British–African Defence and Security Connections

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Notes

Thanks to Dr Andrew Stewart, Dr Kate Utting, and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Whitchurch for reading a draft of this article. While I have gratefully pursued their suggestions, the analysis, opinions, and conclusions expressed or implied in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD, or any other government agency.

1 Martin Rupiah, ‘The “Expanding Torrent”: British Military Assistance to the Southern African Region’, African Security Review 5/4 (1996). In this interesting article Rupiah charts the deep involvement of British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in building the post‐independence army, and, through BMATT’s involvement in Zimbabwe and a host of other Africa states, the perpetuation of ‘an essentially British military system’, p.1. The article raises some concerns about this; as the author notes, ‘the significant point to note about BMATT’s structure is that it is strategically poised to influence doctrine, tactics, and training within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, irrespective of what weaponry the country may use to equip its forces. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces are also increasingly transferring their acquired martial skills to other forces in the region, acting as a policy multiplier reinforcing the original US and British foreign policies for the Southern African region’, p.8.

2 Commission for Africa Report (2005). See the ‘Gleneagles Implementation Plan for Africa January 2006 Update’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website ⟨www.fco.gov.uk⟩ and the ‘UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa’. For a critical evaluation, see William Brown, ‘The Commission for Africa: Results and Prospects for the West’s Africa Policy’, Journal of Modern African Studies 44/3 (2006).

3 The Commonwealth, with its headquarters and Secretariat based in London, is an often overlooked international institution that is involved in a plethora of programmes in African countries and elsewhere. Its core agendas relate to international cooperation, diversity, democracy and the rule of law, human rights, development, education, sporting ties, and civil society.

4 This help was particularly useful in the Security Council. See Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, and Mark Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future (London/New York: Frank Cass 2005). As another example of an African contribution to British defence, there are at present over 800 South Africans are serving in the British armed forces, though the South African government has recently made it illegal for South African nationals to serve in foreign military establishments.

5 Financial Times, 16 Feb. 2006.

6 For the wars of the nineteenth century, see Philip Haythornthwaite, The Colonial Wars Sourcebook (London: Caxton Editions 2000); Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (London: Penguin 1973); and Ian Hernon, Britain’s Forgotten Wars: Colonial Campaigns of the Nineteenth Century (Stroud: Sutton 2003). For the twentieth century, see Robin Neillands, A Fighting Retreat: The British Empire, 1947–1997 (London: Coronet 1997).

7 For Africa and World War II, see Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon 2006). For post‐war strategic planning and Africa, see Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post‐War Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press 1988).

8 Britain did retain military facilities in the country until Colonel Gaddafi forced their closure in 1969. For relations with Libya during the early years of the Cold War, see Saul Kelly, Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000).

9 See Timothy Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport, CT: Praeger 2003).

10 See Daniela Kroslak, ‘France’s Policy Towards Africa: Continuity or Change?’ in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds.), Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (London: Routledge 2004).

11 Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (Harlow: Longman 2002) p. 15.

12 Laudemiro Francisco and Ed:win Connerley, ‘The Political Economy of Post‐Conflict Economic Recovery: Making Peace Substantial in Mozambique’, in Augustin Kwasi Fosu and Paul Collier (eds.), Post Conflict Economies in Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2005) p.199.

13 See Peter Henshaw, ‘Strategy and the Transfer of Simon’s Town, 1948–1957’, in idem and Ronald Hyam, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge: CUP 2003) pp.230–53 and M. Dockrill and J. Young (eds.), Britain, South Africa, and African Defence, 1949–1965 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1989); Geoffrey Berridge, Michael Dockrill and J.W.Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1945–1956 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1989).

14 See Geoffrey Sloan, ‘The Geopolitics of the Falklands Conflict’, in Badsey, Havers and Grove (note 4) p.25.

15 A measure of Britain’s subtle post‐colonial influence in Africa was the way in which it directed, to a great extent, UN policy regarding Rhodesia and South Africa.

16 AP3003, A Brief History of the Royal Air Force (London: HMSO 2004) p.221.

17 One interesting perspective is that British‐trained forces have been most effective in Zimbabwe because they do not meddle in politics.

