Postmodernist Command: A Contradiction in Terms for the British Army?

It is clear from the way the expression is used that ‘postmodern’ and its derivatives (‘post‐modern’, ‘postmodernity’, ‘postmodernism’ and so on) has been given a number of meanings, none (rather appropriately, some would say) definitive. For example, in some instances ‘postmodern’ is used simply to refer to the period of time since what was labelled the ‘modern’ era can be thought to have ended or to be in crisis. ¹ In others the term is used to refer to the state of the world after the collapse of the Marxist paradigm in Russia and the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s and 1990s. ² However, for our purposes in this article the terms ‘postmodernism’ and ‘postmodernist’ are used to encapsulate an unstructured but powerful intellectual movement.

This article examines the relevance of the ideas contained in this intellectual movement in the context of the exercise of command above unit level in British armed forces. A short description of postmodernism and current British military principles of command is followed by a two‐sided debate with positions taken for and against the relevance of the one to the other. A concluding section draws the threads together and seeks to identify useful conclusions.

Although one of the authors is a serving officer in the British Army, and the other has recently retired from it, the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect official policy or thought.

Postmodernism

Postmodernism appeared as an identifiable intellectual phenomenon in Western universities in the 1970s, though its roots can be traced back over the previous 40 years or so.

It came as a reaction against the certainties and structural assumptions contained in ideas associated with ‘modernity’, which is best considered as the twentieth century manifestation of the principles laid down in the Renaissance and developed through what has become known as the ‘Enlightenment Project’. ³

The underlying assumption embedded in the Enlightenment, and thus in modernity, was that everything could be subjected to objective and dispassionate analysis by logic and reason. ⁴ Along with this assumption, there was also a general agreement that there were lasting and stable laws of the Universe and that laws and rules were appropriate to human society. Postmodernist ideas deeply question such assumptions. According to authors in the postmodernist stream, authors such as Foucault, Baudrillard, and Lyotard, ⁵ ‘ground truth’ does not exist, and laws and rules have no inherent virtue. Instead, human beings actually live in a world that is essentially fragmented, chaotic and transient. However, because their perceptions are socially conditioned, they impose an order on this chaos, unconsciously and unquestioningly, by embracing stable but illusory frameworks for daily life. Such frameworks are given generic names such as ‘grand narratives’, ‘metanarratives’, and ‘discourses’ in the postmodernist characterisation, and, to many postmodernists, they contain serious moral and political flaws. Examples of such flaws might be the encoding of unjust power relationships in unquestioned attitudes and expectations and in legal structures.

A typical example of an underlying and systematic pattern of thought, or ‘discourse’, can be taken from the literature on the anthropology of organisations. Although she does not specifically label herself ‘postmodern’, Rosemary Pringle uses the idea of ‘discourse’ in identifying patterns of behaviour in Western industrial business organisations with respect to the role of ‘secretary’. These patterns of behaviour tend to lead to the unquestioned identification of the role of secretary as a female one, and to put women in an inferior position in terms of power and influence. This takes place in spite of any formally stated ‘equal opportunities’ policy that the organisations might have. Without assigning conscious intention to the organisations in question or their members, she argues that the boss‐secretary relationship is the ‘most visible aspect of a pattern of domination based on desire and sexuality’. ⁶

Unsurprisingly, a strong theme in postmodernism is the idea that these discourses and grand narratives should be deconstructed – taken apart in all senses of the expression. In deconstruction, their ingredients can be exposed and, as they are illusory and perpetuate unjust power relationships, they should then be discarded for the good of all. However, deconstruction has consequences. One of the principal results of the removal of stable external frameworks from everyday life is that external standards diminish in importance in comparison to individual experience. If there are no external authorities, no frameworks for life, then everything is open to challenge and interpretation, and so the ultimate test of the validity of any area of life can only be the experience of the individual. This aspect has been explored for example, by Cray in the field of British Youth Culture, ⁷ and is reflected in Rookmaaker’s pessimistic analysis of art in the later twentieth century. ⁸

The effect of postmodernist ideas on our ways of thinking in the Western industrial world has been mixed. On the one hand, it is undeniable that the world is more chaotic than we may like to think, and that the questioning of deep underlying assumptions (the deconstruction of metanarratives and discourses) can be beneficial. It can be particularly beneficial for those who are oppressed, however unintentionally, by the discourses embedded in their society. On the other hand, it is axiomatic that the result of removing certainties is a significant increase in uncertainty. The safe and solid assumptions of the past have been replaced in many cases by a form of relativism summed up by Sarup as:

a tendency to reduce all truth‐claims to the level of rhetorics, narrative strategies or Foucauldian discourses conceived as existing solely by virtue of the differences or rivalry between them, so that no single claimant can assert itself at the expense of any other.

