Abstract
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This principle has shaped the evolution of the climate regime and has played an important role in promoting compromise and agreement. It is argued that some twenty years after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the principle of CBDRC remains as relevant as ever. The practice of Parties under the regime and, most recently, the concerted efforts to shape and flesh out the meaning of the principle, underscore the central role that it plays. At the same time, the binary understanding of CBDRC in the Kyoto Protocol is being replaced with a more nuanced, multifaceted understanding. The evolving interpretation of CBDRC is considered, and its continued relevance as the nucleus of a global burden-sharing regime for addressing climate change is demonstrated.
Policy relevance
The development of a common understanding of the principle of CBDRC is essential for the burden sharing and responsibilities under a future climate agreement. The CBDRC principle captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment, but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This article informs the international climate change negotiations by considering the development of the principle of CBDRC under the UNFCCC over time. It is concluded that, although there has been a significant shift in how the principle is understood, it remains crucial to the integrity and stability of the climate regime.
Notes
See also UNFCCC (Citation1995). The Berlin Mandate, in para. 1(d), avers to the ‘fact that the largest share of historical and current global emissions has originated in developed countries’ (emphasis added).
Whereas Article 3(2) acknowledges that both developed and developing countries may belong to such vulnerable and affected countries, Article 4(8) refers only to developing countries that may require special consideration in the allocation of funding, insurance, and technology transfer.
See, for example, China's submission.
See, for example, India's submission.
See, for example, the submissions by Argentina, China, and India.
The group comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, the Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Samoa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Uruguay, the UK, and the European Commission (see http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php). The Group sees itself as a ‘coalition of the willing’, a group of states that organizes regular meetings to devise strategies that facilitate ambitious and progressive advances towards managing climate change.
The differences in national circumstances matter as much for developed countries, where the COP stresses that the comparability of targets depends on their national circumstances, as for developing countries in the context of their low-carbon development (see UNFCCC, Citation2012b, 1/CP18, para. II. A, 8(b) and para II, B 22).
This argument can be found in the last round of submissions by Argentina and China, in which they specifically refer to aviation and bunker fuels. This has also been a controversial topic in the discussion on other sectoral mechanisms, such as agriculture.