Islamist Moderation and the Resilience of Gender: Turkey's Persistent Paradox

Abstract

As Islamists engage in ideological moderation, they tend to move away from doctrinaire positions on the economy and foreign policy. However, this activity is less apparent with respect to issues regarding women. What explains this variation? Using the Justice and Development Party (JDP) of Turkey as a case study, this essay discusses how and why Islamist groups characteristically resist moderation concerning gender, contending that this resilience stems from three inter‐related factors. First, women have become the symbol of Islamist movements, making gender more resistant to change as opposed to peripheral issues. Second, the JDP seems to have interests in portraying itself as resistant to change since it strategically uses this conservatism to keep in touch with its traditional base. Third, a patriarchal party structure places male values and interests above those of females and reconstructs femininity as pertaining to family by making references to religious texts, custom and tradition. Although playing a crucial role in mobilizing the constituency, women have been systematically excluded from decision‐making mechanisms of their party and their activities have been confined to separate auxiliary organizations called Women's Branches.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Annual Convention of International Studies Association, 3 March 2007, Chicago, IL, and the Annual Meeting of Southwestern Political Science Association, 10 April 2009, Denver, CO. The field work that the research was based on was supported through the Faculty Development Fund of the Liberal Arts College at Colorado State University (CSU), 2007. I would like to thank Yavuz Yaşar, Pınar Ilkkaracan, Nesrin Semiz, Luciana Storelli‐Castro, the editor, Naveed Sheikh, and three anonymous reviewers of the journal for providing me with provoking questions and invaluable comments and suggestions.

Notes

¹Omar Ashour, The De‐Radicalization of Jihadists (New York: Routledge, 2009); Gamze Çavdar, ‘Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?’, Political Science Quarterly, 121:3 (2003), pp. 477–497; Mona Al‐Ghobashy, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37:3 (2005), pp. 373–95; Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation; Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party’, Comparative Politics 36:2 (2004), pp. 205–228; Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, ‘Islamist Moderation without Democratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development’, Democratization, 16:1 (2009), pp. 157–175.

²I define Islamism along the lines described by Sheri Berman in ‘Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society’, Perspectives on Politics 1:2 (2003), pp. 257–272. Accordingly, Islamism is a social movement that aims to mobilize Muslims into political action because of ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life’ (p. 258). Consequently, ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ are two distinct phenomena. The former is the religion, the followers of which are ‘Muslims’, while the latter is a political ideology that Islamists pursue. Another critical distinction is that between the terms ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’, as the former refers to anything that is of or related to Islam, while the latter relates to an ideology, Islamism.

³ De‐Islamization refers to ideological moderation through multiple processes during which Islamist ideology is transformed. These processes include transformation of: (1) radical ideologies to become less radical; and (2) Islamists to become non‐Islamists. An examination of many Islamist groups over time in the Middle East reveals that ideological moderation has met the criteria for the former phenomenon. However, the Turkish case stands as the example par excellence for the latter, as this transformation is the most explicit, clearly defined and drastic.

⁴Many of the JDP's top leaders were active participants in the Turkish Islamist movement. They represented a reformist wing within the previous Virtue Party, where they tried to take over the leadership but failed. After the Virtue Party was closed down by a Constitutional Court order in 2001, the reformists moved further away from their Islamist past and established the JDP, which became a coalition among liberals, nationalists, conservatives and Islamists, while the traditional Islamist movement established another party, named the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party).

⁵Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, ‘Centre‐right Politics in Turkey After the November 2002 General Election: Neo‐Liberalism with a Muslim Face’, Contemporary Politics, 10:1 (2004), pp. 57–74; Sultan Tepe, ‘Turkey's AKP: A Model “Muslim‐Democratic” Party?’, Journal of Democracy, 16:3 (2005), pp. 69–82; İhsan Dağı, ‘Turkey's AKP in Power’, Journal of Democracy, 19:3 (2008), pp. 25–30; William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (New York: Routledge, 2009); Cihan Tugal Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

⁶Özlem Tür and Zana Çıtak, ‘AKP ve Kadın: Teşkilatlanma, Muhafazakârlık ve Türban’ [JDP and Woman: Organization, Conservatism and Headscarf]’, in İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (eds) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu [The Book of the Justice and Development Party: The Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), pp. 614–628; Edibe Sözen, ‘Gender Politics of the JDP’, in Hakan Yavuz (ed.) The Emergence of a New Turkey (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006), pp. 258–280.