The principal thrusts of postmodernism, then, have been the deconstruction of the legitimacy of logical frameworks for thought and action, and the substitution of a relativism where the experience and feelings of the individual are at least as valid as any other bases for forming an opinion. Table 1 (overleaf) gives a simplified but useful summary of some of the most significant differences between the old certainties of the Enlightenment and the ideas offered by postmodernism. ⁹

TABLE 1 ILLUSTRATIVE CONTRASTS BETWEEN ENLIGHTENMENT AND POSTMODERN PARADIGMS

Enlightenment	Postmodernism
Structure	Chaos
Constants	Transience
Objective Truth	Experience
System	Syncretism
Method	Inspiration
Coherent Patterns and Paradigms	Questioning, Deconstruction
Certainty	Uncertainty

Current British Military Principles

It is self‐evident that the British military is based on hierarchical and formally structured principles. These principles seem to place it in the left‐hand column of Table 1. A cursory examination of British military doctrine would also seem to support this view. It seeks to introduce a framework for understanding war rather than a set of rules of conducting war, and has been developed via a process which its authors would probably like to describe as a rational and dispassionate enquiry that has articulated fundamental truths. In this they are not unique and the earlier writings of Sun Tzu ¹⁰ and Clausewitz ¹¹ are, at the very least, testament to man’s constant endeavour to bring understanding to one of his most complex and chaotic activities.

Doctrine as a concept seems to be an idea of modernity. In the foreword to the first edition of British Military Doctrine it is described as ‘essentially enduring [in] nature’, ¹² it is often described as ‘what is thought’ or alternatively ‘a set of beliefs about the nature of war and the keys to success on the battlefield’. ¹³ Thus military thinkers have over time created a set of rules for the successful conduct of warfare. British military doctrine is a product of the late twentieth century and has been developed in the best traditions of rational enquiry. ¹⁴ The resulting hierarchy of ideas and documents provides an analytical framework for commanders who are required to engage in military operations.

The British have come late to this approach, which was preceded by a more pragmatic experience‐based method, suited to the small wars of Empire that forged the British Army of the twentieth century. That is not to deny that the British Army produced excellent tactical doctrine and theatre specific tactics, and had conceptual thinkers. ¹⁵ What was lacking until comparatively recently was a coherent accepted philosophy for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The British Army of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was clearly successful but relied on improvisation of tactics. Brian Holden Reid argues that there is in ‘the British Army – and in British society generally – a widespread reluctance to formulate scientific, doctrinal statements; a preference upheld by the pragmatic and empirical tradition to view and resolve each problem as it occurs on its own terms free from any system’. ¹⁶ The wars of the early twentieth century exposed the Army’s lack of a coherent doctrinal philosophy. However British military thinkers were even then espousing the value of methodical thought: as ‘Boney’ Fuller put it, ‘If we can establish a scientific method of examining war then frequently we shall be able to predict events – future events – from past events.’ ¹⁷

Doctrine is now accepted as a key requirement in the generation of military capability. ¹⁸ As the handbook, Design for Military Operations puts it:

It is the framework for the way in which we are about to measure our military capability. And it is now used to explain the Army’s reason for being as it is and needing to act as it does. … Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. ¹⁹

That the need for a clear rational, analytical approach to warfare has only been accepted in the late twentieth century suggests that the British Army (and others) has come somewhat late to the modernist party just as postmodernism takes over in other spheres.

The twentieth century saw the emergence of what can be termed ‘modern war’ and this has been the driver for the British Army to define a doctrine for warfighting. McInnes suggests that modern war was characterized by a new style of warfare ‘as commanders came to grips with the effects of a mass social base and the industrial technology on battle and war’. ²⁰ He argues that the modern approach to war finally emerged at the end of World War II. His analysis breaks the debate down to material and human qualities and the discussion today focuses on attritionalist and manoeuvrist paradigms with the emerging ideas on Network Centric Warfare now being added to the debate. Throughout all of this there is a clear recognition that a philosophy of warfighting is required for modern war.

