The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity?

Traditional international relations models place the nation state at the centre of the security debate. During the Cold War, the threat of global destruction perhaps justified the model as the lens through which to view security. However, as Dalby and others argue, the assumption that security today can be understood wholly in terms of inter‐state rivalry is no longer useful. ¹ The post‐Cold War concept of ‘security’ has changed in at least four ways, which Rothschild summarises as: downwards, from state level to groups and individuals; upwards, from state level to trans‐ and supra‐national systems; horizontally, from military to other forms of security; and outwards, where responsibility for invigilating these ‘concepts of security’ is dispersed from states to international institutions such as the European Union (EU), local government, non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) and even public opinion and the press. ²

The Copenhagen School has encapsulated the new security thinking into a comprehensive framework for security analysis. Operating across five sectors, Buzan explains that:

the military sector is about […] forceful coercion; the political sector is about […] authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about […] trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about […] collective identity; the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. ³

Although every sector has a different referent object, the framework acknowledges the complex security environment in which each sector affects the others; for example, economic security relies on wealth generation, which is affected by levels of military expenditure, the political framework in which businesses operate and the availability of resources, including people. The connection between migration and security is particularly complex, Choucri argues, because they represent ‘inherently subjective concepts’. ⁴ This article uses the Copenhagen School framework to address the nature of migration as a security threat and considers the EU’s response, both generally and in light of two ominous indicators of ‘increasing perceptions of a societal threat’ in Europe: increasing levels of violence against ‘foreigners’, and the rising popularity of anti‐immigrant parties. ⁵ It does not address the reasons for migration or how migration causes other forms of insecurity.

The paper will first consider the nature of societal security, how migration impacts on identity and what societies can do to protect against the threat. Having established how societies can respond to the migration threat to their identity, the study then considers the EU’s approaches to the Union’s perceived threat in terms of migration control and strengthening identity. Migration control is examined through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the common visa and asylum system, particularly the application of the Schengen acquis to the 2004 accession states. Also considered is the development of European citizenship as a response to evolving and diverse identities. It is concluded that the EU’s emphasis on border control to the detriment of human rights ultimately undermines its identity, thus constituting a new societal security threat. To redress this, the EU needs to securitise its identity dialogue and balance the migration debate within a security‐rights nexus.

Societal Security and Migration

Aniol argues that states are required not only to defend their territorial integrity and political independence, but that they have a responsibility to protect inter alia their cultural identity and social stability. ⁶ Migration potentially threatens both elements, which explains why it has increasingly been viewed through a security lens. ⁷ However, securitising migration can undermine requirements of economic efficiency and human rights, both of which are fundamental to identity and societal security within modern liberal democracies.

Societal Security

Understanding societal security requires close examination of the related but dual concepts of ‘society’ and ‘security’. Traditional security models linking society with the formal structures of the nation state fail to capture the diverse character of states. Not all states are involved in traditional (military) security, and even in those that are, the military can only represent security’s means rather than its ends. ⁸ A broader perspective would view society as a ‘social, cultural and psychological formation distinct from the political and legal construct that is the state’. ⁹ This duality of state and society avoids the traditional model’s weaknesses, without lurching to the opposite extreme and regarding all security as individual security. In Buzan’s model, ‘society’ is the social unit providing its members’ primary identity. ¹⁰ However, social units are more than social groups, they approximate to Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft (community or natural group) rather than Gesellschaft (a rational association based on benefit to its members). Society, or Gemeinschaft, therefore, is more than the sum of its parts and cannot be reduced to its individual members. It requires a robust sense of societal identity ‘to compete with the territorial state as a political organising principle’, the most obvious, but not only examples of which, are religious groups. ¹¹

Security is principally concerned with freedom from threat, thus, whatever constitutes a threat is, de facto, a security issue. ¹² It is both subjective, based on the referent object’s perceptions, and relative because no individual or unit is ever wholly secure. This subjective‐relativism complicates the process of determining how an actor will respond to a security threat because the same act or stimulus is likely to provoke different responses among different societies.

The Copenhagen School defines societal security as:

the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats… [I]t is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religious and national identity and custom. ¹³

With its focus on identity, whatever jeopardises that identity constitutes a potential security threat. However, as societal identities are dynamic, not all such threats materialise; securitising shifting identity depends on the interplay between the society’s vulnerabilities and the nature of the change. In the context of migration for example, a highly homogenised society like Finland perceives as threatening a foreign population of 0.3 per cent, while the relatively uncontentious Swiss migrant population averages 14.7 per cent. ¹⁴ The actor’s response to a threat determines whether it is securitised, namely. whether measures are adopted to address an identified concern. ¹⁵ Any such response requires the capacity to mobilise resources, a matter not just related to formal state action, but the framing of the issue in security terms. Kadelbach, for example, describes how identities are particularly influenced by political discourse in the media. ¹⁶

The societal security concept, however, is contested by authors whose criticisms focus on its reification of society as an objective reality and in the ambiguity of societal identity as a concept. McSweeney argues that societies are not objective realities but rather are created and re‐created by changing social forces; identity, therefore, becomes a ‘process’ rather than a ‘thing’. ¹⁷ Theiler’s rebuttal using social identity theory (SIT), defines groups as having both dependent and independent variables; dependent because societies are human‐made, but independent because they appear to their members as external. SIT supports societal security by viewing groups as psychological facts shaping individual beliefs and actions even though they are not themselves security actors. ¹⁸ Criticism of identity’s conceptual ambiguity, especially its failure to distinguish between groups classed as ‘society’ and those that are not, is also addressed. ¹⁹ SIT acknowledges identity as part‐process but refutes the suggestion that this makes it transient, observing that some societies (e.g. those organised around official religions) are inherently resistant to change. Social identity, therefore, only refers to ‘group categories that have become internalised and thus part of the self’. ²⁰

Societal security’s referent object is not the state but ‘society’, thus, security concerns exist at all levels of the international system, and interact with perceptions of security in other sectors either constructively or destructively. In the EU, migration most clearly links societal security with political and economic security. In Western liberal democracies, political security complements societal security through representative government. ²¹ The converse is also true, and where a polity lacks or is deficient in democratic legitimacy, a difference can exist between political and societal security, in which case, the security dialogue must be broadened to include civil society. ²² Indeed, the EU, which is facing significant challenges to its own legitimacy, is now making determined efforts to increase the role of European civil society in the formulation and implementation of policy. ²³ Societal security can also conflict with economic security; economic growth may depend on levels of migration perceived as detrimental to social cohesion, especially where this cohesion is already weak. Tensions created by the multi‐sectoral approach, therefore, have to be carefully resolved and balanced if one sector’s responses are not to undermine others.

Traditionally, societal security’s main threats come from competing identities and migration, although different identities themselves need not necessarily be competitive. Complementary identities generally will not create the perception of a threat, only where identities conflict are security issues likely to arise. ²⁴ Thus, it is possible to be both Irish and European because the identities are not mutually exclusive, but one cannot be both Christian and Muslim. Even where identities should be able to co‐exist, a threat may be perceived where one identity is dominant, either vertically or horizontally. ²⁵ Vertical competition often exists in the context of an integration project; the securitisation of the EU debate in the United Kingdom for example makes it unlikely that some elements of British societies would identify themselves as both British and European. Horizontal competition exists where a dominant culture exerts an influence on a normatively equal neighbour, such as the relationship between the United States and Canada.

