Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would to extend my sincerest appreciation to General Alfred M. Gray, USMC (ret.), General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (ret.), Lieutenant General Paul van Riper, USMC (ret.), Colonel Tom Hobbs, USMC (ret.), Colonel James Lasswell, USMC (ret.), Colonel Anthony Wood, USMC (ret.) Colonel Michael D. Wyly, USMC (ret.), Major Bruce Gudmundsson, USMC (ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.), for their time and consideration in not only sharing with me their experiences but also in helping me to understand the character and culture of the Marine Corps. I would like to express my appreciation to the staff in the Library and Archives of the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia, for their cheerful help in accessing and locating information, as well as for the generous hospitality they extended to me. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank very much the Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom) ‘New Security Challenges’ Programme for providing funding support for my project on military change in the Marine Corps, without which this research could not have been conducted.

Notes

1 See, for example, Antulio J. Echevarria II, ‘Tomorrow’s Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change’, Parameters (Autumn 1998) pp.85–98; at ⟨http://carlisle‐www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98autumn/echevarr.htm⟩.

2 As a case in point, the US in 2005 has been undergoing a major shift from its former previous focus on enhancing traditional warfare, to developing new approaches to irregular warfare. See Jason Sherman, ‘New Defense Strategy Calls for Proficiency Against “Irregular” Threats’, InsideDefense, 16 March 2005. Most recent has been a return to ‘stability operations’; see Thom Shankar and David S. Cloud, ‘Pentagon to Raise Importance of “Stability Operations”’, NYT.com, 20 Nov. 2005; at ⟨http://select.nytimes.com/mem/tnt.html?tntget=2005/11/20/international/middleeast/20military.html&tntemail0=y&emc=tnt&pagewanted=print⟩.

3 See, for example, Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo‐German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1995); and Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction,: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2005). These analyses show, respectively, that military culture resulted in limitation in the use of force while in the other it led to extremism in the use of force.

4 See, for example, Terry Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organizational Paranoia and the Origins of the Doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare in the US Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006) pp.475–503.

5 See, for example, Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton UP 1997), esp. pp.39–88; and Jennifer G. Mathers, ‘Reform and the Russian Military’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002) pp.161–84.

6 Legro, Cooperation under Fire (note 3) p.19.

7 Ibid.

8 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military Power in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996) pp.18–19.

9 As an example, the so‐called American way of war is a means of conceptually capturing a set of ideas and characteristics that describe ‘a distinctively American approach to war and warfare’ that arguably are cultural in nature and shared by all US military services. For a description of these characteristics or attributes, see Colin S. Gray, ‘The American Way of War: Critique and Implications’, in Anthony D. McIvor (ed.), Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis, MA: US naval Institute Press 2005) esp. 23–34.

10 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP 1989).

11 See, for example, Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press 2005) p.1.

12 Lt. Gen. Krulak will be consistently identified as ‘Victor Krulak’ to avoid any confusion with General Charles C. Krulak, his son, who was Commandant of the Marine Corps from July 1995 to June 1999 and an important figure in the second case study analyzed in this article.

13 Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, USMC (ret.), First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MA: US Naval Institute Press, 1986) p.3. For an account of the culture of the Marine Corps that touches on some of the same traits that Victor Krulak addresses, see James A. Warren, American Spartans: The U.S. Marines: A Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq (New York/London/Toronto/Sydney: Free Press 2005) pp.11–34 (Ch. 1).

14 Tom Clancy, with Gen. Tony Zinni (ret.) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 2004) p.142.

15 On ‘folklore’ as an expression of culture, see Carol Burke, Camp All‐American, Hanoi Jane, and the High‐and‐Tight: Gender, Folklore and Changing Military Culture (Boston: Beacon Books 2004). Lt. Gen. Krulak in elucidating cultural traits of the Marine Corps employs a narrative approach, though it is a historically accurate narrative. Krulak, First To Fight (note 13).

