The myth of ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish foreign policy: the Cyprus debacle as a litmus test

Abstract

This article examines Turkish–EU relations and the Cyprus issue within the Europeanization framework. It seeks to underline how and to what extent EU conditionality was performed in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the post-Helsinki period. The exploration of the relationship between domestic political pressures and the foreign policy choices of the AKP government on the Cyprus issue suggests that EU’s potential in transforming the foreign policy of candidates is both context dependent and questionable. Alongside EU-related factors such as the credible membership perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and how much domestic power struggles are affected by it.

Keywords:

• Turkey
• Cyprus
• Europeanization
• foreign policy
• AKP

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to Prof Dr Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Prof Dr Ali Tekin and Dr Burcu Sarı Karademir for their invaluable comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

1. Börzel and Risse (2003) call them as multiple veto points and formal facilitating institutions. For further information about veto players see also Héritier et al. (2001). For formal facilitating institutions, see Caporaso and Jupille (2001).

2. Another variance of neo-institutionalist theory underpinning Europeanization is historical institutionalism. It seeks to know why a certain choice was made and why a certain outcome occurred by examining the historical evidence. It argues that political events happen within a historical context, which has a direct consequence on decisions or events. Its emphasis on ‘critical junctures’ as moments of radical change that constitute a breaking point at which historical development moves onto a new path, and its particular method of ‘path dependency’ would be helpful in tracing the cycles of continuity and change (though not radical one) in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. I would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for raising this point.

3. For example, based on intergovernmental cooperation, foreign and security policy is a domain where national governments are key actors, allowing only limited involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament and where Community law is not prominent.

4. Those constraints include existence of divergent signals by the European Parliament, the Commission and member states embedded during pre-accession period; methodological challenge in pinpointing the net EU impact from other domestic and global processes for change. See Börzel (2003), Major (2005, 175–90), Grabbe (2001).

5. Rather than affecting the substance and content of policy change, top-down Europeanization is more evident in policy styles, policy rhetoric and the institutional and organizational making of foreign policy. For Greece, see Economides (2005); for France, see Wong (2006), for Britain, see Bache and Jordan (2006).

6. Most probably owing to the EU membership of Greece and Cyprus.

7. Beginning with the Regular Report and Accession Partnership of 2006, the EU began to handle Cyprus under the sub-section of ‘regional issues and international obligations’ (again as part of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria).

8. Specifically, UNSC 649/90; UNSC 716/92; UNSC 750/92; UNSC 774/92; UNSC 1251/99.

9. Denoting the political and military situation before the Turkish military intervention in 1974.

10. Rauf Denktaş, founding president of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.

11. An anonymous career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.

12. In this study, ‘Cyprus’ denotes the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ which has not been recognized by Turkey, formally calling it the ‘Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus’.

13. According to the Luxembourg European Council’s Presidency Conclusions, a political solution should be found ‘under the aegis of the UN (…) with a view to creating a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ (EU Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12–13 December 1997, paragraph 28).

14. The then-EC was trying to stand at an equal distance in the Greek-Turkish disputes, taking into account the Cold War political conditions.

15. Designed primarily to protect British privileges and Turkish Cypriots’ economic rights, Article 5 of the Agreement stipulated that ‘The rules governing trade between the contracting parties may not give rise to any discrimination between the member states or between nationals or companies of these states or nationals and companies of Cyprus’. See Brewin 2000, 23.

16. The original text can be found on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

17. Those chapters cover Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

18. Murat Karayalçın, former Foreign Minister of Turkey, personal interview of the author, 29 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.

19. The London and Zurich Accords as the offspring of the Republic of Cyprus refer to three agreements: (1) the Treaty of Establishment, which defines the territory of the Republic of Cyprus; (2) the Treaty of Alliance, by which Turkey, Greece and Cyprus agree to cooperate in their common defence and (3) the Treaty of Guarantee by which Cyprus undertakes to uphold the 1960 Constitution and Turkey, Great Britain and Greece guarantee Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity.