Migration

Migration is a complex process covering population movement across societal boundaries, either within or between nation states, affecting gaining and losing societies, covering temporary and permanent movement and includes asylum‐seekers and economic migrants as well as illegal migration. In itself, migration is a neutral event whose nature is determined subjectively by the needs and vulnerabilities of the affected referent objects. Huysmans sees three dangers to societal security through migration: public order may be undermined; cultural identity may be challenged, and; the domestic labour market may be destabilised. ²⁶ Migrants are often perceived as posing a threat to public order through criminal activities including drug and people trafficking, theft, and terrorism, although Lohrmann argues that this problem is largely overestimated. ²⁷ The challenge to cultural identity stems from competing cultural values and norms, as illustrated by the 2004 French ban on wearing overt religious symbols, such as the hijab in schools. ²⁸

Finally, migration affects labour markets and domestic stability in both the losing and gaining societies. Developing countries often lose their younger, better‐educated population to the developed world; for example, by 1987, 30 per cent of sub‐Saharan Africa’s skilled manpower stock had emigrated to the EU. ²⁹ As well as the economic impact, societal security is affected by the demographic shift towards an older population. In Moldova nearly a quarter of all citizens of working age have jobs abroad, leaving an ageing population with strong allegiance to the Communist Party and a gender imbalance further skewed by the large‐scale trafficking of young women as part of the sex trade. ³⁰ In gaining countries, too, migration can destabilise through the growth of racism and xenophobia; a factor that today causes concern within the EU. ³¹

There is no simple formula for predicting whether a given level of migration will become a security issue or not. Where migration is accepted or even valued by the referent object, it bypasses or strengthens the security dialogue, regardless of the level of population movement. ³² The 8.3 million refugees, expellees and displaced persons entering West Germany from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1950, equating to one‐sixth of the Federal Republic’s total population, actually strengthened the state’s security. ³³ Whether migration is securitised, therefore, depends on four variables, which Rudolph describes as: cultural proximity; visibility; entry channel; and the effects of historic migration policies. ³⁴

Cultural proximity is concerned with the extent to which the migrant community is perceptibly different – most notably in terms of race, language and religion – to the indigenous society, and also the perceptions of the host society about how easily they can assimilate the new group. In the 1960s, the British government responded to concerns about societal security by progressively narrowing the definition of citizenship and restricting entry of non‐white Commonwealth citizens through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. ³⁵ Today, impassioned debates about Turkish accession to the EU largely focus on the cultural differences, with former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing objecting to accession because Turkey has ‘a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life […] whose peoples’ values are incompatible with Europe’s’. ³⁶

Migration’s visibility is affected by its concentration in time and space, as well as the uneven geographic distribution of ethnic populations within the host society, often in highly visible ethnic enclaves. ³⁷ Another factor is the presence of other security threats of equal or greater importance; acting as gestalts, the perception of large and imminent security threats obscure others that are less immediately threatening. This may explain why mass immigration to Europe immediately after World War II was not perceived as threatening but as an opportunity to bolster military and economic security, while the ending of the Cold War and high levels of economic success have seen Western European xenophobia reach unprecedented post‐1945 levels. ³⁸

It would be wrong, however, to see security concerns as normatively equal across all referent objects. For example, the tension between the economic and societal security sectors in relation to migration is not distributed equitably; the economic benefit of migration largely accrues to the business community, while social costs are widely spread among society at large, potentially making the business community more willing than the public to support immigration. ³⁹ Moreover, this imbalance of cost and benefit can exacerbate feelings of insecurity among societies when migration’s broader benefits are obscured.

The means by which a migrant enters a country becomes an important element in the perception of societal security because the debate itself creates a ‘spiral of insecurity’ in which security professionals, the media and politicians create artificial links – purporting to form a pervasive threat to law‐abiding society – between terrorism, crime, illegality and immigration. ⁴⁰ The existence and imminence of the threat is then used to justify actions falling outside the usual norms of state behaviour, such as inroads into what were previously fundamental human rights. That many ‘illegal’ migrants enter a country lawfully but overstay their visa is often ignored in this context, but highlights security’s subjective and self‐referential nature. ⁴¹

The final variable affecting whether migration is seen as a security issue is the effect of prior migration policy. Traditionally, migration has either contributed to the building of new nations, such as Australia and the United States, or supported economic activity; a cultural distinction that continues to affect security debates. ⁴² Migrants to countries in the former category generally settled, became citizens and thereby contributed to the creation of national identity as well as providing an economic benefit by expanding the size of the labour market. These countries were strengthened by the population influx and were generally more supportive of migration. Economic migrants, however, were expected to remain temporarily in the developed country and then return home. Migration brought an economic benefit to the host country (often European), but not a corresponding increase in societal security. Temporary migrants in these situations were frequently unaccompanied and made little impact on the community in which they sojourned. As the nature of migration changed, migrant workers settled, brought their families, extended their interaction with the indigenous society and thus became more visible. ⁴³ A second element to historic migration is the development of ‘migrant networks’, through which populations sustain links back to their country of origin, assisting with the migration of relatives and friends in a manner complicating control of migration by the destination country. ⁴⁴

Where societies perceive migration as threatening their societal security, destination states employ a range of responses to deal with the matter. Broadly categorised into 2 types, one aims to control migration by preventing or restricting entry to the country, while the other seeks to strengthen identity so migration becomes less threatening.

Migration controls aim to stop migrants from entering the country, or select individuals whose cultural background is similar in the hope that this will minimise the impact on societal security. Border security is essential, and depends on the state’s effective control of the territory being administered, although in a globalised world of air travel and mass tourism, sealing one’s borders to prevent all migration is rarely effective. ⁴⁵ Given these difficulties, and the economic advantages of labour mobility, state policies often target the source of the societal threat rather than its volume. Rudolph notes that such policies aim to discourage migration from those with more culturally diverse backgrounds, or those most visible because their arrival is concentrated in time and space. ⁴⁶ This enables the state to project an image of control while still reaping the economic benefits of migrant labour.

Weiner describes three strategies states may adopt for limiting migration: paying to avoid the problem; threats, and finally; armed intervention. ⁴⁷ Western states often restrict migration by linking aid, structural funds and trade concessions to border security in source countries and also pay third countries to accept refugees. ⁴⁸ The EU, for example, has sought to remove the causes of migration through agreements such as Cotonou (Benin), which offers financial support to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development in exchange for them acting to combat illegal migration. ⁴⁹ Alternatively, states or larger groupings apply diplomatic pressure to restrict emigration, or threaten to withdraw aid or take punitive action to regulate migration. However, preventing migration is not necessarily desirable or lawful given commitments made to human rights, including those enshrined in the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. With entry‐point as part of the security problem, Carrera argues that, the clear link between the lack of legal channels and the number of illegal migrants demonstrates that relaxing the rules for entry could help reduce the number of illegal immigrants. ⁵⁰

The alternative to migration control is to strengthen societal identity. ⁵¹ This can be achieved by assimilating migrants into the indigenous society whereby they abandon their own culture, or by integration. Assimilation requires the migrant to adopt the host society’s norms, and arguably acts counter to notions of liberal democracy; liberal democracies are liberal precisely because they embrace cultural differences. Worryingly, Angela Merkel, while Germany’s opposition leader, announced multiculturalism’s failure and advocated migrant assimilation, potentially taking the EU further from its liberal democratic values. ⁵² Moreover, the more threatening an indigenous society is to the migrant’s societal security, the less likely it is that assimilation will occur.

Faced with hostility, migrant communities band together to protect their societal security, fuelling the host society’s initial fears about differences, potentially provoking hostile responses, thus reinforcing the perceived need for strong migrant communities to resist and so on in Aradau’s ‘spiral of insecurity’. ⁵³ Integration, however, encourages societal security; it ‘recognises and accommodates differences, but requires a sense of common belonging amongst nationals and migrants alike’. ⁵⁴ Effective integration is crucial to strengthening a shared identity, which in turn involves issues of citizenship and rights because integration presupposes an equality of rights and obligations within the state’s legal framework. ⁵⁵

Migration is now clearly located in the security debate, most particularly in relation to what the Copenhagen School calls ‘societal security’. Whether the cause of the security threat is real or perceived is, in some ways, less important than the effect the debate has in creating the impression of a genuine concern. How countries, and transnational polities, such as the EU, react to migration depends on how their societies perceive the threat to their identity based on their own vulnerabilities. If the threat is securitised, the response will generally result in border control, and/or strengthening societal identity.

