Climate solutions to meet the suburban surge: leveraging COVID-19 recovery to enhance suburban climate governance

ABSTRACT

Cities dominate the local climate governance arena, yet both the U.S. and Canada are suburban nations. The vast reaches of suburbia, which far exceed urban cores in land area, population, and emissions impacts, lag on climate action. At the same time, they are comparatively underserved by, and underrepresented within, the policy community. COVID-19 pandemic driven flight from cities to pastoral safety was hyped in the media, but the reality is a more mundane suburban acceleration. As always, suburbs provide more space, 2020s top commodity, at a lower cost. This stands at odds with the prescriptions of urban climate experts, where mixed-use, walkable density is the path to meeting Paris Agreement targets. Without a more expansive approach to subnational action, the popular movement around cities for climate will fail to deliver on its potential. We suggest going beyond narratives that position suburbs as helpful accessories, arguing instead that suburbs themselves can be a locus of climate action. In the context of a green recovery, additional steps include expanding suburban capacity through existing or new networks and supporting organizations engaged in suburban planning to adopt promising practices for equitable, integrated adaptation and mitigation. This approach could be an ideal use of recovery funds, with the potential to parlay immediate action into long-term gains. Governments have always subsidized the suburbs. COVID-19 recovery offers a narrow window to redirect and enhance those subsidies to bring the management of climate impacts within reach.

Key policy insights

• Suburbs, due to their share of population, land area and emissions, must become centres of climate action, not accessories to urban plans.

• Climate action should be designed to meet the specific circumstances of suburban communities. Examples include focusing on retrofitting existing buildings, integrating mixed-use zoning, and prioritizing demand-side management.

• Suburban communities can immediately begin adopting the most promising practices for equitable, integrated adaptation and mitigation.

KEYWORDS:

• Multi-level governance
• local policy
• local adaptation
• climate change mitigation
• integrated solutions

Introduction

Early in the pandemic, media outlets hyped the flight from cities to rural safe havens (Bivins, 2020; Bogost, 2020). For elites with the means to escape, this was not so farfetched. The prospect had a basis in the long history of pandemics (Brockell, 2020) and visions of the future. According to NASA’s futurists and other techno-utopians, it was only a matter of time until people would live dotted across the landscape in serene pods, their daily needs met by drone delivery (Banke, 2018). Perhaps the pandemic was simply hastening that vision (Marsden, 2020). For climate policy, that would present a concerning spectre; a professional class holed up at home, sporadically commuting by air, would increase emissions and further exacerbate carbon inequality (Kartha et al., 2020).

Unsurprisingly, the reality is much more mundane, but still presents a major obstacle to achieving necessary mitigation and adaptation. Rather than radical decentralization, what is occurring in North America is a simple suburban acceleration. Under the COVID-19 pandemic, dispersed single-family homes are becoming even more attractive (Bivins, 2020; Bogost, 2020; Idzelis, 2020), locking in emissions now and into the future. Meanwhile, urban cores rather than suburban peripheries have dominated the local climate governance arena (Dierwechter, 2010). In both theory and practice, it has become popular to proclaim cities as climate saviours, particularly in response to federal dereliction in North America (Watts, 2017). Toronto, New York and Los Angeles make bold climate plans, play leading roles in international networks, and position themselves for a competitive climate edge (Hughes, 2019; Phelps & Miao, 2020). Urban climate experts referring to cities like these tell us that we must double down on dense, walkable, mixed-use, transit-oriented land use patterns (Rosenzweig et al., 2018), but the opposite is underway.

In each of the regions that large cities anchor, they make up a fraction of the land, population, and economic productivity. In all of these cases, the surrounding suburban municipalities, home to the majority of the population and integral to the regional economy, tend to lag in climate planning and action (Dierwechter, 2010; Osofsky, 2015). Even if the direct COVID-19 uptick is overblown as some predict (Berridge, 2020; Patino, 2020), the U.S. and Canada were already solidly suburban nations with a respective 55% and 66% occupying this metropolitan middle ground (Gordon et al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2018). The current crisis presents the possibility of reorienting and expanding local and regional climate action to fully encompass the suburbs on a scale commensurate with the challenge.

