Unstoppable climate change? The influence of fatalistic beliefs about climate change on behavioural change and willingness to pay cross-nationally

ABSTRACT

Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.

Key policy insights

• The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.

• The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.

• Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change behaviour
• risk perception
• fatalism
• efficacy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 We use the term “climate fatalism” to refer to personal beliefs that climate change is unstoppable and related lack of agency to make an impact. The term fatalism has also been used in other contexts, most notably in the cultural worldviews literature (Dake, 1992) wherein a fatalistic worldview is “characterized by high levels of disengagement and belief that much of what happens in society is largely beyond their control” (Xue, Hine, Loi, Thorsteinsson, & Phillips, 2014, p 250). Hence, our use of this term shares some kinship with the cultural worldviews literature, but we are specifically concerned with ‘climate fatalism’, not fatalism as a general outlook on the world.

2 Although trust is widely recognized as a key factor in collective action to address climate change, trust has eluded a simple definition. For conceptual and theoretical discussion about the nature of trust and its importance in social action, see Khodyakov, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; and Sztompka, 1999.

3 Response rates and survey methodologies are not publicly reported for Eurobarometer surveys.

4 This data was gathered utilizing a variety of data collection protocols appropriate for each nation, where participants were selected within households by either the Kish or nearest birthday method. The overall response rate was 37.7%.

5 Although prior studies have used variables for to specific behaviours—such as recycling, reducing flights or purchasing renewable power—we prefer to use a simple, straightforward indicator primarily because we suspect that a given respondent’s probability of certain behaviours is shaped by their national context, rather than solely by individual-level demographic and social-psychological factors. For instance, it is likely implausible for respondents living in middle-income transition states to install solar panels on their home because the products may simply be too expensive or even not available in their nation.

6 See Appendix D in the supplementary online materials for predicted probabilities of the key predictors, climate fatalism and risk perception, on the climate behaviours and willingness to pay outcomes.