The European Union

Europe’s founding fathers sought to ‘foster a distinctive European identity to replace warring national identities’. ⁵⁶ Huysmans believes that the EU’s continuing enlargement and integration agenda is still driven by the fear of returning to a nineteenth century international system. ⁵⁷ The agenda has taken the EU from its non‐military beginnings, and now includes foreign, security and defence policy dimensions, thereby fusing Buzan’s five security sectors into a single strategic framework. ⁵⁸ Enlargement and integration are contributing to a distinctive identity, which Youngs believes is based on policies exporting fundamental human rights and democracy; in eastern enlargement’s export of these values, he detects a ‘sense of Europe becoming whole’. ⁵⁹ Integration, too, will help turn the current 25‐member state Gesellschaft into the hoped for, unified, trans‐national polity (Gemeinschaft), acting against fragmentation and forming an identity that membership alone cannot create. ⁶⁰

However, French Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, attributes Europe’s current identity crisis to the speed of enlargement and ambiguity of the EU’s political model, indicating that identity requires certainty and stability in which to grow. ⁶¹ If, as Caporaso believes, further EU integration needs a strong sense of identity, this cannot be achieved in a continually expanding Europe. ⁶²

Today, Europe needs ‘substantial but controlled immigration’ to counter its falling population. With 450 million people in the EU‐25, the economically active population is expected to decline by over 20 million by 2030, reducing average gross domestic product to less than 1 per cent and undermining the sustainability of social security systems. ⁶³ To maintain the EU’s current balance of working and retired populations, average annual immigration must rise from 6 million in 2000 to 16.5 million in 2040. ⁶⁴ The dilemma, however, is to balance inward migration with the need to strengthen societal identity. Despite immigration’s demonstrable value to the EU member states, social fears of being overrun by outsiders, fuelled by often inaccurate media coverage, have grown to the point that, in 2004, 33 per cent of EU citizens saw migration as a threat, with 39 per cent feeling more threatened than two years previously. ⁶⁵ Among the EU‐15 member states, 20–40 per cent of the public were concerned about immigration, although the EU’s newest members were less concerned about threats to societal identity than about migration’s impact on jobs. ⁶⁶ This may be because accession preparation changed the new members’ identity and their new identity as part of the EU has not yet formed fully. Fears of immigrants with different cultural lifestyles ‘swamping’ societies have elevated issues of identity and migration to the top of the European security agenda. ⁶⁷ If it cannot defend its societal security, the EU becomes vulnerable politically to charges of undermining member states’ national identities, which some already see as threatened by the integration project. ⁶⁸ The first horn of the dilemma demands semi‐porous borders; the second requires their closure, which certainly presents the Union with a difficult balancing act.

The EU’s migration strategy takes a comprehensive approach to security threats. ⁶⁹ Its focus on migration control through strengthened borders has been effectively securitised as a political priority under the ENP and visa and asylum policy. ⁷⁰ Its attempts at strengthening identity have been less effectively coordinated, despite the importance of creating an EU identity given the potentially destabilising influence of the right under Article 39 of the European Community Treaty (EC) for EU citizens and lawfully resident third‐country nationals to move and work freely. Without an overarching EU identity, this provision creates a dilemma in which the presence of ‘foreigners’ from one member state may undermine societal security in another. A range of initiatives are attempting to address the need for a stronger EU identity, including education (SOCRATES, ERASMUS etc.), institutional reform increasing democratic legitimacy, anti‐racism measures, development of a fundamental rights agenda and, most importantly, citizenship, but all these lack the urgency afforded to migration control.

EU Migration Control

Before World War II, Europe was a net source of emigration, however, this changed and in the 1950s and 1960s Europe’s economic security depended on immigration. Countries like France and Germany had negotiated bilateral agreements with the Maghreb and Turkey respectively for workers to regenerate Europe’s shattered economies. ⁷¹ Rudolph argues that the resultant economic growth masked the societal security issues until the 1970s, when migration became a matter of public concern, restructured economies no longer needed unskilled migrant labour and European countries introduced restrictive immigration policies. ⁷² Migration policy was still not a major concern for the European Economic Community because free movement had a low priority in the development of the free market, hence, there was no requirement for a Community competence to engage in migration control or external development cooperation. ⁷³

The 1980s saw another phase of migration with an influx of migrants from Eastern Europe and the Maghreb, but now the EU’s internal market agenda demanded secure borders and migration policy became incorporated into the EU’s constitutional structure. Consequently, Community competence was extended and, in 1992, visa and asylum policy was included in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar while a competence for development cooperation was introduced under Title XX (ex‐XVII) EC.

Visa and asylum policy was brought within the EU’s legislative framework in Title IV EC at Amsterdam in 1997, combining it with the Schengen acquis (a process begun in 1985 named for the town in Luxembourg where the agreement was originally signed), although decision‐making remained intergovernmental. Subsequently, the 1999 Tampere (Finland) European Council created a common migration policy to support the development of an EU area of freedom, security and justice with shared competence between the Union and member states.

The Nice Treaty in 2000 removed the requirement for unanimous agreement and adopted the co‐decision process in relation to some parts of this agenda. Migration remains an area of shared competence, thus presenting practical difficulties in agreeing a common policy because member states are unwilling to relinquish control of a central element of national sovereignty and generally cooperate only where collective EU action would be more effective than national measures, for example in its relationships with neighbouring countries. ⁷⁴

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP, ⁷⁵ authorised under Article 181EC, represents a new framework for relations with neighbouring states, which former EU President Romano Prodi described as being based on the principle of ‘sharing everything with the EU neighbours but [the] institutions’. ⁷⁶ It supplements rather than replaces existing agreements, such as the Euro‐Mediterranean Partnership, but places greater emphasis on political and institutional reforms including reforming border management and visa and asylum arrangements. ⁷⁷ In line with other development cooperation agreements, it contributes to ‘the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. ⁷⁸

The ENP seeks to overcome the shortcomings of traditional migration control policies by requiring migrant‐sending and transit countries to embrace the EU’s norms and values, including the legal framework (the acquis communautaire) by undertaking a series of economic, institutional and social reforms. ⁷⁹ The EU provides signatories with incentives for making difficult domestic reforms by offering aid and trade concessions, thus fitting the ENP neatly into Weiner’s model whereby the EU pays others to handle its migration problem. ⁸⁰ Linking aid with reform gives the EU leverage with its neighbours to prevent migration by strengthening their borders and accepting readmission (where they agree to the return of the EU’s illegal migrants), not just of their own citizens but also those that travelled through them to reach the EU. ⁸¹

This policy is crucial to the EU because the Mediterranean Basin has the steepest demographic gradient in the world, exceeding even that of the United States/Mexico border. ⁸² The recently agreed 2007–2013 ENP budget reflects this priority, providing e14,929 million to address the causes of migration and remove some of the inequality between the EU and its neighbours. ⁸³ Seventeen countries have signed bilateral agreements with the EU; detailed action plans have been agreed individually with seven signatories, and another five are under negotiation. ⁸⁴

Underpinning the ENP is the recognition that a slide into poverty and instability among the neighbouring states, whose combined population is 385 million, threatens the EU with mass illegal immigration. ⁸⁵ This may explain the unusual prominence given to political objectives such as respect for human rights and democratic principles, which Smith observes skews the ENP heavily in the EU’s favour. ⁸⁶ Exporting the EU’s governance model, therefore, seeks to enhance stability in the neighbouring states and thus contribute to the EU’s regional security. ⁸⁷ With the EU’s neighbours strengthening their borders and agreeing to readmission of their own and transiting migrants, a buffer zone is created around the Union in which migrants can be held without threatening the EU’s security. Moreover, by engaging in intercultural dialogue with neighbours that accept its norms and values, the EU hopes to create a ‘ring of friends’ with a common identity beyond its current boundaries, thereby strengthening its societal security. ⁸⁸ The Commission also hopes that supporting its neighbours outside a relationship of full membership will stop them applying to join the EU; this contributes to societal security by reassuring current member states that Europe will not expand indefinitely and providing de Villepin’s hoped‐for period of stability in which the enlarged Union can forge a new identity.