16 Hoffman, Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York: Random House, 2001) p.ix. Italics in original.

17 Clancy, with Zinni, Battle Ready (note 14) p.142.

18 It has also become an American symbol as well as a Marine Corps symbol. On the multiple meanings of this act and its representations, see Karal Ann Marling and John Weltenhall, Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard UP 1991). The Marine Corps certainly understands how powerful a representation this act is for their self‐identity and for how others perceive them. A smaller version of the Marine Corps War Memorial statue in Arlington, Virginia, has been placed at the northern, main, entrance to Marine Corps Combat and Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, a base often referred to as the ‘Crossroads of the Marine Corps’, while the new Marine Corps Museum, also outside the entrance to Quantico, is framed by a ‘post‐modernist’ representation of the flag raising.

19 Examples of this, in the case of the US Marine Corps, can be found in Marion E. Sturkey, Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines (Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International 2002). Sturkey, a former Marine officer, provides in the book, to quote, ‘Axioms for Warriors, Marine Quotations, Battle History, Reflections on Combat, Corps Legacy …for the World’s Elite Warriors’.

20 On story telling as validation for key features of culture, see Geoffrey M. White, ‘The Politics of Remembering: Notes on a Pacific Conference’, in George E. Marcus (ed.), Rereading Cultural Anthropology (Durham, NC/London: Duke UP 2000) p.77.

21 Robert Axelrod, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’, American Political Science Review 80/ 4 (1986) pp 1095–1111; Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation’, American Political Science Review 81/1 (1987) pp.3–21.

22 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press 1989).

23 Lynne G. Zucker, ‘The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence’, in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Univ.of Chicago Press 1991) p.103.

24 John P. Cotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1996) p.156.

25 Victor Krulak, First to Fight (note 13).

26 This is not to suggest that every single Marine shares or accepts such a ‘shared understanding’.

27 The initial emergence of manoeuvre warfare in the thinking of the Marine Corps is somewhat diffuse. Gen. Gray, for example, began implementing elements of warfighting that were consistent with manoeuvre warfare as early as 1976 when he commanded 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Interview with Gen. Alfred M. Gray, USMC (ret.), Arlington, Virginia, 3 May 2006. Yet the first published proposal in favour of manoeuvre warfare emerged only in late 1979, from an intra‐organizational debate with respect to how the US Marine Corps should adapt to the heavy armoured battlefield of the 1970s. See Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”’(note 4).

28 This expression is most often used by ‘maneuverists’, who characterized the Marine Corps’ methodical, linear approach to war as being ‘attritionist’. Those characterized as ‘attritionists’ would reject this particular characterization, and most ‘maneuverists’ who agree that the term ‘attritionists’ was unduly harsh. Off the record interviews with former Marine Corps officers, 2004 and 2005.

29 The first publicly published argument in favour of manoeuvre warfare was published in two parts in late 1979. The arguments for, and about manoeuvre warfare did not end in 1984, rather they subsequently became less frequent, not least as the debate shifted to a range of other related issues. For the first published argument, see Capt. Steven W. Miller, USMC, ‘Winning through maneuver: Part I‐ Countering the offense’, Marine Corps Gazette 63/10 (Oct. 1979) pp.28ff; and Miller, ‘Winning through maneuver: Conclusion‐Countering the defense’, Marine Corps Gazette 63/12 (Dec. 1979) pp.57ff.

30 See Maj. Kenneth F. McKenzie, ‘On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare’, Marine Corps Gazette 77/7 (July 1993) pp.63 ff.

31 Krulak, First to Fight (note 13) p.176.

32 Ibid. p.225.

33 Clancy, with Zinni, Battle Ready (note 14) p.142.

34 Quoted in Victor Krulak, First to Fight (note 13) p.175. Also see Brig. Gen. Edwin Howard Simmons, USMC (ret.). The United States Marines: A History, 3rd edition (Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute Press 1974, 1976 and 1998) p.104.

