Greece and the Macedonian Question: an assessment of recent claims and criticisms

Abstract

This review essay evaluates Greece's role in certain central aspects of the Macedonian Question based on a sustained engagement with key claims recently made by Andrew Rossos in his significant, comprehensive and trenchant critique of Hellenism. Rossos makes the case for the non‐Greek ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians, a necessary first step for the propagation of a Greater Macedonia position, according to which all of geographic Macedonia should exclude Greece and belong to its purported Slavic ‘Macedonian’ majority. After the presentation of the available surveys and information, it is concluded that the Greater Macedonia theoretical edifice is ultimately unsustainable and thus cannot delegitimize the Greek presence and actions in the region. Next, the argument that a huge ‘Macedonian’ minority, possibly numbering in the hundreds of thousands, resides in contemporary Greece is assessed by focusing primarily on Greek electoral politics and results. Finally, after the scrutiny of the relevant documents and other evidence, Rossos' suggestion that Greece conspired with Milosevic's Serbia to partition the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is evaluated. The essay concludes by emphasizing that nationalist historiographies should not be used to impede the necessary path of all the Western Balkan states towards Euro‐Atlantic integration.

Keywords:

• Antiquization
• FYROM
• Greater Macedonia
• Greece
• Macedonia
• Macedonian Question
• Andrew Rossos

Notes

1. The phrase is used in a brief review of Danforth (1995).

2. Throughout this essay the term FYROM will be utilized which is the state's international United Nations name. This approach has the advantage of conforming to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 passed on 7 April 1993, according to which ‘this state [will be] referred to for all purposes within the United Nations “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state’ (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/203/74/IMG/N9320374.pdf?OpenElement). One hundred twenty nine states have recognized FYROM with her constitutional name but only for bilateral purposes. Although this author considers FYROM to be the appropriate reference, quotations that utilize other names are not tampered with, not least because the author's choice is potentially indicative of his or her position. The same applies to the use of the term ‘Macedonians’. This author personally opts for ‘Slav‐Macedonians’, but employs ‘Macedonian’ when used directly by other scholars.

3. Rossos' account begins in 600 BC and ends millennia later in 2001 AD. His treatment of issues such as the original IMRO, IMRO (ob), Ivan Mikhailov's IMRO, early Slav‐Macedonian nationalism, the Ilinden uprising and, particularly, politics, culture and economics in the Yugoslav People's (subsequently Socialist), Republic of Macedonia are all interesting and provocative. However, this essay will concentrate on his treatment of Greece. It is also worth mentioning that Rossos claims that ‘although I sought it, I did not obtain access to the archives in Greece’ (Rossos 2008, xx). Any such occurrence is regrettable and this author would gladly join a campaign to make all relevant archives in all Balkan states accessible to scholars. It should be pointed out, though, that Rossos clarifies that he ‘requested permission to work on the Macedonian Question in the archives in Bulgaria, Greece, and the Soviet Union several times in the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's’ (Rossos 2008, 296, n. 7; emphasis added). It is legitimate to ask whether the discouraging experience prevented him from seeking access in the almost two decades that passed after his initial attempts. Was he denied unfettered access again? If so, he provides no indication of this being the case, although the reader is left with the impression that for Greek archives he is still persona non grata.

4. Prior to the signing of the Interim Accord FYROM had no UN flag. This is because on 7 April 1993, Jamshood K.A. Marker acting in his capacity as President of the United Nations Security Council sent a letter to UN General Secretary, Boutros Boutros‐Ghali suggesting that the ceremony of hoisting FYROM's flag outside the UN building be postponed for a later day. For the relevant document (see Valinakis and Dalis 1996, 149).

5. See Marquand (2009). More recently, it has even been claimed that Alexander the Great was Albanian. See Marusic (2009).

6. See ‘Letter to President Obama’, 18 May 2009 signed by 357 scholars at Internet site: http://macedonia-evidence.org/obama-letter.html#addenda.

7. For a similar assessment, see also Cawkwell (1978, 22). Other scholars attempt to find some useful modern parallels in order to explain the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians: ‘The Macedonians … were racially Greek. The relation might not be so much that of British and Scots as of Germans and Austrians; but in the case of Macedon it was the rather smaller partner which effected the Anschluss’ (Stoneman 1997, 12).

8. Rossos is citing from Borza (1990, 96). Rossos also refers to Hammond (1986, 534–5) whom Borza is actually citing. However, it should be added that Hammond states that ‘In the early fifth century the royal house of Macedon, the Temenidae, was recognized as Greek by the presidents of the Olympic games. Their verdict was and is decisive; for modern readers adduce no evidence. It is certain that the kings considered themselves to be of Greek descent from Heracles, son of Zeus. The royal house of Lyncus in Upper Macedonia claimed descent from the Bacchiadae … The Temenidae and Bacchiadae certainly spoke Greek. They also spoke the language of their people, ‘Macedonian’, a strong dialect of very early Greek which was not intelligible to contemporary Greeks' (Hammond 1986, 534).