The ENP provides a means of securing the EU’s external borders from the outside. Securitising an issue, however, can focus attention on that problem to the exclusion or detriment of others. The ENP risks destabilising the EU’s neighbourhood at the same time as it tries to secure the region. For example, extending EU interest eastwards brings it into contact with Russia’s ‘near‐abroad’ when Moscow is seeking to reassert its own influence in the area. ⁸⁹ Possible political confrontation with Russia over the eastern neighbourhood states could destabilise the EU’s border regions and tempt the EU into assuaging Russian concerns through bilateral agreements under, or independent of, the ENP. Turning the policy into an EU‐Russian agreement could prove unattractive to the Mediterranean countries, and cause an imbalance among the ring of friends. ⁹⁰ In trying to look both east and south, the ENP may split the EU’s security gaze to the detriment of both.

Increasing stability, peace and prosperity throughout the region requires consistency, and in this, the ENP’s series of bilateral agreements may be problematic. ⁹¹ Treating neighbouring states differently could cause resentment against the EU, or among themselves, in either case undermining the regional identity the EU is seeking to build. Imposing EU norms through the ENP could create horizontal identity competition as the EU’s neighbours become increasingly aware of the Union’s overwhelming size and wealth advantage, potentially dominating them in such a way that ‘obliges them to accept the European vision of a shared future, even if they may fear the consequences’. ⁹² Moreover, cultural change on the scale envisaged in the ENP may impact on the neighbouring countries’ societal stability as they embrace the EU’s social model. Vertical identity competition can destabilise societies, and is more likely to do so when the rights normally associated with integration, such as easier personal access to the EU’s internal market, are denied. The refusal of the EU’s member states to open the border to neighbourhood states in the interest of security may, therefore, undermine another part of that security. ⁹³ To compound the problem, as Cygan has observed, closed borders make the export of principles and ideas difficult, hindering the creation of the regional identity to which the neighbouring societies could aspire. ⁹⁴

Visa and Asylum Policy

Visa and asylum policy represents the EU’s ‘hard’ legal power, being tied to the Schengen acquis within Title IV EC and is an essential element in the creation of an internal market. Article 61(a)EC aims to ensure ‘common measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration’, which are essential enablers for an internal market in which barriers to free movement are removed (Article 62(1)EC). Since its inception, the Schengen participants have sought to strengthen border security through improved procedures, most of which are contained in the Schengen border manual. This outlines four elements of an EU entry‐control system and covers: activities in third countries; international border cooperation; measures at external borders and measures within the Schengen area. ⁹⁵ The policy, therefore, has two main strands: it looks outwards by regulating access to the EU, and has an internal focus in which movement within the Union can take place freely. It complements the ENP by strengthening external borders from the inside and promotes a sense of shared identity because it increases interdependence among states, where border‐screening efforts in one country protect the security of others. ⁹⁶ Internally, it removes barriers to free movement for EU citizens, and those third‐country nationals lawfully resident in the Union. Schengen is thus inextricably linked to the possession of rights; it is no coincidence that the Tampere European Council, which was devoted to setting up an area of freedom, security and justice, also established the group that created the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. ⁹⁷

The visa and asylum policy seeks to create a common border policy and harmonise visa requirements among the member states. The border becomes the first point at which someone enters the Union, whether at one of the outer land borders, or a sea or air port. To a large extent, the EU’s land borders are now the new accession states, while sea or air ports in any member state can also represent the external frontier. Sealing all these borders in an era of global travel required joint and coordinated action across the member states, which the visa and asylum policy sought to provide. Under Article 3 of the Act of Accession 2003 (Accession), new members of the Union were required to implement the Schengen acquis as central to maintaining the EU’s security, which transferred the responsibility and cost away from the existing member states to the new accession countries. The EU has also successfully pushed responsibility for policing the sea and air ports onto commercial carriers, requiring them to act as immigration controllers under threat of financial penalties if they bring illegal migrants into the Union. ⁹⁸ While this has helped seal the borders, in securitising the migration debate, differences between categories of migrants can sometimes be forgotten. What, then, has the impact of visa and asylum policy been on three such groups: asylum‐seekers, economic migrants, and EU citizens in the accession states?

At Tampere, the EU adopted a common response for dealing with asylum‐seekers, defining four ‘building blocks of the asylum system’, namely: determine the state responsible for the examination of an application; establish conditions for refugee reception; describe minimum standards for asylum procedures, and; define the qualification and content of refugee and subsidiary protection status. ⁹⁹ Asylum is perhaps one of the more controversial areas of migration because asylum‐seekers have rights protected by the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, and Article 18 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the EU context, Lavenex rightly describes the competition between internal security and human rights approaches that has resulted in security being favoured over the protection of human rights. ¹⁰⁰ By imposing visa requirements on greater numbers of travellers, forcing carriers to act as immigration officers and intercept those without visas at greater range, exporting border controls and mandating readmission agreements through the ENP, it is now more difficult for asylum‐seekers to access the territory of the EU member states, thereby limiting access to their rights. ¹⁰¹

Notwithstanding the EU need for migrant workers to sustain its economic development, economic migration is an area in which policy is lacking. ¹⁰² Member states have continually sought to limit economic migration, prompted mainly by public fear of higher unemployment and reluctance to accept ‘the other as equal’. ¹⁰³ Despite these concerns, some progress is being made and a 2004 Commission Green Paper on economic migration is fostering much‐needed debate. Importantly, the Green Paper recognises that migrants are not merely factors of production, but that they should have social rights equal to those of EU citizens: a position surely acceptable to a Union seeking to base its identity on fidelity to human rights and democracy. ¹⁰⁴ The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights cannot be describing truly fundamental human rights if they apply only to some people and not to others based solely on the accident of birth within a geographic area.

One option to ensure congruence of the policy with EU identity would be to grant EU citizenship, independently of nationality of a member state, to lawful economic migrants; this would represent a radical departure from current practice, but could address EU’s societal security concerns in two ways. It would deepen the integration of migrant workers and their families by recognising that integration is most effective when it offers cultural recognition and participation in the polity’s political and socio‐economic activity. ¹⁰⁵ Moreover, it could counter the rise of xenophobia in the EU because, as Smith observes, migration control justified on essentially racist grounds, will ‘feed back to strengthen racist currents in society’. ¹⁰⁶ Member states, however, may be unwilling to see EU citizenship given stand‐alone rather than dependent status, because the EU would then compete with national identity for citizen loyalty, thus threatening national societal security, which itself could destabilise the Union.

EU migration policy applies to third‐country nationals entering the EU, not the movement of citizens within the Union; hence the enlargement process’s emphasis on border control by requiring new member states to implement the Schengen acquis before joining. ¹⁰⁷ This forced many new members to impose migration controls on neighbouring countries with whom they previously shared open borders, potentially damaging their relationships. ¹⁰⁸ Both Hungary and Poland have large ethnic minority communities in neighbouring, non‐EU states, and risk becoming isolated from these diasporas, which could affect societal identity in both the origin and host countries. ¹⁰⁹ Despite securing their external borders, potentially at some cost to their identity, a transitional arrangement allows the accession countries’ borders with the rest of the EU to remain in place. Article 24 (Accession) permits a derogation from Article 39EC’s free movement rights in relation to EU citizens from the eastern accession countries. Restrictions can be applied for up to seven years, provided they are not more stringent that those applying to third‐country nationals, and are subject to periodic review.

The transition measures are driven by concerns about non‐EU members entering the Union through the eastern accession states, and a fear among some member states that accession would precipitate mass migration from the populous new members. Despite a positive first report on the beneficial economic effects on the three states (UK, Ireland and Sweden) that opened their borders to the accession countries, only Finland, Greece and Spain are expected to follow suit; Austria and Germany are expected to continue to apply the transition measures. France is likely to relax its restrictions only slightly while the others are considering their positions. ¹¹⁰ This suggests that the EU’s identity cannot cope with the destabilising effects of mass internal movement, let alone that from outside its borders.