35 Hoffman, Chesty (note 16) p. 399. Just as some of the ‘fighting’ words of individuals are ‘fictional’, so are some of the ‘individuals’ who are perceived to represent Marine Corps values and characteristics. This is seen in the identification by many Marines of John Wayne, after he played Sgt Styker in the 1949 movie The Sands of Iwo Jima, as symbolizing for many years, as Gen. David M. Shoup, USMC, noted, the ‘hell for leather, go and get ‘em attitude [of the Corps]….When we went into combat, we went after the enemy.’ Quoted in Lawrence H. Suid, Guts & Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film, rev. and expanded edition (Lexington: Kentucky UP 2002) p.129.

36 See Hoffman, Chesty (note 16) p.588, endnote 18.

37 Simmons, for example, in his The United States Marines does not note this ‘quote’ by Puller, whereas elsewhere he sets down other famous ‘fighting’ quotes by Marines where there is supporting evidence. Other works that do include the Puller saying include Martin Russ, Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea, 1959 (New York: Penguin Putnam 1999) p. 230; J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, 3rd rev. ed. (Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky 1992) p. 518; and Sturkey, Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines (note 19) p.21. Both Sturkey and Moskin provide different variants of the saying, the most pithy being that used by Moskins – ‘They’ve got us surrounded. The bastards won’t get away this time.’

38 For a veritable list of real and apocryphal fighting words by Marines, see Sturkey, Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines (note 19), ‘Fighting Words from U.S. Marines’, pp.19–31.

39 Col. Michael Duncan Wyly, USMC (ret.), ‘Teaching Maneuver Warfare’, in Richard D. Hooker, Jr., (ed.), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1993) p.248.

40 On the Marines Corps Chosin Reservoir Campaign, see Russ, Breakout (note 37).

41 As an example, Lt. Col. Howard A. Christy, USMC (ret.), reflecting on his experience in Vietnam, observed: ‘In one conversation with a battalion commander the question was put: If a unit was to draw fire from the far side of a wet rice paddy, would he order an assault across the paddy? Without hesitation he said that he would.’ Christy, ‘Patrolling Hill 55: Hard lessons in retrospect’, Marine Corps Gazette 78/4 (April 1994) pp.76ff.

42 For an in depth examination of this, see Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951 (New York: Cambridge UP 1994).

43 Quoted in Leonard Bushkoff, ‘Myths and the Marines: A Softening of the Corps?’, Los Angeles Times [Home Edition], 13 March 1988, p.2

44 This description of manoeuvre warfare, particularly as set forth in FMFM‐1, Warfighting, is obviously a gross simplification, for manoeuvre warfare is a mindset, a philosophy of warfighting, rather than a ‘how‐to’ approach to the conduct of warfare.

45 William S. Lind, ‘Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare’, Marine Corps Gazette 72/1 (Jan. 1988) pp.16ff. Also see Lt. Col. Michael D. Wyly, ‘War Without Firepower?’ Marine Corps Gazette 67/3 (March 1983) pp.17ff.

46 McKenzie, ‘On the Verge of a New Era’ (note 30).

47 Quoted in Capt. John F. Schmitt, ‘Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine’, Marine Corps Gazette 74/8 (Aug. 1990) pp.90ff.

48 William S. Lind, ‘Why the German Example?’ Marine Corps Gazette 66/ (June 1982) pp. 59ff. The most commonly used example was the German Army. Lind’s article is a rebuttal to complaints and concerns about the reliance on the German Army as an example, and he notes several reasons for the dislike of the German example.

49 Interviews with Col. Michael D. Wyly, USMC (ret.), Sept. 2004 and Major Bruce Gudmundsson, USMCR (ret.), Aug. 2005.

50 Interview with Col. Tom Hobbs, USMC (ret.), Sept. 2004.

51 This effort to effect change was a persistent feature of his four year command of the Marine Corps. Indeed, the onset of the Gulf crisis in 1990–91 and the resultant US‐led Operations ‘Desert Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’ significantly detracted from his effort, as these operations demanded his full attention, and numerous command directives regarding changes he wanted to make only emerged from the Marine Corps Headquarters in the last weeks and days of his Commandancy. Interview with Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper, Quantico, Virginia, June 2004.

