The convergence–divergence debate revisited: framing the issues

Background and research questions

The convergence–divergence debate started and peaked in the 1990s on the question of the endpoint of political and economic change that followed the collapse of communism primarily in a subset of politically significant transition countries, namely those situated in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). That debate centred on the issue of whether countries in transition converged towards a (more or less) common model of market‐based liberal democracies, or whether change was much more country‐ or region‐specific, thus leading to diverging (or non‐converging) patterns of transformation. By ‘transition’, I refer to the process of transforming one‐party command economies into some form of market‐based polyarchies. This process of transformation, in its essence, was a process of reorganizing the economic and political systems of the countries in question in ways that fundamentally altered the very nature of the system of production, ownership and distribution of resources and the very nature of power and government. Along the way, ownership, government, taxes and expenditure, trade, as well as the limits between what was perceived as the public and private spheres, and the very structure of the state itself and many of its functions underwent fundamental change or genesis.

Almost two decades since the wave of political and economic transitions that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the landscape of transition outcomes among post‐communist countries appears much clearer today. From an empirical point of view, it is a fact that democratization and marketization within the post‐communist world have developed unevenly in the years since 1989, thus leading to a broad pattern of two ‘orbits’ of change. The first ‘orbit’ is followed by a group of 10 CEE countries and is characterized by an accelerated domestic transformation that has led to their accession to major Western institutional structures, including the EU and NATO. The second trajectory is defined by transitions in Europe’s ‘near neighbourhood’, i.e. South Eastern Europe (or Western Balkans) and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus – but also Georgia and Armenia) that are still largely viewed as unfinished. But within that second group, variation is remarkably strong indeed.

A key attribute of this second group, then, is its lagged yet diverse transitions. Understanding the causes behind the this broad pattern of variation within the second group sets the background for the theme of this Special Issue. Do these lags reflect different stages of the same type of transition, or different types of transition altogether?

The research questions that provide the underlying link and form the unifying framework of the essays in this Special Issue follow from the analysis above. First, does the offer of the prospect of membership always lead to convergence towards EU structures, norms, regulations and practices? Second, is sustained convergence possible without a clear prospect of membership?

The aim of this Special Issue is to take a comprehensive look and a broader comparative perspective of the transition in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The look is ‘comprehensive’ because the focus moves beyond state‐building and ethno‐politics, which often monopolized scholarly interest in the region in the past, and enriches our outlook with perspectives on the economic transition and performance of the Western Balkan and Eastern European countries as well as on their political reforms and transition. The broader perspective is comparative because the Special Issue examines comparatively a triangle of post‐communist regions: (a) the Western Balkans, mostly consisting of former Yugoslav republics; (b) Eastern European ¹ countries (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine); and (c) as a standard or measure of comparison, the CEE countries, all 10 of which became EU members in two waves, in 2004 and 2007. It is obvious that the choice of regions largely reflects, and is ideally suited to address, the research questions proposed above.

General outlook: CEE, Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the convergence–divergence debate

Out of a number of possible ways of approaching the subject matter of this Special Issue, the chosen frame of the discussion is provided by the convergence–divergence debate. Framing the discussion in this way has many advantages. First, it is a ‘natural’ way of comparing the experiences of the various transition countries, since comparison is intrinsic to the very concepts of convergence and divergence. Beyond this obvious point, though, the convergence–divergence angle offers an economical and efficient way to link this analysis to earlier analyses that took place mostly in the 1990s, and in this way build on and even improve on those.

Before going further into the analysis, it is useful to provide in this introduction a selective overview of the broader debate, since the domestic or external origins of the determinants of post‐communist economic transformation have preoccupied scholarly debate for years since the fall of communism; and for good reason. After all, this was a historical process of tremendous political, economic and social implications affecting not only the transforming countries themselves but also the architecture, structure and units of the broader international system that surrounded them.