At this stage it is worth emphasizing the essential tenets of British doctrine. These tenets were articulated at the start of the twenty‐first century in British Defence Doctrine. ²¹ The start point is the definition of Principles of War and a Warfighting Ethos, and other themes are included, notably the manoeuvrist approach, the application of mission command, joint and multinational operations and flexibility and pragmatism. Importantly a large part of British doctrine is focused on Command which has a whole publication dedicated to it – Army Doctrine Publication 2 ‐ Command. The intimate relationship of command to delivering the British approach is summarised in the foreword:

If we are to execute our operational doctrine with its premium on achieving high tempo and destroying the cohesion of an adversary in order to succeed on the battlefield, then we shall need an approach to command that matches our approach to warfighting. ²²

A warfighting ethos is enshrined in British doctrine and seeks to ensure that planning and training will be measured against high intensity conflict. British Defence Doctrine describes in detail the expected environment, which will be dynamic, destructive, confused and chaotic. Initial plans will be abandoned and intangible factors such as fear, courage and leadership will all be significant. Risk will not be avoided but confronted and managed. By maintaining a warfighting ethos the British military expect to be able to have the ‘emotional capacity to cope with all the circumstances they are likely to confront’. ²³ This chaotic and dynamic environment requires a distinct method of warfighting: one termed the Manoeuvrist Approach, which in turn relies on Mission Command.

The Manoeuvrist Approach focuses on the mind of the enemy commander. Rather than attempting to destroy an enemy piecemeal in Cannae‐style battles of annihilation the aim is to unhinge and disrupt the enemy. Ultimately the defining aim is to destroy his will to fight rather than the physical means to fight. Attrition of men and equipment still play a role but it is the purpose of that destruction which defines the Manoeuvrist Approach. ²⁴ Destruction seeks to enable manoeuvre allowing ‘unacceptable pressure’ to be placed upon the enemy ‘at times and places he least expects’. ²⁵ The tempo of the friendly forces enables them to paralyse the enemy’s ability to decide and act in a timely manner. Physical activity such as firepower and manoeuvre are important but only in the effect they have on the enemy’s ability to function as a cohesive whole.

In order to deliver the rapid tempo that is required by the Manoeuvrist Approach the British military have adopted Mission Command. It is intended to ‘promote decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction’. ²⁶ Hierarchy is still required as the commander must ensure his subordinates understand his direction but the control relationship is altered. Control is accomplished by subordinates understanding the effect they have to deliver and why. They are allocated sufficient resources to complete the task but are not told how they should achieve it. Mission command is of course entirely dependent on having individuals who have the character to command in the warfighting environment, adopting a manoeuvrist approach.

The final aspect of British Doctrine is its use of hierarchical formal structures. The status of each commander and unit is expressed in unambiguously defined ‘states of command’: ultimately, all operations are commanded by the government via the Ministry of Defence, and below that level there are clearly defined and recognised categories of command, ‘Full Command, Operational Command, Operational Control, Tactical Command, and Tactical Control’. ²⁷

Postmodernist Command? Surely Not!

A strong case can be made that there is not, and can never be, any place for postmodernist ideas and attitudes in the exercise of military command in the ways embraced by the British Armed Services.

The need for doctrine and associated procedures ²⁸ for military operations and command is widely accepted within the British military. Furthermore, British military doctrine and practice both contain an embedded idea of hierarchy and framework. We have already seen that command structures are hierarchical, and it is self‐evident that individuals (both commanders and commanded) exist within a stable and legally mandated hierarchy of rank and responsibility. Each operation has a well‐defined chain of command from the highest level to the lowest, with a formally designated array of military units and resources. All this indicates that there is a confirmed requirement for frameworks for thought and action, arising from the British military experience.

Second, the British military command system is based on removal of ambiguity and uncertainty as an essential prerequisite for planning and issuing orders for military operations. In the planning process, commanders at all levels are taught, and encouraged to practice, the ‘Estimate Process’, ²⁹ for instance. This process seeks to capture all relevant factors and to draw out useful reasoned conclusions on which plans can be based. After the plans have been made, it is axiomatic that operation orders have to be clear to be effective, and, when issued are bound into a stable and unifying framework by the use of time.

It might be said that this practice of hierarchy and the aspiration to clarity and certainty are simply cultural artefacts. Indeed, it is undeniable that they are elements in the organisational culture of all three British Services. But there are several practical reasons why they are important. Most obviously, it is vital that all caught up in the complex processes involved in military operations should have a clear and coherent set of orders, and that these orders should have been based on careful consideration and planning. The need to win the battle without wasted life depends on such considerations. Furthermore, simplicity and stability are far easier for tired people to manage, and experience has shown that physical and mental fatigue are an unavoidable companion to military operations.