52 FMFM‐1 was not introduced until 1989 as Gray initially did not think that there was need to write a manual, and was only subsequently persuaded that having a manual that all Marines could read and understand would be useful. Interview with Gen. Alfred M. Gray, USMC (ret.) Arlington, May 2006.

53 See, for example, Maria L. LaGanga, ‘Gray Tours Bases Be ‘Warriors’ Again, Top Marine Urges’, Los Angeles Times [Orange County Edition] 15 July 1987, p.3.

54 Gray quoted in Anthony Perry, ‘A Different Battle Cry for Marines: Hit the Books!’ Los Angeles Times [San Diego County Edition] 28 July 1989, p.1.

55 See, for example, ‘President Picks “Real Warrior” to Head Marine Corps’, Los Angeles Times [Home Edition], 17 June 1987, p.4.

56 In the Hall of the Commandants in the Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, where the official portraits of all Marine Corps Commandants are hung, Gray’s portrait stands out, as he is the only Commandant wearing camouflage battledress (there is a tin of chewing tobacco in the picture as well). All the rest of the commandants were painted wearing full dress uniform.

57 Gen. Gray was an inveterate reader of works relevant to warfighting, whether this be Sun Tzu, battle histories, or other works, and applied what he learned when in combat. Interview with Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Arlington, Virginia, May 2006.

58 For a succinct discussion of this reform, see Paul K. van Riper, ‘The relevance of history to the military profession: an American Marine’s view’, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds.), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (New York: Cambridge UP 2006) pp.49–51.

59 Col. Michael D. Wyly, USMC, ‘Marine Corps University Established at Quantico’, Marine Corps Gazette 73/10 (Oct. 1989) p.11ff.

60 Central to this was the study of military history, with the focus on critical engagement with a wide range of historical battles and campaigns spread across time, situations and cultures. Interviews with Lt. Gen. Paul van Ripper, USMC (ret.) June 2004; Col. Tom Hobbs, USMC (ret.), Sept. 2004; and Major Bruce Gudmundson, USMCR (ret.), July 2005.

61 Perry, ‘A Different Battle Cry for Marines: Hit the Books!’ (note 54).

62 Interview with Col. Tom Hobbs, USMC (ret.), Sept. 2004.

63 Molly Moore, ‘Marines Toughen Training to Create Commandos’, Washington Post, 10 Dec. 1988, p. 01

64 For a discussion of a large exercise, see Andrew R. Hoebn, ‘Force‐on‐Force at MCAGCC’, Marine Corps Gazette 72/7 (July 1988) p.9ff.

65 For a discussion of free play exercises and the critique by Gen. Gray stemming from his tenure as Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division from 1981 to 1984, see Al Santoli, Leading the Way: How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military: An Oral History (New York: Ballantine Books 1993) pp. 129–30.

66 ‘Bridging the Doctrinal Gap’, Marine Corps Gazette 72/4 (April 1987) pp.47ff.

67 Charles Jones, The Boys of ‘67: From Vietnam to Iraq, The Extraordinary Story of a Few Good Men (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books 2006) pp.237 and 242.

68 See Capt. Kevin R. Clover, USMC, ‘Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?’, Marine Corps Gazette 72/2 (Feb. 1988) p.54ff.

69 Gen. Gray was also, with this command, Commanding General, II Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Europe.

70 Quoted in Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston/New York/Toronto/London: Little, Brown 1995) p.176.

71 See Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (ret.), Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (New York: Ballantine Books 1995).

72 For an examination of the application of manoeuvre warfare by 1st Marine Division during ‘Desert Storm’, see Gen. J. Michael Myatt, USMC, ‘Comments on maneuver’, Marine Corps Gazette 82/10 (Oct. 1998) pp.40ff, and Lt. Col. G.I. Wilson, USMC, ‘The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art’, Marine Corps Gazette 75/6 (June 1991) pp.23ff.

73 This consensus was in part established during what was known as the Vision 21 exercise. Commandant Gen. Carl Mundy initiated the Vision 21 Project in Sept. 1994 in order to ‘help the Marine Corp leaders develop a vision for the 21st Century by enabling them to understand the possible futures for the country, to realize the implications of those futures, and to identify what the USMC can be and do’. Frederick Thompson (ed.), Vision‐21 Source Book: Volume 1: The Process (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, CRM96‐10, March 1996) p.1.