The vast majority of scholarly work in the 1990s has focused on the transformation of CEE countries. A number of competing approaches have attempted to explain individual trajectories but also broader patterns of transformation by emphasizing domestic or external determinants of the transitional process. Among analyses with a domestic focus, prominent approaches included path‐dependence, historical legacies, structural determinants (see for example Lane 2002; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Stark 1996; Winieck 2004; Alexander 2001; Kovacs 2000; Cook 2002) and domestic politics (see for example Grzymala‐Busse and Innes 2003; Vachudova 2001; Lane 2002; Fish 1998). The broad conclusion reached by approaches with a domestic focus concerning the causes and individual and/or collective transformation outcomes is that countries follow diverging trajectories. Among analyses with an international/external focus, besides the literature on Europeanization, prominent approaches included globalization and regionalization (see for example Verdun 2003; Stewart and Berry 1999; Bruszt and Stark 2003; Oman 1999; DeMartino and Grabel 2003).

However, the major focus of the Special Issue in terms of external influences falls on the EU and its policies in the regions in question. The predominant view in the Europeanization literature is that the decisive impact of the EU on the accelerated economic transformation in CEE has been largely achieved by means of accession conditionality and negotiations. The focus on the accession process per se is so pervasive that Grabbe (2001) defined the Europeanization of the CEE countries in terms of the impact of the accession negotiations on national patterns of governance. ² Others, like Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, 210–28) have placed prominent focus on accession conditionality. Vachudova (2005), who studied the impact of passive leverage (the prospect of membership, i.e. not negotiations and conditionality per se), seems to discount it in favour of active leverage (i.e. accession negotiations and conditionality). With regard to the accession negotiations and the pre‐accession period, Grabbe points towards conditionality as a Europeanizing force in CEE countries. ³ She identifies five ways through which the EU conditions domestic outcomes in the transition countries: (1) gate‐keeping (opening of negotiations); (2) monitoring; (3) prescription of institutional blueprints; (4) aid and technical assistance; (5) twinning (Grabbe 2001, 1020–4). ⁴

In addition to the domestic/external framework underlying scholarly work, and although today we can approach the topic in a more or less dispassionate manner, looking at the way the debate unfolded in the 1990s, convergence or divergence of countries was often examined under a (not always stated) normative/ideological prism. This was a debate between, on the one hand, those who saw convergence towards some form of market‐based liberal democracy as an inevitable stage in the history of human civilization, ⁵ and therefore as a worthy objective to aim at; on the other hand stood those who believed that this vision of international affairs (often referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’) represented a means of interference to domestic affairs of sovereign states in order to promote a specific historical and institutional experience that resonated in a small subset of (mostly Western) units of the international system. So, in the normative dimension, an element of ideology has been prominent, if not always stated and overt.

In a memorable and often‐quoted passage, Stark writes:

[N]ot the crumbling of traditional structures but the collapse of communism gives new life to the transition problematic… Within that problematic, the present is studied as an approximation of a designated future, risking an underlying teleology in which concepts are driven by hypostasized end‐states. In the framework of transitology, the transitional present is a period of dislocation as society undergoes the passage through a liminal state suspended between one social order and another, each conceived as a stable equilibrium organized around a coherent and more or less unitary logic. (Stark 1996, 994)

In fact, for Stark even the term ‘transition’ is problematic, and in his view ‘transformation’ is a better term because it is not teleologically oriented. For this line of thought, divergence was a ‘good’ thing because it meant that countries defied the unduly influence of external players, ranging from states to international institutions and multinational companies.

Fukuyama’s prediction concerning the prevalence of market‐based liberal democracies as the ultimate socio‐economic and political model sparked heated debates (and critique) throughout the world. Although his argument does appear to have some empirical backing, the experience of the first decade of the twenty‐first century suggests that the call of the ‘end of history’ with countries converging towards a market‐based liberal democratic model of political and economic governance may have been premature. ⁶

Why revisit?

So, why is it important to revisit the convergence–divergence debate at this historical juncture? For three reasons, I contend. First, because we now have a clearer empirical picture of patterns of transition and convergence than the one we had in the 1990s. During the 1990s, we were more or less in the middle of an ongoing process of change, which allowed ample latitude for triumphalism or outright rejection – none of which, in hindsight, seems justifiable. Although this process is not over for the countries that form the subject matter of this enquiry, the ‘dust has subsided’, or has done so to a large extent, and we are therefore better able to understand the true directions and dimensions of change and, therefore, of convergence.

The second reason is because we can now pay serious attention to non‐CEE countries, in particular those in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The strategic importance of the CEE countries and the level and intensity of bilateral and multilateral foreign policies towards them in the 1990s literally eclipsed changes in more peripheral regions. Now that the CEE countries have been integrated into the core Western institutions, including the EU, it is possible to extend our analysis to the broader set of transition countries and regions for comparative purposes.

