Far-Right vigilantes and crime: law and order providers or common criminals? The lessons from Greece, Russia, and Ukraine

ABSTRACT

The extant literature claims that vigilante groups protect the traditional societal order by taking the law into their own hands. Vigilantes target entire categories of ‘others’ to prevent and punish their alleged criminality or norm-breaking. These activities are often connected with far-right political movements. However, the literature fails to explain why far-right vigilante groups are frequently involved in purely criminal activities (like extortion or robbery), despite their public presentation as bastions of law and order. This text provides a tentative theory of the political-criminal convergence in political violence under the disguise of community protection against crime and norm-breaking. This theory is demonstrated through the cases of Russia (Russian National Unity), Greece (Golden Dawn), and Ukraine (Azov movement).

KEYWORDS:

• Far-right
• vigilantism
• ordinary crime
• political violence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Publication records

• Laryš, Martin and Miroslav Mareš, 2011, ‘Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation,’ Europe-Asia Studies, 63(1): 129-154.

• Laryš, Martin and Miroslav Mareš, 2012, ‘Oil and Natural Gas in Russia’s Eastern Energy Strategy: Dream or Reality?’ Energy Policy, 50: 436-448.

• Laryš, Martin and Miroslav Mareš, 2015, ‘The Transnational Relations of the Contemporary Russian Extreme Right,’ Europe-Asia Studies, 67(7): 1056-1078.

• Holzer Jan, Laryš Martin, and Miroslav Mareš, 2018, Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Putin’s Russia: Legacies, Forms and Threats. London: Routledge.

• Laryš Martin, 2019, ‘Violent attacks against migrants and minorities in the Russian Federation,’ In.: Bjørgo Tore and Miroslav Mareš (eds.), Vigilantism Against Migrants and Minorities, London: Routledge, pp. 69-86.

• Laryš Martin and Emil A. Souleimanov, 2021, ‘Delegated Rebellions as an Unwanted Byproduct of Subnational Elites’ Miscalculation: A Case Study of the Donbas’, Problems of Post-Communism.

Email: [email protected], [email protected]

Notes

1. The Azov movement includes entities such as the political party National Corps (‘Natsionalnyi korpus’), its vigilante wing National Brigades (‘Natsionalni druzhyny’), the Orden circle, and the Youth Corps, among others. The Azov Regiment is not part of the Azov movement despite their common roots in 2014. The regiment became more or less independent from the movement because this military unit started its de-politization in 2015–2016 and the Azov political movement lost its power over it (Shekhovtsov 2022).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Martin Laryš

Martin Laryš graduated in Political Science from the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, the Czech Republic, in 2009. Currently, he is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Political Studies, where he conducts research on the micro-dynamics of political violence in the post-Soviet area. Martin also works as a researcher in the Prague-based Institute of International Relations (IIR).