Varieties of suburban growth

After multiple decades of sustained post-war suburban expansion, in the early 2000s walkable cities finally appeared to exert a greater pull than the cul-de-sac (Benfield, 2014; Dougherty & Whelan, 2012; Frey, 2013). Millennials and boomers, the two outsize cohorts of the twentieth century, were both shedding cars and moving to condos, compelled by the opportunity and convenience of urban life. But by the time COVID-19 struck, it was already becoming clear that this was a brief anomaly, that millennials were not so unlike previous generations when it came time to settle down (Frey, 2018; McClelland, 2019). At the same time, the most desirable cities were in the throes of runaway gentrification, becoming increasingly unaffordable (Lerner, 2019). As always, the suburbs provided more space at a lower cost. While suburbs were once again becoming more attractive, in the face of lockdowns, urban cores became drastically less so. Compounding this, historically low interest rates made home-buying more compelling for those with means (Campisi, 2020; Zochodne, 2021).

Of course, witnessing this suburban growth unfold, it is important not to fall back on a reductive view of the suburbs. While the word conjures homogenous sprawl, scholarship in urban planning and geography has illuminated how the suburbs are heterogeneous, in terms of land use, demographics, and building patterns. At a regional scale, suburbs fall into at least three main types: declining inner ring (the first band of post-war suburban growth), successful job centres, and developing communities (Orfield, 2011). Many of these suburbs are socioeconomically and racially diverse; some are now thriving ‘ethnoburbs’ while others have become concentrators of poverty and some still skew wealthy and white (Anacker, 2015; Florida, 2017; Li, 1998; Pew Research Center, 2018). Between them, they may be more different than alike in terms of their demographic profiles and resources. Affluent ‘technoburbs’ may be more like ‘central cities’ in their social capital and global ties than they are like the inner ring marked by dollar stores and pawnshops (Fishman, 1987; Garreau, 1992).

This diversity is plain to see and multiplying in built form as well. The platonic ideal of suburban development – the homogenous, single-use, cul-de-sac form – remains largely untouched in some inner rings and continues to be reproduced in some outer rings (Ross, 2014). But in redevelopment, builders have also shifted their model to meet a growing demand for a semblance of urbanism, featuring a mix of housing types and uses. Malls have been turned inside out to become ‘lifestyle centers’ (Dickinson, 2015). Old brownfields (post-industrial sites) have been redeveloped into complete communities while greenfields (undeveloped lands) have been stamped with a nostalgic small-town template (Duany et al., 2000; Williamson & Dunham-Jones, 2021). High tech job centres feature office towers with street level retail and transit oriented development (Dunham-Jones & Williamson, 2011; Talen, 2015; Williamson & Dunham-Jones, 2021). The majority of North American metropolitan regions are comprised of some version of these suburbs.

Climate consequences of accelerated suburbanization

An accelerated return to the suburbs increases both operational and embodied emissions. Pre-pandemic, suburban communities typically produced more operational greenhouse gas emissions per capita than urban environments (Glaeser & Kahn, 2010; Jones & Kammen, 2014), although this trend is not universal (Andrews, 2008). From an embodied emissions perspective, the suburbs require a significant carbon investment to build new homes, maintain roads, and create the infrastructure that sustains suburban life (Norman et al., 2006).

Operationally, transport emissions are a critical piece of the suburban climate puzzle. During the initial months of COVID-19, reports of CO₂ reductions due to lockdowns and slowed economic activity dominated headlines and scientific discussions. Nearly half of these reductions came from declines in surface transportation (Le Quéré et al., 2020), often associated with an increase in telework. While electrification of vehicles may begin to reduce transportation emissions, that transition will likely be slow to meet climate targets (Milovanoff et al., 2020). Additional electricity demand, and the persistence of fossil fuel sources, may undermine the climate benefit of this transition (Muratori, 2018). In addition, suburban relocation will likely increase commuting distances. Though remote work is expected to continue at elevated levels, it may lead to longer commutes when blended with telework. Commuters may be more willing to break the one-hour commute barrier which has historically provided some constraint on metropolitan growth (Bortz, 2020; Marchetti, 1994). In preliminary analysis, increased acceptance of remote work could even induce a shift towards flight commuting (Donovan, 2020). And due to cold starts and their associated emissions, short trips for errands can come at a greater carbon cost than commuting (de Nazelle et al., 2010). Thus, small reductions in emissions from commuting may be eclipsed by both the operational and embodied emissions required to support, maintain, and adapt to the suburban transition.