If we revisit Table 1, we can see immediately that successful military operations are likely to be more reliant on the left‐hand column (‘Enlightenment’) than on the right (‘Postmodernism’). Uncertainty and chaos are inevitable ingredients in military operations, arising from what Clausewitz called the ‘friction’ of war. ³⁰ It is vital therefore in military operations to counter friction by the promotion of structure, reliability (‘constants’ from the left‐hand column), hard intelligence (‘objective truth’), common procedures (‘system’ and ‘method’), and overarching frameworks (‘coherent patterns and paradigms)’ to enhance the element of certainty as far as possible.

As a concrete example, let us consider the landing of a military force of brigade strength on a hostile shore. Such an amphibious operation requires the coordination of naval, air, and land forces over a considerable period of time. Information on the shore and its approaches must be gained by reconnaissance, likely areas of enemy opposition must be identified and a fire plan created to neutralize them. A complex and tightly reasoned landing schedule must be produced and all those involved must be aware of their part in it. This schedule has to be constructed between the twin constraints of the required force structure and the available amphibious shipping and helicopters. Command arrangements have to be worked out in advance and must take into account the transition of command from the overall task force commander to the commander of the amphibious operational area and then to the land component commander when the appropriate stance has been achieved on land. Throughout, there has to be a plan for air defence of the operation, incorporating surveillance, target acquisition, surface‐to‐air missiles, artillery, and air defence fighters. This plan must also allow for the transition of friendly ground attack aircraft not involved in air defence. The whole plan must be designed to minimise ‘chaos’ and ‘uncertainty’ (from the right‐hand column of Table 1), and there can be no room for ‘syncretism’, ‘questioning’, ‘deconstruction’, and uncoordinated ‘inspiration’.

Additionally, when the plan is put into effect it must be harmonised by the use of a common unambiguous framework that is flexible enough to be adjusted in the face of the unexpected. The usual mechanism for achieving such a framework is to use a combination of finite and positive elements of time and space. Particular actions are programmed to take place within a particular area at a particular time. The passage of time is for all practical purposes regular and fixed and can be measured with the precision required, and the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid, or in its absence the certainties of latitude and longitude, can provide measurable and unambiguous delineation of space.

In short, such an operation requires the tenets and standards of modernism and has little room for the elements adduced by postmodernist thinkers.

On the Other Hand… The Postmodern in the Art of Command

To argue that successful military operations are reliant on a modernist enlightenment approach is to be seduced by the drill‐square ‘image’ that armies need to be balanced, ordered, coordinated and solidly organised to deliver success. In fact, the Enlightenment approach characterised in Table 1 is but one, and by no means the only, response to the condition of war. The nature of war is to a large extent encapsulated not by the left‐hand side of that table (‘structure’, ‘constants’, ‘system’ and so on) but the right (‘chaos’, ‘transience’, uncertainty’). We suggest therefore that outwardly ordered hierarchical structure and common doctrine mask what must be the truly successful approach to command, which is one that thrives in the transient atmosphere of war.

The thrust towards order and framework within the British military probably arises from its historical experience in both World Wars. For example, the British Army was left with a legacy of the so‐called ‘tidy battlefield’, and it became expert at the well planned operation, as Correlli Barnett has pointed out,

It was dogged and resolute but not very dashing….The British Army was good at rigidly controlled, elaborately organised, set‐piece attack in which all its commanders believed…There was therefore a rigidity, an emphasis on hierarchy and strict control from the top which tended to inhibit initiative and swift exploitation… ³¹

General John Kiszely argues that this approach was perpetuated by the Cold War deployment of the British Army on the Rhine where:

much faith was placed in well‐reconnoitred ground and well‐prepared battle positions…warfighting was reduced to implementation of a General Deployment Plan – a stately quadrille which relied on everyone knowing the steps in advance. ³²

Furthermore, the British maintain a reverence for highly structured ‘unquestioning discipline’ as demonstrated by the Coldstream Guards Regimental Sergeant Major at the Battle of Gazala (1942) who in response to questioning as to the course of action in the face of repeated German advances replied “‘Do?” he shrieked. “Do? I’ll tell you what we are going to do. My orders are to stay here and that’s what we’re going to do.” That was the Guards who held Knightsbridge – splendid chaps.’ ³³

British doctrine now recognises that for much of the twentieth century too much reverence was paid to unquestioning discipline and the heroic images contained in the paintings on mess walls. Correlli Barnett’s harsh criticism of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery that ‘his own temperament leaned so strongly towards elaborate rehearsal and tightly centralised control’ ³⁴ could be extended to a post‐war Army that he, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, must have influenced.

