The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles for trust building (2009–2010)

Abstract

Among the four unsettled conflicts in the wider Black Sea region the Transnistrian one is often described as the most solvable. Between 2009 and 2010 the conflict in Transnistria emerged as an important security issue on the European agenda. This article intends to demonstrate how a myriad of global, regional and domestic developments provided a fresh start for building trust between the key regional actors, and synergy for creating a favourable setting for a sustainable solution in the long run. However, these new tendencies around Transnistria evolved in parallel with the inertia of old agendas and competing regional security logic. Hence, the article will also address the obstacles which precluded progress towards a propitious environment for conflict resolution. It will conclude with considerations of where the conflict settlement stands and what may be expected in the mid and long term.

Keywords:

• Moldova
• Transnistria
• conflict
• EU
• the US
• Russia

Notes

1. According to the latest census conducted in Transnistria (2004) there are three major ethnic groups: Moldovans represent 31.9%, Russians 30.3%, and Ukrainians 28.8%. For more see, ‘Oglasheny Predvaritelinye Itogi Pridnestrovskoi Perepisi Naseleniya’ [Preliminary results of census in Transnistria have been released], Olivia Press, http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol37-09-05.htm.

2. In 2008 Moldova had allocated 0.6% of GDP for national defence. In 2009 Moldova cut its defence budget by 25%, the sharpest reduction in Europe. For more see, SIPRI Yearbook 2009 and 2010 – Military Expenditure, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB0905.pdf, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex.

3. Latest opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Public Policies (November 2010) reveals that 3.1% of Moldovans believe Transnistrian conflict settlement should be country’s top priority. In the public survey, the Transnistrian conflict is ranked sixth as problem to be solved by Moldova, issues of public order, economic development and prosperity lead the top three. For more see, ‘Barometrul Opiniei Publice’ [Public Opinion Barometer]. Institutul de Politici Publice. http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/2010/BOP_Noiembrie_2010. ppt#256,1, Barometrul Opiniei Publice (accessed November 2010).

4. Russian numerical participation in the mission kept declining. Currently, the ‘peacekeeping’ force is composed of 402 solders from Russia, 492 from Transnistria, 355 from Moldova and 10 military observers from Ukraine. See, RIA Novosti. http://www.newsmoldova.md/politics/20101116/188445011.html (accessed November 16, 2010).

5. The deadline was extended at the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Porto (2002) by one year. See, ‘10^th Meeting of the Ministerial Council’, OSCE. http://www.osce.org/files/documents/b/f/40521.pdf (accessed December 6–7, 2002).

6. Russia’s military involvement on the Transnistrian side has been proven in the ‘Ilascu and others versus Republic of Moldova and Russia’ case at European Court of Human Rights. See, http://jurisprudentacedo.com/Ilascu-si-altii-c.-Moldovei-si-Rusiei-Jurisdictia-in-regiunea-Transnistreana/Pagina-2.html.

7. The withdrawal was a protest against the new customs regime between Moldova and Ukraine (agreed on 30 December 2005), which would not allow Transnistrian exports without Moldovan customs stamps and against the deployment of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) along Moldo-Ukrainian border and covering also the Transnistrian segment (on 30 November 2005 onwards), which would effectively monitor the application of the new customs regime.

8. The US State Secretary has pointed that: ‘[…] all participating states, including Georgia and Moldova, must have the right to agree to the stationing of foreign forces on their sovereign territory’. See, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hRb-BzBIy6NTNgmpzKtvGvhSS50g.

9. Author’s interview with a former US State Department official, October 2010.

10. Author’s interview with a former US State Department official, October 2010.

11. For excerpts from the interview with the US Ambassador to Moldova see, http://www.timpul.md/articol/modificarea-constitutiei-in-vizorul-partenerilor-externi-7299.html.

12. Moldovan citizen Ernest Vardanyan is a freelance reporter living in Tiraspol. On 7 April 2010 he was arrested by the secessionist authorities and accused of ‘treason and espionage for Moldova’. On 16 December 2010 he was sentenced by the Transnistrian Supreme Court for 15 years in prison. Human rights organizations qualified his arrest as abusive and trial as unjust, demanding his immediate release.