In addition to greater transportation emissions, accelerated suburbanization is likely to increase other operational energy requirements. Larger homes, often cited as one of the core justifications for a suburban transition (Lerner, 2020), require greater energy to heat and cool (Lee & Lee, 2014). The proliferation of smart household appliances may reduce energy demand, but their benefit is overshadowed by the accumulating number of appliances and devices that drive energy demand (Gram-Hanssen, 2013). Further, while remote work will likely reduce transportation emissions, these may be offset by an increase in operational emissions required to maintain thousands, if not millions, of home offices.

Beyond operational emissions, development and maintenance of suburban areas will incur significant embodied emissions. To start, land use changes that precede suburban development may require conversion from a state that actively sequesters carbon to one of impermeable surfaces with buildings that are net carbon emitters (Andrews, 2008). Cement, asphalt, and other building materials are carbon intensive products that will magnify the consequences of suburban expansion (Lehne & Preston, 2018). Increasing dark, impermeable surfaces also intensify the heat island effect, creating additional demand for cooling (Mohajerani et al., 2017). In addition, the infrastructure, services, and other development that support suburban living will increase carbon emissions relative to those of existing urban environments (Mitchell et al., 2018). To the extent that governments provide this infrastructure, they are in effect subsidizing suburban development patterns and supporting demand for fossil fuels (Duany et al., 2000).

Post-COVID-19 climate policy must address our post-COVID-19 reality, including the acceleration of suburbanization. Climate policy in an increasingly suburban North America must address the expanded consumption of space and materials which increases per capita operational and embodied emissions, raising the risk of exceeding a 2°C temperature increase.

Overlooked suburban climate governance

In these growing suburbs, attention to the climate crisis, let alone planning and action, has been anemic (Dierwechter, 2010). In many cases, this is not a case of wilful neglect, but of capacity constraints and more pressing needs, particularly in inner ring suburbs with low-income, marginalized populations (Osofsky, 2015). However, those competing issues tend to be exacerbated by the climate crisis. With versions of a ‘green recovery’ ascendant (Andrijevic et al., 2020), and an increasing recognition that the economy and the climate are inextricably linked, there is a similar recognition that tackling climate destabilization must also include tackling systemic racism and inequality (Huxley et al., 2020).

High profile networks such as the C40, Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities, and Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance have promoted cities as key actors at the highest levels of climate governance. With major global cities as their constituents, these networks help to influence a global narrative on climate solutions while also providing technical support and facilitating peer learning (Bellinson & Chu, 2019; Fünfgeld, 2015). Some more expansive networks such as the Climate Mayors (U.S. based) and ICLEI (global), do include a wider range of municipalities from first tier cities to small suburbs. However, the narratives and solutions they promote tend to fit the conventional urban mould, and require the resources and capacity characteristic of cities but rarely found in suburban municipalities. Recommendations prioritize complete streets, energy efficiency and dense housing (Rosenzweig et al., 2018), overlooking strategies for a landscape of strip malls, highways and horizontal housing developments (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Typical images of local climate solutions (bottom) betray an urban bias. Suburban environments (top) which comprise more land, population and emissions, deserve more attention. (Image sources, clockwise from top left: Joe Mabel, GNU 1.2; Terrien, CC BY 3.0; Sids1, Ponsonby Road, CC BY 2.0; Paul Krueger, CC BY 2.0; Martha Heinemann Bixby, CC BY-NC 2.0; City Clock Magazine, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.)

Reflecting its peripheral status, suburban climate governance has received limited attention in academic literature. A small body of research has found that within metropolitan regions, cities are more often leaders than suburbs on climate action (Dierwechter, 2010; Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013; Osofsky, 2012, 2015) Unsurprisingly, action across suburbs within metropolitan regions is uneven. This may be explained by differences in municipal wealth and connections to global capital flows; in six major metropolitan areas across the U.S., the suburbs that were economically more ‘city-like’ tended to be more engaged in climate planning (Dierwechter, 2010). The participation of suburban municipal governments is also likely influenced by state policy (Dierwechter, 2010). A separate set of six metropolitan regions revealed that in all cases, participation was stronger in the urban core, and the only region with participation across all categories of suburbs was San Francisco (Osofsky, 2015). California is well-documented to be a ‘thousand-pound gorilla’ on climate policy, extracting climate action even from local areas under federal jurisdiction (i.e. military installations) (Teicher, 2019). Also confounding, the Dallas-Fort Worth region undermines the promise that cities can fill a federal vacuum, as politically conservative regions tend to be laggards on the whole (Foss & Howard, 2015). In spite of a call for suburban climate research attending to impacts and determinants of resilience, little momentum has developed (Leichenko & Solecki, 2013). Most studies of urban climate action in effect analyze climate action in large cities where the action is.