⁷This point was less so for the Virtue Party, which was in essence a transitional party moving from a traditional Islamist party to a reformist one. See Fazilet Partisi, Fazilet Partisi Genel Başkanı M. Recai Kutan'ın Seçim Beyannamesi Basın Toplantısı [Press Conference of Recai Kutan, the Chairman of the Virtue Party, for Electoral Platform] (İstanbul: Fazilet Partisi, 20 March 1999).

⁸See Millî Selâmet Partisi 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi [The 1973 Election Platform of the National Salvation Party] (İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi Matbaası, 1973); Necmettin Erbakan, Yıkılan Tabular [Taboos are being Destroyed] (Ankara, Turkey: Refah Partisi, 21 October 1992).

⁹Necmettin Erbakan, Aktüel Olaylar ve Milli Görüş [Contemporary Issues and the National View] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, 2 December 1992).

¹⁰Necmettin Erbakan, Refah Partisi 3. Olağan Büyük Kongresi [Welfare Party's Third Convention] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, 7 October 1990), p. 30.

¹¹ Refah Partisi ve 1 Kasım Zaferi [Refah Partisi ve October 1st Victory] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, n.d.), pp. 34–35.

¹² Teşhis: Türkiye′nin Gerçek Durumu, Sebepleri [Diagnosis: Turkey's Real Condition and Its Causes] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, n.d.).

¹³Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri [Turkey's Problems and Solutions] (Ankara, Turkey: Refah Partisi, 1991), pp. 33–35; Adil Düzen 21 Soru 21 Cevap [Just Order: 21 Questions 21 Answers] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, n.d.), pp. 1–2.

¹⁴Erbakan, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵ Refah Partisi ve 1 Kasim Zaferi [Refah Partisi and the October 1st Victory] (Ankara: Refah Partisi, n.d.), p. 5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁷ Hürriyet 14 August 2001.

¹⁸The JDP government's foreign policy during its second term (2007–present) has been charged with an ‘axis shift’, which refers to a fundamental departure from the traditional secular and pro‐Western foreign policy. These allegations mostly stem from the JDP government's occasional confrontation with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue and pursuit of close relations with Iran and Syria, which is not always in agreement with US policy. Despite this often‐articulated concern and criticism inside and outside Turkey, the JDP's recent foreign policy, albeit active, can be hardly characterized as Islamist. The JDP still aspires for Turkey's EU membership, continues its economic and political relations with the West and does not take Islam as the guiding principle of its interests. See Yüksel Taşkın, ‘Turkey's Search for Regional Power’, MERIP, 21 August 2010, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082110.html (accessed 21 August 2010).

¹⁹ Millî Selâmet Partisi 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi, op. cit., pp. 65–66.

²⁰Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen [Just Economic Order] (Ankara, Turkey: Refah Partisi, 1991).

²¹ Fazilet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesinde Ilkeler‐Hedefler [Principles and Goals of the Virtue Party's Electoral Platform] (İstanbul, Turkey: n.p., 18 April 1999).

²²Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottoway, ‘Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones’, Carnegie Papers, no. 67 (2006), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_67_grayzones_final.pdf, December 2009 (accessed 12 January 2010).

²³The MB's latest party programme was issued in 2007, even though the group has remained banned since 1954. ‘Barnamaj Hizb Al‐Ikhwan Al‐Muslumin’ [The Programme for the Party of the Muslim Brotherhood], The Muslim Brotherhood Home Page, available at http:www.islamonline.net/Arabic/Daawa/2007/08/00.doc, 25 August 2007 (accessed 2 February 2010).

²⁴Omayma Abdel‐Latif, ‘In the Shadow of the Brothers: The Women of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’, Carnegie Papers, no. 13 (2008), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/women_egypt_muslim_brotherhood.pdf, (accessed 2 February 2010); ‘Barnamaj Hizb Al‐Ikhwan Al‐Muslumin’ (op. cit.).

²⁵Schwedler, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁶Janine A. Clark and Amy E. Young, ‘Islamism and Family Law Reform in Morocco and Jordan’, Mediterranean Politics, 13:3 (2008), p. 333.

²⁷Katie Zoglin, ‘Morocco's Family Code: Improving Equality for Women’, Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009), pp. 964–984.

²⁹Ibid., p. 65.

²⁸Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Policy 135 (2003), pp. 64–65.

³⁰David S. Landes and Richard A. Landes. ‘Girl Power: Do Fundamentalists Fear Our Women?’, New Republic (8 October 2001), p. 20.

³¹This mistake is quite common in literature and was also made even in famous works such as Samuel Huntington's ‘For a Critique’, see James. G. Mellon, ‘Islam and International Politics: Examining Huntington's “Civilizational Clash” Thesis’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2:1 (2001), pp. 73–83.

