The Clash of Civilisations thesis contends that the fundamental source of conflict in the post‐Cold War world will be cultural rather than ideological or economic.Footnote 1 The key features of this thesis will be identified and examined in order to assess its validity.Footnote 2
The American Professor Samuel P. Huntington arguesFootnote 3 that while nation states remain the key players in global relations, conflicts will now occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. A civilisation is defined as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes them from other species’.Footnote 4 Huntington identifies seven or eight civilisations based on factors including history, language, custom and religion. His civilisations are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic‐Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.
Civilisations will clash principally because the differences between them are fundamental and often irreconcilable, such as ‘views on the relations between God and man, individual and state, parents and children, man and wife as well as…rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy’.Footnote 5 This basic cause is bolstered, in Huntington’s analysis, by factors arising in the modern world. The increasing interaction between the people of different civilisations is heightening awareness of their differences while social and economic change is breaking down traditional focuses for identity such as the nation‐state. As a result people are increasingly defining themselves in ethnic and religious terms, often taken to extreme lengths in the form of fundamentalism.
With the failure and collapse of Communism, Western economic and cultural dominance is increasingly seen as a threat by those in other cultures, causing them to re‐emphasise and even re‐invent their own identities, giving rise to phenomena such as ‘Islamification’. The rise of economic unions such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area in the West and the East Asian economic bloc centred on China, deriving their success from shared values and mutual understanding, is seen as proof of this as well as representing another influence tending to reinforce the differences between civilisations. Unlike theorists such as Francis Fukuyama,Footnote 6 Huntington does not regard Western ideals either as universal or as a prerequisite for modernisation. Echoing the early twentieth century writings of the German Oswald Spengler,Footnote 7 the American’s thinking contemplates the possibility of Western decline and the rise of other civilisations instead.
Huntington suggests that clashes will occur both at the macro level between nations, and at the micro level between groups within states. In both cases, the parties to conflict will be differentiated by the civilisation to which they belong.
It is quite possible to interpret today’s world in terms of a clash of civilisations. The ethnic struggles in the former Yugoslavia and in many successor states to the Soviet Union pit Orthodox Christian against Muslim, while the frequent stand‐offs over Kashmir see Hindu India confronting Muslim Pakistan. In Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq the West confronts Islam, a struggle given a new dimension by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
The basis of Huntington’s thinking lies in the characterisation and definition of his civilisations and an acceptance that the underlying causes of conflict arise from the differences between these civilisations. It is therefore necessary to examine these areas in detail as a means of validating the thesis.
Huntington’s civilisations are defined in a very simplistic manner. The main criterion for deciding to which civilisation a country belongs seems to be religion, although it is clear that geographical location plays a significant role in the definition, especially in cases such as Latin America and Africa.Footnote 8 Furthermore, the rich diversity of the civilisations is not explored in by Huntington.Footnote 9 Is it really meaningful to include in a single Islamic civilisation the ‘theocracies of Iran and Sudan, the politically opportunistic interpretation of Islam in Saddam’s Iraq (pre‐2003), open repression in Syria, enlightened absolutism in Jordan and a typical post‐modern, post‐colonial state in Egypt’.Footnote 10
Furthermore, this assumption of an essential homogeneity within, in this case, Islam fails to account for the numerous conflicts between Muslims and the extensive differences in foreign policy exhibited by Islamic states.Footnote 11 Even within nation‐states there are infinite differences in the attitudes of people and civilisation can be seen as specific to each individual, born out of upbringing, education etc.Footnote 12 Indeed, how does one measure the influence of immigration into Western societies?
Huntington’s contention that differences between civilisations cause conflict because they are fundamental suggests that there must be an inherent inflexibility: an inability to contemplate compromise or change. It is widely observed that in reality cultural norms change with time, even on such elemental issues as individual versus community values.Footnote 13 Some commentators even argue that Western values emphasising individual freedom are universal and the natural consequence of adopting modern economic reform, and that all civilisations will eventually modernise and adopt these values for themselves.Footnote 14 Whether this alternative vision can be justified or not, it is certainly true that many in the Islamic world share what Huntington would identify as Western liberal values and vice versa.
