Complementarity between the EU and NATO in light of the war in Ukraine: an analysis from the perspective of collective securitization theory

ABSTRACT

Although the majority of studies on collective securitization theory (CST) focus primarily on states as the principal actors, certain scholars also concede the potential occurrence of collective securitization within international organizations. Aligned with this viewpoint, the present article posits that CST framework can serve as a valuable tool in substantiating the commonly voiced notion of complementarity between NATO and EU. With this purpose, specific focus is placed on Russia’s war in Ukraine that has been unfolding since February 2022. Hence, all six stages of CST have been taken into consideration to justify the assumption that CST is applicable as an analytical framework to elucidate such complementarity.

KEYWORDS:

• Collective securitization theory
• European Union
• NATO
• EU-NATO complementarity
• Russia-ukraine war

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2024.2358586.

Notes

1. Even Putin himself acknowledged, almost 10 months into the military campaign, that the operation was in fact a war (Ilyushina 2022).

2. To take a case in point, the Multi-national Divisional Headquarters South East (HQ MND-SE) in Bucharest became operational in 2017 (NATO 2018).

3. In another brief in mid-February, she expressed her concerns once again. To suggest potential solutions for easing tensions in the region, she highlighted the security assurances outlined in the Minsk Agreements of 2015, despite the fact that they were no longer relevant (UN 2023). ‘With Invasion of Ukraine, Security Council’s 2022 Efforts to Maintain International Peace, Stability Mired by Widening Rifts between Veto-Wielding Members’, SC/15172, 12 January. https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15172.doc.htm.

4. The sessions held by the UN Security Council on Ukraine in 2022 also offer valuable insights into the extent to which the conflict in Ukraine has posed a security concern. The country served as the focal point in precisely one-sixth of the 276 public hearings conducted. Fifteen of them convened under the agenda item ‘Threats to international peace and security’ while eighteen were tagged under the ‘Maintenance of Peace and Security in Ukraine’ and two under ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security’ (UN 2023).

5. The referendum was held on 1 June 2022. The voter turnout of 65.8% was the second lowest in the country’s history. 66,9% of the voters approved the abolition (Hivert 2022; Murray 2022).

6. In April 2022, Danish Parliament also approved the deployment of 1.000 troops to Latvia (Gronholt-Pedersen 2022; The Baltic Times 2022)

7. Yanev had cautioned against using the term ‘war’ on the grounds that it was not how Putin was calling the operation. For Petkov, the Defence Minister’s reaction was unacceptable in presence of casualties numbering in thousands (Kantchev 2022; Oliver 2022).

8. A day before Russia’s invasion began, Polish and Slovenian prime ministers had sent a letter to Charles Michel where they demanded a roadmap for Ukraine’s accelerated membership to the EU, by 2030 (Republic of Slovenia 2022; Slovenia Times 2022).

9. For instance, in 1992, NATO has enforced the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 781 over the Bosnian territory by launching the Operation Sky Monitor. Similarly, the 1993–1995 Operation Deny Flight found its legal basis in the UNSCR 816. Libya constitutes another example with the Operation Unified Protector of 2011 that was legally justified with the UNSCR 1973.

10. The region ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ covers 36 states that SIPRI focuses on. It includes the 27 EU member states, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and the UK.

11. Part of the Eurojust-supported Joint Investigation Team that is more than a year old now, the ICPA will serve to analyse the evidence for the prosecution for future trials, be they national or international. It will convene prosecutors to prepare future prosecution processes associated with the crimes of aggression. Evidence related to these types of crimes will be gathered and securely preserved, stored and analysed. Its purpose is therefore to support and enhance investigations into the crime of aggression by securing key evidence and facilitating case building at the earliest possible stage (European Commission 2023).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Armağan Gözkaman

Armağan Gözkaman is a professor of European Union, dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences in Istanbul Beykent University. He also presides the EU Application and Research Center in the same institution. He holds BA (International Relations) and MA (European Union) degrees from Galatasaray University (1999 and 2003). As a Jean Monnet scholar, he completed an MA degree in Political Science/European Union Studies in Robert Schuman University (2001). He received joint Ph.D. degree from Strasbourg University and Marmara University (2009-2010) with French government scholarship. His research interests center on European studies, international security and Turkish foreign policy. He works in Beykent University since 2012.