Finally, much of the analysis in the 1990s and early 2000s was based on false or weak premises. It was assumed, for example, that the EU was prepared to differentiate on the basis of the transformation of the candidate countries in the periphery, thus rendering its conditionality credible. Reality showed that that was not always the case. The analyses of the cases of Bulgaria and Romania are quite telling in this respect: these analyses simply lost their empirical bases. By many measures, Bulgaria and Romania look increasingly like their CEE counterparts and less like their Eastern neighbours. More importantly, the trend in the future would seem to head that way. It seems that here, some of the most significant errors were made during the 1990s because of the way the cases of Bulgaria and Romania were used to support theories that showed a preference for domestic explanations, in particular institutionalist ones, as well as legacy‐based or evolutionary approaches. For example, it was assumed that countries that had experienced Ottoman rule were less inclined to accept reform and modernize, and were thus more likely to stay outside the EU. History proved otherwise, so with the power of hindsight we may be in a position to correct that point.

It seems, then, that we are now able to create a more inclusive, and therefore broader, frame of reference; one that includes non‐candidate or no‐hope transition candidates systematically, while defining EU and EU member‐state preferences and policies more accurately. That is the type of framework a ‘revisited’ convergence–divergence framework should introduce. In this way, we will be in position to review our understanding of the patterns of convergence, expand our analysis to include neglected regions, and correct conclusions reached earlier based on weak premises. For these reasons, revisiting the convergence–divergence debate is meaningful and important.

Defining ‘convergence’

Convergence is a process that takes place within a system of units and, by definition, need be relational – that is, refer to the relative state of affairs between two different units. What is considered as ‘units’ depends on our system of reference. ⁷ For example, the discussion in the previous section has been about convergence at a systemic (macro) level. Yet convergence is a process, and as such need not in principle be tied to one macro or micro substantive area. It may be observed in structures of systems, processes and policies, as well as outcomes in various substantive areas such as the political, economic and social ones, to mention but a few.

Usually, definitions of convergence, with minor variations, refer to increases in similarity between the subjects of the enquiry and their various properties (Heichel, Pape, and Sommener 2005; Knill 2005). For a more accurate definition of convergence, it is important to distinguish between two key forms/kinds of convergence: topical and transformative. ⁸ Topical convergence is an inter‐unit process of approximation that does not require internal change for any unit. Topical convergence may take many forms and include many sorts of interaction between two or more units, such as increased inter‐linkages, contacts, visits, joint committees and so on, depending on our unit and system of analysis. In essence, it is a process of approximation (as Jens Bastian very astutely points out in his article in this volume), but does not require the level of similarity between two units to be increased.

Transformative convergence, on the other hand, is an intra‐unit process of change that may affect one or more units. This second form of convergence has attracted much attention in the literature. Convergence, in this case, is usually associated with increasing the level of similarity between two or more units of different origin across one or more dimensions common to both. ‘Increasing the level of similarity’, however, can mean many different things. If, for simplicity, we assume that a system has two units, then increasing the level of similarity might involve change in only one unit (or subset of units) which becomes more similar to its stationary counterpart (as was, to some extent, the case of transition countries). Alternatively, it may involve change in both units towards a common direction. A more expansive definition of convergence would suggest that increased similarity may also result from decrease in dissimilarity between the units, especially if we expand our definition of convergence to include dimensions of change that are uncommon between them. In this case negative change – such as reducing or abandoning uncommon dimensions – leads to a decrease in dissimilarity.

From the definition of convergence and the structure of the system and its units, we can also derive types of convergence. If our system consists of units organized in groups, convergence may be intra‐group, inter‐group, or systemic. Intra‐group convergence entails increases of similarity among the units of one group, but not among or between groups. Inter‐group convergence, on the other hand, involves increases of similarity between groups. Systemic convergence means a system‐wide (that is, involving the entire system of groups and units) increase in similarity on one or more dimensions. For example, the very nature of transition following the fall of communism is a case of systemic convergence.

