Towards a European Military Culture?

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Notes

1 The possibility of a common European defence policy, the European Defence Community, was first proposed in May 1952. It was never ratified and the French Assembly voted decisively against it in 1954. See C. Piening, Global Europe (London: Lynne Rienner 1997) p.32; B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre, E. Tromer and O. Waever, The European Security Order Recast (London: Pinter 1990) p. 137; and W. Van Eekelen, Debating European Security: 1948–98 (The Hague: SDU 1998) p.8.

2 W. Johnsen, S. Blank and T‐D Young, ‘Building a Better European Security Environment’, European Security 8/3 (Autumn 1999) p.14 of pp.1–25; J. Howorth, ‘European Defence and the Changing Politics of the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 39/4 (2001) pp.76–9 of 765–89; R.Youngs, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: what impact on the EU’s approach to security challenges? European Security 11/2 (Summer 2002) pp.101–24; John Boranski, ‘NATO Beyond 2000: a new flashpoint for European Security’ European Security 9/2 (Summer 2000) pp.1–12; J. Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’, Survival 42/2 (Summer 2000) p.35 of 33–55; S. Hoffman, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 38/2 (2000) p.193 of pp.189–98; and M. Webber, T. Terriff, J. Howorth and S.Croft, ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the “Third Country Issue”’, European Security 11(2) (Summer 2002) p.78 of pp.75–100.

3 Howorth (note 2) p.36.

4 The origin of the Petersberg Tasks lies in the June 1992 Bonn meeting of the foreign and defence ministers of the Western European Union (WEU) member states. Following this meeting, the so‐called Petersburg declaration was made. See J. Hayward and E. Page (ed.), Governing the New Europe (Cambridge: Polity 1995) p.334. This declaration outlined a set of humanitarian ‘tasks’ which the WEU should commit itself to, by fulfilling military intervention up to the level of peacekeeping. Although the WEU was subsumed into the ESDP in 2001, the Petersberg Tasks remain its enduring contribution to European foreign policy. See S. Duke, ‘The Second Death (or the Second Coming?) of the WEU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34/2 (1996) pp.167–90.

5 Richard Youngs, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: what impact on the EU’s approach to security challenges?’, European Security 11/2 (Summer 2002) pp.101–24; Council of Europe, The Common Foreign and Security Policy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the Europe Communities 2002).

6 E.g. A. Missiroli, ‘ESDP – Post‐Iraq. Building a European Security and Defence Policy: what are the priorities? The Cicero Foundation (2003). Retrieved from, ⟨http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/missiroli_jun03.html⟩ J. Lindley‐French, ‘Terms of Engagement: the paradox of American power and the transatlantic dilemma post‐11 September’ Chaillot Papers No. 52. 2002 Retrieved from, ⟨http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai52e.pdf⟩ J. Lindley‐French, ‘In the Shades of Locarno? Why European Defence is failing’ International Affairs 78/4 (October 2002 pp. 789–811.

7 Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (2003) ⟨http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf⟩.

8 A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge 1992); A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (Univ. College London Press 1998).

9 R. Keohane, (ed) Neo‐Realism and its Critics. (New York Columbia University Press 1986).

10 T. Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’. International Studies Review 4/1 (2002) pp.49–72; J. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’ World Politics 50/2 (1998) pp.324–48; J. Legro and A. Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ International Security 24/2 (1999) pp.5–55; J. Legro, Cooperation under Fire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1995); E. Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton UP 1999); A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, International Organization 46/2 (1992) pp.391–425; A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: CUP 1999); F. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: CUP 1989); Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (London: Lynne Rienner 1996).

11 R. Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge: CUP 1990)

12 D. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy (London: Massachussetts Institute of Technology 2000).

13 Chief of the General Staff, Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (1996) Army Code No. 71451, Foreword.

14 As a rule of thumb, procedure refers to those activities performed at company level and below, doctrine to the processes of command and control which occur above the company level. Of course, the divide is not total since the kinds of doctrine which are developed at battalion level and above will necessarily reflect and mould operational and tactical procedures at company level.

15 Joint Warfare Publication 0–01, British Defence Doctrine (Shrivenham, UK: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre 2001) p.3.1.

16 Commander Steven Haines, who was one of the authors of JWP 0–01, described this method of research at a meeting of the Strategic Policy Studies Group at Exeter University in Sept. 2002.

17 Ibid. p.3.1.

18 Ibid. p.3.7.

19 Ibid. p.3.1.

20 Ibid. p.3.1.

21 Kier (note 10) p.121, p.130.

22 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell 1976) p.226.