74 ‘Ne Cras’ Speech, presented to Center for Naval Analysis Board of Trustees, 17 Dec. 1997, p. 15: Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Center for Naval Analysis Board of Trustees. Dec. 97. Box 99: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia. This future security environment is embodied in the Corps concept of ‘chaos in the littorals’. See, for example, Krulak, ‘Chaos in the Littorals’, US Naval Institute Proceedings 122/11 (Nov. 1996).

75 See, for example, Gen. Charles C. Krulak, testimony, House National Security Committee, Hearings on the FY 97 Defense Budget, 13 March 1996, p. 12.; Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers; File: House National Security Committee, Service Chiefs hearing March 96, Box 137: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA; and Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Letter to Senator Dan Coats, 7 Oct. 1998, p.3; Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Legislative Affairs, 1998; Box 136; Archives, General Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Also see, for example, Krulak, ‘Chaos in the Littorals’ (note 74).

76 Krulak in particular stressed the very probable asymmetrical character in a presentation titled ‘Ne Cras’ that he gave iteratively from late 1997 through to late 1998. See, for example, ‘Ne Cras’ Speech (note 74).

77 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Letter to Senator Dan Coats (note 75). Also see Gen. Charles C. Krulak, with Dr David B. Crist (Interviewer), Oral History Transcript: General Charles C. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.) (Washington DC: History and Museums Div., HQ, USMC 2003) p.138 (Access restricted).

78 Krulak, Oral History Transcript (note 77) p.138.

79 Statement of Gen. Charles C. Krulak. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee, 15 March 1996, ‘Concerning Battlefield Concepts for the 21st Century’, p.12; Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Senate Armed Services Acquisition and Technology Hearings March ‘96 (1), Box 137: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia.

80 Victor Krulak, First to Fight (note 13) p.67.

81 Just prior to this claim, Victor Krulak briefly recounts some technological innovations undertaken by the Marine Corps that did not work. Ibid.

82 Victor Krulak, First to Fight (note 13) pp.68–9.

83 Ibid. p.110.

84 Clancy with Zinni, Battle Ready (note 14) p.142.

85 Quoted in Warren, American Spartans (note 13) p.17.

86 Krulak, Oral History Transcript (note 77) p.138.

87 Ibid.

88 ‘The 31st Commandants Planning Guidance: A Marine Corps for the 21st Century’, Aug. 1995, p.A‐3.

89 For an articulation of the future, see Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘Preparing for the Future: Address to Luncheon Meeting of the National Strategy Forum’, Chicago, 10 May 1996. Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: National Strategy Forum, May ‘96, Box 107 A, Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia.

90 See for example, ‘The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance’, p. A‐2.

91 Commandant of the Marine Corps, ‘Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG)’, Frag Order, 31 Aug. 1997, p.1. (italics added).

92 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, USMC, ‘Innovation, the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine’, Marine Corps Gazette 80/12 (Dec. 1996) pp.12ff.

93 See Statement of Gen. Charles C. Krulak (note 79).

94 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, testimony, House National Security Committee (note 75); and Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Letter to Senator Dan Coats (note 75).

95 ‘The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance’ (note 88) p.A‐13.

96 Ibid.

97 See Andrew Mays, Christine Grafton and James Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior: A Case Study in Experimentation’; SAIC Document no. SAIC‐01‐6989&SAC (MacLean, VA: The Strategic Assessment Center, 30 Aug. 2001) p.16.

98 Quoted in Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’ (note 97) pp.8–9. See also, for example, Gen. Charles C. Krulak, testimony, Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive testimony on Emerging Battlefield Concepts for the 21st Century and the Implications of These Concepts fro Technology Investment Decisions in the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997 and the Future Years Defense Program, 15 March 1996 (Stenographic Transcript) pp.13–14: Gen. C.C. Krulak Papers, Folder: ‘Senate Armed Services Committee Acquisition & Technology Hearing March 1996 (3), Box 137: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia.

