ABSTRACT
As marine-ice around Antarctica retracts, a vast ‘blue carbon’ sink, in the form of living biomass, is emerging. Properly protected and promoted Antarctic blue carbon will form the world’s largest natural negative feedback on climate change. However, fulfilling this promise may be challenging, given the uniqueness of the region and the legal systems that govern it. In this interdisciplinary study, we explain: the global significance of Antarctic blue carbon to international carbon mitigation efforts; the urgent need for international legal protections for areas where it is emerging; and the hurdles that need to be overcome to realize those goals. In order to progress conservation efforts past political blockages we recommend the development of an inter-instrument governance framework that quantifies the sequestration value of Antarctic blue carbon for attribution to states’ climate mitigation commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Key policy insights
Blue-carbon emergence around Antarctica’s coastlines will potentially store up to 160,000,000 tonnes of carbon annually.
Blue-carbon will emerge in areas of rich biomass that will make it vulnerable to harvesting and other human activities; it is essential to incentivise conserving, rather than commercial exploitation of newly ice-free areas of the Southern Ocean.
Antarctic blue carbon is a practical and prime candidate to build a cooperative, inter-instrument, non-market mitigation around; this should be considered at the ‘blue COP’ UN Climate change discussions in Spain.
Allowing Antarctic fishing states to account for the carbon storage value of blue carbon zones through a non-market approach under the Paris Agreement could provide a vital incentive to their protection under the Antarctic Treaty System.
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research would be the ideal body to facilitate the necessary connections between the relevant climate and Antarctic governance regimes.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Brendan Gogarty http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9494-6598
Jeff McGee http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2093-5896
David K.A. Barnes http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9076-7867
Chester J. Sands http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1028-0328
Narissa Bax http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4338-1080
Marcus Haward http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4775-0864
Rachel Downey http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9275-8879
Camille Moreau http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0981-7442
Bernabé Moreno http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9751-6307
Christoph Held http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8854-3234
Maria Lund Paulsen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1474-7258
Notes
1 That includes the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for purposes of scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protection and scientific study: see CCAMLR Art IX(1)(f) & Art IX(2)(g).
2 The jurisdictional limits on CCAMLR rational use considerations arise in part as a result to concerns about the clash of the CCAMLR with other fisheries treaties outside north of 60S during its negotiation. Further, while Antarctica’s and Antarctic systems’ contribution to the global environment – including oceans, climate and atmosphere – was already recognised at the time of drafting in the 1970s, the focus of the parties centred on fishing and there was little conceptual engagement with how massive ecosystem changes within the convention area might occur in the near future that would alter its global ecosystem role. See ATCM, ‘Summary of Preliminary Views Expressed by Delegations to the Second Extended Prepatory Meeting on the Question Posed in the United State's Paper ANT/EPM/6 on Antarctic Marine Living Resources Issues’ Antarctic Treaty IXth Consultative Meeting ANT/EPM2/5 27 July 1977; ATCM Final Meeting report Antarctic Treaty Report of Ninth Consultative Meeting, 23, 29, 42, 45, 74.
3 n.b no new ASMAs have been agreed since 2014 meaning this data remains current at the time of publication.
4 This is, in part due to the fact that the nominating party is responsible for managing the protected area.
5 Currently there are 72 ASPAs, with 8 having a marine component. See Wauchope, Shaw, and Terauds (Citation2019).
6 Additionality has been a longstanding and persistent issue in global emissions agreements, and the source of much debate in relation to the voluntary mechanisms established by Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Concerns over experience with additionality under the Kyoto Protocol and its Clean Development Mechanism have indeed stalled the finalisation of an agreed mechanism to date (Schneider & Theuer, Citation2018).