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Abstract
Cyprus’ commitment to the European perspective of the Western Balkans is shaped by a range of factors. As well as balancing its national interests, it also aims to stand by a ‘position of principles’ on conflict issues. It equally seeks to be a reliable partner to the EU and move closer to its Western allies, while accommodating its Eastern ones. Nevertheless, over the last 10 years, Nicosia has Europeanised its policies and thinking. This has seen it reach out to Kosovo to try and build de facto relations. However, since the ‘national problem’ remains at the core of its foreign policy, relations with ‘motherland’ Greece are also key. This has in turn complicated dealings with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Overall, Cyprus remains more firmly focused on the Middle East, making it a rather peripheral actor in the Western Balkan countries’ EU integration process.
Notes
* The content of this article is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the European Parliament.
1. According to Protocol 10 of the 2003 Accession Treaty, the Republic of Cyprus has joined the EU in its entirety but because of the Turkish occupation, the acquis communautaire only applies to the part of Cyprus south of the dividing Green Line, which comes under the jurisdiction of the island’s only internationally recognised government.
2. Author’s interview with commentator, in Nicosia, on 14 September 2016.
3. Author’s interview with an official in the Cyprus House of Representatives, in Nicosia, on 28 May 2014.
4. Author’s interview with an official in the Cyprus House of Representatives, in Nicosia, on 28 May 2014.
5. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build a tailored relationship with NATO, based on the needs and priorities for cooperation of each partner country and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government. Cyprus sees the PfP as an entry point into NATO, a possible precursor to future NATO membership. The ʻBerlin Plusʼ agreement refers to a comprehensive package of security arrangements finalised in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities (including its planning capabilities and NATOʼs Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for EU-led crisis management operations.
6. During his short visit to the island on 21–22 May 2014, US Vice-President Biden, the first one by a senior US official in more than 50 years, underscored ‘the value the United States attaches to our growing cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. This relationship is now a genuine strategic partnership and it holds even greater promise’ (Christou Citation2014).
7. Author’s interview with NGO worker, in Nicosia, on 21 May 2013.
8. The Cyprus Embassy to Athens is also designated to Albania, while the Cyprus Embassy in Budapest is also responsible for relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Embassy of Cyprus in Belgrade plays a double act to also cover Montenegro. However, Cyprus does not have any representation in Kosovo or fYROM.
9. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 16 September 2016.
10. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 16 September 2016.
11. Author’s interview with official at Presidential Palace, in Nicosia, on 26 May 2014.
12. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 23 May 2014.
13. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 16 September 2016.
14. The case Sejdić-Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina refers to the 2009 ruling of the ECtHR in response to a complaint by a Roma and a Jewish minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) of their inability to be eligible for election to the House of Peoples and run for the presidency of BiH. The ECtHR ruled in favour of the applicants on both accounts noting a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) of the Convention Protocol No. 1, and of Article 1 (right to free elections) of the Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination) of the same Convention.
15. Author’s interview with Cyprus government official, in Nicosia, on 8 May 2014.
16. Brexit would imply that the UK – an influential EU member state that is seen in the Republic of Cyprus to favour on aggregate pro-Turkish positions – would be outside EU Council decisions.
17. Author’s interview with official at the Cyprus Presidential Palace, in Nicosia, on 26 May 2014.
18. ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’
19. More specifically, the ICJ Opinion mentions the Security Council resolution 1251 of 29 June 1999 (paragraph 11) which reaffirmed that a ‘Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded’ (International Court of Justice Citation2010, 50).
20. Author’s interview with commentator, in Nicosia, on 14 September 2016.
21. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 16 September 2016.
22. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia, on 8 May 2013.
23. Author’s interview with official in the Cyprus House of Representatives, in Nicosia, on 28 May 2014.
24. However, this also creates a paradox in terms of its support for international law. After all, in response to Greece’s 2009 veto on fYROM accession to NATO, Skopje instituted proceedings before the ICJ accusing Greece of having breached the provisions of their 1995 Agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Greece agreed that it would not object to any application made by fYROM to international/regional organisations so long as it used only the appellation set out in ‘paragraph 2 of the United Nations Security Council resolution 817’ (i.e., ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’). This opened the door for the country to join a variety of international organisations, namely the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. In 2011, the ICJ ruled in favour of fYROM, stating that Greece had breached its obligation of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995. It could be argued, once again, that Cyprus’ stance to back Greece on the name issue points to the fact that it is the implications that situations have for the Cyprus problem, rather than the application of international principles, that most affect Cypriot decision-making, including on EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.
25. Author’s interview with official at Presidential Palace, in Nicosia on 26 May 2014.
26. Author’s interview with MFA official, in Nicosia on 23 May 2014.
27. Author’s interview with Cyprus government official, in Nicosia on 23 May 2013.
28. Author’s interview with commentator, in Nicosia on 19 September 2016.
29. Author’s interview with commentator, in Nicosia on 14 September 2016.