99 To those individuals involved in the MCWL, as well as to Krulak, ‘the naming of the concept [as Sea Dragon] was significant in that it implied that the concept was designed to respond to irresistible forces for change that required transformation of the Marine Corps into something different’. Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’ (note 97) p.9.

100 Krulak, ‘Innovation, the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine’ (note 92).

101 Statement of Gen. Charles C. Krulak (note 79).

102 For an in depth look at the establishment of the MCWL and the setting up and running of Hunter Warrior, see Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’(note 97).

103 ‘Urban Warrior’ was conducted in two phases. The first phase consisted of two Limited Objective Experiments that focused on tactics, techniques, technologies and procedures for conducting operations in urban terrain that would be building blocks for follow‐on, larger experiments. The second phase, the Culminating Phase Experiment, was a full‐scale experiment conducted in the San Francisco Bay area in March 1999. Urban Warrior Information Packet, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, March 1999.

104 On the ‘three block war’, see Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘Three Block War’, Vital Speeches of the Day 64/5 (15 Dec. 1997).

105 For some of the lessons and problems which emerged during Urban Warrior, see Joel Garreau, ‘REBOOT CAMP: As War Looms, the Marines Test New Networks of Comrades’, Washington Post, 24 March 1999, p.C01.

106 Quoted in Roger J. Morris, ‘Reality Has Bitten Hard into the Corps’ “Dragon of Change”’, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, Virginia, 21 Nov. 2000, p.1.

107 ‘The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance’ (note 88) p.4.

108 For a discussion of some of the ideas (and concerns) that were sent in, see Krulak, Oral History Transcript (note 77) pp.160–1.

109 As Krulak once noted, to succeed required that the Marine Corps ‘must be ruthless in stamping out those things which restrict creative thinking or limit the development of new approaches to the challenges we face’. Statement of General Charles C. Krulak (note 79) pp.5–6. On the need to challenge ‘conventional wisdom’, Ibid. p.4.

110 See, for example, Statement of General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Readiness Subcommittee, Concerning Current and Future Military Readiness, 14 March 1996, pp.10–11: General C.C. Krulak Papers: Folder: Senate Armed Service Committee Readiness Hearing, Mar '96 #1; Box 137: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia.

111 Interview with Col. James Lasswell, USMC (ret.), 25 March 2004.

112 For Krulak’s fully fleshed out interpretation of the meaning of the ‘strategic corporal’, see Gen. Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine, (Jan. 1999) ⟨http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm⟩.

113 One initiative that encompassed both of these aims was the introduction of ‘The Crucible’ to entry level training for both basic Marines and Marine officers. See Gen. Charles C. Krulak USMC, ‘The Crucible: Building warriors for the 21st century’, Marine Corps Gazette 81/7 (July 1997) pp.13ff. For a detailed description of what the Crucible, effectively a 50‐hour endurance obstacle course, entails for enlisted personnel, see James B. Woulfe, Into the Crucible: Making Marines for the 21st Century (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1998).

114 Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’ (note 97) p.14.

115 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Email message to Col. Tony Woods; Subject: ‘Thoughts’, 17 Jan. 1998, 21:04:26 EST: Gen. C.C. Krulak, Papers: Folder: Warfighting Lab, 1 June 98 to 30 June 98: Box 164: Archives, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia.

116 Interview with Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC (ret.) 10 March 2004.

117 Thomas A. Mahnken, ‘Marine Attitudes Towards Transformation’, presentation at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, 2 Dec. 2004. I would like to thank sincerely Tom Mahnken for sharing his and James R. FitzSimonds findings with me.

118 US Navy Dept., Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington DC: HQ USMC 2001) p.5.

119 For a more detailed discussion of the obstacles to reform efforts by Krulak, see Terry Terriff, ‘Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the Marine Corps for Future Warfare’, Contemporary Security Policy, forthcoming 2007. For critiques and concerns specific to the ‘Hunter Warrior’ experiment, see Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’ (note 97) pp.39–42.

