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Abstract
All states of the Caspian look at different security and political alliances to address their concerns and interests. Emerging disputes over the oil fields made the states to search for consensus at the level of sub-regional multilateralism on the legal status of the Caspian, which reflected complexities and divergence of their interests. Coercive policies of the regional powers, such as Russia’s war in Georgia, geographically limited security options (Kazakhstan), richness with resources and developing political identities affected directions of cooperation and integration. Strengthened by the powerful vested interests, energy cooperation was so far the most effective one in the Caspian. It was promoted by the energy security interests of the ruling elites of the Caspian states, regional and international organizations, global powers and transnational corporations. Broader political cooperation, which is limited by geographic conditions and selectivity of ruling elites, is increasingly overcome by the non-state actors, who have been struggling with the autocrats empowered by the oil revenues and lack of incentive, support and investment from the leading democratic states, prioritizing energy interests in the Caspian. The utilization of the modern communication technologies such as internet and social networks by the civil and non-state actors, in particular after the events of the Arab spring, alters the focus from sub-regional to regional and global cooperation and empowers the civil actors, making them even in the conditions of the oil-based economies, emerge as the alternative leading forces in democratization and integration in the global processes.
Notes
1. In his interview to the author (EU4Seas field research report 33-3, 13 January 2009, Moscow), advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia listed the following reasons of the unresolved Caspian status: involvement in the Caspian of extra-regional powers, first of all the US and then the EU; conservatism of the international law and emergence of three new states, leading to an absence of balance of interests among the littoral states.
2. Most recently, this issue was analyzed in Idan and Shaffer (Citation2011).
3. Interview (EU4Seas field research report 33-8) with Nikolai Kuzmin on 12 March 2010, Almaty.
4. The representatives of state oil company of Azerbaijan, for instance, do not see unresolved issue of the Caspian legal status as an obstacle even for such projects, as planned trans Caspian gas pipeline, pointing to a few legal ways allowing to bypass the issue. (EU4Seas field research report 33-5, Interview with representative of SOCAR, Baku, 30 April 2010).
5. The paper by Bottger and Falkenhain (Citation2011) argues, that the EU pursues the ENP goals in Azerbaijan only partially and implements them inconsistently in a policy, which lacks civil society’s inclusion. Nassib Nassibli in his EU4Seas policy paper The Caspian Sea basin and the EU Multilateral Strategy directly asserts, that ‘… the EU programmes managed to advance neither multilateral cooperation, no democracy and stability in the Caspian basin’ (8).
6. European neighbourhood and partnership instrument. Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_azerbaijan_en.pdf.
7. Frederick Starr of SAIS and Ed Chow of CSIS were quoted confirming the growing confidence of the state oil company and the government of Azerbaijan in gas negotiations (Azerbaijan’s Rising Gas Negotiators, Citation2011).
8. The stability in the conflict of Nagorno–Karabagh, supported by ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994 appeared to be a sufficient background for realization of the major alternative projects – both signing of the ‘contract of the century’ in 1994 by Azerbaijan government with transnational corporations and the transportation project by passing Russia–Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan.
9. Programme of Euro-Atlantic Council of Azerbaijan (working draft, July 2011).
10. Center for Economic and Social Development, led by Vugar Bayramov, Center for Economic Research, led by Gubad Ibadoglu and others held numerous conferences, round tables, presentations on the issue of Azerbaijan’s entrance to WTO.
11. Reporters without borders named Turkmenistan and Iran in top 10 enemies of internet freedom (Mark Citation2009), while Russia – to the category ‘Countries under surveillance’ in 2010; journalists reported cases of hacking against critical websites in Kazakhstan ‘Kazakhstan’s stripping journalist’s website hacked’ written by Tomrys, neweurasia.net 26 July 2011 http://www.neweurasia.net/media-and-internet/kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-stripping-journalist%E2%80%99s-website-hacked/.
12. One such network was created in 2010 in the eve of the OSCE Summit in Astana. Although the initial goal of the network was conduct of the parallel conference to the official meeting, the network serves also as a way of communicating human rights and democracy promotion issues between the states of Central Asia, Caucasus, Europe and other parts of the world.
13. Source of statistics: World Bank Development Indicators.