Continuity and change in Russia's climate negotiations position and strategy

Abstract

The positions and strategies of Russia in the international climate negotiations are examined. The shift towards a more integrated negotiation strategy and its use of rhetoric at the Copenhagen meeting reflected both a change in Russia's domestic elite and its bureaucratic politics, and a desire to appear to be a responsible global power. However, climate change is still an issue of only limited public salience, which allows Russia some leeway in formulating its negotiating positions. Indeed, Russia is still unpredictable in the negotiations and its primary concern remains advancing unconstrained economic growth. Russia's recent decision to abandon, along with Canada and Japan, the ‘Kyoto-2’ track of negotiations shows that its role in future climate negotiations depends on broadening developing country participation and the positions of the members of the Umbrella Group (most notably, the US) and China. The analysis thus lends support to negotiation theories that emphasize the two-level interplay between international and domestic politics and the relevance of contingent strategies and coalitions in shaping policy options.

Les positions et stratégies de la Russie dans les négociations internationales sur le climat sont examinées. Le changement vers une stratégie de négociation plus intégrée et sa rhétorique au sommet de Copenhague reflète à la fois un changement dans l’élite nationale de la Russie et ses politiques bureaucratiques, ainsi qu'un désir de se présenter en tant que puissance mondiale responsable. Toutefois, le changement climatique n'est toujours qu'une question d'importance publique limitée, de qui donne à la Russie une certaine marge dans la formulation de ses positions de négociation. En effet, la Russie est encore imprévisible dans les négociations et sa principale préoccupation est toujours de favoriser une croissance économique sans contrainte. La décision récente de la Russie d'abandonner, en même temps que le Canada et le Japon, la trajectoire de négociation «Kyoto-2» montre qu'elle peut toutefois jouer un rôle positif dans les négociations climatiques futures, sous réserve de l’élargissement de la participation des pays en développement et les positions des membres du Groupe parapluie (plus particulièrement, les EU) et la Chine. L'analyse apporte donc un soutien aux théories de négociation mettant en valeur l'interaction à deux niveaux, entre la politique internationale et nationale, et la pertinence des stratégies contingentes et des coalitions dans le façonnement des options de politiques.

Keywords:

• climate cooperation
• climate negotiations
• energy policy
• negotiation strategy
• Russia

Mots clés:

• coopération sur le climat
• négociations sur le climat
• politiques sur l’énergie
• stratégie de négociation
• la Russie

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge research support from the Swiss Network of International Studies for the project Negotiating Climate Change. We are grateful for comments from Katja Michaelowa, Axel Michaelowa, Joyeeta Gupta, John Odell, Joelle de Sépibus and from four anonymous reviewers; as well to Paula Castro Pareja and Florian Weiler for research collaboration.

Notes

Latest available estimate with 2008 data (see WRI, 2011).

The Umbrella Group is a coalition of non-EU developed countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, and US).

In order to enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol required 55 ratifications and the accession of countries contributing no less than 55% of total emissions by industrialized countries. In the absence of the US, this implied that all major Annex I emitters needed to ratify it, including Russia itself.

These are Center Telecom, Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, Gazprom, Irkutskenergo, Novatek, and Tatneft.

For example, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (who until Spring 2011 was Chairman of the board of the state-dominated Rosneft oil company) is thought to strongly oppose a new climate pact (Westphal, 2010). The Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko, is also an opponent of a post-2012 regime. Although the Ministry of Economic Development has clearly benefited from the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, its Vice-Minister, Andrey Klepach, has (pessimistically) commented that the costs of the Protocol to the Russian economy will reach 2% of GDP (Korppoo and Spencer, 2009).

Authors’ own translation.

For example, on the eve of COP 15, the Institute of Oceanography of the Russian Academy of Sciences issued a report that claimed human activity is not a major factor in climate change. Similarly, the Director of the research institute of the Ministry of Energy has attributed global warming to the slowing of the Earth's rotation (Charap and Safonov, 2010).

See Bailer (2012) for more on the index of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ negotiating strategies.