For operational reasons, a fourth benchmark‐based type of convergence may be conceived. In this case, the level of convergence is measured against an external anchor or standard and the increase of similarity may still be intra‐group, inter‐group or systemic. Because in the case of benchmark‐based convergence the anchor of comparison is external, it is possible to envisage also unit‐level (as well as inter‐unit) convergence towards the benchmark, which is not possible with endogenous measures. ⁹ If the time dimension enters our typology a fifth type of convergence, lagged convergence, may be introduced (Knill 2005).

Depending on the area of convergence, and in particular to the extent that we are considering structures, the end‐state of the process of convergence is isomorphism (Knill 2005; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Radaelli 2000). Isomorphism is a referent to shaping the form of things, and as such does not seem appropriate to describe functions, policies or outcomes.

Understanding what isomorphism is, and what it is not, may help us to better understand what the process of convergence is. Increasing the levels of similarity between two units does not render them isomorphic, although they converge. Similarly, the slightest change between two isomorphic units is divergence, even if the two units are extremely similar. So, isomorphism is used here rather to describe one endpoint of the possible range of outcomes of the process of convergence.

In the end, Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ argument left his main thesis open to criticism because it largely appears to have claimed a move towards isomorphism at a systemic level, when in fact what was happening was more likely convergence towards the socio‐economic system that emerged victorious at the end of the Cold War.

Framing convergence: level and units of analysis

When trying to understand the process of convergence or divergence between and within transition countries, what are the proper units and system of analysis, and at what level should the sources of causality be sought? Are states the systems of our units, or the units of our system? From the viewpoint of the philosophy of science, this discussion concerns the level of analysis and the direction of explanation (Hollis and Smith 1991). The level of analysis, in turn, is concerned with what the appropriate system of reference and its units are. Waltz (1979) introduced three levels: systemic, domestic, and individual. This discussion is relevant here because, even if we assume the international system as the source of determinants, the question remains whether and how domestic groups relate to the process of convergence. Moravcsik organized these domestic groups in a more systematic way by dividing the domestic level into three categories: ‘state‐centred’, ‘society‐centred’, and ‘state‐society’:

First, ‘society‐centered’ theories stress pressure from domestic social groups through legislatures, interest groups, elections, and public opinion. Second, ‘state‐centered’ domestic theories locate the sources of foreign policy behaviour within the administrative and decision‐making apparatus of the executive branch of the state. Cybernetic limitations on decision‐making, governmental elite ideologies of free trade or anti‐Communism, and bureaucratic procedures have been used to reinterpret such classic subjects of Realist historiography as the Peloponnesian War, Bismarckian imperialism, and the NATO alliance. Third, theories of ‘state–society relations’ emphasize the institutions of representation, education, and administration that link state and society. The liberal claim that democracies do not make war on one another is based on one such theory. (Moravcsik 1993, 6)

If the international system is assumed to be the system of reference, then the question arises of what constitutes its units. Answers may range from the state (either as a unitary actor or following the bureaucratic model) to international institutions, multinational corporations, and other transnational interest groups. If, on the other hand, the country is perceived as the system of reference, the units become elites, classes, domestic institutions, or social groups. The international approach seeks international determinants of convergence or divergence, whereas the domestic approach focuses more on domestic conditions, legacies, and path‐dependent approaches.

Even if we agree that the international level is appropriate for examining the sources of convergence or divergence, the question of its units still remains. Conflicting views on the proper units of analysis lead to different choices of actors. Theories extending from the traditional realist or nationalist/statist approaches assume the state to be the primary unit of analysis. Liberal and classical Marxist approaches, on the other hand, see the state as having far less importance. In this case, interest groups and institutions through transnational relations, or classes, are assumed to be the primary units of analysis. It is important to note here that the state remains a key unit of analysis in all articles in this Special Issue.

But to say that the state is the proper unit of analysis does not answer the question of the direction of explanation. Do we move ‘bottom‐up’ or ‘top‐down’ between the system and units of analysis in our attempt to provide explanations? Extending the predicates of structural theories, like neo‐realism (Waltz 1979) or World Systems theory (Wallerstein 1991; Gowan 2004) to the discussion of convergence would suggest that the causes for convergence, at both state and inter‐state level, should be sought at the structure of the international system, which means that the direction of explanation should be top‐down. Many other accounts that focus more on domestic determinants of foreign policy contest this idea, however. Focusing on domestic structures, such as bureaucracies (e.g. Alison 1971), or on domestic elites (see Melnykovska and Schweickert in this volume), provides a better account and, therefore, so does the bottom‐up explanation.

