Rising powers: the evolving role of BASIC countries

Abstract

The exponential growth in global populations, economic activity and resource utilization means it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy global demand for a number of fundamental resources, while some key ecosystems services are under stress. The likelihood of future resource scarcities have begun to influence the positions taken within international climate change negotiations by fast-growing developing countries. When Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the BASIC group it took many by surprise. The coordination needed to align this heterogeneous group of countries cannot simply be understood in terms of a set of shared interests around climate policy. How the BASIC group emerged and the nature of its cooperation on climate change are examined within the broader context in which these increasingly powerful countries came to join forces. Although traditionally aligned with the G77 group of developing countries, recent strategising as a group of emerging economies reflects their realization that there are insufficient global resources available to follow the same development pathway as industrialized countries. Hence, they must seek alternative growth pathways, which requires establishing common ground while also keeping track of each others' positions on important global issues like climate change.

Keywords:

• BASIC
• climate change negotiations
• climate cooperation
• Copenhagen
• equity
• geopolitics
• South–South

Notes

Prime examples of the post-Copenhagen blame game are given in Mark Lynas’ (2009) article in The Guardian and the in-depth coverage by Rapp, Schwägerl and Traufetter (2010) that appeared on the Der Spiegel web site.

Interviews were held in October 2010 with senior diplomats from the BASIC countries, Europe, and the Americas.

See also the relevant sections about India and China in Hallding et al. (2011, pp. 57–76).

Based on a discussion with a senior diplomat from a BASIC country in June 2011.

The Group of Eight + Five (G8+5) is an international group that consists of the leaders of the heads of government from the G8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US), plus the heads of government of the five leading emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa). The G8+5 group was formed in 2005 when Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister of the UK in his role as host of the 31st G8 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, invited the leading emerging countries to join the talks. The hope was that this would form a stronger and more representative group that would inject fresh impetus into the trade talks at Doha, and in response to the need to achieve a deeper cooperation on climate change. The G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue was launched on 24 February 2006.

President Bush initiated a group called the ‘Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change’ in 2007. President Obama renamed it the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’. The ‘new’ MEF was officially launched in March 2009 ‘to facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies [and] help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual U.N. climate negotiations’ (Timmons Roberts, 2013)

This text was described by The Guardian (Vidal, 2009) as ‘a secret draft agreement worked on by a group of individuals known as “the circle of commitment” – but understood to include the UK, US and Denmark’. The view that the EU and the US set an ambush for the BASIC countries was referred to by BASIC diplomats and negotiators in interviews carried out for Hallding et al. (2011).

Interview on 11 June 2011. Hurrell and Sengupta (2012, p. 463) also support the view that there was a BASIC strategy of ‘sidelining Europe in climate change negotiations and forcing the United States to negotiate within a very different institutional context’.

This figure was calculated on the basis of data from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (see Boden, Marland, & Andres, 2009; CDIAC, 2013).

Walsh, Tian, Whalley, and Agarwal (2011) show how similar sentiments are reflected in the common principles and negotiation issues that both countries face.

The Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998) in part operationalizes the UNFCCC and sets legally binding targets for 37 industrialized countries to reduce their GHG emissions.

During COP 15, Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao stated that China would never compete with other developing countries for even a single cent of financial support (Zhao, Tian, & Wei, 2009).

Interviews carried out for Hallding et al. (2011) point to several reasons why Mexico did not become a BASIC member, although the main reason seems to be its membership of the OECD.

The APP was created in 2005 through a non-binding multilateral agreement between Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the US.

This is a clear example of structural continuity across the US administrations even when, arguably, some of the important goals for international climate cooperation are different. Another example of this continuity is the APP.

See also Haites, Yamin, and Höhne (2009) for more information on a joint proposal for a post-2012 architecture that would take into account BASIC country interests as produced by a broad-based group of researchers from leading BASIC and international institutions.

This thinking is not new, and can be traced back to the Byrd–Hagel Resolution (S. Res. 198) passed by the US Senate in 1997. The resolution stated that the US should not be a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and was passed by a 95–0 bipartisan majority.

As de la Fontaine and Seifer (2010) point out, the term ‘South–South cooperation’ has been used for, and associated with, all sorts of relations in the Global South. Here it is used to describe cooperation among (or led by) emerging powers, including the direct interaction between these countries and, as described by Kragelund (2011), how they, without direct coordination, seem to share an interest in engaging with African countries in a way that differs from the West.

The WTO G20 (otherwise known as ‘G20 developing nations’) is a trade bloc that operates in the WTO negotiations. It is separate and distinct from the G20 group of major economies. Membership has fluctuated but the following countries are currently part of the group: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

The Doha Development Round of the WTO trade negotiations (also known, semi-officially, as the Doha Development Agenda) was launched in November 2001 with the aim to reform the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules.

No joint statement was issued at this first BASIC meeting, but a press conference was convened by The Times of India (Dasgupta, 2009), and the strategizing of the BASIC groups was reported by the then Indian Environment Minister, Jairam Ramesh (2009), to the Rajya Sabha (i.e. the Indian Upper House).

The reason why South Africa was invited to be part of the original BRIC group is a subject of some debate. Some have argued that it is its African credentials that brought it into the group (The Economist, 2012, March 29). Interviews conducted for Hallding et al. (2011) suggest, however, that South Africa might also have lobbied to be part of the BRIC group.

These internal dynamics from the BASIC formation were revealed in a discussion with a senior BASIC country diplomat in June 2011. The close coordination before and during COP 15 between China and India is corroborated by the suo moto statement by then Indian Environmental Minister, Jairam Ramesh (2009), to the Rajya Saba.

The bibliography contains references to all BASIC ministerial joint statements from the 2nd meeting in New Delhi, Feb 2010, to the 14th meeting in Chennai, Feb 2013 (“Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group, New Delhi” 2010; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Third Meeting of BASIC Ministers, Cape Town” 2010; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group” 2010; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Fifth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change” 2010; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of Sixth Basic Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, New Delhi” 2011; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Seventh BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change” 2011; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Eighth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change” 2011; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Ninth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change Beijing, China” 2011; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the 10th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, New Delhi” 2012; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusions of the 11th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Johannes- Burg, South Africa” 2012; “Declaração Conjunta Da XII Reunião Ministerial Do BASIC Sobre Mudança Do Clima – Brasília, Brasil, 20 e 21 de Setembro, 2012” 2012; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the 13th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change Beijing, China” 2012; “Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the 14th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Chennai, 16th February, 2013” 2013). To the authors' knowledge no formal joint statement was issued after the first BASIC ministerial in Beijing, Nov 2009, however the outcomes of the meeting was reported through a press conference, see Dasgupta (2009).

Walsh et al. (2011) have described how it has been a central issue, particularly for India and China, to redefine this principle in a way that allows developing countries room to pursue their own individual development goals.

Qi (2011, pp. 305–306) shows how India's view on a shared vision of an ‘equitable sharing of the carbon space’ differs from China's view of ‘per capita accumulative emissions reflect[ing] the principle of equity’.

The members of the LMDC are Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Venezuela.