³²Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 1–27.

³³Bassam Tibi, ‘Islamists Approach Europe: Turkey's Islamist Danger’, Middle East Quarterly (2009), p. 47.

³⁴Zeyno Baran, ‘Turkey Divided’, Journal of Democracy, 19:1 (2008), p. 57.

³⁵Sultan Tepe has successfully demonstrated the complexity of the JDP policies and the difficulty of identifying it with a clear ideological camp. See ‘Turkey's AKP: A Model “Muslim‐Democratic” Party?’, Journal of Democracy, 16:3 (2005), pp. 69–82.

³⁶For major institutionalist figures and books, see Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, and Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

³⁷John Zysman, ‘How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 3:1 (1994), p. 244 quoted in Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), p. 375.

³⁸Georgina Waylen, Engendering Transitions: Women's Mobilization, Institutions and Gender Outcomes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Mounira Charrad, States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Georgina Waylen, ‘What Can Historical Institutionalism Offer to Feminist Institutionalists?’, Gender and Politics, 5:2 (2009), pp. 245–253.

³⁹There was no law or regulation banning traditional women's clothing. Yeşim Arat, Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy Islamist Women in Turkish Politics (New York: State University of New York, 2005); Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (Seattle, WA: Washington University Press: 2002); Zehra Arat, ‘Kemalism and Turkish Women’, Women and Politics, 14:4 (1994), pp. 57–80.

⁴⁰Arat, op. cit., p. 73.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Burçak Keskin‐Kozat, ‘Entangled in Secular Nationalism, Feminism and Islamism’, Cultural Dynamics, 15 (2003), pp. 183–211.

⁴³Valentine M. Moghadam, ‘Rhetorics and Rights of Identity in Islamist Movements’, Journal of World History, 4:2 (1993), p. 243.

⁴⁴Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Fatma Müge Göçek, ‘To Veil or not to Veil the Contested Location of Gender in Contemporary Turkey’, International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 1 (1999), pp. 521–535.

⁴⁵Moghadam, op. cit.

⁴⁶Gamze Çavdar, ‘To Branch or not to Branch? Women and Political Parties in Turkey’, Kadın/Woman 2000 Journal for Woman Studies, VII:1 (2006), pp. 91–125.

⁵⁰ Yeni Şafak, 19 November 2006.

⁴⁷The JDP's Party Programme, available at http://www.akparti.org.tr/parti-programi_79.html (accessed 11 April 2010).

⁴⁸ Seçim Bildirgesi, 2002, available at www.akparti.org.tr/.../SEÇİM%20beyanname-KISALTILMIŞ.doc (accessed 20 March 2010).

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 34.

⁵¹ Yeni Safak, 29 January 2006.

⁵² Hürriyet, 8 March 2008.

⁵³Women's labour market participation dropped from 34% in 1988 to 27% in 2000 and 22% in 2007/2008. See Türkiye'de Kadınların İşgücüne Katılımı, Report no. 48508‐TR, TC Başbakanlık ve Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 23 November 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1268839345767/Female_LFP-tr.pdf (accessed 24 August 2010).

⁵⁴Yalçın Akdoğan, Muhafazakăr Demokrasi (Ankara, Turkey: n.p., 2003).

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁶For the extensive list of legal changes, see Türkiye'nin Kadınları Umudun Adımları Ak Parti İktidarında Kadın [Turkey's Women Steps of Hope Woman during the AKP Government] (Ankara: AK Parti Genel Merkez Kadın Kolları Başkanlığı, n.d.); Ak Parti İktidarında Kadın Hakları ve Fırsat Eşitliği Alanında Gerçeklestirilen Yasal Düzenlemeler [The Legal Changes Concerning Women's Rights during The AK Party Government] (Ankara; AK Parti Genel Merkez Kadın Kolları Başkanlığı, n.d.).

⁵⁷Author's interview with Nesrin Semiz, the Secretary General of Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği (the Association for Capital Women's Platform), 20 July 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹For an insider's analysis of the women's successful campaigning, see Pınar Ilkkaracan and Liz Ercevik Amado, ‘Good Practices in Legislation on Violence Against Women in Turkey and Problems of Implementation’ (UN Office at Vienna, Austria, 23 May 2008), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2008/vaw_legislation_2008.htm (accessed 2 May 2010).

⁶⁰Ilkkaracan and Amado, op. cit.

⁶¹Author's interview with Pinar Ilkaracan (on the phone), 14 April 2010.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³The New Penal Code was accepted in Law no. 5237, which came into effect as of 1 April 2005.