18 ‘History of the Namibian Defence Force’, Ministry of Defence, Windhoek, Namibia, ⟨www.mod.gov.na⟩.

19 The Ethiopian mission (Operation ‘Bushel’) during the highly‐publicized famine saw C‐130 Hercules transports deliver 32,158 tons of grain in 2,152 sorties. See A Brief History of the Royal Air Force (note 16) p.306.

20 The importance of NEO is reflected in the fact that the British armed forces felt the need to develop doctrinal publications in this field. See Non‐Combatant Evacuation Operations, Joint Warfare Publication 3–51 (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre 2000).

21 See Christopher Clapham, ‘African Security Systems: Privatization and the Scope for Mercenary Activity’, in Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: South African Inst. of Int. Affairs 1999); Alex Vines, ‘Mercenaries and the Privatization of Security in Africa in the 1990s’ in ibid.; Herbert M. Howe, ‘Executive Outcomes and Private Security’, in Howe, Ambiguous Orders: Military Forces in African States (London: Lynne Rienner 2001). Many thanks to Dr Chris Kinsey for material on this subject.

22 Geoffrey Till quoted in Comment: The King’s College Newsletter 166 (March 2006) p.6.

23 For Africa and the Indian Ocean, see Mihir Roy, ‘Looking East: Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean’, African Security Review 4/3 (1995).

24 This theme is fully developed in Ashley Jackson, ‘Imperial Defence in the Post‐Imperial Era’, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), Old World Order: Themes in British Imperial Defence, 1856–1956 (London: Frank Cass 2006).

25 For just one example of the potential threat from organized crime and drug‐trafficking, see Richard Reeve, ‘The Bight of Benin Trafficking Axis’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (Oct. 2005). Britain has a Customs and Excise officer in Nigeria to coordinate policy and is assisting in the expansion of Ghana’s Narcotics Control Board from 60 to 200 officers.

26 ‘NePad’, in ‘Countries and Regions’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, ⟨www.fco.gov.uk⟩.

27 See ‘Friend of Forager? How China is Winning the Resources and Loyalties of Africa’, Comment and Analysis, Financial Times, 23 Feb. 2006.

28 See ‘China and India Fill Void Left by Rights Campaigners’, ‘Africa Oil and Gas’, Financial Times, Special Report, 1 March 2006.

29 See ‘China and Africa: No Questions Asked’, The Economist, 21 Jan. 2006. For an overview of China’s lengthy relationship with Africa, see ‘The “All‐Weather Friend”? Sino‐African Interaction in the Twenty‐First Century’, in Taylor and Williams (note 10).

30 ‘China and Africa’, The Economist, 21 Jan. 2006, p.58.

31 See Justin Hempson‐Jones, ‘China’s Dangerous Energy Nexus’, RUSI Newsbrief 26/3 (March 2006).

32 ‘World Business Report’, BBC World Service, 1 March 2006. America’s European Command sponsors a Gulf of Guinea Guard for maritime security purposes.

33 See Denis Tull, ‘China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance, and Consequences’, Journal of Modern African Studies 44/3 (2006).

34 UK Trade Statistics, reproduced in Paul Williams, ‘Britain and Africa after the Cold War: Beyond Damage Limitation?’, in Taylor and Williams (note 10) p.53.

35 David Hale, ‘The Rise of China and India: Implications for African Growth and Security’, in Terence McNamee (ed.), African Security, Commodities, and Development, Whitehall Report 4–06 (London: RUSI 2006) p.19.

36 ‘Ghana: Special Report’, Financial Times, 1 Nov. 2005.

37 Water privatization was seen by the World Bank and G8 countries as the most effective way to bring clean water to large numbers of poor countries, though many companies are reported to be pulling out. See ‘Big Water Companies Quit Poor Countries’, The Guardian, 22 March 2006.

38 Erik Solheim, ‘The Petroleum Sector in Africa: Between Global Security, National Interest, and Local Governance?’ in McNamee (note 35) p.23.

39 David Leigh and David Palliser, ‘Revealed: The New Scramble for Africa’, The Guardian, 1 June 2005.

40 Ann Talbot, ‘UK Government Launches New Plan for Africa’, World Socialist Website ⟨www.wsws.org/articles⟩. See also reports of the activities of British‐based African International Airlines and Breco Services in ‘Unkindest Cuts’, Africa Confidential 46/14 (July 2005) p.2. For a critique of government policy in this area, see Paul Williams, ‘Britain and Africa after the Cold War: Beyond Damage Limitation?’ in Taylor and Williams (note 10) pp.46–7.