Problems with the practical application of Huntington’s thesis can be seen in real world examples. The clash of civilisations approach suggests that groups will come together in support, yet the coalition to defeat Iraq in 1991 included numerous Arab nations and Iran supported Christian Armenia in its conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan. Conversely, the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda took place within a single civilisation, and wars within Western civilisation have been the most numerous and bloody in history.Footnote 15 Perhaps the flaw is in seeing some change in the nature of conflict: ‘what was the East‐West clash if not one rooted in civilisations? Two opposing and incompatible visions of society with different approaches to quite fundamental questions of the order of the state and individual.’Footnote 16
Looking next at the causes of conflict, Russet and others conducted a statistical analysis of conflict between pairs of states in the period 1950 to 1992 in an attempt to establish whether there was any evidence supporting Huntington’s key assertions. Despite the effects of the Cold War ideological clash, one would still expect to see some corroboration of the thesis in reality. They concluded that differences in civilisation had no statistically significant effect on the probability that a pair of states would go to war.Footnote 17 They also investigated whether the incidence of conflict between civilisations would increase as the Cold War progressed towards its end, or during periods where it was less intense. Using two different measures of intensity they concluded that the reverse was the case: the Cold War inflamed civilisation conflict.Footnote 18 The data also indicated that states within civilisations had fought much more frequently among themselves than with others, and that inter‐civilisation conflict decreased overall in the period examined.Footnote 19
Commentators agree that most recent conflicts have started within states, usually between rival ethnic or communal groups for a variety of reasons Footnote 20 The first identifiable cause of war is to achieve political objectives. Although revolutionary ideology is no longer a major factor, there is evidence that many sub‐state conflicts are prosecuted by parties competing for political power. This appears to have been the case in the recent civil wars in Liberia and Somalia, in which the aim of the warring parties was essentially to seize or hold on to political control of the country.Footnote 21
A second major cause of conflict is competition for scarce resources. In the next 50 years the world’s population will pass nine billion and scarcities of renewable resources will increase.Footnote 22 Areas of shortage include the degradation of farmland and forests, the depletion of freshwater sources and fisheries, and it is expected that long‐term environmental effects such as global warming may exacerbate these existing problems in the future.Footnote 23 It is widely asserted that competition for scarce resources lies at the heart of most conflicts, and that the subsequent polarisation of competing parties along ethnic or religious lines is merely a product of the significance of those social divisions within a society.Footnote 24
In other words, although the resulting conflict may be between groups which appear to come from different cultures, the real underlying cause of it is resource scarcity. The single resource most likely to cause conflict in the future is water, especially where rivers run through the territory of several countries so that those downstream are distrustful of those higher up.Footnote 25 This relationship will tend to cause conflict completely independently of civilisation boundaries.
Analysts agree that sub‐state conflict will occur mainly within weak or failed states.Footnote 26 A common reason for this type of conflict in recent years has been post‐colonial collapse. Successor governments often struggle to establish their legitimacy or indeed maintain security without the backing of the colonial power. Groups within the state begin to struggle for power and the state institutions cannot prevent them from doing so, leading to civil war of the type seen in the former Yugoslavia. The situation there was exacerbated because the different ethnic groups were split up, a common tactic of colonial powers to reduce their cohesion, causing a subsequent struggle to reunite in the civil war.Footnote 27 This cause of conflict has been very common in recent years following the breakup of the Soviet Union, but is likely to reduce in significance as this effect is gradually resolved.
There are various other reasons why a state might weaken or fail. During the Cold War both superpowers sponsored Third World regimes in an attempt to further their political and ideological aims at the expense of the other. The end of this sponsorship has resulted in the weakening of many regimes to the point of failure such as that seen in Zaire in the mid‐1990s.Footnote 28
A more general reason for state weakening throughout the world today is the loss of legitimacy leading to pressure for reform. Governments the world over are increasingly required to legitimise their status by meeting the needs of their populations. This does not necessarily mean democratic freedoms, as some more fundamentalist regimes will claim to meet other needs more effectively, but it does mean that states which fail to maintain legitimacy will weaken and become vulnerable.Footnote 29
Weak states are unable to guarantee the security of groups within society, and these groups will then prepare for and engage in violence to maintain or enhance their position.Footnote 30 In such situations, the people will align themselves to groups based on underlying identities within that society. In the contemporary world these group identities are likely to be formed along ethnic, religious or otherwise cultural lines.Footnote 31 Governments faced with internal discontent can attempt to democratise or clamp down via a return to oppressive control. The first approach, in a fundamentally weak state, generally promotes the division of people into opposing groups and makes protest easier, while the second will not halt the tide of conflict in the long run.Footnote 32
It is important to note that in these circumstances the underlying causes of the conflict are not cultural in nature. Historically, the allegiances into which society divides are just as likely to be political as ethnic or religious, although it is easy after the event to ascribe cultural causes.Footnote 33 Even where society is divided by religion or ethnicity before conflict breaks out, perhaps where one group holds the political power and has disproportionate access to resources, it can still be argued that it is these social and economic issues which are at the heart of the conflict rather than strictly cultural ones. In the vast majority of observed cases of ethnic or religious conflict, whereas religion remained a constant prior to the outbreak it was preceded by intense political or economic tensions.Footnote 34
The reaction of other civilisations to Western dominance requires some investigation. Huntington contests that other civilisations, especially Islam, are in conflict with the West because they fundamentally oppose values of individual freedom and secularity. This can be seen as a reaction against the relative success of Western societies evidenced by the disparity in standards of living. Alternatively, conflict and violence can be ascribed to frustration at the failure of indigenous societies to translate Western systems into positive benefits, namely Islamic anti‐Western feeling stemming from the failure of Arab nationalism and socialism.Footnote 35
The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center represented a new form of terrorism in which terror represents an end in itself and there is no desire to further tangible political aims or to negotiate.Footnote 36 Taken at face value the rhetoric employed by Al‐Qaeda indicates an irreconcilable clash between Western and Islamic values, yet closer examination suggests more pragmatic socio‐economic reasons. Gross social and economic inequalities prevail in the states from which the terrorist leadership is drawn, and these are becoming starker as populations rapidly grow.Footnote 37 Terrorist action is thus the product of frustrations with no alternative outlet.