Although based on principles of human rights, democracy and respect for the rule of law, the EU has not guaranteed these principles coherently. ¹¹¹ Securitising migration control under the ENP and visa and asylum policy seals the EU’s external borders but has prompted criticism that in doing so, it has created a ‘fortress Europe’ in which the legitimate rights of migrants are subordinated to security concerns. ¹¹² Geddes accuses the EU of adopting migration control policies that ‘reduce the ability of asylum‐seekers to access the territory of EU member states’, thereby depriving asylum‐seekers of their rights and enabling the EU to avoid its international obligations under the United Nations Convention. ¹¹³ Migration control, therefore, fails to address adequately the issue of migrant rights.

With an EU‐identity based on respect for fundamental rights, the failure to balance security with the need to grant and protect rights hazards this identity, although Directive 2003/109/EC, effective from January 2006, grants some rights to financially secure third‐country nationals having five‐years lawful residence in the EU. ¹¹⁴ Generally, however, the fundamental rights of asylum‐seekers and migrant workers’ lag behind those of their EU colleagues, while EU citizens in the accession states have no absolute right to the full benefits of membership, despite bearing the cost of EU border control. Indeed, over the seven‐year transition period, the rights of families of the EU’s new citizens are potentially worse than those granted to third‐country nationals. ¹¹⁵ The relationship between the accession states and the EU’s old members, therefore, is not that of equals and, far from creating a single sense of identity, membership becomes a two‐tier system in which the new entrants may justifiably perceive themselves as second class. ¹¹⁶ In terms of societal identity, two identities are undoubtedly worse than one.

Strengthening EU Identity

The preamble to the EC Treaty describes a determination to ‘lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, thereby establishing a link between the creation of an EU identity and democratic legitimacy. ¹¹⁷ Early development of the EU, however, adopted Jean Monnet’s neo‐functionalist philosophy involving political elites but leaving ordinary citizens largely isolated from the integration process. ¹¹⁸ Despite this focus on integrating governmental elites, member states still regard some EU internal measures as foreign policy issues, suggesting that identity competition exists even among those most involved in directing the European project. ¹¹⁹ The Commission itself acknowledges that the lack of a European demos undermines the legitimacy of the EU project. ¹²⁰

To some extent, the nature and extent of Europe’s frontiers define its identity and continued expansion makes identity‐building difficult, hence the need for a breathing space before further accessions, especially Turkey’s, and the ENP’s vital role in balancing support for the neighbourhood while denying membership. ¹²¹ For too long, however, the EU has defined itself in negative terms – not being Soviet, not being American – an ultimately destructive strategy that lingers in the vision of a non‐Islamic EU when arguing against Turkish accession. ¹²² Europe needs a positive identity, and Buzan detects a distinctive European identity through respect for human rights which, if developed, could sustain the Union in the face of its societal security challenge. ¹²³

Despite this, restrictions on the free movement of citizens from the new accession states have been adopted through fears of mass migration, even though candidate countries accept the EU’s identity as a community of values more easily than existing member states. ¹²⁴ Within the EU‐15 too, populations are sufficiently diverse culturally for migration to destabilise other member states; for example, Belgium sees Italian migrants as threatening its societal security. ¹²⁵ This internal migration problem may, hitherto, have been masked because intra‐Community migration has been surprisingly limited. ¹²⁶ Without a robust sense of identity among the EU‐25, however, Article 39EC’s free movement provisions could represent a dangerous dynamic in European integration.

Community identity exists on three levels; the political, symbolic and moral/ethical. ¹²⁷

Political identity concerns how societies and individuals identify with the polity’s structures, but the creation of the EU’s political and administrative structures has not resulted in a corresponding emergence of a popular EU identity. This acknowledgement of a democratic deficit impacts on the strength of the EU’s political identity. ¹²⁸

Symbolically, flags and anthems provide a locus for loyalty, but cannot themselves generate it; attempts to create a European identity by the ‘top‐down imposition of symbols of statehood … have generally been doomed to failure or worse, derision’. ¹²⁹ The failure to recognise the symbolism of a ‘constitutional’ treaty is believed to have contributed to its rejection in May and June 2005 by the referendums in France and the Netherlands. ¹³⁰

The third level is the ethical/moral framework concerning fundamental issues of rights, ideology and religion. Hirsi Ali sees widespread concerns about the potential Islamification of Europe as pervading the Turkish accession debate, especially among those who ‘fear for their identity’. ¹³¹ Dalgaard asserts that the EU is held together by common values, not shared by Turkey, therefore, unless Turkey’s politico‐cultural values change, accession could dilute the EU’s moral/ethical framework and could undermine policy‐making norms. ¹³²

These three levels of identity normally combine within the framework of national citizenship, comprising as it does legal, political, emotional and cultural dimensions. ¹³³ Trans‐national bodies like the EU, however, do not have a shared ethno‐cultural identity and a different citizenship model is needed; Habermas suggests a model of ‘constitutional patriotism’ based on loyalty to constitutional norms separate from national identity. ¹³⁴ While removing the need for a shared cultural or ethnic heritage is attractive in the context of Turkish accession, rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, partly over concerns about identity, suggests that the EU urgently needs a stronger identity if it is to feel less threatened by societal differences. However, securitising identity without considering societies’ rights risks permanently freezing the identities, preventing them from adapting to accommodate each others’ differences, and thus reduces the likelihood of effective migrant integration. ¹³⁵ Sweden strengthened its cultural identity in anticipation of migration’s social problems, but this has now become a major obstacle to the integration of migrant workers. ¹³⁶ An EU that defines itself in terms of respect for rights cannot freeze its identity permanently but should seek to base it around the developing concept of European citizenship and the rights therein.

European Citizenship

‘Every citizen holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.’ ¹³⁷

Citizenship aims to create a European Gemeinschaft and confers rights and duties on its citizens as an intrinsic part of this integration process. ¹³⁸ However, to allay concerns among the member states that their identities are threatened, EU citizenship is dependent on nationality of a member state. This compromise between the Union and member states over the nature of citizenship was clear from the outset, with Føllesdal commenting on the anaemic content of the rights. ¹³⁹ The rights add little new to the acquis communautaire, but affect each level of identity by impacting on citizens as ‘market citizens’, ‘political citizens’ and ‘social citizens’. ¹⁴⁰ Market rights cover free movement (Article 18EC), political rights include the right to vote in European elections, use EU consular facilities when abroad and petition the European Parliament and Ombudsman (Articles 19–21EC), while social rights are delivered through a link with the non‐discrimination provisions of Article 12EC. ¹⁴¹ Although EU citizenship is less about legal rules than an attempt ‘to change the way individuals identified with the Community institutions’, rights and identity are inseparable and the citizenship provisions as defined in the Treaty were unlikely to provide the foundation for building societal security. ¹⁴²

Encouragingly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), after a hesitant start, has extended the rights into a citizenship acquis that could provide a vehicle for building the sense of identity necessary to realise the EU’s ambitions and protect it against the destabilising effects of migration. The potential citizenship acquis can be seen in Boukhalfa, where Advocate General Leger opined that ‘[i]f all the conclusions inherent in this concept are drawn, every citizen of the Union must, whatever his nationality, enjoy exactly the same rights and be subject to the same obligations’. ¹⁴³

ECJ judgments have developed protection for EU citizens, and their third‐country family members, by extending the law’s personal and material scope. The judgment in Martínez Sala extends Community law beyond workers to cover social citizens, holding that a Spanish national lawfully resident in Germany fell within the personal scope of the Treaty by virtue of her Union citizenship, despite the fact that she was not economically active. ¹⁴⁴ O’Leary describes the Martínez Sala judgment as ‘putting the flesh on the bones’ of EU citizenship because all member state nationals are now within the scope ratione personae and have access to Community law’s remedies. ¹⁴⁵ The material scope of Community law was extended in Bidar, where the ECJ held that the pursuit of secondary education entitled a citizen to enter another member state, further extending free movement beyond those seeking employment. ¹⁴⁶ It is now clear that a citizen comes within the Treaty’s scope rationes personae et materiae once they have established lawful entry or residence.

