India as an emerging power in international climate negotiations

Abstract

India's negotiation strategies in international climate policy have considerably changed over the past decade. While core positions have not altered substantially, the way they were presented and supported at the international level reveals major changes. In particular between 2007 and 2011, India's international climate policy shifted from defensive, pure distributive strategies toward mixed strategies with a number of ‘value-creating’ elements, dynamism and flexibility became clearly visible in India's international climate policy. This shift is confirmed by evidence from a novel dataset based on an assessment of country submissions at the UNFCCC negotiations, negotiation summaries and interviews with an Indian delegate and representatives of other delegations. India's change in strategy appears to be driven by several factors: developments in the national political landscape whereby the personality of the delegation leader and minister in charge plays a critical role, a general trend related to rising public awareness of India's vulnerability to climate change, increasing domestic energy constraints, direct economic benefits from the Kyoto Protocol's market mechanisms, reactions to international pressure from other developing countries, and increased reporting by domestic media.

Les stratégies de négociation de l'Inde dans les politiques climatiques internationales ont considérablement changé le long des deux dernières décennies. Alors que les positions de fond n'ont pas changé substantiellement, les façons dont elles sont présentées et soutenues au niveau international reflètent des changements majeurs. Entre 2007 et 2011 en particulier, la politique climatique internationale de l'Inde a muté, de stratégies de défense et purement distributives, vers des stratégies mixtes composées d'un ensemble d’éléments créateurs de valeur, dynamisme et flexibilité. Cette mutation est confirmée par les résultats d'un nouvel ensemble de données, basé sur l'évaluation de contributions de Parties aux négociations de la CCNUCC, des résumés des négociations et entretiens avec un délégué indien et représentants d'autres délégations. Le changement de stratégie de l'Inde semble être motivé par plusieurs facteurs : l'évolution du paysage politique national ou la personnalité du chef de délégation et du ministre en charge jouant un rôle critique, la conscience publique montante quant à la vulnérabilité de l'Inde face au changement climatique, les contraintes croissantes sur l'énergie nationale, des bénéfices économiques directs issus des mécanismes de marché du protocole de Kyoto, la réaction face à la pression internationale venant d'autres pays en développement, et l'accroissement des reportages par les médias nationales.

Keywords:

• climate cooperation
• climate change negotiations
• negotiation strategy
• India

Mots clés:

• Coopération sur le climat
• négociations sur le climat
• stratégie de négociation
• l'Inde

Acknowledgements

This paper was written in the context of the research programme “Negotiating Climate Change” funded by the Swiss Network of International Studies (SNIS). The authors gratefully acknowledge excellent research assistance by Lena Hörnlein. Moreover they are grateful for very helpful comments and suggestions by Stefanie Bailer, Anne-Sophie Bentz, Pamposh Bhat, Paula Castro, Navroz Dubash, Joëlle de Sépibus, Joyeeta Gupta, Dan J. Kim, John Odell, Dietmar Rothermund, and Florian Weiler.

Notes

Note that for each country delegation, only one delegate was interviewed. The data may thus not reflect the position of the entire delegation or of all its senior members. However, the interview statements are supplemented by other sources.

For a detailed review of the relevant literature and supporting statistics, see Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011); for further details on the development of the debate within India, see Dubash (2012a, Parts IV–V).

The G77+China is the central group with which India traditionally identifies itself. The emission targets of the AOSIS group of countries are particularly salient. The EU represents the progressive end of negotiation positions within Annex I countries.

On middle power coalitions and leadership, see Higgot and Cooper (1990).

Formally, among the non-Annex I countries, Brazil had the largest delegation with 450 delegates. However, all Brazilian nationals that attended the COP (including NGO members or members from business lobbies) were automatically integrated in the delegation. This was not the case for other delegations, so a comparison with Brazil is not very meaningful.