But 60 years on, things are changing. The adoption of mission command and the manoeuvrist approach by the British Army appears to be an unconscious acceptance of ideas that are moving towards the postmodern. For instance, in introducing the second edition of British Military Doctrine the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS) may not have viewed himself as postmodern, but that is arguably his standpoint when he stated,

The important word is ‘understanding’. Little these days is predictable. Our people do so well in many parts of the world because our officers and NCOs have an understanding of warfare that is broadly based and they are not reliant, except where necessary, on rigid adherence to prescriptive rules. ³⁵

This view puts the individual’s response to their particular circumstances at any one time as the key factor rather than the application of constants or objective truths. In saying that little is predicable, CGS is challenging a key tenet of the Enlightenment that objective truth can be found through study and the application of reason and method.

Let us now turn to how the British Military have sought in recent years to describe the characteristics required of a commander, and the exercise of command. Definitions of the qualities required of the commander are bound to be subjective but British doctrine has attempted to set them down, as follows in Table 2. ³⁶

TABLE 2 QUALITIES OF A COMMANDER

• Leadership • Professional Knowledge • Vision and Intellect • Judgement and Initiative • Courage and Resolve • Self Confidence • The Ability to Communicate • Integrity and Example

Some of these qualities (for instance, Professional Knowledge, Judgement, and Ability to Communicate) clearly belong to the realm of the Enlightenment, but, interestingly, there is also a recognised need for the less tangible or measurable aspects of Vision and Intellect which lean more to the inspirational and experiential and thus to the postmodern side of Table 1.

Further indications of a less structured approach to warfare appear in the current concepts of the manoeuvrist approach and ‘effects based operations’. The manoeuvrist approach seeks to capitalise on the postmodernist view that individual experience is what is important. When seeking to defeat an opponent, attacking his will or ‘courage and resolve’ is central to success:

He must be overwhelmed with a sense of hopelessness, a feeling of paralysis born of the realisation that his aims are not achievable. If defeating the enemy by destruction alone has limitations, the complementary approach is to attack the enemy’s will to resist. ³⁷

Destruction still has a central place but its role is not destruction per se, but to create an image of defeat in the enemy’s mind. As weapons become more precise specific parts of an enemy’s structure can be targeted – not for their military value but for their symbolic value. Thus in the 2003 Gulf War statues became a military target because of their role in maintaining the image of a regime in power. Some advocates of ‘effects based operations’ go as far as to say that combat and attrition will be of limited utility in the future. For instance, Major General Deptula (Director of Plans and Programs, Headquarters US Air Combat Command) recently argued that we are currently witnessing the ‘end of strategy’ and the ‘attritional approach to warfare that characterised the major conflicts of the twentieth century’. ³⁸

Effects based operations may require a different type of command to be successful. Operations will no longer develop in a linear manner and so campaign planning may become less structured. Instead of leaders who meticulously map out a route to the campaign endstate through a series of connected operations, a new emphasis is required. An opportunistic approach is needed that seeks to exploit the transient and chaotic nature of the battlefield. To be successful, this commander must be able to be comfortable without structure and system. Command of this sort relies heavily on the ability of individuals – their vision, judgement and initiative – and this is not new. As General Sir David Fraser has written of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, ‘Although often as ignorant as his opponents of exactly who was where or doing what, he nevertheless always gave the impression of being in control, of deciding with great rapidity, of drawing events in his wake…’ ³⁹ . Rommel owed much of his success not to material superiority but to his recognition of the transient nature of war. The phrase ‘drawing events in his wake’ describes how he, for the critical phase of battle, determined what everyone’s perception was.

Surprise formed a large part of Rommel’s success and again this is a factor that exploits an individual’s immediate experience. The target of surprise is the enemy commander’s mind, not his forces, as articulated in British Defence Doctrine: ‘Surprise should primarily be directed at the mind of the enemy commander rather than at his forces. The aim should be to paralyse the commander’s will.’ ⁴⁰ The purpose of surprise according to this definition is not to obtain destruction or attrition, but to create an effect or an image, which will by its very nature be transient. Although transient, surprise works because it undermines a belief in objective truth. If the enemy appears behind you, in contradiction to the latest intelligence, what else is no longer true?