New rights have also been brought into play by combining citizenship with Article 12EC’s non‐discrimination provisions. Grzelczyk entitled a student to claim social assistance from the host state, even though his right of residence was dependent on economic self‐sufficiency; the Court held his request for financial support was not an ‘unreasonable burden’. ¹⁴⁷ Although citizenship rights only apply to nationals of EU member states, the ECJ has developed a concept of derived rights for family members from third countries based on their relationship with an EU citizen. In Baumbast and Chen, rights of residence were derived for third‐country nationals based on their need to provide care for EU citizens. ¹⁴⁸

From unpromising beginnings, therefore, the ECJ’s development of the citizenship acquis has improved the potential for strengthening EU identity, but the concept is still too limited to forge the identity the EU needs to cope properly with migration and future enlargement, especially that of a nation as culturally different as Turkey. Abstract documents containing vaguely worded rights do not create an identity, and despite the inclusion of rights in the treaties, citizenship has failed to create a single European cultural, political or social identity. ¹⁴⁹

Making EU citizenship dependent on member state nationality, introduces a conceptual distance between the EU and its citizens, and if the connection between the polity and its demos is unclear, there can be no sense of loyalty to, or responsibility for, societal identity. This is exacerbated when member states take credit for popular developments and blame the EU for bad news, thereby undermining citizen loyalty to the Union. Everson argues that this lack of allegiance explains why, despite referring to citizens’ duties, the EU imposes none. ¹⁵⁰ While understandable, people often value things more having earned them, therefore, by not requiring anything from their citizens, is the EU less likely to create the loyalty it craves?

From a technical perspective too, the connection between the EU and citizens is weakened because the majority of rights are only enforceable against member states horizontally, rendering the link between citizenship rights and the EU even more tenuous. ¹⁵¹ Moreover, the general exclusion of reverse discrimination, where a state does not extend to its own nationals the treatment EU law obliges it to give nationals of other member states, means that citizenship rights are only enforceable once a situation is brought into the Union arena, principally by movement. ¹⁵² Consequently, citizenship rights are largely denied to those remaining at home while protecting EU citizens from other member states, further weakening the sense of EU identity, and potentially increasing racist hostility.

EU citizenship only extends to nationals of member states, albeit limited for those in the eastern accession states, despite the development of the concept of derived rights – ‘derived’ because the rights attach to EU citizens and not third‐country nationals. Huysmans believes that linking rights to citizenship privileges member state nationals while de‐legitimising immigrants and asylum‐seekers, fuelling popular fears of migration and thereby magnifying, in society’s eyes, migration’s threat to security. ¹⁵³ The ECJ’s positive moves towards an EU identity based on citizenship’s shared rights are, therefore, undermined if their popular acceptance cannot be secured. Sasse observes that states and their populations generally oppose migration for the purpose of gaining welfare benefits, potentially placing the ECJ on a collision course over the extension of citizenship rights through Martínez Sala, Grzelczyk and other cases where EU citizens could claim welfare payments in states other than their own. ¹⁵⁴

Reich argues that the ECJ has extended the citizenship provisions beyond the intentions of the Treaty makers, thereby leaving the acquis exposed. ¹⁵⁵ On 1 May 2006, however, a new Citizenship Directive came into force giving legislative support for the ECJ’s position by conferring benefits on all EU citizens, not just the economically active. ¹⁵⁶ If EU identity is based on the premise that every Community national ‘is entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights’, further legislative support for the granting of rights is sorely needed. ¹⁵⁷ Adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides an opportunity to reinforce the EU’s identity both among its citizens, and in relation to its foreign policy, including under the ENP and Schengen arrangements. ¹⁵⁸ Like citizenship, however, the non‐binding Charter of Fundamental Rights contained in the Constitutional Treaty lacked teeth, although the ECJ has developed a fundamental rights acquis that provides EU citizens with the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. ¹⁵⁹ Arguably, fundamental rights should be granted to anyone lawfully resident in the EU on the basis of their humanity and not their nationality.

The EU’s response to strengthening its identity has generally been less convincing than its efforts to bolster border control, largely because identity competition between the member states and the EU has limited its effectiveness, despite the ECJ’s expansionist approach towards improving the citizenship acquis. As Turkish integration is principally a matter of identity, the EU has until 2015 to create a Gemeinschaft and become secure enough in its own identity for further enlargement. Moreover, by continuing to deny citizenship to third‐country nationals, the EU perpetuates the isolation of disparate communities inside its borders. Ultimately, migrant integration raises questions of rights, especially in an EU whose self‐identity is based on the provision and protection of rights. Extending the citizenship acquis to lawfully resident third‐country nationals, irrespective of financial independence, would reinforce integration and help build a stronger, societal identity. Sasse describes a new approach that seeks stability by balancing security and rights in a new nexus. An EU identity based on providing more direct rights for its citizens, and extended to migrants, could balance migration control’s security dynamic within an enlightened and inclusive social agenda. ¹⁶⁰

Conclusion

Societal security is about identity and concerns society’s ability to preserve its essential character. Since the 1990s, migration has increasingly been seen as a threat to societal security, including through inter alia its challenge to cultural identity. Responses to this threat have generally sought to control migration by closing borders and tightening visa and asylum policies either unilaterally or in conjunction with neighbouring states. Alternatively, societies have sought to strengthen their identity, preventing their members from fearing for their cultural identity and facilitating the integration of new groups.

The EU’s migration situation is particularly complex with 25 member states, each of which has national identity concerns in addition to sharing a collective concern about the Union’s societal identity. Romano Prodi argued that ‘Europe needs security. External security must be achieved by reducing unrest and tension on our borders.’ ¹⁶¹ The EU has undoubtedly securitised a migration threat and focused on its borders; however, strengthening borders under the ENP and Schengen acquis, while restricting migrant access to the EU, brings its own problems. The ENP imposes EU norms and values on neighbouring countries in exchange for aid and trade concessions, which could directly threaten societal security in neighbouring states by challenging their historical sense of identity or indirectly by creating an irresistible horizontally‐competitive identity. Either way, in protecting its borders, the EU is in danger of undermining the stability of the neighbouring countries and, therefore, its own security. Moreover, its expanding area of interest overlaps with Russia’s ‘near‐abroad’, potentially destabilising the eastern neighbourhood.

The Schengen acquis strengthens the EU’s external border from the inside, but could destabilise the Community by changing the engagement dynamic in the east between states that formerly had close relations but are now less open to cross‐border migration. Poland, for example, is now isolated from its sizeable ethnic community on the other side of the EU border. Adding to a sense of injustice, the exclusion of the majority of new eastern accession countries from Schengen’s free movement provisions for up to seven years, despite having borne the costs of implementing the acquis, could create a sense of a two‐tier Union, inevitably precluding a single EU identity. By subordinating rights to security, EU attempts at migration control, therefore, may protect the borders but risk undermining the EU’s identity.

Societal security cannot satisfactorily be achieved solely by closing external borders, not least because the EU internal market depends on free movement of labour, which communitarises the internal migration of ‘foreigners’. Although protected by law, without an EU identity, this migration represents a potential threat to the societal security of the host states. The EU has failed to address this in the same security dialogue as the migration of non‐EU citizens. The development of EU citizenship represents one approach to strengthening a sense of collective identity among all of the Union’s citizens. However, its current anaemic form is unlikely to provide the sense of attachment needed for the creation of a Gemeinschaft capable of coping with even the Union’s current cultural differences. Tentative steps have been taken towards reinforcing societal security through strengthened identity with the provision of rights, largely through the judicial activism of the ECJ. Securitising this debate would elevate the priority of creating an EU identity, which is essential if the Union is to consolidate ready for Turkish accession in 2015.