Historians have critically examined the complex intersection of federal policies, transportation technologies, and lifestyle aspirations that gave rise to suburban development (Harris, 2004; Hayden, 2004; Jackson, 1987). But recent work on ‘global suburbanisms’, demonstrates that there has been a lack of critical thought on the contemporary suburbs (Hamel & Keil, 2015). They are too often demonized, ignoring the wholesale social and economic interdependence with the central city (Keil, 2020). Opening up horizons of climate action, we suggest going beyond narratives that position suburbs as helpful accessories (Maginn & Keil, 2019), and instead view suburbs themselves as a locus of climate action. The few explanations of weak suburban climate governance point the way with proposals including state regulations or incentives (Dierwechter, 2010), differentiated models targeted at different types of suburbs, and coordination between networks to avoid duplicating work with limited resources (Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013; Osofsky, 2015).

Targeting mitigation to suburban emissions

To meet climate targets and limit warming in a post-COVID-19 world, the vast reaches of suburbia, which far exceed urban cores in land area, population, and emissions impacts, must become central to climate action. Without a more expansive approach, the popular movement around cities for climate will fail to deliver on its potential. This is not to say that suburbs should supplant cities; all of that central city action is as urgent as ever, but suburbs should be elevated to a footing that reflects their contribution to the problem.

Enhanced suburban climate governance can proceed in three ways: (1) Decision-makers at all levels of government as well as NGOs can shift the climate action narrative to include suburbs or highlight them in their own right; (2) NGOs and climate organizers can expand existing transnational, national, and subnational networks and develop new ones that target suburbs; and (3) Suburban municipal governments and local organizations directly engaged in planning can take advantage of the opportunity to leapfrog, adopting the most promising practices for equitable, integrated adaptation and mitigation.

In terms of the narrative, suburbs can join other historically overlooked spheres of climate action, namely the global south and marginalized populations. These spheres have clear intersections. The suburbs in the global north now house increasing numbers of people of colour, immigrants, and low-income communities who had historically been targeted by exclusionary practices (Frey, 2011; Keil, 2020; Kneebone & Berube, 2013). The ‘cookie-cutter’ image of the suburb as white and middle-class no longer holds; in the 2000s, poverty, and with it racialized poverty, has accelerated in U.S. suburbs over and above the urban core (Kneebone & Berube, 2013; Pooley, 2015). Similarly, while suburban studies have historically focused on North America, a growing literature analyses the rapid expansion of suburban settlements in the global south, while also questioning whether and how the concept of ‘suburb’ translates (De Vidovich, 2019; Herzog, 2015; Ren, 2021; Zhao, 2020). Acknowledging that the issues explored here do not directly translate, it remains productive to interrogate how local climate governance can effectively address the dominant sources of emissions and vulnerability in varied urban peripheries.

When regional leaders promote visions of an equitable, decarbonized future, they might dwell on the ways in which the suburban expanse becomes a solution through green space, paratransit and low-grade density. With suburbs as a cause in their own right, they become a beacon for resources and action. This narrative shift would risk suburbs succumbing to green gentrification which has become commonplace in leading cities (Anguelovski et al., 2019; Wolch et al., 2014), but at the same time, would create an opportunity to adopt more self-aware climate planning, moderating the influx of capital with affordable housing and transportation. With a recent leftward shift apparent in some suburbs, residents may also be more prone to support climate action (Damore et al., 2020).

