Greece and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: understanding an ambivalent relationship

Abstract

Greece’s position towards the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans remains ambivalent: on the one hand, Greece remains declaratively one of the most ardent supporters of integrating the whole Balkan region into the EU; on the other hand, Greece is also a persistent obstructing factor whenever its multiple interests in the Balkans produce friction. We investigate this ambivalent position to understand its origins. We argue that Greece’s position can be understood with reference to three key factors: (a) the particularities of Greece’s foreign policy-making and its persistent traits, (b) the background of Greece’s relationship with the region and the legacy of multiple disputes that were created or exacerbated in the early post-Communist period and (c) the legacy of turning EU enlargement policy into a Greek foreign policy tool during the 1990s. These factors not only explicate the existence and persistence of Greece’s ambivalent policies, but also are likely to continue to shape Greece’s enlargement policy in the future. In that context, we expect that Greece will engage in a delicate balance of, on the one hand, strategically placing conditionality to ensure favourable compromises with neighbours, and, on the other, not jeopardizing the continuation of the enlargement process per se.

Keywords:

• Greece
• European Union
• enlargement
• Western Balkans
• Greek foreign policy

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Gina Panagopoulou and Haris Livanos for their assistance in data collection for this article, Julianne Funk for editorial comments, our interviewees for sharing their insights and knowledge as well as two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

Notes

1. Interview with officials in the Secretariat of European Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2014. See also the views of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Venizelos: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ statements to Greek journalists in Tirana, 21 February 2014). Text in Greek available at: goo.gl/IxN0q6 (last accessed: 8 November 2017).

2. For the formal decision-making process in foreign policy, see Ghikas (2003) and Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.-a).

3. Makridimitris (2005, 354) speaks of the disregard for analysis, ‘ineffective implementation of decisions’, ‘a poorly prepared and unfit administrative mechanism’ and outcomes that are more in line with the ‘bureaucratic logic and party or individuals’ interests’. For the historical parameters of the predominance of the executive, see Arvanitopoulos (2005); Stefanidis (2001).

4. For contrasting views on the doctrinal characteristics and the public role of Orthodox religion in modern Greece, see Lipowatz (1993) and Prodromou (1995).

5. For various analyses of the historical, sociological and identity backdrop to Greece’s irrational and obstinate foreign policy, see Diamantouros (1993); Ioakimidis (2003); Lipowatz (1993) and Mouzelis (1995). For recent manifestations of the same traits in Greek society, see DiaΝΕΟsιs (2017) and Marantzidis (2017).

6. See Panayotis Ioakimidis in Tsakonas (2010, 37).

7. For studies on Greece’s relations with its Balkan neighbours during the post-Communist period, see Koppa (2005); Serbos (2010) and Wallden (2003, 2004).

8. See various contributions in Kofos and Vlasidis (2005). See the text of the Interim Accord available at: goo.gl/dHn0mJ (last accessed: 31 March 2017).

9. For the Greek 2003 Presidency’s achievements and its contribution to the EU accession prospects of the Balkan region, see Wallden (2005).

10. Interviews with officials in the Secretariat of European Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2014.

11. For an overview of the various open issues and disputes between the two countries, see Heraclides (2010).

12. There is no consensus as to whether or to what extent Greek foreign policy has actually ‘Europeanized’. For important scholarly studies illustrating different sides of the argument, see, among others, Agnantopoulos (2013); Chryssogelos (2015); Economides (2005); Tsardanidis (2015) and Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005).

13. Interview with top MFA advisor of the period, October 2014. It should be mentioned that in subsequent years, the Greek Government under Kostas Karamanlis adjusted the so-called Helsinki strategy to one more akin to a ‘passive socialization’ of Turkey. For the strategies of active and passive socialization of Turkey, see Tsakonas (2010).

14. For details see Tziampiris (2003) and Serbos (2010).

15. Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, FYROM name issue, available at: http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/ (last accessed: 8 November 2017).

16. Interview with officials in the Secretariat of European Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2014.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint statements of Foreign Minister Kotzias and FYROM Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki following their meeting in Skopje, 24 June 2015.

20. On the diplomatic dynamics in the triangle Athens-Skopje-Sofia, see Christidis, Armakolas, and Paschalidis (2017).

21. For example, in December 2006, 66% of Greeks favoured vetoing Skopje’s entrance to the EU with its temporary name fYROM, while in November 2007, a few months before Athens effectively blocked Skopje’s NATO membership, 81% of Greeks favoured vetoing EU and NATO membership if the two countries did not agree on the name dispute. All data are from the ‘Barometer’ of the Public Issue polling agency, available in Pieridis (2010).

22. See, for example, Pieridis (2010).

23. ‘EU ministers back candidacy status for Albania’, BBC Democracy Live, 24 June 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/europe-28015352 (last accessed: 25 September 2017).

24. Interviews with officials in the Secretariat of European Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2014.

25. Lecture by the Head of the Greek Liaison Office held in Pristina, available at: http://english.albeu.com/news/news/greece-might-recognize-kosovo/184885/ (last accessed: 22 September 2017).

26. For aspects of Greece’s engagement with Kosovo, see Armakolas and Karabairis (2012).

27. ‘Kosovo has a clear European perspective, says Deputy PM and FM Venizelos’, Greek EU Presidency, 19 February 2014, available at: http://gr2014.eu/news/press-releases/kosovo-has-clear-european-perspective-says-deputy-pm-and-fm-venizelos (last accessed: 20 October 2014).

28. Ibid.

29. For an analysis of changing attitudes in the Greek society, see Marantzidis (2017). For the effects of the crisis on levels of euroscepticism in Greece, see Clements, Nanou, and Verney (2014). For the new battle lines of pro- and anti-EU forces in Greek public discourse, see Lialiouti (2017).

30. Standard Eurobarometer (62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85) Full Reports and National Reports and Executive Summaries for Greece, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm (last accessed: 13 February 2017).