⁶⁴Author's Interview with Ilkkaracan (note 62).

⁶⁵ Hürriyet, 23 October 2003.

⁶⁶For Ferai Tunç and Murat Bardakçı's comments, see Hürriyet, 26 December 2003 and 30 November 2003, respectively.

⁶⁷ Sabah, 23 November 2003.

⁶⁸ Hürriyet, 3 November 2003.

⁶⁹Pınar Ilkkaracan, ‘How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey's Aspiration to Join the European Union’, in P. Ilkkaracan (ed.), Deconstructing Sexuality in the Middle East: Challenges and Discourses (London: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 41–64.

⁷⁰ Milliyet, 4 September, 2004.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷² Milliyet, 11 September, 2004.

⁷³ Hürriyet, 8 September 2004.

⁷⁴ Hürriyet, 13 September 2004.

⁷⁵ Milliyet, 7 September 2004.

⁷⁶Milliyet, 9 September 2004.

⁷⁷Miliyet, 9 September 2004.

⁷⁸Ilkkaracan, op. cit.

⁷⁹These are indeed artificial categories as both are the types of crimes committed by men against women in the name of preserving men's ‘honour’. According to the amended code, the ‘honour killings’ might be subject to reduced sentences on the basis of ‘unjust provocation’, while the ‘custom killings’ are not. By making this distinction, the law not only establishes double standards for the same crime but also reinforces the concept of women as property.

⁸⁰ Hürriyet, 13 September 2004.

⁸¹‘Unjust provocation’ means that the offender acts under the influence of rage caused by an unjust act. If this condition is met, the offender gets a reduced sentence. In the case of murder, the offender's sentence may be subject to reductions ranging from one‐quarter to three‐quarters of a life sentence. See the New Penal Code (no. 5237), accepted at 24 September 2004, available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html (accessed 23 May 2008).

⁸² Radikal, 15 July 2006.

⁸³JDP's webpage, available at http://www.akparti.org.tr (accessed 10 February 2007); KA‐DER (The Association for the Support and Education of Female Candidates), available at http://www.ka-der.org.tr (accessed 11 April 2010).

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Erdoğan further explained that adopting a quota system would mean that ‘women are weak and should seek help from men … [Men] and women are entitled to equal rights in this country’. Zaman, 27 October 2008.

⁸⁹Akman, op. cit.

⁸⁶ Sabah, 5 January 2007.

⁸⁷Nuriye Akman, ‘Fatma Şahin İle Söyleşi’ [Interview with Fatma Şahin], Zaman, 17 January 2010.

⁸⁸Taha Akyol, ‘Meydanlarda Kadınlar’ [Women are in Streets], Milliyet, 5 March 2009.

⁹⁰The central decision mechanism has other female members, not associated with the WBs, with full voting rights. For instance, the remaining 19 members of the Committee consist of two female and 17 male members. The female Head of WB is not represented in the Central Decision‐Making and Administrative Committee (CDAC), which has a total of 51 members (14 female and 37 male), all of whom have the right to vote. http://www.akparti.org.tr (accessed 16 August 20100).

⁹¹See the JDP Code, Article 86, available at http://www.akparti.org.tr/akim/tuzuk.asp?dizin=102&hangisi=1 (accessed 11 August 2010).

⁹² Hürriyet, 2 August 2004.

⁹³ Zaman, 20 January 2010.

⁹⁴Sibel Eraslan, ‘Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Kadın Emekçileri’ [Tayyip Erdoğan's Female Workers] Vaktim, 5 March 2010.

⁹⁵This is an interesting point because the previous Head of the WB, Selma Kavaf, called homosexuality a disease.

⁹⁶ Sabah, 8 March 2010.

⁹⁷ Hürriyet, 27 December 2008.

⁹⁸ Hürriyet, 13 December 2008.

⁹⁹ AK Parti Kadın Kolları Haberler [News from the JDP's WB], 5 May 2009, available at http://kadinkollari.akparti.org.tr/turkce/haber.asp?id=622 (accessed February 2010).

¹⁰⁰Akman, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ Zaman, 2 March 2009.

¹⁰²According to research conducted by Hakan Yılmaz, the most widespread form of conservatism in Turkey is religious conservatism. However, conservatism in the area of sexuality and male–female equality is by no means unique to the religious constituency. See Hakan Yılmaz, ‘Conservatism in Turkey’, Turkish Studies Quarterly, 7:1 (2008), p. 62, available at http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HakanYilmaz-2008-ConservatismInTurkey-TPQ.28465311.pdf (accessed September 2).