Compatibility of regionalizing actors’ activities in the Mediterranean region; what kind of opportunity for the European Union?

Abstract

Using conceptualization of levels of regionalism and twofold typology of actors (governmental [GOV]–non-governmental [NON-GOV] and external–internal), this article presents a quantitative and qualitative analysis of regionalizing actors’ activities in the Mediterranean in order to assess their compatibility in different fields of regional cooperation. The research thesis supported in the article is, that the Mediterranean is a region where formulation of a common idea on the content of regional cohesiveness is still a subject of highly competitive process of contestation which gives opportunity to the EU’s actorness. Results show a prevailing influence of external inter-GOV actors which has already altered regional activities of internal actors in three ways: (1) there are examples of ‘defensive’ and ‘agenda influencing’ reactions of few internal informal inter-GOV fora in political-economic-human rights fields, especially to the EU’s inter-regional practices, and lately absence of GOV regionalizing actors; (2) there are supportive (EU agenda following) reactions of regional non-governmental (NON-GOV) actors present in functional and also human rights fields and (3) despite poor market regionalization regional NON-GOV functional cooperation is growing especially under external inter-governmental ‘sponsorship’, which has consolidated existence of new regionalizing actors, i.e. multi-actor coalitions. The latter also represent the biggest immediate opportunity for the EU’s actorness.

Keywords:

• Mediterranean
• contested idea about a region
• internal and external actors
• non-governmental and governmental actors
• field of cooperation
• the EU’s actorness

Notes

1. Mediterranean is ‘present’ in the following constellations of Foreign Affairs Council’s working groups: C.11: WP on the Western Balkans Region, C.12: Ad hoc WP on Middle East Peace Process, C-13: Middle East/Gulf WP, C.14: Mashreq/Maghreb WP, C. 15: Africa WP, C.16: ACP WP (Council of the EU 2011, 7).

2. This fact is further confirmed by the EU’s reaction to the Arab spring which entirely bypassed the UfM and managed to produce a reshaped ENP framework of the EU’s pluri-bilateral agreements with individual Mediterranean partners, not excluding a multilateral (Mediterranean) dialogue (European Commission and HIGH Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011).

3. The number (26) requires explanation. There are only 22 Mediterranean littoral states (Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) three are not coastal Mediterranean states but are institutionally connected in region’s affairs and are thus understood as a part of the Mediterranean region (Jordan, Mauretania and Portugal). Palestinian Authority is legally not a state; nevertheless it is an equal member to states in most regional fora.

4. Regionalization is understood as a process which features intra-regional activities usually as a bottom-up response to globalization in a certain geographical area. The article is interested in its effects on regional level of analysis and does not analyse regionalization as continentalization of the world system as defined by Lähteenmäki and Käkönen (1999, 208).

5. Capabilities and presence are defined by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 25–33). Presence captures the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders, and capability signifies the ability to exploit opportunity and capitalize on presence.

6. Historically, micro-regions have been seen as sub-national regions within the territorial boundaries of particular nation-states (or before that of empires). This is one of the main explanations why the discourse of micro-regions has been sharply separated from the discourse of macro-regionalism (Söderbaum 2005, 91).

7. For example: representation of the EU in the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) in the form of observer status gained in 1974 has been upgraded on 10 May 2011 to the right of addressing the GA in general debate through communications, to present proposals and amendments or to reply (but not vote) (UN GA 2011). The relevant UN GA resolution also leaves open representation of other regional groups and was therefore firmly supported by a few of them, i.e. the Caribbean Community, the African Union and the Arab Group (UN GA, Department of Public Information 2011).

8. Spheres of influence were a common foreign policy strategy of the nineteenth Century big powers in the European Concert, when the Mediterranean was split into Western (French) and Eastern (British) spheres and remained under such ‘division’ of power also during the interwar period with new states claiming their influence in the region. The struggle for power by external big powers remained in effect especially during the cold war with Mediterranean representing a direct clash arena of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.

9. There was also a third sub-RGO, Reserve internationale maritime en Mediterranée occidentale, founded in 1993, but it was dissolved in 1997 (Bojinović Fenko 2009b, 224).

10. These regional centres are: Mediterranean Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre (REMPEC) seated in Malta, Specially Protected Areas Regional Activity Centre (SPA-RAC) seated in Tunis, Priority Actions Programme Regional Activity Centre (PAP-RAC) seated in Split, Environmental Remote Sensing Regional Activity Centre (ERS-RAC) seated in Palermo, and Regional Activity Centre for Cleaner Production (RAC-CP), seated in Barcelona.