20. Suat Kınıklıoğlu, then-AKP deputy, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey; Serdar Denktaş, leader of the Democrat Party and former foreign minister of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.

21. Also known as the ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, the Plan prepared by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan aimed at ending the division of the island before its accession. It was presented on 11 November 2002 and went through four sets of adjustments to take into account the points of both parties. The Plan proposed a Swiss-style confederation and a Belgian-type federation under the name of the United Cyprus Republic, with a rotating presidency and two component states that were to share sovereignty. It also called for a single sovereignty and international legal personality with partition and secession prohibited. It would have established a limited right to return between the territories of the two communities, and would have allowed Turkey and Greece to maintain a military presence, though with phased reductions in troop numbers.

22. Serdar Denktaş, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.

23. For example, then-AKP Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış noted that ‘we told the Europeans that granting Turkey a date for inauguration of negotiations [at the Copenhagen summit on 12 December 2002], could compel us to rethink our policy over ESDP and Cyprus’ [author’s translation]. 2002. Cumhuriyet.

24. As compensation for the rejection of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots, the Commission adopted three different regulations: the Green Line Regulation, the Aid Regulation, and the Direct Trade Regulation. So far, the third one has not been implemented due to the Greek Cypriot veto. Nonetheless, these regulations are only partial compensation for the relevant economic backwardness of the Turkish Cypriots. What is significant for the Turkish side is the opening of Ercan Airport in Northern Cyprus to direct flights as well as the formal espousal of this move by Greek Cypriots.

25. Votes for the AKP have steadily increased from 34.28% in the November 2002 parliamentary elections to 46.47% in July 2007 and to 49.9% in July 2011 elections.

26. ‘Erdoğan: ‘Bıçak Kemiğe Dayanmak Üzere’’ [It is no longer tolerable]. 2011. Hürriyet, July 20. However, Egemen Bağış, Minister for EU Affairs, said in an interview with the daily Kıbrıs Gazetesi that while Ankara will keep relations with the European Commission, European Parliament and candidate states intact, it will ignore the Greek Cypriot Administration. Interview with Eylem Eraydın. 2012. Kıbrıs Gazetesi, March 3.

27. See ‘Half-country to lead miserable union’. 2011. Today’s Zaman, November 22; ‘Sefil Birliğe Yarım Başkan’ [Half-Country Leading a Miserable Union]. 2011. http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/guncel/11/23/sefil.birlige.yarim.baskan/637736.0/index.html; accessed 24 November 24, 2011. Bağış went even further, to warn that options of settlement in Cyprus involve reunification, a two-state solution and annexation of Northern Cyprus into Turkey. 2012. Kıbrıs Gazetesi, March 3.

28. Derviş Eroğlu, ‘Müzakere Süreci Başarısız Oldu’ [Negotiation Process Has Failed]. 2012. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25337458/, April 6; accessed, April 7, 2012.

29. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘Kıbrıs’ta Ban Ki Moon Planı Oluşturalım’ [Let’s Prepare a Ban Ki Moon Plan in Cyprus]. 2013. http://www.abhaber.com, November 7; acessed 13, November 13, 2013.

30. Derviş Eroğlu, ‘Yıl sonuna kadar ana konularda anlaşma sağlanabilir’ [Agreement would be reached on basic issues by the end of the year]. 2013. http://www.cnnturk.com, September 29; accessed, September 10, 2013.

31. For example see Sami Kohen ‘Ankara Denktaş’ın çizgisine geliyor’ [Ankara gets closer to Denktaş’ line]. 2012. Milliyet, January 17; Yalçın Doğan ‘Annan gibi müstehcen kelimeleri kullanma’ [Do not use nasty words like Annan]. 2012. Hürriyet, January 17; Asım Akansoy ‘Eski Türk tezlerine dönüş’ [Return to the former Turkish thesis]. 2011. Kıbrıs Postası, January 17.

32. Eurobarometer National Reports on Turkey confirm that ‘[f]or Turks, the EU means, first and foremost, economic prosperity.’