Existing transnational networks have been central to facilitating climate action in cities. For the suburban context, subnational networks (operating at the scale of the state or province), variously led by state governments, utilities, NGOs and universities, may at times offer a better fit, closer to the ground. These may coalesce out of informal coalitions of climate champions or be more formally directed by public agencies. Expanding some of this capacity toward suburbs would offer peer-to-peer learning and technical support, providing suburbs similar advantages to cities. The established model of networks partially funding dedicated climate staff could provide stable funding with a minor contribution from the local government, serving as a catalyst for building institutional knowledge. Dedicated capacity would provide the space to develop and share targeted suburban policies. With this shift in focus, strategies would be responsive to the realities of suburban demographics and physical form. Collaboration between suburbs within a region can also be constructive, however even with the advent of regional collaboratives, horizontal coordination is fraught with tensions due to competing interests and social inequities (Shi, 2019).

Uneven suburban action means that some leaders already exist, and these communities could serve as models and anchors within new and established networks. A recent review of suburban sustainability case studies points to promising suburbs from Long Island to Tampa Bay that foster connections between people and place in brownfield and infill development. It also highlights that suburban municipalities, particularly those farther from the core, tend to lean on other levels of government to remedy their capacity gap (Garren & Brinkmann, 2020). Increased capacity would be an ideal use of recovery funds, with the potential to parlay immediate action into long-term gains. Some early steps could focus on building bridges with youth climate movements, providing a forum for action and employment.

Reframing suburbs and allocating network resources are key, but suburban champions would not be starting from scratch. They can make use of existing ideas and practices for planning, retrofitting, and redesigning suburbs (Beske & Dixon, 2018; Williamson & Dunham-Jones, 2021), while rendering these more cohesive and prominent.

Each of the three types of suburbs presents distinct potential for climate mitigation and adaptation. In the inner ring, the first band of post-war expansion, smaller, aging buildings are prime candidates for deep energy retrofits, a strategy that with some training could also serve as a job creation mechanism. Where there are opportunities for redevelopment, rezoning for a true mix of uses that actually meets the majority of daily and weekly needs should become the default. Redevelopment of large greyfields such as old municipal airports and malls can include redesign for adequate public green space, providing for forms of social and ecological resilience. Multiple benefits include social space for remote workers now isolated at home for the long-term, water management and cooling capacity, and a reserve for socially distanced contact.

For greenfield suburban development, adaptive capacity should be a first consideration, with the option to avoid developing places that are prone to flooding or that edge into the wildland/urban interface, and actively setting aside land through mechanisms such as conservation easements, preserving social and ecological benefits. For new development, a compact form including attached and multifamily housing can reduce the overall built footprint, allowing more space for green infrastructure and limiting the extent of new carbon-intensive grey infrastructure (Mohajerani et al., 2017; Norton et al., 2015). Compact units also have a meaningful role to play in reducing embodied and operational emissions per capita (Ellsworth-Krebs, 2020). Smaller units with less private green space would help to reduce water demand with its related energy use, and in some small measure, mitigate against water scarcity. Decentralized energy and communications systems, such as microgrids, could reduce emissions while providing resilience to grid failures (Kelly-Pitou et al., 2017).

Job centres, with dense mixed-use office space, are the most city-like of the suburbs, and have the most to learn from their current urban counterparts. They could expand active transportation options, reducing car trips to meet daily needs. They can also expand affordable housing that allows lower-income workers to benefit from short commutes. In recently built up places, adaptation in the public realm may be a more feasible first step, including urban greening to reduce the heat island effect and provide flood management. At this point, these are broad gestures that remain to be developed through the engaged work on the ground that suburban-focused networks could facilitate.

Conclusion

This vision for suburbs as a locus of climate policy, planning, and action is intentionally ambitious. At a time when floods and fires are bearing down and governments are actively allocating billions in COVID-19-recovery funds and pledging to support a green economy, taking up suburban climate policy offers a massive untapped opportunity. Governments have always subsidized the suburbs through infrastructure investment. Now this investment can be done differently, subsidizing transit and infill rather than low density development. As governments rapidly allocate recovery funds, and temporarily accept mounting debt, COVID-19 recovery offers a narrow window to redirect and enhance those subsidies to bring the management of climate impacts within reach.

Acknowledgements

This article benefited from the insightful comments provided by Brent D. Ryan, Aria Ritz Finkelstein, Zachary Lamb and Raymond Cole on a previous draft, as well as the comments from the reviewers. The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions with which the authors are affiliated.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).