13. The ‘Corfu Process’ was initiated in June 2009 during informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers. It was a reaction to president Medvedev proposal on European Security Treaty. The process proposes to begin a dialogue aiming to improve confidence and discuss way of improving the security architecture in Europe. See, http://www.osce.org/cio/46125.

14. These are related to transport, customs services, healthcare, competitiveness, food, aviation safety, innovations and communication. See, ‘Green Light for Moldova to Take Part in EU Programmes’, ENPI Info Center. http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=23289&id_type=1&lang_id=450 (accessed November 24, 2011).

15. For chronology of events since the idea of the European Security Treaty has been put forward in Berlin 2008 and draft treaty proposed by Russia publication see, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2009/11/291600_223080.shtml.

16. Author’s interview with a Romanian diplomat, October 2010.

17. European expert remarks at a closed-session seminar, October 2010.

18. Author’s interview with a senior Moldovan official, July 2010.

19. Data on Transnistria’s economic agents registered in accordance with Moldovan legislation retrieved from, Veaceslav Berbeca (2010). Problema Privatizarilor din Regiunea Transnistreana [Problems of Privatization in Transnistrian Region]. IDIS-Raport de Prevenire a Crizelor, April–October, 10.

20. Experts estimate that external trade contributes around 80% to Transnistria’s GDP. See, http://origin.europalibera.org/content/article/2086297.html.

21. Author’s interview with EU official, December 2010.

22. Alternatively, if constitutional changes in Transnistria are passed Smirnov might keep his job. However, he will have to share power with a prime minister approved by the parliament as the amended constitution would envision. In this case, Moscow might encourage emulation of the Russian-type duumvirate in Transnistria, limiting in this way the power of Smirnov.

23. After the Russo-Georgian war, President Medvedev formulated five points which will guide Russian foreign policy. The last one referred to regions where Russia has privileged interests, mentioning in this connection its close neighbours. See, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml.

24. Russian MFA Comments on the Situation in Moldova. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/9B0F3ACDA3E8B52CC3257592002C3EB8 (accessed April 8, 2009).

25. Interview with EU diplomat, December 2010.

26. The fact sincerely recognized by the former Transnistrian official. As he put it: ‘[…] for about 20 years Transdniestria helped Russia to influence Moldova […] very efficiently’. See, Andrey Safonov, Transdniestria’s Path. In Moldova-Transdniestria: Working together for a prosperous future, eds. Denis Matveev et al. Chisinau: Cu Drag Publishing House, 191.

27. Russian expert’s remarks at a closed-session seminar, October 2010.

28. Author’s interview with EU senior diplomat, December 2010.

29. Author’s interview with a European expert, October 2010.

30. The main actors’ positions on Astana OSCE Summit agenda is summarised in ‘After the Astana Summit: More Questions than Answers’, CSIS/IND Policy brief, 9/10. http://csis.org/files/publication/101217_CSIS-IND_PolicyBrief.Nr.9.pdf.

31. Interestingly enough representatives from the post-Soviet de facto states shared similar opinion after visiting Tiraspol. Author’s interview with Abkhaz expert, May 2010.

32. Author’s interview with EU official, December 2010.

33. According to Freedom House, civil liberties improved in Moldova in 2010 ‘due to a more balanced and diverse media environment, a reduction in government hostility toward civil society groups, and a lack of interference with political gatherings ahead of the November 2010 parliamentary elections’. ‘Freedom in the World 2011’, Freedom House, 2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=594. Moldova also advanced in Press Freedom Index in 2010 from 114th place to 75th. See, http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1034

34. Discussion reported by the one of participants of the round table. For more see, Victor Chirila, Dialoguri Transnistrene.Tiraspol: Comert ‘Liber’ sau ‘Direct’ cu UE? [Transnistrian Dialogues. Tiraspol: Free or Direct Trade with the EU?]. Radio Europa Libera. 15 http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/2218803.html (accessed November 2010).