9. Borza concludes that ‘Once freed from the constraints of modern Balkan political rhetoric, the issue of the ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians and their royal house recedes into its proper historical significance: the blood‐lines of ancient peoples are notoriously difficult to trace’ (Borza 1990, 97).

10. On page 119 even a map of ‘Partitioned Macedonia’ is helpfully provided. The partitioned regions are those of ‘Vardar’, ‘Pirin’ and ‘Aegean’ Macedonia. Rossos does acknowledge an interesting distinction between the unification of what he calls Macedonians and the unification of the geographical territory of Macedonia. Unfortunately, he fails to expound upon this theme and explore the ideological and policy consequences (see Rossos 2008, 222).

11. One can justifiably wonder about what kind of indisputable data might exist that allow Rossos to make such confident assertions for more than a millennium ago.

12. According to Rossos, and as regards what he considers the Macedonian national consciousness, it was only in the 1930s that ‘the three major strands – the intelligentsia's Macedono‐Bulgarianism and Macedonianism and popular Macedonianism (našizam) – would come together’ (Rossos 2008, 97).

13. See also Rossos' fascinating discussion of the national identity of the leaders of IMRO during the time of Ilinden (2008, 103–5).

14. Rossos goes on to caution that ‘even these [numbers] are educated speculation at best’ (2008, 7).

15. Of these ‘2.250 [were] in the Florina Prefecture (5.7% of valid ballots) and 1,347 in the Pellas Prefecture (1.27%)’ (Kostopoulos 2000, 324).

16. Election results are taken from the website of Greece's Ministry of the Interior (www.ypes.gr).

17. See also Danforth (1995, 116) and Poulton (1995, 166).

18. For a significant, comprehensive but not entirely persuasive analysis of these issues see McDougall (2009).

19. In fairness, it should be added that Rossos states that the minority's ‘numbers will remain unfathomable unless and until Athens officially recognizes this minority's existence and ends its repressive and discriminatory policies.’ (Rossos 2008, 7). But in this author's view, elections have settled to a considerable extent this debate.

20. An evaluation of Greece's role in the Macedonian name dispute must cover almost two decades of diplomacy and requires a separate essay. For a discussion that also includes an analysis of more recent developments see Tziampiris (2009).

21. See also the detailed account in Michas (2002, 49).

22. Michas readily accepts this. See Michas (2002, 52).

23. Cited in ‘The Backstage of the Skopje Issue’ at Internet site: http://folders.skai.gr/default.asp?la=1&pid=10&tID=128 [in Greek].

24. The relevant passages from the minutes of the meeting were published in 1995 (see Tarkas 1995, 91). Rossos is thus wrong when he alleges that Greece's ‘scheme [with Serbia] finally compelled EC member and the United States (and thus NATO) to blow the whistle on Greece's demands and assume a more realistic stance (Rossos 2008, 271). It was Mitsotakis himself who blew the whistle, and it is no coincidence that Rossos offers no sources to back up his ‘whistle blowing’ allegations.

25. The cited statement was made by Greece's Permanent Representative at the UN, Mr Antonis Exarchos. For a series of statements made during 1992 by Greek officials at the highest levels in support of no changes in FYROM's borders see Tziampiris (2000, 51).

26. For an account and analysis of the events in connection with the ethnic crisis in FYROM see especially Phillips (2004). For a comprehensive analysis of how Greece reacted to the crisis, see Tziampiris (2003, 113–30).

27. ‘No to Any Change in Borders’, Flash.gr, 13 June 2001 [in Greek].

28. ‘What we are Sending to Skopje’, To Vima, 8 March 2001 [in Greek].

29. This behaviour nicely complemented the excellent bilateral economic relations that had ensued after the signing of the Interim Accord. See Nikas (2005).

30. (See, e.g. Karakasidou 1993; Karakasidou 1997; Koliopoulos 1999; Kostopoulos 2000; Michas 2002; Roudometof 2002; Zahariadis 2005; Kontogiorgi 2006; Livanios 2008). Rossos in fact cites many of these studies. It is however noteworthy that Rossos only refers to one study by Evangelos Kofos, probably the most significant Greek historian of the Macedonian Question of at least the past half century. Granted, Communism and Nationalism in Macedonia (Kofos 1964) is his magnum opus, but Rossos only cites the first and not the enlarged second edition (Kofos 1993). That a Greek author of Kofos' stature is largely neglected is arguably indicative of Rossos' attitude towards mainstream Greek historiography on the Macedonian Question.

31. See for example, Museum of the Macedonian Struggle 1997 and Museum of the Macedonian Struggle 1996.