41 Kurt Shillinger, ‘Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in Countering Terrorism?’, RUSI Journal 150/2 (April 2005) p.50.

42 See ‘Protest of Botswana’s Bushmen Kicks up Dust’, Financial Times, 28 Sept. 2005 and ‘The Row about the Bushmen’, The Economist, 18 Feb. 2006, p.61.

43 See ‘Another Front, Another Deal’, Africa Confidential 46/25 (Dec. 2005) p.5 and ‘Enemies Everywhere’, The Economist, 1 Oct. 2005, p.59.

44 For an example of official prognosis on the causes of instability, see The Causes of Conflict in Sub‐Saharan Africa, Framework Document (London: Dept. for International Development 2001).

45 Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (UN Inst. for Disarmament Research and Inst. for Security Studies, South Africa 2000).

46 See ⟨www.gfn-ssr.org⟩ A search of this site on 2 March 2006 revealed 150 papers relating to Africa.

47 EUCOM covers all of Africa except East Africa and the Horn which comes under Central Command. For American involvement in Africa, see James Hentz, ‘The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in Sub‐Saharan Africa’, in Taylor and Williams (note 10).

48 ‘21st Century Marines in Africa: West and Central Regions’, conference report (Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities/Gen. Alfred Gray Marine Corps Research Center 2006).

49 Col. David Crawford, EUCOM Africa Division Chief, ‘EUCOM Vision for Africa’, paper presented at the ‘21st Century Marines in Africa’ conference, 18–19 Jan. 2006.

50 See Stephen Hurt, ‘The European Union’s External Relations with Africa after the Cold War: Aspects of Continuity and Change’, and Adekeye Adebajo, ‘From Congo to Congo: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War’, in Taylor and Williams (note 10).

51 See The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub‐Saharan Africa (London: Dept. for International Development 2004).

52 Andrew Stewart.

53 Lt. Col. Mark Stevenson, ‘UK Engagement in Sub‐Saharan Africa’, paper presented at the ‘21^st Century Marines in Africa’ conference, 18–19 Jan. 2006.

54 Steve Stead, ‘The Role of External Tools to Manage African Conflict’, in McNamee (note 35) p.37.

55 See Omar Touray, ‘The Common African Defence and Security Policy’, African Affairs 104/417 (2005) pp.635–56.

56 See Theo Neethling, ‘Realizing the African Standby Force as a Pan‐African Ideal: Progress, Prospects, and Challenges’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 8/1 (2005) pp.1–25; Andrew Stewart, ‘African Standby Forces’ in Terence McNamee, Greg Mills et al. (eds.), Trade, Development and Security in Africa: Report of the 2005 Tswalu Dialogue (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 2005) pp.23–8; and Nelson Alusala, ‘African Standby Force: East Africa Moves On’, African Security Review 13/2 (2004).

57 Paul Collier, ‘African Security: What the Statistics Suggest’, in McNamee (note 35) p.6.

58 Richard Reeve, ‘Ghana Key to G8 Engagement with ECOWAS Security’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 Oct. 2005. Reeve notes that Britain’s West African effort, centred on peacekeeping training and infrastructure support, has been smaller than France’s Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) and America’s African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA). But ‘while [Britain’s initiative] has had less obvious impact than the high‐profile US and French programmes, it has arguably been more in line with the current GPOI [Global Peace Operations Initiative] thinking on peace support initiatives through the establishment of sustainable local training infrastructure under African command and aligned to African conditions’. GPOI is an American presidential initiative providing $660 million over five years to build peacekeeping capacity.

59 Stevenson (note 53).

60 See ‘UK Support for African Peacekeeping Capabilities’,⟨www.fco.gov.uk⟩.

61 See G.A. Chisnall, ‘The Value of Military Advisory Teams: Lessons from the Australian Experience in Sierra Leone’, Australian Army Journal 1/2 (2003) p.111.

