The evolving security environment in the eastern Mediterranean: is NATO still a relevant actor?

Abstract

The article aims to briefly describe the main trends and drivers in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (with an emphasis on the eastern Mediterranean) and to assess whether NATO has a meaningful role to play, either as an autonomous actor, or in cooperation with the EU or regional actors. More specifically, the article will assess the possible contribution of NATO in the following areas/missions: (a) peacemaking operations/PSOs, humanitarian intervention (Libya-type) and post-conflict stabilization; (b) security sector reform; (c) maritime security; (d) combating WMD proliferation; and (e) energy security.

Keywords:

• eastern Mediterranean
• Mediterranean dialogue
• WMD proliferation
• security sector reform
• maritime security

Notes

1. It has been observed that although the Mediterranean may be regarded as a ‘geographic entity’, this did not make the Mediterranean ‘a political or strategic whole’. Other analysts argue that today’s Mediterranean may be seen as a vital crossroads open to influences and exchanges, but they also tend to stress that the Mediterranean has become a ‘frontier’ separating different worlds. According to Stephen Calleya, the Mediterranean ‘is a frontier separating different political, economic, military and cultural forces’ (Winrow 2000, 3 and 7). According to Roberto Menotti, ‘The Mediterranean region is not unitary, let alone cohesive. The Mediterranean basin comprises a large number of national actors belonging to various subregional complexes, linked by a series of interacting rivalries, animosities and highly competitive relationships. In other words, the basin is practically a patchwork of sub-regional complexes showing little coherence’ (Menotti 1997–1999, 25).

2. According to the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a driver is a factor that directly influences or causes change (Global Strategic Trends 2010, 6). For NATO, a driver designates the course of an event that results in a specific trend into a component (FSE 2007, 11). Jair van der Lijn defines drivers as underlying causes or incentives for an actor or phenomenon (van der Lijn 2011, 149).

3. Defined as ‘developing countries whose futures were poised at critical turning points and whose fates would significantly affect regional, and even international, stability’. (Chase, Hill, and Kennedy 1999, 4).

4. ‘If certain conditions are fulfilled, some countries will move towards a sustainable future, while others will either remain in or accelerate dynamics towards unsustainability, instability and/or conflict’ (Tocci 2011, 3).

5. As Nathalie Tocci argues, the overall prospects for war and peace in the Middle East will be fundamentally shaped by Egypt’s probable resurgence on the regional scene. It will fill part of the void currently filled by non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey (Tocci 2011, 7).

6. It should also be noted that young democracies are often unstable and have weak institutions.

7. It is estimated that China already gets around 50% of its imported oil from the Middle East. China’s oil imports from the Middle East are expected to rise five- to sixfold until 2030, and its dependency will rise to 70 or even 80%. The projection or India’s crude oil imports from the region is quite similar (Economy 2010, 142; Strategic Trends 2011, 51 and 64).

8. The EU-ISS examines four scenarios for the EU's future: (1) barely keeping afloat, (2) fragmentation, (3) concept of Europe redux and (4) gaming reality: conflict trumps cooperation (EU Institute for Security Studies [EU-ISS] 2010, 14–15). Van der Lijn presents another five scenarios for the EU: (a) EU integrates further, but militarily it remains the junior partner to the USA. As such, this scenario is more or less a continuation of the current situation; (b) the Union becomes an independent political and military entity that distances itself from the USA; (c) the Union disintegrates and nationalism becomes predominant again; (d) the Union is a strong economic trade unit; and (e) The EU expands too far and too fast and disintegrates into a free trade organization, which is peacefully integrated into the world system. (van der Lijn 2011, 152; see also Project Europe 2010).

9. The World Bank notes that poor nations will bear 75–80% of the cost of floods, increased desertification and other disasters caused by global warming, and it estimates that by 2030, developing countries will need $75 billion annually for adaptation and another $400 billion for low-carbon technology development. The EU estimates that $130 billion a year by 2020 would cost-effectively address climate change. (Glenn, Gordon, and Florescu 2010, 67).

10. Water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can lead to conflict over remaining resources, which can drive human migration, which can create new food shortages in new regions (Podesta and Odgen 2007–2008, 116).

11. The Mediterranean south played a rather marginal role in the East–West strategic competition and NATO strategy (Lesser 2005, 5; Whitman 1997–1999, 5).

12. According to NATO, the Dialogue is aimed at ‘creating good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean, as well as promoting regional security and stability. It provides for political discussions with the participating countries. Its work is organized through an annual Work Programme focusing on practical cooperation in security and defence-related areas, information, civil-emergency planning and science’ http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/med-dia.htm. For a history of the Mediterranean Dialogue see, Whitman (1997–1999, 11–12).

13. The discovery of significant natural gas deposits in the exclusive economic zones of Israel and Cyprus and the alleged holdings of the Levant Basin may provide an additional energy source outside the former Soviet space and the Middle East proper.

14. As Ian Lesser points out, the ‘proliferation of new energy routes, and especially gas pipelines, around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands is uniting previously distinct economies and encouraging interest to protect this complex and costly infrastructure. It is a promising area for cooperation on a Mediterranean and sub-regional basis. It will also raise new issues for the transatlantic debate about energy security’ (Lesser 2005, 14).

15. According to Anthony Cordesman, the ‘real threats in the Middle East may well consist of how well local powers can achieve enough stability and resources to consistently meet the world’s growing need for oil and gas exports’ (Cordesman 2005, 2).

16. Even a marginal contribution to the reduction of the level of mistrust toward the ‘West’ among the elites of those states and – a much more difficult task – their societies, would be a significant achievement (Menotti 1997–1999, 15 and 17). In this context, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI constitute a useful tool of preventive diplomacy and a potentially important confidence-building measure (Winrow 2000, 2).