The relevance of this discussion to the topic of this dissertation is elaborated by Hollis and Smith in their discussion of Singer: ‘The unit or state level exaggerates the differences among states, and underestimates the impact of the system on the actions of states; the systems level assumes that states are more homogeneous than they are and overestimates the impact of the system on the behaviour of the units’ (Hollis and Smith 1991, 100; Singer 1961). The striking pattern of the entire set of countries under transformation is that all of them renounced a planned economy as the organizing ideology and practice at the economic level, thus resulting in systemic convergence by our definition. Despite, however, the fact that the direction of change is not region‐ or country‐specific, the outcomes are, as the articles in this issue show.

Does, then, a top‐down (i.e. from the international system to its units) or a bottom‐up approach make more sense when trying to understand and explain patterns of convergence or non‐convergence? At first, this question seems problematic, because of significant variations among national trajectories of transformation and therefore in international patterns of convergence. If we assume that international influence is exercised in a uniform way upon all transition countries, then variation in the pace of national transformations logically lies primarily at the domestic level, and is determined by domestic parameters. If, however, it could be shown that external agents exercised their influence in a deliberately non‐uniform way and that these selective patterns of international influence match the patterns of differentiated domestic outcomes, then the explanatory power of domestic particularities, constraints, and legacies is significantly reduced.

But are domestic actors consciously involved in mechanisms underlying international convergence? If yes, how does the linkage between external agents and domestic reforms happen? The enquiry of the link between external agents, domestic agents, and domestic reforms is of particular significance for both empirical and theoretical reasons. The empirical relevance concerns primarily the mechanisms through which external influences translate into domestic outcomes. Unless we accept the extreme case that domestic structures might be little more than ‘transmission belts’ of external influences, there is important understanding to be gained by examining the actions and reactions that occur at the domestic level.

One note of caution is in order here: if we resort to using both the international and the domestic levels as our levels of reference in order to explain transformation outcomes and patterns of convergence, we may gain in comprehensiveness but lose in parsimony, while at the same time violating the integrity of levels of analysis. An additional case against violating levels of analysis was made by Singer (1961), who is concerned with the careless combination of data at various levels of aggregation.

Contrary to this position, and in relation to the intrinsic limitations of systemic theories, Moravcsik suggests that:

Systemic theorists… are thus faced with a dilemma. They can maintain the purity of the international level of analysis by radically limiting their theories to those areas where restrictive assumptions hold, or they can seek systematic ways to integrate domestic politics into systemic approaches. Each alternative challenges one of the major justifications for privileging systemic theory: the former undermines its comprehensiveness, the latter its parsimony. (Moravcsik 1993, 8–9)

In effect, he calls for the bridging of levels of analysis in order to deal with the shortcomings of one‐level analyses, an approach that is particularly useful in the context of our work here.

Contributions in this Special Issue

Othon Anastasakis makes the case that the EU has entered a phase of risk aversion, which is reflected very clearly in the nature of the instrument of conditionality. Indeed, the author makes the case that the political conditionality of the EU has been undergoing a qualitative change (a ‘procedural enhancement’), reflecting to some extent internal EU mood and limitations (absorption capacity etc), the pace of reforms in the aspiring members, and a general desire to avoid risks.

Usually, the analysis of domestic transformations focuses on either the domestic or international levels of analysis. The article by Jens Bastian introduces an interesting variant that looks at the role of regional offices (the European Agency for Reconstruction, in this case) as an intermediating step, an intervening variable. The article shows why a remote, top‐down approach centred in Brussels does not, or indeed cannot, work as effectively as when it is complemented by regional presence. This intervening variable, though no magic wand, makes a big difference in terms of reform outcomes on the ground. Along the way, the Bastian article reminds us that approximation, which is what is happening between the EU and the Western Balkan countries, does not automatically lead to convergence.

Martin Brusis looks at the stability of political institutions through cross‐national democracy and governance indicators in transition countries in the Balkans (and beyond, in Section 3) and makes two substantive arguments, while raising a third, mostly methodological, issue. First, by looking at a number of indexes, the article concludes that they largely reflect the gradation of relationships between the EU and the South East European countries (with some notable exceptions, namely Serbia and Turkey) who, for different reasons, appear to defy the general pattern. Second, countries in the Balkans seem to converge both as a group and towards Europe. Finally, in reviewing methodological and measurement issues (but not conceptual validity), the author offers a particularly welcome critical assessment of the indexes used in the analysis of democratization, given that the (often uncritical) use of indexes in the literature is on the ascendancy.