33. The research was conducted by the A&G Research Company on 28 April 2008. More detailed information can be attained from http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/pdfler/abye-uyelik-anketi.pdf.

34. While Strategy Paper (2008–2009) states that ‘Accession negotiations with Turkey are a long-term process’, the Negotiating Framework document stipulates that ‘With a view to the establishment of a Financial Framework, negotiations could not be concluded for the period from 2014’.

35. The ‘open-ended’ and long-term nature of the accession process was especially noted by the 2004 Commission Progress Report and Recommendation on Turkey, Negotiating Framework document and Strategy Papers (of 2005 and 2008–2009). For example, the Strategy Paper of 2005 explicitly emphasized that the pace of enlargement must take into account the EU’s capacity to absorb new members.

36. For example, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, in his speech before European Parliament’s Foreign Relations Commission on 16 February 2012, considered Turkey a ‘challenge’ for the EU and stated that ‘our economic crisis confirmed that our political project intended for the EU would be unable to survive the accession of such a weighted country like Turkey’. http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=38937; accessed 17 February 2012.

37. ‘Sefil Birliğe Yarım Başkan’ [Half-Country Leading a Miserable Union], http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/guncel/11/23/sefil.birlige.yarim.baskan/637736.0/index.html; accessed 24 November 2011.

38. For example French President Nicolas Sarkozy asserted that ‘I am in favor of signing a contract with Turkey. I am in favor of a joint market with Turkey. But I am against Turkey’s integration into Europe. Turkey is a small Asia. And there is no reason for it to be a part of Europe … Turkey is a great civilization; but not a European one’ (quoted in Müftüler-Baç 2008, 66). Further, statements in some EU circles (led by France) as to the ‘need to redefine EU’s borders’ or that ‘absorption capacity’ should be taken into account in future enlargements fuelled already existing sensitivities in Turkish public opinion.

39. In fact, the 1974 military intervention of Turkey was conducted during then-CHP leader and PM Bülent Ecevit’s tenure.

40. For example, see then-deputy chairman and former ambassador Onur Öymen’s statement published in daily Cumhuriyet on 18 January 2003. Also see the views of the former ambassador and Istanbul deputy of the CHP Şükrü Elekdağ written in Yankı Dergisi [Yankı Journal] on 1 May 2009.

41. ‘Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan Kıbrıs Mesajı’ [A Message from Kılıçdaroğlu on Cyprus]. 2011. Hurriyet, July 20.

42. It was at the time of coalition government of the DSP-MHP-ANAP that Turkey attained candidacy status.

43. For example, the NSC meetings dated 30 December 2008 and 24 April 2008 buttressed the new process but reiterated that any solution should be based on bizonality; existence of two distinct peoples; political equality of the two parties; equal status of two founding states; establishment of a new partnership state; and continuation of Turkey’s effective and virtual guarantees.

44. Exceptions to the compatible attitude of the military included the government’s Action Plan in January 2006 to open Turkey’s harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot sea vessels and aircrafts in return for opening the Northern Cypriot sea ports of Gazimagosa, Girne and Gemikonağı to international traffic, and Ercan Airport to direct flights. Yaşar Büyükanıt, Chief of General Staff portrayed the government’s decision as ‘a departure from the state’s official policy’ and a ‘surprise’ (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 10). The military also openly criticized Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat’s initiative to open up the intersection of Lokmacı/Ledra Street in Lefkoşa in 2007, which was located in the forbidden military zone, on the grounds that such steps should be taken reciprocally (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 10).

45. Meanwhile, ‘expected transformation’ denotes more precisely the implementation of the Additional Protocol in full, agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan consistent with Greek Cypriot demands made in the rejuvenated inter-communal talks on the island that have taken place since 2008, or even recognition of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ in full compliance with EU conditionality.

46. An anonymous top-level diplomat in the Presidency of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.

47. Egemen Bağış, interview with Demet Cengiz Bilgin. 2011. Hurriyet, 11 December.

48. Egemen Bağış. 2011. http://www.euractiv.com, January 27; accessed 20 September 2011.