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Abstract
This study analyses factors related to attitudes toward European Union (EU) accession, taking into account political affiliation, religious and ethnic identity, fear of foreign threat, utilitarian considerations, along with a number of other variables through a survey conducted among Turkish citizens in general and also among various Alevi communities. The results show that Alevi identity, in contrast to Kurdish background, was strongly indicative of positive attitudes toward the EU. Furthermore, in conjunction with existing literature on EU integration, political party affiliation, utilitarian concerns and fear of foreigners were associated with attitudes toward membership among all groups, while religiosity was not a significant determinant of attitudes toward the EU.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Burcu Kamarlı, Zeki Sarıgil, Torsten Selck, Emine Bademci, Gökhan Güler and Ayşenur Kılıç among others for their valuable contributions at various stages of this research.
Notes
1. Scholars range in their estimates anywhere from 10 to 25%. Poyraz (Citation2005) notes that Alevis themselves have claimed 30–40%.
2. For an interesting study analyzing how other national parties in Europe take positions on Turkey’s accession based on such strategic and structural factors rather than ideology, see Chatzistavrou (Citation2010).
3. The authors have intentionally chose to avoid the term ‘minority’ for several reasons though this term could (and has) been widely appropriated in discussions about Kurds and Alevis. While it is true that the Turkish state does not formally recognize these groups as minorities, it is also true that many members of these groups, particularly among Alevis, do not appreciate being identified as a ‘minority’ either. Stemming from policies employed toward the end of the Ottoman Empire, the designation of ‘minority’ has become an expression that results in further marginalization and isolation of the targeted group. Thus, the apparent ‘benefits’ of minority status are seen as far inferior to the cost of being socially labeled as a ‘second-class citizen’ and ‘potential traitor’. For this reason, the authors felt that the expression ‘non-dominant’ cultural groups/communities would suffice.
4. There are a number of interesting and detailed studies regarding the particular case and developments regarding Turkey’s EU relations. For a broader picture of the individual case, see the collected works of Çarkoğlu and Rubin (Citation2003) and Uğur and Canefe (Citation2004).
5. For a number of excellent studies on Alevis, see the collected work by Olsson, Özdalga, and Raudvere (Citation2003) and the ethnographic study by Shankland (Citation2003).
6. As indicated by Melikoff (Citation2003, 6), the distinction between the groups was more in regard to social practices rather than belief. While the Bektaş community tended to engage in a more sedentary life and organized ritualized religious practice centered around lodges (tekke), the Kızılbaş tended to be more nomadic and flexible in religious practice, infusing local folklore into existing religious legends.
7. Sometimes referred to as Selim, the Grim by English historians or Yavuz Sultan Selim in Turkish.
8. For a broader survey and debate on the Kurds in Turkey, see Kirişçi and Winrow (Citation1997), Barkey and Fuller (Citation1998), McDowall (Citation2004), Heper (Citation2007), and in Turkish, Yeğen (Citation1999).
9. For more about the composition of these elites, see Zürcher (Citation2005).
10. Approximately 20% of Alevis are Kurdish, see Poyraz (Citation2005).
11. The parties formed by these political elites have been regularly closed down by the Constitutional Court. They have existed as the People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi), the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi), the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi), the Democratic Society Party (DTP), and, as of 2009, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
12. The DTP was closed in December 2009 by the Constitutional Court for ‘undemocratic’ behavior and support for terrorism.
13. This is true for the time during which the survey was distributed (see Note 8).
14. Turkish Communist Party.
15. Two-tailed Pearson coefficient with a significance of .000 for both.
16. Two-tailed Pearson coefficients, .339, .327, .216, and .322 respectively all with .000 significance.