Europeanization post-accession: rule adoption and national political elites in Romania and Bulgaria

Abstract

Romania and Bulgaria’s inability to fully meet membership criteria has questioned the European Union’s ability to influence domestic reform post-accession. This article investigates stalled Europeanization post-accession due to the dilution of the external incentive model, and the reassertion of domestic structures, through an interplay between formal, behaviuoral and discursive adoption. The findings show that the implementation of post-accession Europeanization was delayed by Brussels’s reluctance to substantiate their threats and the national political elites’ ability to stifle implementation by relying on techniques of ‘smoking-mirrors’. The article applies discourse and historical analysis. By focusing upon the period 2007–2011, it considers the efficiency of post-conditionality mechanisms of compliance.

Keywords:

• Europeanization
• post-accession
• Romania
• Bulgaria

Acknowledgement

Acknowledgements to Mihaela Racovita for assistance with data collection.

Notes

1. Three safeguards can be invoked up to three years after accession: a general economic 40safeguard clause (article 36); a specific internal market safeguard clause (article 37) anda specific justice and home affairs safeguard clause (article 38). Any improper use of EUfunds will lead to financial corrections such as delayed disbursements, reduction onfuture payments or recovery of funds.

2. In 2007, the Romanian Minister of Justice motivated pressing for investigations, trials and verdicts in response to Brussels demands. While stressing that the Commission ‘remains vigilant’, Commissioner Frattini denied having required quantity and stressed that ‘Romania should worry less about the safeguard clause and more about making progress.’

3. In 2007, the Member of the European Parliament from the European People’s Party Joseph Dall warned that since ‘we are responsible for the tax-payers money, and as long as we do not have the certainty that their money are getting where they should, there is a real possibility for the safeguard clause’ (in Ziua 23 October 2007). In 2009, the MEP Markus Ferber, Group of the European People’s Party-European Democrats delivered a similar warning (in Ziua 2 July 2009).

4. Frans Timmermans, the Dutch Minister for European Affairs, referred to ‘the lack of political will and lack of initiative in addressing local corruption’ and called for the activation of the safeguard clause for both countries. The Dutch government later backtracked. The French Senate warned against stigmatization of Romania and Bulgaria (see euractiv June 2009).

5. The Boc government was criticized both by the de facto leader of the liberal-democrats, President Basescu, attempting to delimitate himself from the government’s performance, and by the leader of the social-democrats, Mircea Geoana, President Basescu’s main counter-candidate. Geoana announced that his party is a dissident in office and urged his ministers to attack their coalition partners forcefully.

6. The chair of the Romanian Parliament Commission for European Affairs dismissed a consultant inquiry over the pace of adopting EU directives. By December 2007, the commission had discussed no EU legislation, an activity dismissed as irrelevant in May (‘we do not have time for peanuts now’, referendum to impeach the president) and secondary in fall (time of local elections). Private conversation with the consultant.

7. Gigi Becali, owner of the football club Steaua and leader of the New Generation Party, under investigation for corruption and bribery of public officials, entered the European elections in coalition with the nationalists of Romania Mare Party. Both parties’ leaders were elected MEPs. Following several appeals, he was granted the right to exit the country. In Bulgaria, Alexander Tomov (indicted for embezzlement of 18mil euros and falsifying documents) and Ivaylo Drajev (prosecuted for drunk driving, killing of two persons and for bankrupting a Burgas plant by siphoning off its funds) were candidates for Tomov’s party the ‘Bulgarian Social Democracy’. Attempts to contest their candidatures were overthrown by the High Administrative Court. Though not elected, investigations were severely impeded given that during the campaign, candidates are immune from prosecution.

8. Attempts by anti-corruption prosecutors to indict Former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase (i.e. Afacerea Tamara, Afacerea Zambaccian) were rebuffed by parliament by refusing to revoke his parliamentary immunity (strange ideological coalitions form in such occasions). Investigations of ministers for misuse of public money (rumoured to have financed President Basescu’s daughter campaign for the European parliament as an independent) also stalled. The Sport Minister, Monica Iacob-Ritzi, resigned under pressure, and the prosecutor general asked the parliament’s permission to prosecute. The Minister of Tourism, Elena Udrea, was investigated by a parliamentary commission who complained of restricted access to documents, and the minister’s refusal to testify. In the summer of 2008, observers expected that a fall of government might be engineered to divert attention ahead of the presidential elections. In December, the prosecutors announced the closure of the Udrea case. She was appointed minister for Development and Tourism (the ministry with the largest budget, including managing the EU funds).

9. Created in 2002 as the Anticorruption Prosecution Office, DNA is headed by a chief prosecutor and two deputies, nominated by the Minister of Justice and appointed by the president. DNA is subordinated to the General Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Its tasks are to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption-related offences (such as bribery, graft, patronage and embezzlement) that caused a material damage higher than €200,000 or whose value of the involved amounts or goods is higher than €10,000.

10. The database uses primary documents from euractiv and Europa database and highest ranking daily newspapers in Romania (Adevarul, Cotidianul, Evenimentul Zilei, Gandul, Jurnalul, Romania Libera, Ziua) and Bulgaria (Trud, 24 h, Dnevnik, Kapital). Declarations of Bulgarian officials have also been collected from the database available on www.europe.bg. Timeframe: 1 January 2007–31 December 2009.