Geo‐strategic position as leverage in EU accession: the case of Turkish–EU negotiations on the Nabucco pipeline

Abstract

This article examines the Turkish–EU negotiations for the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement and the Turkish–EU membership talks to problematize Turkish leaders’ tendency to establish linkages between their country’s geo‐strategic value and the EU accession process. It argues that Turkey’s ability to gain strategic leverage depends on the formation of a winning coalition inside the EU in favour of its membership, which among other things, depends on the presence of a joint strategic outlook on the specific issue area. In the case of Nabucco negotiations, short of such consensus, there emerged an anchor credibility dilemma which both prevented linkages between geopolitical position and the accession process, and stalled strategic cooperation in energy security.

Keywords:

• Turkish–EU relations
• accession process
• anchor credibility dilemma
• energy security
• Nabucco
• South Stream
• Gazprom
• East‐West energy corridor
• Southern gas corridor

Notes

1. For criticisms of Turkey’s energy policies, see Pamir (2007, 20) and Winrow (2004, 27–32).

2. A related challenge has been the entry of China into Central Asia as a potential buyer. Moreover, growing competition over the Azeri gas by rival European pipeline projects raises questions over the feasibility of Nabucco; see Kardas (2010).

3. For press release, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/748&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

4. For relevant EU initiatives, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/index_en.htm

5. For counter‐arguments that new Russia‐backed proposals could complement European energy security, see Mankoff (2009, 15).

6. See, for instance, the joint press statement of a high‐level conference on energy cooperation, bringing together representatives from Turkey and the Commission, held in İstanbul on 5 June 2007 (http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/jointprelease-en.pdf).

7. For an overview of the developments leading to the IGA, see Aras and İşeri (2009).

8. See Rehn’s remarks at the Bosphorus conference, 10 October 2008 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/es/article_8217_es.htm).

9. For Rehn’s remarks at the conference, entitled ‘Turkey as an Energy Hub for Europe: Prospects and Challenges,’ 4 March 2009, acknowledging the synergy between energy cooperation and accession process, see http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8535_en.htm. Speaking at the same conference, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler asked Europeans to appreciate Turkey’s constructive role in the BTC and Nabucco pipelines during the accession negotiations; see http://www.epc.eu/prog_details.php?cat_id=6&pub_id=987&prog_id=1

10. For Rehn’s address on 26 June 2009, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/318&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

11. For Barroso’s remarks at the signing of the IGA, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/339

12. I am grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing this out.

13. Turkey has observer status with the ECT.

14. Selim Kuneralp, Deputy Undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry responsible for economic affairs, emphasized that the progress of IGA talks would have accelerated if the energy chapter had been opened.

15. For a critical evaluation of Turkey’s arguments for becoming a ‘hub,’ see Roberts (2010).

16. These diverging perspectives between Turkey and the EU were visible as early as during Barroso’s meeting with Erdoğan in Turkey in April 2008.

17. For limitations of Turkey’s resort to energy card, see Triantaphyllou and Fotiou (2010).

18. For Güler’s remarks to that effect, see Radikal 2009.