Security relations in the Black Sea region: Russia and the West after the Ukrainian crisis

Abstract

The Ukrainian conflict – as all post-Soviet conflicts – has three interrelated dimensions – global, regional and local – with deep implications for international security including the Black Sea region. The strategic interdependence between Russiaand West during the last decade became not only anaemic but antagonistic. The regional implications of that can be compared to the boomerang effect: problems at the strategic level affect the regional level and return to the originators. Generally speaking, Commonwealth of Independent States conflicts can be viewed as the product of the Soviet legacy and the patchy collapse of the USSR as well as the ill-conceived policies and mistakes of the involved parties, Russia and external actors – USA, NATO and EU.

Keywords:

• Russia
• Black Sea
• Ukraine
• NATO
• security
• Ukrainian crisis

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The former NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana on many occasions repeated that the West–Russia relations in the 1990s were really fantastic.

2. NATO’s enlargement strategy has been meticulously bypassing Russia. After 9/11,when asked how Moscow viewed the second wave of NATO expansion, Putin said, ‘We would reconsider our position on expansion, of course, if we were ourselves part of this process’. Jones, Gareth. ‘Putin Softens Stance on NATO’, Moscow Times (October 4, 2001). p. 1. In March 2003, the EU published the Communication on Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A new Framework of Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (2003), the first draft of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It was a product of overheated debates in EU about Russia’s participation in this project since some of the EU member states were against it. The solution was found in a compromise to invite Russia in such a manner that it would be unacceptable for Kremlin. The document regarded EU neighbours as one whole area without any differentiation and prioritization. Thus, Russia, the biggest and closest EU neighbour, was put into one group with the most distant Mediterranean countries. Given Russia’s post-imperial complexes and its obsession with the status issue, Moscow’s negative response to the EU offer was predictable and Brussels got an argument not to include Russia into its regional strategies on the basis of ‘Russia’s own choice’.

3. After years of work on a gas pipeline South Stream to cross southeastern Europe and bring fuel to the heart of EU, side-stepping troubled Ukraine, Gasprom confirmed a change in strategy. Gasprom said it would transport the gas to a hub in Turkey, from which the EU can take it or leave it. (For more information see: Alexander Panin, South Stream Alternative see as Paper Tiger, Moscow Times, January 2015, 1–2).

4. On 7 September, the Canadian frigate Toronto was buzzed by a Russian aircraft in the Black Sea with the plane coming within 300 m. The Toronto locked its radar on the Russian plane but took no further action as the Russian plane was not armed. The incident coincided with larger Russian larger naval combat training activities near Sevastopol (Frear, Kulesa, and Kearns 2014).

5. During a press conference on January 29, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said that Minsk could pull out of the Moscow-led EEU if agreements are not kept, but also emphasized that the country's integration with Russia is deep and strong.

6. Violence spiked in August 2014, and in November 2014, Azerbaijani forces shot down an Armenian helicopter.

7. Unlike in Georgia and Moldova, where full European integration is a proclaimed goal of the government, a closer integration with the EU does not seem to be a priority for Azerbaijani policy-makers.