23 Ibid. §85.

24 E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen & Unwin 1964).

25 Ibid. p.225.

26 Ibid.

27 Naval Staff Directorate, BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO 1999).

28 Ibid. p.172.

29 Gordon’s work on the Battle of Jutland is pertinent here since it involves a rich discussion of the relationship between naval doctrine and individual initiative. See A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray 1996). However, although Gordon fully recognises that individual initiative is, in fact, the product of a wider culture and, indeed, that individual initiative can be institutionalised through the adoption of the appropriate doctrines (e.g. Admiral Sir George Tryon’s TA signal), Gordon more generally contrasts institutional cultures and personal genius. The argument forwarded here is just the opposite. The very virtuosity of individual commanders is itself also a product of group culture.

30 JWP 0–01 (note 16) p.7.3

31 Ibid.

32 E. Goffman, Encounters (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill 1961) p.115.

33 Sir James Eberle’s comments were made at a meeting of the Strategic Policy Studies Group at Exeter University in Sept. 2002.

34 JWP 0–01 (note 16) p.3.7.

35 F. Cameron, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: past, present and future (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1999) p.75; P. van Ham, ‘Europe’s Precarious Centre: Franco‐German Co‐operation and the CFSP’, European Security 8/4 (Winter 1999) p.6 of pp. 1–26.

36 Cameron (note 75); G. Edwards, ‘Europe’s Security and Defence Policy and Enlargment: the ghost at the feast?’ (Florence: EUI, RSC Working Paper 2000/69) p.8.

37 Gen. Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Warner 1998) pp.39–40, 277, 282–3.

38 Ibid. p.40.

39 S. Rynning, Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France: 1958–2000 (London: Praeger 2002).

40 P. Herrly, ‘Current Operations of the French and German Armies’, Army Magazine (Sept. 2003) p.2. Retrieved from ⟨www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/⟩.

41 J. Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi Paper 333 (Oxford: OUP for IISS 2000) pp.19–20.

42 R. Pengelly, ‘French Army in profile: hollow force to hard core’, International Defence Review, May 2000. Retrieved 14 Dec. 2004. ⟨http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/idr/idr 000531_1_n.shtml

43 M. Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper 340 (Oxford: OUP for IISS 2001) p.18.

44 R. Scharping Der Bundesminister Der Vertidigung, Die Bundeswehr sicher in 21.Jahrhundert: Eckpfeiler für eine Erneuerung von Grund auf (2000). Retrieved 4 Dec. 2004, ⟨www.friederle.de/krieg/scharpingeckpfeiler.pdf⟩; R. von Weizsäcker, Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (2000). Retrieved 9 Feb. 2005 ⟨www.spdfraction.de/cnt/rs/rs_datei/ø,,1663.øø.pdf⟩; G. von Kirchbach, Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, Eckwerte für die Konzeptionelle und Planerische Weiterentwicklung der Streitkraefte (2000). Retrieved from 14 Dec. 2004, ⟨www.friederle.de/krieg/kirchbacheckwerte.pdf⟩ and ⟨www.bundeswehr.de/misc/pdf/wir/00_bericht_kommission.pdf⟩; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Ministry of Defence), Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr (2004). Retrieved 9 Feb. 2005 ⟨www.bundeswehr.de/misc/pdf/broschueren/broschuere_kdb.pdf⟩.

45 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (note 44) pp.13–21; B. Giegerich, ‘Mugged by Reality? Germany defense in the light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines’ (2003) p.5. Retrieved 17 May 2004, ⟨http://www.dias-online.org/a25.shtml⟩.

46 G. Lachmann, ‘Strucks Weltstreitmacht’, Welt am Sonntag 18. January 2004, ⟨http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/form?_index=exec_en.html&_lang=en&ut=3283169693⟩.

47 T. Enzinger, ‘Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkraefte in der Informationgesellschaft’in J. Vollert (ed.), Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Bremen: Edition Temmen 2002) pp.117–22, 139; M. Opel, ‘Die Zukunft unserer Sicherheit’ in Informationgesellschaft’ in J. Vollert (ed.), Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Bremen: Edition Temmen 2002) pp.60, 62–5.

48 Scharping (note 44) pp.13–14; Weizsäcker (note 44) p.123–4; and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (note 44) p.39.

49 W‐D Löser, “Ethische Grundsätze der Bundeswehr – besondere Bedeutung vor dem Hintergrund des neuen Aufgabenspektrums’ Europäische Sicherheit 6 (2006) p.8. p.11.