The need to focus on an enemy’s ‘will’ may well increase in years to come. Modern war that dominated the twentieth century focused on attrition. It did so to seek decision through defeat of an army in the field or to coerce an enemy by creating the image of defeat in their mind via physical destruction. The weaknesses of this approach were also exposed during the twentieth century. Even when manoeuvrist approaches are adopted the enemy’s mind can remain resolute in not accepting defeat. Types of warfare where this is manifest are those where ideologies clash ⁴¹ such as that on the Eastern Front in World War II or wars for self‐determination. Arguably, the emerging trend at the moment is conflicts between societies that have so little in common that it is impossible for one to influence the other because they simply do not understand their opponents’ underlying motivations. Coercion and destruction will not work when the individual identifies so strongly with the cause that he will not be coerced and when attrition simply makes him more determined.

When commanders do not focus on the enemy’s will then an introspective methodological approach may emerge. Such approaches to the complexity of war (at any level) that depend on reason and method are superficially attractive but often lead to failure. Andrew Gordon describes how the differing approaches manifested themselves at the Battle of Jutland as ‘Ratcatchers’ and ‘Regulators’. Regulators could be described as assuming ‘that the new warfare of machinery and science could only be responsibly managed by scientific automated techniques of command and control by comforting process of tabulation, automation and regulation’. ⁴²

Vision and intellect are constantly challenged by man’s desire to impose a framework of method. Indeed, even the seemingly enlightened approach that encourages the teaching of how to think rather than what to think imposes its own methodological restrictions. This tendency, as noted above, is increased when automation and machinery are involved. In some respects method is the antithesis of inspiration. For instance, the description of the decision‐making process in British Military Doctrine emphasises a linear progression summarised in Figure 1. ⁴³

FIGURE 1 DECISIONING‐MAKING PROCESS

This linear construct is filled with the spirit of the Enlightenment and is probably a poor model for how most individuals really solve problems. Critically it reduces the input of experience and inspiration, focusing on method and empirical evidence. The desire for structure and method negates an individual’s ability to contribute through vision and initiative. Indeed, writers such as Smith and Storr ⁴⁴ suggest that focus on a linear process may blind the individual to the requirement for timely decision‐making: instead of relying on inspiration, individuals may go through the process of attempting to impose structure on problem solving.

It is accepted that commanders, in common with most other people, will often have in‐built biases and preconceived notions, and so they are expected methodically to consider all options (as in the Estimate Process considered above). However, in reality this merely slows things down. Smith compares the decision time of a modern US division (14–18 hours) to that of a World War II German division (5 minutes) to illustrate this point. ⁴⁵

The tendency to impose structure and method may well increase with the growth of information technology, as there will be more information. It seems likely that there will be an increased desire to capture it and put it into frameworks to make it accessible and comprehensible. However, such a process will not satisfy the essential requirement for understanding. Schmitt and Klein use a chessboard analogy to expand this point, ‘the thing that separates the chess master from the novice is that the chess master sees patterns and meaning where the novice sees a disarray of individual pieces’. ⁴⁶

Recognising the pattern is the first step in the problem‐solving. The next step is to establish a new order by means of an act of creativity, which by definition cannot be planned in advance. ⁴⁷ Rather than accessing the information flood by ever‐better frameworks, the commander is therefore likely to be forced to rely on his judgement and his intuition for inspiration.

Whether formally stated or not, successful command involves coping with chaos, dealing with transience and applying experience‐based intuition and inspiration, and it exists above all in an atmosphere of uncertainty, as Storr discusses at some length. ⁴⁸ Postmodernism identifies and accepts these elements as part of the real processes of everyday life and therefore provides a more realistic set of approaches to the art of command.

So then, the approaches from Modernity and the Enlightenment, centred as they are on the primacy of reason, do not reflect the realities of command, and fall well short even of the thought enshrined in official British defence doctrine. The formally stated qualities required of a commander have a significant postmodern element. The thrust towards the manoeuvrist approach, mission command, and effects based operations are taking the British military away from modernity towards postmodernism. There is a growing realization that reasoned linear approaches to problem‐solving are slower and more cumbersome than the use of the intuitive leaps of natural human reasoning. It is time that the true postmodern nature of command is formally recognised and we depart from the myth that it is a rational, logical, linear process.

Conclusion: Reconciliation? Is That Possible?

Two strong, mutually opposing, cases have been put in this debate. Would compromise simply be an enlightened but doomed attempt to bring two irreconcilable views together, or even an attempt as postmodern syncretism? We believe not.

