After the Crimean crisis: towards a greater Russian maritime power in the Black Sea

Abstract

The modernization of the Black Sea Fleet currently underway is believed to be one of the most ambitious parts of the Russian State Arms Procurement programme 2011–2020. Up to 18 units are being built and are expected to be commissioned in the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2020, while new infrastructures are being developed. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has overthrown the Black Sea maritime context. It is likely to give substantial impetus to Russian naval plans in the Black Sea and, by extension, to sustain Moscow’s resumption of naval activity in the Mediterranean. Yet, whereas Russia’s maritime power has been dramatically enhanced due to the takeover of Crimea, Moscow’s naval power in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean remains challenged by a set of qualitative factors. Beyond, the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the inability of the European Union to manage its Black Sea environment as well as it has highlighted the United States waning influence and interests in the region.

Keywords:

• Black Sea
• Russia
• Ukraine
• Crimea
• Sevastopol
• Russian Black Sea Fleet
• security
• naval cooperation
• Mediterranean

Notes

1. According to the European Commission, the Black Sea Region includes Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. However, one should also note the ‘wider Black Sea area’ which refers to the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and includes the ten countries above plus Albania and Serbia. See Dimitrios Tryantaphyllou, ‘The Security “Paradoxes” of the Black Sea Region’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, n° 3, September 2009, 226, note 4.

2. SIPRI Military Expenditures database. Military expenditures concern Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia through 2000–2010.

3. D. Boltenkov (Ed.), Russia’s New Army, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow, 2011, 82. 9–12 surface ships and 6 classic submarines. Voted in 2010, the SAP 2010–2020 should be provided by 2020 with a €500 billion budget, from which €112,4 billion should be allocated to Navy’s upgrading. See Igor Delanoë, La flotte de la mer Noire, de Catherine II à Vladimir Poutine: un outil de puissance au service des ambitions méditerranéennes de la Russie (1783–2012) 785.

4. The road map and financing of the development of naval bases and facilities on the Russian Black Sea coasts and in the Mediterranean have been framed by the following document: ‘Создание системы базирования Черноморского флота на территории Российской Федерации в 2005–2020 годах’ (‘Creation of a Basing System for the Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of the Russian Federation in 2005–2020 years’). See official website: http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/ViewFcp/View/2006/179/.

5. ‘Ukraine: Putin signs Crimea annexation’, BBC News, 21 March 2014.

6. Joint Doctrine Publication 0–10. British Maritime Doctrine, 2011, V.

7. ‘Secteur naval en Russie’, Publication des Services économiques, Direction générale du Trésor, June 2013, 1.

8. Valeri Ratchev, ‘Black Sea: a New Analytical Framework is Needed’, in ‘Crimea’s Problems in the Context of Regional Security’, special issues, National Security and Defense, n° 4–5, 2001, 47, quoted by Deborah Sanders, ‘Between Rhetoric and Reality: the decline of Russian Maritime Power in the Black Sea’, art. cit., 45.

9. ‘New command system for the Russian military’, Ria Novosti, 15 July 2010.

10. Christian Le Miere, ‘Evaluating Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’, IISS Voices, 26 February 2014.

11. Russian Navy conducted the largest for last ten years inter-fleet exercises in Eastern Mediterranean from 19 to 29 January 2013. Around 20 vessels were involved as well as three submarines, including one nuclear. See ‘Четыре флота водной Средиземке’ (‘Four Fleets in one Mediterranean’), Nezavissimaïa Gazeta, 14 January 2013.

12. ‘Russian Navy Starts Forming Mediterranean Task Force’, RIA Novosti, 11 March 2013.

13. Ibid. See also ‘Russian naval task force to be deployed in Mediterranean’, Interfax, 25 February 2013.

14. See Igor Delanoe, ‘Le partenariat stratégique russo-syrien: la clef du dispositif naval russe en Méditerranée’ (‘The Russian-Syrian Strategic Partnership: the Key of Russian Naval Plans in the Mediterranean’), Note de la FRS n° 6, February 2013, 9 pages.

15. «Кабмин Кипра одобрил использование российскими самолетами базы под Пафосом», Voice of Russia, 10 January 2014.

16. ‘Russian warships stop in Cyprus, destination thought to be Syria’, Famagusta Gazette, 16 July 2012.

17. ‘Government refuses Russia’s request to set up a military base in Montenegro’, Balkan Independent News Agency, 20 December 2013.

18. ‘Egypt’s Sisi sees new defense cooperation with Russia’, Reuters, 14 November 2013.

19. «Россия поставит Алжиру две подлодки типа Варшавянк» (‘Russia Will Supply Algeria with two Submarine from Varshavianka type’), Itar-tass, 21 February 2014.

20. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

21. ‘Russia terminates Black Sea Fleet agreements with Ukraine’, Ria Novosti, 2 April 2014.

22. ‘Kharkiv sellout’, Kyiv Post, 22 April 2010.

23. ‘Russia Plans Black Sea Fleet Rearmament’, RIA Novosti, 23 February 2013.

24. ‘Киев и Москва обновят состав рабочих групп по базированию ЧФ в Крыму’, Ria Novosti, 23 February 2013.

25. ‘Russia to Draft Black Sea Fleet Development Program by June’, Ria Novosti, 25 April 2014.

26. ‘Ukraine-Russia dispute over Kerch Strait unresolved’, Ria Novosti, 11 November 2010.

27. ‘Gazprom to set up 2 joint ventures with Ukraine’s Naftogaz’, Ria Novosti, 1 December 2010.

28. ‘Russia Returns 13 out of 70 Navy Ships in Crimea to Ukraine’, Ria Novosti, 21 April 2014.

29. Romanian Navy official website: http://www.navy.ro/en/index.html.

30. ‘Romania calls for greater US military presence in Black Sea’, Reuters, 1 May2014.

31. ‘Exercice conjoint des marines américaine, bulgare et roumaine en mer Noire’ (‘Joint Exercise of US, Bulgarian and Romanian navies in the Black Sea’), French-China.org, 8 March 2014.

32. Georgia sent athletes in Sochi, which has been seen as a major conciliatory gesture toward Russia. Giorgi Menabde, ‘The Olympic Truce between Russia and Georgia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11, Issue 74, 2014.

33. ‘Перекоп’ отремонтируют под наблюдением РС’ (‘Perekop to be Repaired under the Supervision of RS’), Flotprom, 19 July 2013.

34. Russian Federal Service of Statistics.

35. See Turkish Naval Forces official website: http://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/denizweb/english/uluslararasi/KUH.php.

36. ‘Black Sea Fleet Ships Deployed Longer in Mediterranean in 2012’, Rusnavy, 15 November 2012.

37. Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘New Pay Structure Approved’, Russian Military Reform, 13 December 2011.

38. Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Job satisfaction among Russian officers’, Russian Military Reform, 5 June 2012.

39. «Завершено формирование Южного Центра Судостроения и Судоремонта ОСК», OSK official website, 25 January 2013.

40. ‘Russie :10 Mds dans les chantiers navals’ (‘Russia: $10 bln in shipyards’), Le Figaro, 1 June2013.

41. ‘Минпромторг РФ считает перспективным развитие трех верфей Крыма’ (‘Russian Ministry for Commerce to Develop three Shipyards in Crimea’), Flotprom, 20 May 2014.

42. ‘Russian Defense Ministry Placed $140 Million Order at Crimean Shipyard’, Ria Novosti, 17 April 2014.