120 For full quote, see above.

121 Krulak, Oral History Transcript (note 77) p.138.

122 Ibid. pp.176–7.

123 Ibid. p.180.

124 Ibid. On this point, also see Mays, Grafton and Lasswell, ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Hunter Warrior’ (note 97) pp.48–9.

125 Krulak was very aware of such concerns. In an article published in Dec. 1996, he noted that there was an ‘impression that Sea Dragon and the AWEs are about dismantling our battle‐proven Marine Corps, replacing it with technology‐dependent, firepower‐based, squad‐sized forces. Some Marines also believe that these squad‐sized units are demonstrating; what our new operational concept, OMFTS [Operational Maneuver From The Sea], is going to look like in practice’. The Commanant sought to make clear that that these concerns were not the case. Krulak, ‘Innovation, the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine’ (note 92).

126 Interview with Gen. Charles C. Krulak, 26 Aug. 2000, Washington DC. Interview notes provided to author by Col. James Lasswell, USMC (ret).

127 For a vignette of this operational environment and adaptive enemy that Marines face in Iraq, see Julian E. Barnes, ‘In Ramadi, the Battle Is Ever Changing’, Los Angeles Times, 6 Aug. 2006; at ⟨http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la‐fg‐tactics6aug 06,0,1298527,print.story?coll=la‐headlines‐world⟩ (accessed 6 August 2006).

128 These include lessons learned from the much more low key and obscure follow‐on Project Metropolitan. On Project Metropolis, see, for example, Maj. Daniel Schmitt, USMC, ‘Waltzing Matilda’, Marine Corps Gazette 89/1 (Jan. 2005) pp.20ff.

129 On the fulsome embracing of the DO concept by the Marine Corps, see Gen. Michael Hagee, USMC, ‘Creating Stability in an Unstable World’, Marine Corps Gazette 89/6 (June 2005) (insert); Brig.Gen. Robert Schmidle, USMC, ‘Distributed Operations: From the Sea’, Marine Corps Gazette 88/7 (July 2004) pp.37ff; and Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC, ‘Distributed Operations: The Time Is Now’, Marine Corps Gazette 88/7 (July 2004) pp.36ff.

130 On the links between the lessons of the conduct of fighting in Afghanistan to ‘Hunter Warrior’ and to what has become known as Distributed Operations, see Maj. Lloyd D. Freeman, USMC, ‘Winning the Future Battles: Why the Infantry Must Change’, Marine Corps Gazette 87/4 (April 2003) pp.54ff. ‘Hunter Warrior’, however, was not the sole intellectual source for the development of the Distributed Operations Concept. Email communication from Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.) to author, 3 Feb. 2006.

131 See, for example, Master Sgt Douglas E. Patton, USMC, ‘Enlisted PME Transformation’, Marine Corps Gazette 90/2 (Feb. 2006) pp.14ff; and Lt. Gen. James Mattis, USMC and Frank Hoffman, ‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars’, US Naval Institute Proceedings 131/11 (Nov. 2005) pp.18ff. On the need to train NCOs to become ‘strategic corporals’, see 1st Lt Christopher Tsirlis, ‘Marines Must Train for Threats with No Boundaries’, US Naval Institute Proceedings 130/8 (Aug. 2004) pp.70ff; and Charles K. Curcio, ‘Are NCOs Prepared for Today’s Small‐Unit Leadership?’, Leatherneck (July 2005) pp.32–3.

132 Col. Jeff Bearor, USMC (ret.), ‘Changing to Win the War on Terror’, The Family Security Foundation, 3 Aug. 2006, at: ⟨www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=190783⟩.

133 Given the number of individuals, from the lowliest grunt to four star generals, that comprise the US Marine Corps, this should not be taken to mean that every single Marine understands manoeuvre warfare or is very good at manoeuvre warfare – only that there has been shift in how they see themselves as warriors.

134 This assumes the military organization being sufficiently self‐reflective to be able to identify correctly its cultural attributes – which is not a given.