First, it seems that in its doctrine the British military tries to borrow from both traditions – the modern and the postmodern – and in some areas this is reasonably successful. It clearly recognises the value of inspiration, short‐term experience and the grasping of transient opportunities, while aspiring to clarity and method in executing an operation. Furthermore, in focusing on the mind of the individual it seeks to exploit an opponent’s belief in objective truth and certainty by stimulating doubt and uncertainty.

We can see how British military doctrine seeks to combine features of modernity and postmodernism most clearly in comparing the recognised qualities of a commander (Table 2) with the enlightenment/postmodernism comparison in Table 1, as follows.

According to our analysis (simplified as it is in Table 3), the qualities connect with both sides of the table.

TABLE 3 THE FLOW OF COMMAND QUALITIES

Second, it is likely that different contexts lead more or less to the dominance of one approach or the other. It is undeniable that in planning a complex operation, such as the amphibious landing discussed above, rationality and stable frameworks are necessary. All those involved should know what they have to do and when. Nobody should choose their time or place of action by intuition: an overarching schedule is required. However, no prior planning or rational preparation is going to help in the face of an unexpected twist of events: indeed, it is military lore that no plan survives contact with the enemy. ⁴⁹ The logical, reasoned approach of the Enlightenment is clearly the best for the stages before the operation begins, but a postmodern approach has a great deal to commend it in the face of the uncertainty that comes when it is in progress. The Enlightenment can only get the forces to the beach.

Similarly, in conventional operations such as those in the early phases of Operation ‘Telic’ (2003) the Enlightenment paradigm is obviously highly useful: the different sides are organized into identifiable formations, each side has a formal command and control apparatus, and so on. However, in other cases such as the peace enforcement operations in the Balkans, the later stages of Operation ‘Telic’ in Iraqi urban areas, and in the global ‘war against terror’, there is less predictability, less stability, and more uncertainty and therefore postmodern approaches and assumptions are more likely to be appropriate to the conditions.

Coda: Warnings and Rumblings

So, we have the choice, and we can make appropriate choices in the right contexts. But of course things are never so tidy. The problem for any military system, and the British military is no exception, comes when an inappropriate course is followed. For example, a desire to apply method and system to the processes of thinking may undermine or stifle judgement, intuition, initiative and inspiration. We may be particularly vulnerable when adopting or facing new technologies. When we consider the burgeoning areas of precision weapons, or digitisation and the network‐enabled capability that it brings, we need to bear strongly in mind the impact that new technology had on the Victorian and Edwardian Navy – the promotion of method over vision and intellect.

Postmodernism has one more warning for us. In common with all elements of the Establishment, at least in Western societies, the British military is bound to be prey to metanarratives or discourses that inform and dominate our thinking from concealed positions. What are our discourses?

It might be said, for example that there is a grand narrative of command in which the commander (at whatever level) is assumed to be in a position of knowing more than those junior to him or her – in the way expressed in the anonymous but much quoted military proverb that ‘tactics is the opinion of the senior officer present’. While it might be going too far to say that the exercise of command is no more than an expression of a discourse of power that has no objective reality, do we give more deference than is really appropriate to the presumed wisdom and cognitive authority of commanders? Similarly, it is a basic tenet of British defence policy that we prepare for conventional war ⁵⁰ and that this allows us to adapt to less intense operations. But, given the one‐sidedness of the conventional campaigns that British forces have been engaged in since the Korean War, may the vision of the big clash of arms not really be just another metanarrative that has little basis in experience?

Postmodernist questioning and deconstruction may have a place after all, if only to test the mettle of our approach to command, and to the wider issues of Defence.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Charles Kirke

Charles Kirke is a retired Lieutenant Colonel, British Army

James York

James York is a serving Officer, British Army.

Notes

1 See, for example, David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980) p.116.

2 See, for example, John Alan Williams, ‘The Postmodern Military Reconsidered’, Charles Moskos et al. (ed.), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: OUP 2000) pp.265–77.

3 See, for example: Harvey (note 1) pp.32, 114, 230; Charles Lindholm, ‘Logical and Moral Dilemmas of Postmodernism’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3 (1997) pp.747–60; Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post‐structuralism and Postmodernism, 1st edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993) pp.157, 269.

4 Robert Cooper, and Gibson Burrell, ‘Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: An Introduction’, Organization Studies 9 (1988) pp.91–112.

5 See the useful summaries of postmodernist writers in Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Cambridge: William B. Erdmans 1996).

6 Rosemary Pringle, ‘Office Affairs’, in Susan Wright (ed.), Anthropology of Organizations (London: Routledge 1994) pp. 115–23, this p.117.