Taking the evidence together it must be concluded that contemporary conflict has many causes; individual conflicts and wars result from a combination of many interlinked reasons. There is no doubt that cultural factors play a role in most conflict, and in the post‐Communist era societies in discord invariably fragment along ethnic or religious lines. Thus, on superficial inspection, Huntington’s thesis seems a valid explanation for the evidence. Its flaws are brought into focus by the simplistically defined civilisations which fail to withstand rigorous examination. It is clear that conflict does not represent a clash of civilisations but rather stems from the same causes as always. As Gray notes, ‘The change in current circumstances is the worldwide spread of industrial production leading to the end of western global hegemony. What is not new is the traditional conflict between and within states over territory, religion, resources and commercial advantage.’Footnote 38
Huntington’s thesis should not be dismissed lightly. There are many who subscribe to the Clash of Civilisations and commentators have noted that viewing the world through Huntington’s filter could cause his ideas to become a self‐fulfilling prophecy. Conflicts could be started or intensified by the actions of statesmen informed by ideas of a clash of civilisations. It is for this reason that Huntington’s thesis is not only limited but potentially dangerous.
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Alex Osborn
Major Alex Osborn, British Army, ICSC (L) 1.Notes
1 The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this viewpoint are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK MOD or any other government agency.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs 72/3 (1993) p.22 of pp.22–49.
3 This summary is drawn from Huntington (note 2) and Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’, The Sunday Times, 14 Oct. 2001.
4 Huntington (note 2) p.24.
5 Huntington (note 3).
6 John Gray, ‘Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present’, International Affairs 74/1(1998) pp.3–4 of pp.149–64.
7 Robert W. Cox, ‘Thinking about Civilisations’, Review of International Studies 26/5 (Dec. 2000) p.218 of pp.217–34.
8 Bruce M. Russett, John R. O’Neal and Michaelene Cox, ‘Clash of Civilisations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence’, Journal of Peace Research 37/5 (2000) p.592 of pp.583–608.
9 Dieter Senghaas, The Clash within Civilisations (London: Routledge 1998) p.74.
10 Ibid. p.89.
11 Saqeb Mueen, ‘Fallout from the War in Iraq: Domestic Echoes in Foreign Policy?’, RUSI Journal 148/3 (June 2003) p.31 of pp.26–32.
12 Cox (note 7) p.220.
13 Ibid. p.221.
14 Senghaas (note 9) p.75.
15 Gray (note 6) p.9.
16 Senghaas (note 9) p.82.
17 Russett et al. (note 8) p.595.
18 Ibid. pp.599–600.
19 Ibid. p.602.
20 Charles J. Dick, ‘Conflict Spills into the 21st Century’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/12 (Dec. 2000) p.48 of pp.5–40.
21 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Contemporary War: Ethnic Conflict, Resource Conflict or Something Else?’, Civil Wars 3/1 (Spring 2000) p.111 of pp.92–116.
22 Thomas F. Homer‐Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict, Evidence from Cases’, International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.5–40.
23 Ibid. pp.17–18.
24 David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, ‘Containing Fear, The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996) p.44 of pp.41–75.
25 Homer‐Dixon (note 22) pp.19–20.
26 Dick (note 20) p.48.
27 Daniel Byman and Stephen van Evera, ‘Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict’, Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998) pp.25–7 of pp.1–50.
28 Duyvesteyn (note 21) p.97.
29 Gray (note 6) p.6.
30 Byman and van Evera (note 27) p.37.
31 Senghaas (note 9) p.75.
32 Byman and van Evera (note 27) pp.33–5.
33 James Kurth, ‘Religion and Ethnic Conflict – in Theory’, Orbis 45/1 (Spring 2001) p.283 of pp.281–94.
34 Ibid. p.293.
35 Ibid. p.290.
36 Matthew J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters 33/1 (Spring 2004) pp.29–30 of pp.29–43.
37 Ibid. p.36.
38 Gray (note 6) p.10.