The Justice and Development Party’s identity and its role in the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey

Abstract

This paper investigates the identity of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – the conservative–democratic party in power in Turkey since November 2002 – and assesses its role in the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey. It argues that the AKP leadership has successfully employed an identity‐based strategy highlighting the possibility of being Muslim and sharing European norms and values at the same time and the importance of Turkey’s EU membership to refute ‘the clash of civilizations’ thesis to get Turkey closer to the EU in the post‐September 11 global political context.

Keywords:

• AKP
• Turkey
• identity
• discourse
• EU enlargement

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank David Phinnemore, Altay Nevzat, Burcu Sarı Karademir and the reviewers for their comments on the earlier versions of this paper. Responsibility for this version is ours.

Notes

1. The Treaty of Lisbon redefines the principles and values of the EU with some additions: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non‐discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’ (Official Journal 2007, Article 1a).

2. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the then Chief Adviser of Erdoğan and the mastermind of the AKP’s foreign policy, stated that as it is a false and dividing concept which indicates monopolization of the representation of Islam, the AKP leadership did not use the concept of ‘Islamic party’ but instead presented themselves as part of the Turkish political tradition (see Al‐Ahram Weekly On‐line 2004). Since 1 May 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

3. Bergsonian intellectuals such as Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Peyami Safa, İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and Mustafa Şekip Tunç are considered as synthesis‐oriented conservatives.

4. Gül does not reject that he previously considered the EU as a ‘Christian club’. Indeed, during his term as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gül stated that different circles in Europe act with different reflexes. Among those, some actions justify this labelling of the EU as a ‘Christian club’ while there are also loyal supporters of Turkey. Here, he points at the existence of two Europes and confusion in Europe (see Gül 2007, 174–5).

5. The mounting worries of the secular bloc due to the policies of the RP‐DYP coalition government created an antagonistic atmosphere which ended up with the notorious February 28 recommendations taken in the NSC meeting. Erbakan, as prime minister, at first refused to ratify these recommendations designed to protect secularism but later noticed that he did not have much choice. This process, which has been labelled ‘post‐modern coup’, resulted in his resignation.