7 Graham Cray, Postmodern Culture and Youth Discipleship: Commitment or Looking Cool? (Cambridge: Grove Books 1998).

8 Hans R. Rookmaaker, Modern Art and the Death of a Culture (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books 1994).

9 This is a more developed version of the table first published in Charles Kirke, ‘Postmodernism to Structure: An Upstream Journey for the Military Recruit?’, in Richard Holmes and Terri McConville (eds.), Defence Management in Uncertain Times (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2003) p.142.

10 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: OUP 1971).

11 Carl von Clausewitz (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds.), On War (London: Everyman 1993).

12 MOD, Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine, Army Code 71451 (1989).

13 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell UP 1984) p.27, as quoted in the Editor’s introduction to John Gooch (ed.), The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine (Camberley, UK: Strategic and Combat Studies Inst. [SCSI] Occasional Papers, No. 26, 1997) p.6.

14 Snyder (note 13) p.17.

15 See for example Gary Sheffield’s letter, ‘The Principles of War’, British Army Review, No.131 (Spring 2003).

16 Brian Holden Reid, A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98 (Camberley, UK: SCSI Occasional Papers, No. 33, 1998) p.12.

17 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson 1926) p.38.

18 See John Waters, ‘The Influence of Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall’, British Army Review, No.130, (Autumn 2002) pp.37–40, for a discussion of the introduction of doctrine and ‘the coherent approach…that formed the basis of SDR and shaped ..the entirety of the UK armed forces’ that doctrine engendered.

19 MOD, Design for Military Operations: the British Military Doctrine, 2nd edition, Army Code 71451 (1996), Foreword, and p.1.

20 Colin J. McInnes, Men, Machines and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1914–1945 (Camberley, UK: SCSI Occasional Papers, No. 2, 1992) Introduction.

21 MOD, British Defence Doctrine, JWP (Joint Warfare Publication) 0–01, 2nd edition (2001).

22 MOD, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Vol. 2 Command, Army Code 71564 (1995).

23 British Defence Doctrine (note 21) pp.3–4.

24 John Kiszely, ‘The Meaning of Manoeuvre’, RUSI Journal 143/6 (Dec. 1998) p.38.

25 British Defence Doctrine (note 21) pp. 3–5.

26 Ibid. pp. 3–7.

27 See, for example, Command (note 22) Annex A to Chapter 4.

28 See, for example, the ‘Standing Operating Procedures’ published as part of MOD, Land Component Handbook, 10 vols. (2000–2001).

29 Command (note 22), Chapter 3.

30 Clausewitz (note 11) p.38.

31 Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army (London: Cassell 2000, orig. 1970) p.404.

32 John Kiszely, The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945 (Camberley, UK: SCSI Occasional Papers, No. 26,1997) p.21.

33 Robin Neillands, The Desert Rats: 7th Armoured Division 1940–1945 (London: Orion Books 1995) p.104.

34 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Cassell 1999, orig. 1960) p.313.

35 Design for Military Operations (note 19).

36 Command (note 22) p.2–1.

37 MOD, ADP, Vol. 1 Operations, Army Code 71565 (1994) para. 0213.

38 Nick Cook, ‘Cause and Effect’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 June 2003, pp. 52–7, this p.52.

39 David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (London: HarperCollins 1994) p.327.

40 British Defence Doctrine (note 21) p.37.

41 Coker argues that ‘the modern age hated as no other’, Christopher Coker, ‘Post Modern War’, RUSI Journal 143/3 (June 1998) p.14.

42 Andrew Gordon, ‘Ratcatchers and Regulators at the Battle of Jutland’, in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till, Challenges of High Command in the 20th Century (Camberley, UK: SCSI Occasional Papers, No.38, Dec. 1999) pp.44–51, this p.44.

43 British Military Doctrine (note 21), Chapter 4, Figure 6.

44 Kevin B. Smith, ‘Combat Information Flow’, Military Review (April 1989) pp.42–54; Jim Storr, ‘The Nature of Military Thought’, PhD, Cranfield University, 2002.

45 Smith (note 44) p.50.

46 John. F. Schmitt, and Gary A. Klein, ‘Fighting in the Fog: Dealing with Battlefield Uncertainty’, Marine Corps Gazette (Aug. 1996) pp.62–9, this p.65.

47 Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, ‘Military Risk Taking: C3I and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96–114, this p.99.

48 Storr (note 44) pp.49–78.

49 Anon. military proverb.

50 See, for example, MOD, Strategic Defence Review, White Paper (London: TSO 1998) Chapter 3.