Migration control and identity are inseparable parts of the societal security whole; however, securitising migration control has only succeeded in strengthening the EU’s external border. This unbalanced approach makes it harder for migrants to enter the Union, but it ignores the fundamental rights and identity issues interwoven in this debate. The EU sees itself as a champion of human rights, but, in failing to acknowledge the rights issues connected with migration, it undermines its own identity, although new rights for economically independent long‐term residents go some way towards recognising this. However, unless the security dialogue emphasises identity through developing the practice of rights‐protection to balance that of border security, EU attempts at migration control may be more harmful than the security problem they seek to resolve. Developing a baseline of rights for citizens and lawful migrants by securitising identity building within a security‐rights nexus, potentially through the extension of EU citizenship, could balance the migration debate, align it with the EU’s self‐vision, and strengthen its identity, thereby contributing to the EU’s overall security.

Notes

1 S. Dalby, ‘Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualising the Human Security Agenda’, Working Paper No.30 (Institute of International Relations: Univ. of British Columbia April 2000) p.16.

2 E. Rothschild, ‘What is Security?’ Daedalus 124/3 (Summer 1995) p.55.

3 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Japp de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner 1997) p.7.

4 N. Choucri, ‘Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages’, Journal of International Affairs 56/1 (2002) p.97.

5 C. Rudolph, ‘Security and the Political Economy of International Migration’ (Institute of Governmental Studies, Univ. of California, Berkeley 2002) Paper WP2002–4, p.26.

6 W. Aniol quoted in A. Kicinger, ‘International Migration as a Non‐traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon’, Central European Forum for Migration Research Working Paper 2/2004, p.2. ⟨www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2004–02.pdf⟩ (accessed 18 Jan. 2006).

7 S. Léonard, ‘Studying Migration as a Security Issue: Conceptual and Methodological Challenge’, Paper for SGIR Fifth Pan‐European International Relations Conference, Netherlands Congress Centre, The Hague, 9–11 Sept. 2004, ⟨http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Leonard%20‐%20Studying%20migration%20as%20a%20security %20issue.pdf⟩ (accessed on 12 Dec. 2005). Cited with the author’s permission.

8 Steve Smith, ‘The Contested Concept of Security’ in Ken Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 2005) p.33.

9 T. Theiler, ‘Societal Security and Social Psychology’, Review of International Studies 29/2 (April 2003) p.250.

10 Ibid. p.251.

11 Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter 1993) p.23.

12 Buzan et al. (note 3) p.23.

13 Wæver et al. (note 11) p.23.

14 Buzan et al. (note 3) p.30.

15 Theiler (note 9) p.251.

16 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working Paper (Heidelberg, Germany: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law/NY Univ. School of Law Sept. 2003) p.51. ⟨www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901–04.pdf⟩ (accessed 30 Nov. 2005).

17 McSweeney quoted in Booth (note 8) pp.35–6.

18 Theiler (note 9) p.263.

19 Léonard (note 7) p.10.

20 Theiler (note 9) p.266.

21 Wæver et al. (note 11) p.48.

22 Dalby (note 1) p.13.

23 Commission of the European Communities, European Governance – A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 Final, p.30.

24 Wæver et al. (note 11) pp.43–4.

25 Buzan et al. (note 3) p.121.

26 Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies 38/5 (2000) p.752.

27 R. Lohrmann, ‘Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?’ International Migration 38/4 (Sept. 2000) p.8.

28 Kicinger p.2.

29 E. Ferris, ‘Peace, Security and the Movement of People’, Peace and Change 19/4 (Oct. 1994) p.406.

30 M. Jandl, ‘Moldova Seeks Stability Amid Mass Emigration’ (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute Dec. 2003), ⟨www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm? ID=184⟩ (accessed 2 Feb. 2006).

31 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Racism and Xenophobia in the EU Member States: Trends, Development and Good Practice, Vienna, Austria, Annual Report 2005 – Part 2, p.30 ⟨www.eumc.europa.eu⟩.

32 Choucri (note 4) p.105.

33 Rudolph (note 5) pp.11–12.

34 Ibid. p.8.

35 Nana Poku and David Graham (eds.), Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security (Westport, CT: Praeger 1998) p.34.

36 The Economist, 19 March 2005, ‘Looking to Europe: A Survey of Turkey’, pp.3–5.

37 Rudolph (note 5) p.19.

38 Poku and Graham (note 35) p.98.

39 Rudolph (note 5) p.4.

40 C. Aradau, Migration: The Spiral of (In)Security, Rubikon International Forum of Electronic Publications, March 2001, ⟨http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/%7Erubikon/forum/claudia1.htm⟩ p.3 (accessed 12 Dec. 2005).

41 Huysmans (note 26) p.759.

42 Poku and Graham (note 35) p.30.

43 Rudolph (note 5) p.19.

44 Ibid. p.9.

45 M. Weiner, ‘Security, Stability and International Migration’, International Security 17/3 (Autumn 1992) p.120.

46 Rudolph (note 5) p.27.

47 Weiner (note 45) pp.121–3.

48 Ibid.

49 Kicinger (note 28) pp.4–5.

50 S. Carrera and M. Formanisano, ‘An EU Approach to Labour Migration: What is the Added Value and the Way Ahead?’ Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 232 (Oct. 2005) p.7.

51 Wæver (note 11) p.191.

52 Rockwell Schnabel and Francis Rocca, The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and its Challenge to the United States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2005) p.96.

53 Aradau (note 40).

54 Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action, (Report of the Global Commission on International Migration Oct. 2005) p.44 ⟨http://www.gcim.org/attachements/gcim‐complete‐report‐2005.pdf⟩ (accessed on 30 Jan. 2006).

55 Poku and Graham (note 35) p.194.

56 Sionadh Douglas‐Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman 2002) p.5.

57 Huysmans (note 26) p.757.

58 Buzan et al. (note 3) p.188.

59 R. Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/2 (2004) pp.416–17.

60 J. Caporaso, ‘The Possibilities of a European Identity’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs 12/1 (Summer/Fall 2005) pp.65–6.

61 BBC News, 27 Jan. 2006 20:46:00GMT, ‘French PM urges EU Border Clarity’ at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4656484.stm⟩ (accessed 28 Jan. 2006).

62 Caporaso (note 60) p.71.

63 Carnegie Council Worldview Breakfast (14 May 2004), The Challenges of Global Migration: An EU View, at ⟨www.cceia.org/printerfriendlymedia.php/prmID/4985⟩ (accessed 2 Feb. 2006) p.2.

64 O. Perni, ‘Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU’s Integration Process. The Spanish Case’, Paper prepared for conference ‘European Security in the XXI century’, Granada, Spain, 5–9 Nov. 2001, p.29 ⟨www.ugr.es/∼ceas/Multiculturalismo/Migration%20Flows .pdf⟩ (accessed 12 Dec. 2005).

65 A. Buonfino, ‘Politics, Discourse and Immigration as a security concern in the EU: a tale of two nations, Italy and Britain’ for workshop ‘Who Makes Immigration Policy? Comparative Perspectives in a post 9/11 world’, ECPR joint sessions of workshops, Uppsala, Sweden, 2004, ⟨www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr⟩ pp.1–2.

66 Ilvo Diamanti and Fabio Bordignon, Migration and Citizenship Rights in Europe, 5th ed. (Laboratorio di Studi Politici e Sociali (LaPolis) 21 Nov. 2005), ⟨www.fondazionenordest.net/uploads/media/english_version.pdf⟩ (accessed 3 Feb. 2006) p.5.

67 Lohrmann (note 27) p.8.

68 Wæver et al. (note 11) p.3.

69 Commission of the European Communities, Priority Actions for Responding to the Challenges of Migration: First Follow‐up to Hampton Court, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2005) 621 Final, p.2.

70 Commission of the European Communities, Study on the links between legal and illegal migration, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2004) 412 Final, p.11.

71 Poku and Graham (note 35) p.95.

72 Rudolph (note 5) p.17.

73 Huysmans (note 26) p.754.

74 Kicinger (note 28) p.4.

75 Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 104 Final.

76 Quoted in S. Pardo, ‘Europe of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy’, Geopolitics 9/3 (Autumn 2004) p.735.

