![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
This study examines the extent to which Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, brought together by partnership in the Adriatic Charter in 2003, have made progress toward the development of trust and belonging (a security community) that will facilitate wider Euro–Atlantic integration. We assess identity and belonging with partners and neighbours, as well as within individual states. Moreover, we examine whether notions of security community ‘trickle down’ to the public. Based on extensive fieldwork, we conclude that there has been an increase in interactions among these countries at the elite level, but the general public in each country appears to exhibit less trust and sense of community.
Notes
1. Like the European Union, we use the term ‘Western Balkans’ to refer to the countries of the former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia and plus Albania (The Western Balkans Citation2011).
2. For an analysis of the role of Western institutions before and during the recent conflicts in the region see Woodward (Citation1995).
3. We acknowledge the role of other countries, governments and citizens around the world, but we limit the scope of this project to the extension of a ‘Western’ security community to the Western Balkan countries.
4. The ability of third-party actors to directly cause attitudinal change in a population is severely limited. These actors are attempting to incentivize change among these countries and to create an environment where government interaction and public interaction eventually lead to greater cooperation and eventually, trust.
5. This article does not focus on the impact of the Charter itself, but rather, on the process of community development that emerged in the wake of the Charter’s signing.
6. Arguing that these three countries represent the best cases for Euro–Atlantic integration and highlighting that they experienced relatively less violence during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, should not suggest that they have not experienced their own violent conflicts, regional tensions and post-conflict challenges. Croatia fought a bitter war with Serbia and was involved in the Bosnian War. Albania faced economic hardships that led to internal violence and Macedonia has also succumbed to ethnic violence. Ethnic relations between Albania and Macedonia have also been challenging. Our argument is simply that these three states never directly engaged in violent conflict with one another and that they have made significant strides toward integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
7. We are not suggesting that the A3 created peace between these three member countries or that the creation of this partnership was a direct attempt at post-conflict reconciliation. Rather, we examine the idea that the increased and iterated interactions facilitated through membership in this group led to an enhanced sense of common cause, and subsequently, trust between the three.
8. Elite level refers to those in governing positions or in decision-making bodies. This includes politicians, public decision-makers and organization leaders among others. Public level is the ‘everyday’ average person who does not have formal policy-making power, beyond the power to vote.
9. Kosovo’s inclusion as an observer, and possible next member, has caused Serbia to limit its participation (Brajshori Citation2013).
10. On the importance of communication, see Cioffi-Revilla, Merritt, and Zinnes (Citation1987). On the negative consequences of communication (e.g. nationalism), see Holsti (Citation1980).
11. Basic security includes the security of minority and/or vulnerable groups, the containment of small arms and light weapons, the accountability of local law enforcement and the accepted invalidation of underground economies (Wennmann Citation2005, 479–94).
12. ‘Awkward’ states are those with high volatility and general governance practices that contradict Western norms (Kavalski Citation2006, 86–100).
13. The focus groups were only conducted in Macedonia due to funding limitations.
14. The household survey in Macedonia was conducted before NATO‘s invitation to Albania and Croatia.
15. There is a small population (2%) of ethnic Greeks. Most of these are in the southern part of the country (De Rapper Citation2007, 566–75).
16. This would not include Albania, but based on the general lack of interest among average Croatians in Albania, we do not believe that the results would change significantly.
17. Macedonia and Kosovo reached a settlement on the border issue. However, due to the lack of full recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the UN, the legitimacy of the resolution remains questioned (EU Hails Macedonia and Kosovo Citation2009).
18. Table IV provides a categorization of the case study data for both elites and the general public. Research data was used to judge whether elites and public citizens had made progress toward the development of security community. We relied on Adler and Barnett’s three tiers of security community, discussed previously, to categorize each group in each country.
19. The general survey questionnaire we developed for household survey research in the A3 countries was altered only slightly to fit the specifics for each country during the implementation phase of the survey. In each country, more than 1000 residents from various demographic backgrounds were surveyed via a local polling organization. For specific details about the household surveys in each country, please contact the authors.