62 See Ministry of Defence Press Notice, ‘UK Trains an Extra 17,000 Nigerian Peacekeepers’, Sept. 2005, ⟨www.news.mod.uk⟩. This is a good example of the intelligent use of funding to support African initiatives: it was a Nigerian government decision to develop a purpose‐built facility to conduct training for all Nigerian battalions going on peace support operations.

63 R. Reeve, ‘Ghana Key to G8 Engagement’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 Oct. 2005.

64 Information from the British Army website.

65 ⟨www.southafrica.info⟩.

66 Britain gave £3.7 million to support the Mozambican deployment in Burundi, and a further £2 million to the AU African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) Trust Fund. The Mission has now been ‘blue hatted’ and is under UN control as ONUB, which continues to receive British support via the ACPP peace support operations budget. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (note 51) p.10.

67 S. G. Hughes (Regional Conflict Adviser – Southern Africa), ‘Briefing Note: Overview of UK Assistance, Southern Africa Peace and Security Agenda’, Dec. 2003.

68 See Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping back from the brink, Adelphi Paper 380 (London: Routledge for IISS 2006) and ‘Libya: Change is in the Air But Happens Slowly on the Ground’, The Economist, 11 March 2006.

69 ‘Morocco Said to Produce Half the World’s Hashish Supply’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (Nov. 2005).

70 ‘UK/Africa Terror Imperative’, Africa Confidential 46/19 (Sept. 2005) p.8. For American security interests in the region Jonathan Lindley, ‘Of all the Regions of the World: The US in the Maghreb’, RUSI Newsbrief 26/3 (March 2006).

71 ‘Stability Increases Importance’, ‘Africa Oil and Gas’, Financial Times, Special Report, 1 March 2006.

72 See Kurt Shillinger, ‘From London to Lusaka: Lessons for the War on Terror’, RUSI Newsbrief 25/ 9 (Sept. 2005) p.99. The author writes of the ‘growing London‐Africa connection, and the Muslim community in Johannesburg, ‘at one end of a web of financial and personal conduits that run through the Muslim community of Durban and up to the Middle East via Swaziland and Mozambique’.

73 See ‘British Troops to Help US Forces in Horn of Africa’, Daily Telegraph, 24 Dec. 2005. John Prendergast, ‘Old Wine, New Bottles? US Policy Towards Africa after 9/11 and Iraq’, in Richard Cobbold and Greg Mills (eds.), Global Challenges and Africa: Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 2004) pp.109–14.

74 Joshua Kucera, ‘Briefing: Djibouti – US Foothold in Africa’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 Oct. 2005.

75 Joshua Kucera, ‘Naval Coalition Monitors the Seas around the Horn’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 Oct. 2005.

76 For a discussion of African maritime security, see Pastor Awitta, ‘A Naval Component for the African Union Standby Force: “Which Way Forward?”’, The Bulletin: A News Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies 4/3 (2006).

77 Helmond‐Römer Heitman, ‘Africa: A Case for Focused Military Aid’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 Nov. 2005.

78 Navy News, Jan. 2006.

79 The enhanced influence of DFID came about under the Labour administration when the department was created to replace the Overseas Development Agency, which had been a part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

80 DFID’s activities in Africa are listed by country at ⟨www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa⟩.

81 See Humanitarian/Disaster Relief, Joint Warfare Publication 3–52 (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre 2002).

82 See The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (note 51) annex 1, p.27.

83 Reuters, ‘Horn of Africa Weekly round up’, 18–24 Feb. 2006, at ⟨www.alertnet.org⟩.

84 Lt. Col. M. Whitchurch to A. Jackson, 22 March 2006.

85 Sarah Beaver (Director‐General, International Security Policy, MOD), ‘The EU: A New Partner for the UN in Peacekeeping’, RUSI Journal 149/4 (Aug. 2004) p.16.

86 ‘Delta Force’, Navy News, Jan. 2006.

87 RAF News, 3 March 2006.

88 See ‘Undiplomatic Closure’, Africa Confidential 46/12 (June 2005) p.8 and ‘Unkindest Cuts’, Africa Confidential 46/14 (July 2005) p.1. Six FCO desk jobs in its two African directorates have been cut since Jan. 2004 as budget levels have been frozen.