The article by Brad Blitz examines a very sensitive sector: the penal system and its reform in Albania. The sector falls under the general category of ‘human rights’, but does not appear to make adequate progress despite the conditionality attached to it. The author makes the case that historic legacies and path dependencies condition the trajectory of penal reform in the country. Unlike those who see the prospect of membership as the key to reform that helps countries enter a virtuous cycle of reform, the experience of penal reform in Albania shows that domestic legacies and existing practices can be very decisive. Having noted this, the author also observes that the reform of Albania’s penal system has been influenced by external demands, considering ideological, political but also practical aspects of penal reform, such as the level of infrastructure and state capacity. The problems of the penal system are related partly to historic legacies, but mostly to political and administrative deficiencies and, more fundamentally, to the malfunctioning of the judicial sector at large.

George Georgiadis gives primary importance to external determinants as the explanatory variables of convergence or the lack thereof and makes two claims. First, today’s EU policies towards its periphery are path‐dependent and in fact reflect policy choices made in the critical years between 1989 and 1993. Second, EU policy has not promoted overall convergence among CEE, Western Balkan, and Western CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) transition countries, because its policies have been geographically and geopolitically differentiated from the very beginning of the transition process. Instead, it has promoted only partial convergence among countries that were included in the intensive track that has led to EU membership.

The article by Amy Verdun and Gabriela Chira shows, much like the Anastasakis article, that the posture of the EU towards its Eastern periphery has clearly changed. A much more reluctant and much less enlargement‐eager EU will no longer follow the same generous policy. In other words, existing candidate countries will enter because they have reformed, not in order to do so. Non‐candidate countries, however, can try to make themselves more attractive by unilaterally and voluntarily reforming in accordance with EU rules to render themselves compatible and more likely to be granted accession when the window of opportunity opens again. Thus, the article illustrates the types of strategies that are followed by countries that wish to enter, but are not (or not yet) on the ticket for accession in the near future.

Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert examine Ukraine’s transformation and make three claims. First, without the prospect of membership, and in the absence of strong incentives, it is unlikely that top‐down reforms will resonate with either the elites or the people in Ukraine. Second, in such an environment, oligarchs and elites determine the pace of reform and convergence with the EU. Third, EU and European Neighbourhood Policy initiatives, if properly crafted and targeted, may affect the preferences of the elites, and therefore the level of convergence. The policy recommendation that follows from this is that the European Neighbourhood Policy would be more effective if it were to rely on appropriate incentives and mechanisms encouraging bottom‐up forces of convergence by identifying the domestic groups that are willing and able to drive necessary reforms and institution‐building.

Notes

1. Throughout this Introduction, I will use the terms ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Western CIS’ interchangeably.

2. For a more detailed account of alternative definitions of Europeanization in the literature, see Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2003.

3. For a more elaborate analysis of the impact of conditionality on the CEE countries, see Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004. They argue that it is necessary to be cautious about the idea of a uniform impact of conditionality; following their study of the impact of conditionality in the areas of regional policy and regionalization, they observe differentiated outcomes in different CEE countries.

4. Beyond the post‐communist context, a broader list of ways through which Europeanization results in domestic transformation has been proposed by Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2003, 4): (1) EU prescription of domestic institutional adaptation; (2) alteration of domestic opportunity structures and, subsequently, of domestic winners and losers; (3) changes of beliefs and expectations of domestic agents that in turn affect the formation of preferences at the domestic level; (4) formation of European ideas as a legitimizing force for domestic reform.

5. ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post‐war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (Fukuyama 1992).

6. Although Fukuyama’s response might be that his thesis is macro‐historical, and as such can only be verified or falsified in the long run.

7. See relevant section later in this article, and also Hollis and Smith 1991 for an excellent treatise on the topic.

8. I will not discuss here how the two may relate.

9. For a more formal set of definitions as well a discussion of causes, see Brusis in this Special Issue; see also Knill 2005 and Heichel, Pape, and Sommener 2005.