What makes authoritarian regimes sweat? Linkage, leverage and democratization in post-Soviet South Caucasus

Abstract

This paper seeks to investigate the role of the international environment in the democratic transition process in the post-Soviet South Caucasus states. Based on the famous theoretical model of linkage and leverage, the influence of two main regional actors, Russia and the West (In this paper, ‘the West’ is conceptualized as the sum of influences stemming from the EU, the US and the multinational institutions dominated by the Western states (e.g. NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, and EBRD).), are explained and conceptualized. The paper argues that competitive authoritarianism, the form of political regime that is believed to be predominant in the region, is the result of the flawed democratization strategy pursued by the EU and the US on the one hand and the influence of Russia, the counter-hegemonic power, on the other hand, which explicitly or implicitly decreases the transformative power of the West.

Keywords:

• democratization
• South Caucasus
• authoritarian regimes
• linkage
• leverage
• regime change

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Tanja Börzel, Michael Zürn and Sergey Minasyan for numerous helpful comments on the draft of this article. The author also thanks Denis Dafflon for inviting the author to contribute to the special issue of the journal.

Notes

1. The term ‘post-Soviet states’ refers to the 15 independent countries that became independent in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. These states are also referred to as the Newly Independent States (NIS). Because of the theoretical scope of the research, both terms are used, but only to describe the non-Baltic western NIS: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

2. In recent years, several terms have been used to describe the six post-Soviet states situated between Russia and the EU. From the EU perspective, they form the Eastern dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy which is covered by the ‘Eastern Partnership Initiative’. The European Commission calls them European Neighbourhood Countries (ENC). From the Russian perspective, they comprise Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’, a term used to represent the zone of Russia’s privileged interests. It is notable that both the EU and Russia apply a holistic approach to the region as they prefer to speak of ‘neighbourhood’ as a single entity, rather than of individual neighbouring states.

3. A few exceptions include Ademmer (2011), McFaul (2010) and Tolstrup (2009).

4. For a few exceptions see: Ambrosio (2009) and Ademmer (2011).

5. In the remaining part of the paper, I term the analytical concept of Levitsky and Way the ‘linkage and leverage theory,’ as these two concepts are the most widespread in transitions literature and are closely associated with the authors.

6. In fact, Armenia has a stronger tradition of street protests and mass mobilization than does Georgia; almost every election since independence has been accompanied by the opposition protests and large street rallies.

7. After the August War of 2008, Russia lost almost all leverage with Georgia. The resolution of territorial conflicts was shelved, and all links between the two countries were cut. The EU became the main mediator between the conflicting sides, something to which the Georgian government had been aspiring.

8. To evaluate the Western approach towards Georgia, I use here the concept introduced by Börzel, Pamuk and Stahn that divides the good governance strategies of the EU and US into four categories: output-oriented ‘effective governance’, ‘effective government’, input-oriented ‘democratic governance’ and ‘democratic government’. The output-oriented approach targets the ‘administrative core’ of good governance reform, either by strengthening the government (‘effective government’) or ‘by including of non-state in the implementation process’ (‘effective governance’). In contrast, the input-oriented approach is more focused on the democratic dimension of good governance and pursues its goals either through transnational (‘democratic governance') or intragovernmental channels (‘democratic government’) (Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2009, 150–6).