77 Jean‐Pierre Masse, ‘What is a Neighbour? Examining the EU Neighbourhood Policy from the Perspective of Movement of Persons’, 10 June 2005, p.5. ⟨www.libertysecurity.org/article270.html⟩ (accessed 12 Dec. 2005).

78 COM(2003) 104 Final (note 75) Art.177(2)EC.

79 Ibid. p.10.

80 Weiner (note 45) p.121.

81 K. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs 81/4 (2005) p.765.

82 Poku and Graham (note 35) p.96.

83 Smith (note 81) p.767.

84 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: A year of progress, IP/05/1467’, Press Release, Brussels 24 Nov. 2005.

85 Heather Grabbe, ‘How the EU Should Help its Neighbours’, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, June 2004, p. 1, ⟨www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_eu_neighbours. pdf⟩ (accessed 21 Dec. 2005).

86 Smith (note 81) p.765.

87 Manuela Moschella, ‘European Union’s Regional Approach Towards its Neighbours: The Euro‐Mediterranean Policy vis‐à‐vis Euro‐Mediterranean Partnership’, Jean Monnet Centre, Dept. of Political Studies, Univ. of Catania, Italy, 2004, p.3, ⟨http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf⟩ (accessed 21 Dec. 2005).

88 H. Malmvig, ‘Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of Euro‐Mediterranean Dialogue Between Cultures’, Mediterranean Politics 10/3 (Nov. 2005) pp.352–8.

89 COM(2003) 104, p.5.

90 Pardo (note 76) p.736.

91 Masse (note 77) p.7.

92 George Joffé, ‘European Union and the Mediterranean’, in Mario Teló (ed.), European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post‐hegemonic Era (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2001) p.221

93 Smith (note 81) p.766.

94 Adam Cygan, ‘Union Immigration Policy After Enlargement – Building the New Europe or the New Iron Curtain’ in Barbara Bogusz, Barbara, Ryszard Cholewinski, Adam Cygan and Erica Szyszczak (eds.), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2004) p.241.

95 A. Geddes, ‘Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43/4 (2005) p.94.

96 Gallya Lahav, ‘Migration and Security: The Role of Non‐State Actors and Civil Liberties in Liberal Democracies’, p. 100 ⟨www.un.org/esa/population/publications/secoord2003/ITT_COOR2_CH16_Lahav.pdf⟩ (accessed 12 Dec. 2005).

97 Erika Szyszczak and Adam Cygan, Understanding EU Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2005) p.226.

98 Lahav (note 96) p.93.

99 Geddes (note 95) p.795.

100 Sandra Lavenex, The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies. Between Human Rights and Internal Security (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 2001) p.4.

101 A. Geddes, ‘International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe’, International Migration 39/6 (2001) p.33.

102 Carrera and Formisano (note 50) p.3.

103 Ibid. p.4.

104 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM(2004) 811 Final, p.10.

105 G. Sasse, ‘Securitisation or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies Towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43/4 (2005) p.679.

106 Quoted in Ferris (note 29) p.409.

107 Carnegie Council Worldview Breakfast (note 63) p.5.

108 A. Adinolfi, ‘Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New Member States: The Transitional Measures’, Common Market Law Review 42/2 (2005) pp.482–3.

109 Cygan (note 94) p.248.

110 The Economist, 11 Feb. 2006, ‘When East Meets West: Europe’s Labour Mobility’, p.41.

111 Amnesty International, More Justice and Freedom to Balance Security: Amnesty International’s Recommendations to the EU, 27 Sept. 2004, p.3 ⟨www.unhcr.ch/cgi‐bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RSDCOI&id=4173d9244⟩ (accessed 28 Jan. 2006).

112 Cygan (note 94) p.242.

113 Geddes (note 101) p.33.

114 Council of the European Union, Directive 2003/109/EC (25 Nov. 2003), Status of Third‐country Nationals who are Long‐term Residents, OJ(2004) L16.

115 Adinolfi (note 108) p.488.

116 Cygan (note 94) p.246.

117 A. Hirsi Ali, ‘The Possibilities of a European Identity’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs 12/1 (2005) p.51.

118 Douglas‐Scott (note 56) p.480.

119 Wæver et al. (note 11) p.8.

120 C. Shore, ‘Whither European Citizenship? Eros and Civilisation Revisited’, European Journal of Social Theory 7/1 (2004) pp.33–4.

121 Michael Emerson, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?’ Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 215 (2004) p.1.

122 Schnabel and Rocca (note 52) pp.77–8.

123 Buzan et al. (note 3) p.185.

124 G. Kosztolányi, ‘Identity Crises: The Problems of Establishing Identities’, Central European Review 2/16 (25 April 2000) p.6.

125 John Rath in John Wrench and John Solomos (eds.), Racism and Migration in Western Europe (Oxford: Berg 1993) p.221.

126 Carrera and Formisano (note 102) p.5.

127 Hirsi Ali (note 117) p.53.

128 Ibid.

129 Jo Shaw, ‘Individual Rights and Citizenship: A Dynamic Interaction’ (Centre for the Study of Law in Europe, Univ. of Leeds, UK 1998) p.2, ⟨www.gps.uni‐hannover.de/europe/shaw.htm⟩ (accessed 30 Nov. 2005).

130 Hirsi Ali (note 117) p.55.

131 Ibid. p.57.

132 K. Dalgaard, ‘The European Union’s Imperial Overstretch’, RUSI Newsbrief 25/4 (6 April 2005) ⟨www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:P4253AA0EE7D6A/⟩ (accessed 2 Feb. 2006).

133 Shore (note 120) p.29.

134 Douglas‐Scott (note 56) p.480.

135 Aradau (note 40) p.4.

136 Rath (note 125) p.222.

137 Official Journal of the European Communities, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ(2002) C325/35, Article 17(1)EC.

138 Sasse (note 135) p.675.

139 Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Union Citizenship: Unpacking the Beast of Burden’, ARENA Working Papers, WP01/9 (2001), ⟨www.arena.uio.no/publications/working‐papers2001/papers/wp01_9.htm⟩ (accessed 30 Nov. 2005).

140 Douglas‐Scott (note 56) pp.486–514.

141 D. Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’, The Modern Law Review 68/2 (2005) p.235.

142 N. Barber, ‘Citizenship, Nationalism and the European Union’, European Law Review 27/3 (2002) pp.246–7.

143 European Court of Justice, Case C‐214/94, Boukhalfa v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I‐2253.Recital 63.

144 European Court of Justice, Case C‐85/96, María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I‐2691.

145 S. O’Leary, ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Citizenship’ European Law Review 24/1 (1999) p.68.

146 European Court of Justice, Case C‐209/03, Bidar v Ealing London Borough Council [2005], The Times, 29 March 2005.

147 European Court of Justice, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies‐Louvain‐la‐Neuve [2001] ECR I‐6193.

148 European Court of Justice, Case C‐413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I‐7091 and Case C‐200/02, Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 3 CMLR 48.

149 Szyszczak and Cygan (note 97) pp.233–4.

150 M. Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in Jo Shaw and Gillian More (eds.), New Legal Dynamics of the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) p.89.

151 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Oxford: OUP 2004) p.405.

152 European Court of Justice, Cases C‐64 & 65/96, Uecker and Jacquet v Land Nordrhein‐Westfalen [1997] ECR I‐317.

153 Huysmans (note 26) p.753.

154 Sasse (note 105) p.674.

155 N. Reich, ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Free Movement and Citizenship in an Enlarged Union’, European Law Journal 11/6 (2005) p.683.

156 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2004/38/EC (29 April 2004), The Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely, OJ(2004) L229.

157 European Court of Justice, Case 168/91, Konstantindis v Stadt Altensteig‐Standesamt [1993] ECR I‐1191, Recital 46.

158 R. Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/2 (2004) p.419.

159 European Court of Justice, Case 4/73, Nold KG v Commission [1974] ECR 491.

160 Sasse (note 105) p.675.

161 Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity. The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2006) p.39.