed that the VRS was surprised by the breakout, it is claimed that the mines ‘had always been there’ (‘hadden daar … altijd al gelegen’).

[20] ICTY (1995c: 5). The trial did not clarify which units these were exactly (ICTY 2001: §283–5).

[21] The judgment does not give clear dates and times for the local MUP orders and deployments (ICTY 2005: §74).

[22] The Nazi‐era German Reserve Police Battalion 101 presents a marked contrast. For instance, on relaying the orders for their first massacre in July 1942, the commanding officer gave his men an option not to participate. Subsequently, he repeatedly broke down and wept (Browning 1998: 57–58, 212). To date, only Dražen Erdemović, who took part in the mass executions as a private in the 10th Sabotage Detachment, is known to have expressed misgivings. His commanding officer told him he could instead join the ranks of the Muslim victims if he wished (Honig & Both 1997: 63–64).